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Article 67 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community  provides
that during the transitional  period the Member States shall gradl'ally femove
restrictionJ and abolish disciiminatory treatment afiecting capital movements
between them, to the extent necessary for the proper functioning of the Common
Market.
This, then, was the aim of two directives, issued in 196O and 7962 by the EEC
Council on proposals from the Commission,  which, for certain_ important categories
of transacti6n, 
-eliminated 
exchange restrictions that hindered the free movement
of capital within the Community.-However, because of the faster advance  towards
econ6mic integration  and agreement o! common .policies, the tates of- progtess
in the variouJ sectors soon got out of phase and it became evident that there
would have to be a new drive to develop a European capital market.
Discussions  within various Community bodies, in panicular the Monetary CoT:
mittee, had shown that the meaturei likely to 
- encourage such progress would
gain in effectiveness if worked out with the aid of-a-clearpict]rre of the objectives,
Eonditions and implications  of integration in this field. The Commission therefore
decided to entrusi a group of independent experts with a study -of t\e problems
confronting the capital mirkets of the Community as a tesult of implementation
of the Treaty.
The Group of experts consisted  of the following members:
- 
Dr. A. B,trrNsunc,  Managing  Director, Algemene  Bank Nederland, Amsterdam;
- 
Prof. J. L. BrcNnner-,  Ptesident,  Kredietbank S' A', Luxembourg;
- 
Prof. G. Dprm Ponre, Director, Research Department, Banco di Roma, Rome;
- 
Prof. A. Fnnnlnr, Director-General,  Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Rome;
- 
M. R. FneNcr, Director,  Banque Internationale, Luxembourg;
- 
Dr. L. Glrsxr, Chaitman, Landeszentralbank,  Btemen;
- 
M. J. Guvor, Pattner, Messrs Lazard Frbres & Co, Paris;
- 
M. A. Lnurer-ussy,  Director and member of the Executive Commitee, Banque
de Bruxelles, Maltre de Conf6rences in the University of Louvain;
- 
Prof. Dr. H. Mor.rrn, University of Munich, Director of the Institut fiir inter-
nationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, Munich;
- 
M. G. Pt Bscorr, Director,  Caisse des Ddp6ts et Consignations, Paris;
- 
Prof. C. Sncnf, Director for Studies, Directorate-General  for Economic  and
Financial Afiairs of the EEC Commission;
- 
Prof. P. TesetoNr, of the Faculty of Law and Economics,  Paris'Other experts closely associated with the work of the Group were:
-'M. 
P. Be,nnr, Director, Research  Department,  European Investment Bank;
-- M. R. BBnrnaNo, Director of Payments,  OECD;
-- M. E. Isnaur,, of the Banque  Internationale,  Luxembourg;
-- M. G. Srntor,r,  Director, Finance and Treasury Department,  European Invest-
ment Bank;
- 
M. A. TneumssrN, Director-General for Credit and Investment, ECSC High
Authority;
-- M. P. Iilflrnrneurn, Head of Division,  Directorat€-General  for Credit and Invest-
ment, ECSC High Authority.
The chairmanship of the Group was entrusted to the representative
Commission, Prof. Claudio Secn6, who also supervised the preparation
report.
The Group of expetts ptesented  the report which follo'*ts. The Commission
wishes to express its thanks and appreciation to the Group for the important and
valuable worlc it has perfotmed. Though the report does not of course in any way
prejudge the position the Commission will take on the problems  examined, the
Commission regards it as an excellent basis for the accomplishment of its tasks
in this field.
Brussels, Nouember 7966.
of the
of theContents
FORE\fORD
INTRODUCTION
SUMMARY OF THE REPORT
Part One: THE ELEMENTS  OF THE PROBLEM
Chapter 1: A European capital matket: its foundations and the con-
ditions for its development
I. Economic foundations of a European capital market
II. Role of public authotities and financial institutions
Chapter 2: Structuml problems common to the markets of the EEC
Member States
L Gross capital {ormation  and its financing:
Saving-investment equilibrium
II. Demand for capital
III. Supply of capital
IV. Adjustment of supply and demand on the capital market
Chapter 3: Existing links between capital markets
I. Analysis of private medium- and long-term capital movements
IL Measures taken or planned under the Rome Treaty to facilitate
capital movements
Annex: Survey of exchange-control  systems applicable to the main
categories of capital movement  between the Member States
Part Two: CONDITIONS FOR EFFICIENT USE OF ECONOMIC
POLICY INSTRUMENTS  IN AN INTEGRATED  MARKET
Chapter 4: Policies for control of aggregate  monetary demand  and
regulation of the capital market
I. Control of aggtegate monetary demand
II. Capital market policies
Chapter .5: Policies for stimulation of saving and dfuection of capital
investment
L Selective incentives for saving and investment
II. Harmonization of instruments
Page
5
11
t5
37
39
40
46
52
52
57
65
7L
79
79
85
89
95
97
97
107
t12
tl)
1t7Page
Chaptet 6: Finance policies of public authorities and enterpdses  I29
f. Recourse to the capital market by public authorities  and public
enterprises  1,30
II. Financing of public authorities and enterprises and development of
a European  capital market  I34
Part Three: \7IDENING CREDIT CHANNELS
Chapter 7: Medium- and long-term credit to industry
L Distribution of medium- and long-term credit
IL lnternational bank lending and the interpenerration of banking
systems
lII. Development of refinancing techniques  on the European market
Chapter 8: Credit for housing and local authorities' capital expenditute
I. Official assistance in the financing of housing
IL Extension of credit machinery for housing and local authorities'
capital expenditure
III. Refinancing  techniques  on the European market
PaTt FouT: THE INTEGRATION OF SECURITIES  MARKETS
Chapter 9: Structure of fixed-intetest.securities  markets
I. Supply of capital on fixed-interest-securities  markets
II. Issues of fixed-interest securities
III. The Euro-bond issue market
Chapter L0: Structure of equity markets
I. Supply of capital on equity markets
II. Issues of equities
Chapter 11: Operation of a Eutopean securities market: information
for the public, dealing in and movement of securities
I. Information
IL Operation of the stock exchanges and movement of securities
Annexr Model Prospectus for public securities  issues of securities  of
admission to stock exchange  listing
Part Five: REMOVAL OF OBSTACLES  PREVENTING EQIJAL  AC-
CESS TO THE EUROPEAN CAPITAL  MARKET
Chapter 12: Disparities in the working and supervision of financial
institutions
I. Required adjustments: principles and methods
r45
1,47
147
149
r59
r6)
1.64
r67
t7r
177
179
180
188
196
203
203
2L7
225
225
238
252
267
269
269IL Banks
III. Institutions specializing in medium- and long-term  credit
IV. Savings  banks and their central organizations
V. Life assurance companies
Chapter 13: Exchange tisk - 
an obstacle to transactions
L Problems arising from the assumption  of an exchange risk
II. The reduction of risks connected with fluctuations in exchange
rates around Parity
Page
271
275
276
280
284
284
287
293
293
294
individuals  298
of financial insti-
335
III. Techniques for spreading  exchange risks between borrorvers and
lenders  -  288
Chapter 14 Tax obstacles
L Objectives
II. Present obstacles
III. Adjustment of direct taxation of investments by
IV. Adjustment of direct taxation of investments
tutions
V. Adjustment of indirect taxes on the raising and transfer of capital
STATISTICAL ANNEX
304
309
Annex: Taxation of distributed ptofits of joint stock companies  and of -- 
interest on bonds accruing 
-to 
individuals,  and comparative  tables
ttroti"g the efiect of ta*alion on income received  313LIST OF TABLES
L. Gross domestic  capital formation and its financing
2. Savings as a percentage  of. gross national  product (GNP) and of gross
domestic capital formation  (GCF)
3. Gross public-sector saving as a proportion of public-sector investment
4. Self-financing  of enterprises:  gross rates
5. Size of the capital markers combined
6. Supply of funds by sections of the capital market
7. Net domestic  issues of medium- and long-term  securities
B. Medium- and long-term loans to business and private customers
9' Net domestic issues of medium- and long-term  fixed-interest  securities
for the financing of the public sector in the EEC countries
1.0. Bonowing by enterprises
1L. Financial structure of enterprises
12. Net financial investment of non-financial
1.]. Movements of long-term  private capital
14. Movements of long-term  private capital
15. Public issues of foreign bonds
16. Public issues of foreign bonds, classified
dence of issuer
17. Gross fixed capital formation in the housing sector
18. Analysis of net purchases  of fixed-interest securities
19. Apparent and real yields of fixed-interest  securities
20. Net domestic issues of medium- and long-term fixed-interest securities
21 . Tap issues of medium-  and long-term fixed-interest securities
22. Issues of variable-yield  securities
23. Market value of variable-yield  securities
24. Assets of investment  companies (open-end  and closed-end)
25. Gtoss issues of convertible  bonds
26. Number of foreign variable-yield securities quoted on nine international
exchanges
27. Investments of life assurance companies
28. Investments of savings banks and their central institutions
29. Bank lending and security investments
3Cl, Lending and security  investmenrs of specialized  institutions
TO
sectors
by country
by type
by market of issue: and resi-
Page
339
34L
343
344
346
347
348
349
350
)52
354
355
356
358
360
36r
362
363
365
366
369
370
371.
372
373
374
375
376
378
380INTRODUCTION
Terms o{ reference for the Group's  study
1. The terms of reference  laid down by the Commission {or the Group's study
assigned five basic tasks which may be summarized  as follows:
a) To establish  and specify what needs to be done to develop a European-  clPital
market, having r.gard, on the one hand, to the aims of the Treaty of Rome
- 
p"rii*htlyln iis financial  clauses --t ald, on the other, to the scope for evolving
joini solutiont from the efiorts currently  being made by the various Member States
to imptove the functioning of the markets;
b) To analyse present difierences of market organization in the Member States,
to assess tire implications of these difierenceJ  and thus ascertain the factors
responsible for the present fragmentation of markets;
c) To take stock of intra-Community capital {lows during-the-current^stage  of
fraeme"ted capital markets, in order to uitett what would be the significance  of
bro'adening thi market on a European scale;
d) To endeavour to establish what impact the establishment  of a European  capital
market would have on the Member 
-states' pursuit of economic policies based
mainly on the use of financial instruments;
e) To consider how the structure and the working,of the financial institutions
would have to be adapted so that the markets could be integrated.
The Group was invited to put forward .specific  recommendations on the above
points in its report, which was later to form the basis for concrete measures to
be taken by the Community authorities.
Scope of the study
2. In accordance  with explanatory notes appended to its terms of reference,-the
Cto"p ,o f"r u, possible lift purelv descipiive themes outside the range of its
;;4il.  True, it 'hu, ut times ielt it necessary  to describe some_ special  aspect.of
the structure 
'of. a capital market, some special technique used by one particular
intermediary ot some^fiscal or other regulition in force in a Member State. Such
puttug"t have, howevef, been intoducid  into the fepoft only w}en they thtew
iigtri'"" lh. i.".ii" nri,r." of the obstacles to integration or the scope of the
recommendations  put forward.
No systematic  analysis of national capital markets has therefore been undertaken'
An analysis of this kind would at besi have been of only limited value since papers
l1on the situation and problems of the capital market had already been prepared
by certain Member States and international organizations.  The OECD Committee
for Invisible Transactions  has for instance been invited to make a "Studv on the
lmprovement of Capital Matkets", the results of which are to be published shortly.
In addition, the underlying purpose of the Group's work difiers from what was
aimed at in most of these othet studies, which set out to reveal certain deficiencies
in the structure or functioning of the capital markets and to seek remedies
exclusively at national level. The OECD study, too, although it has a wider scope
as it ranges over several markets, endeavours to bring out the problems common
to certain markets but does not tackle the question of their integration.  The
special feature of the Group's approach  lies in the fact that it adopts from the
outset a Community outlook and makes its analysis with an eye to the conditions,
methods and probable  implications of setting up a European  capital market and the
obstacles that will be encountered.
The Group's study covers the main financial flows and channels and devotes
special attention to certain categories of institution.  The specific problems of
other categories of institution or financial intermediary have not been discussed
in detail: this applies for example to the agricultural credit institutions,  to
professional or co-operative credit or social insurance institutions and to stock-
brokers and stock exchange  intermediaries. This does not mean that the problems
connected with these financial intermediaries were regarded by the Group as being
of secondary importance: in fact, the principles emerging in this report for the
solution of the problems of the particular categories of institution considered are
in many ways equally applicable  to these financial intermediaries as well.
The Group also realized that it would not be possible, within the limited  scope
of the present repoft, to provide  solutions to all the many problems posed by such
a vast operation to be completed  gradually over a period of years. It hopes
nevettheless  that its work may throw light on the path to be followed and thus
make a useful conffibution to the preparation of the various measures to be
considered with this end in view.
Plan of the study
I  For the presentation  of its study, the Group has adopted a plan cenffed around
five main themes.
a) In Pan I an attempt is made both to define the bases and conditions for
developing a European capital market and to pinpoint the problems of structure
common to the markets of the Six, together with the scope of the financial links
that have already come into being within the Community.
b) \n Part II the study sets out to show how the establishment of a European
capital matket can be facilitated by certain adjustments in the way the economic
policies of the Member States are applied.
c) Part III contains the Group's recommendations  for widening the scope of the
supply of medium- and long-term  credit for industrial  equipme.nt  and oT lending
to the housing sector and to local authorities.
12d) Pa11 IV studies the conditions  in v'hich securities markets can be integrated
and their contribution to the financing of investments increased.
e) PatV deals with the various obstacles, basically of a technical nature, which
may impede the balanced development of a European capital market, whether in
the form of difierences in the ways the financial institutions  are regulated ot in
the form of obstacles that stem from exchange risks and disparities in the system
of taxation.
Organization of the work
4. The care taken to balance the number of experts drawn from public and
private financial  institutions,  from the academic world and from various international
organizations illusrates  the main concern of_ the GrogP in its approach to the
pr6blem*  to carfy out a study which, while dealing exh_austively with the matters
Leing examined,  siill had the primary'aim of indicaiing definite action to be taken.
The Group held in all twelve meetings of two_ days each. _ At the first of these
meetings i p.ogru--e was drawn up and working methods -were decided upon.
For each mieting one of two members of the Group or the Secretariat were
invited -  "t 
tapipofteurs - 
to pfepafe a paper on.the subje_ct to be dealt with
and to open the 
^discussion. 
Subjetts-were determined in accordance with a general
outline fbr the final report, drawn up when work first began.
Members o{ the Group invited to submit a paper were assisted by the Secretariat,
one of whose tasks was to produce background documents for the Gr-oup's
discussions. After each meeting the Secretariat  wrote up an account of the
discussions showing the points that had emerged.
For the preparation of the final report, it was thought advisable to have the
editorial work carried out by the Cfiairman and the Secretariat, who prepared  a
draft and submitted it to the Group; constant contacts vdth the various experts
made it possible, however, to give the work a collective character.
The Secretariat  of the Group was composed of M. R. Bistolfi, M. P. A. Rutsaert,
M. M. Sarmet and M. H. Stoller, of the Directorate  for Studies in the Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Afiairs of the EEC Commission; the statistics
for the report were pfepafed by M. L. Tanter, M. B. Taquet and M. F. Turli.
The follorring  independent experts also helped with the examination  of special
problems: M. G. 
- 
Gelders, Director ^t the Commission Bancaite,  Brussels,
M. U. Grosfils, Head of the Research Department of the Banque de Bruxelles,
M. L. Jeorger,  Inspecteur des Finances, Paris, M. J. G. Lieberherr,  Messrs Lazard
Frdres & C", Paris, and M. J. Truquet, Banque de France, Paris.
The report was appfoved by the Group at its meeting-of.-14,15  and 16 S_eptember.
The approval giv; by the members-in their individual capacities  applies to the
t.oort "t 
u *}iol. and not to each of its separate proposals taken out of context.
"lrlSUMMARY OF THE REPORT
Chapter 1: A European  capital market: its foundations and the conditions for
its development
1.. Less progress has been made with the development  of -a Europegy 9ap.it9l
market than with the other elements of the economic union being established  in
the Community.  Today, the reforms  abeady under consideration  -to 
improve the
functioning of 'the c pitul markets in certain member countries ofier a chance of
laying thJfoundatioris of a wider market; the focusing of -efiort on this wider
mark-et seems indeed to be a condition for the success of these reforms, as the
present shortcomings of the capital markets are due not so much to insufficient
iavings as to the im-possibility  of adjusting correctly supply and demand on markets
that are too narrow (secs. 1 and 2).
2.  Market mechanism contribute  best to economic growth and to the equilibrium
of the economy when they operate within the framework of policies reflecting -the
long-term goali set for the ecbnomic  and social systems. It is- also an accepted  fact
thai some methods by whicJr financial  policy is implemented in each countfy afe
more compatible than others with the gradual  development of capital markets that
are mofe open to the outside wotld.
In all the Member States the financing of economic  growth is coming to depend
more and more on the capital market, and the establishment of wider markets
and close co-ordination of economic  policies rvould facilitate this growth by:
i) Ofiering enterprises  new and more varied opportunities of obtaining from
outside ro,rrces the financial resources  that can help them expand to the size needed
for eficient operation in the common market;
ii) Bringing more into lme the conditions on which finance can be obtained in
the Community, and so reducing the distortions in competition due to present
difierences;
iii) Increasing the supply of capital as financial savings are attracted to the market
by the wider range of investment  outlets;
iv) Intensifying financial flows and so lessening the risk of the disturbances that
are characteristic  of excessively narrow markets (secs. 3-7)'
).  A European  capital market would facilitate the implementation of the common
policies introduced in various sectors. Also, while there can be no_ monetary
union in the Community without such a market, its creation is already indispensable
if the present paymenis svstem, based on_fixed rat_es of exchange and complete
freedom for cuirent transactions,  is to work smoothly (secs. 8-11)'
154. Though a European  capital market ought to be the result of spontaneous
developments, it will none the less require constructive efiotts on the part of
gov€rnments  and financial institutions. The adjustments  that the public authorities
will have to make are concerned primarily with closer co-ordination of their
national economic policies and shifts in the importance  attached to the various
instruments they normally use: their objectives,  however, ne:ed not necessarily
be afiected.
Ihe following  points in particular deserve a thorough  re-examination:
i) The tax regimes applying respectively to home and to foreign investment,  and
difierences in the tax treatment of the various forms of investment or of the
,channels utilized by the investors;
ii) The rules applicable to certain financial mechanisms, so as to reduce the
fragmentation of markets at present split up into a number of separate channels;
iii) The eligibility rules for institutional  investors which at present severely
:restrict their freedom of choice both on national and on external  markets;
i.v) The exchange control regulations governing  capital movements (secs. 12-15).
.r. As these adjustments are carried out by the public authorities, the financial
institutions  that arc currently most active in international operations will be able
to set the pace for the rest of the market:
i.) Certain financial techniques not at present familiar in all member countries
will come to be more widely used, with the result that the range of available
investment outlets and resources will be broadened;
ii) Financial institutions will tend to be less narrowly specialized,  and this will
help to restofe efiective competition;
iii) At the same time the links between these institutions will be strengthened:
they will set up joint services  and be able to improve the allocation of their
resources  in the broader framework as it emerges (secs. 16 and 17).
(;. The European  market that stems from these developments  'will take the form
o{ a network of transactions  which, if at first limited, will gradually be extended
to cover all the categories of financial flows. Within the Community it will not
i:mply the supremacy of any single centre, and this evolution will lrelp intensify
rather than hinder the existing  relationships  with the capital markeis of non-
member countries (sec. 18).
1'. The progress  made in establishing an integrated capital market will depend
first and {oremost  on the general stability of currencies  and on t}re extent to which
public finances are correctly managed. Only in these circum{itances  will it be
possible to ensure the steady expansion of savings and to avoid setbacks due
to conflicting measures taken by the public authorities in their endeavours to
re-establish equilibrium in price trends and in external  paymentis.
l6Chapter 2: Sttuctural problems common to the matkets of the EEC Member
States
1.  The prospect of the integration of capital markets which have hitherto been
more or less lsolated raises the question of the efiects of possible disparities  in
the savings rates and in the conditions under whicJr saving-investment  equilibrium
is achieved in the various Member States. Although the rates of saving difier
appreciably  from one country to another in the Community, they are in fact higll
and are unlikely to pose problems for the working of a future Egropean capital
market. On the other hand, the ways in which the financial  surpluses of certain
sectors of the economies are adjusted to the financial deficits of others vary fairly
sharply from country to country; this fact has a ditect impact on the wor\ing of
the domestic  capitai markets and thus on the process of integration of these
matkets (secs. 1-19).
2.  The contribution made by the capital markets to the financing of gross
domestic  capital formation appears to be similat and rematkably_  constant in most
membet countries.  The average {or the Community as a whole is close to the
corresponding  figures for the United Kingdom and the United States (secs. 10-13).
3.  An examination  of the demand for capital shows that the business  sector's
needs have been growing rapidly as ptofit margins have been squeezed  by rising
wages, by keenei competition  and, in some cases, by price freezes, while the
call-s emaiating from the public authorities have also been increasing.  This overall
rise in demand-for capital-must, in short, be seen in the light of twin requirements
which have to be faced by the lvlember States: their economic  potential must be
{urther developed in order to cope mofe successfully 
"vith 
foreign competition,
while certain urgent steps to improve the social and economic  infrastructures
cannot be postponed (secs. 14-18),
4.  The way available resources are distributed between the various sectors,  and
particularly  between the public authorities, public enterprises, private business
and housing, depends  essentially  on decisions  taken by_the authorities.  The
scale of p"biic iniestment, the major r91e plqy-e{ by_ oficial financial intermediaries,
and the'dominant position on the'market held by thg public authorities  leave only
a relatively small aiea in which the play of traditional market forces can determine
the allocation of resources  (sec. 19).
5.  The way in which financing requirements afe met depends to a large extent
on the composition of the funds available. It is this_ composition rather than
a shortaee of savinss which explains the sructural imbalance  to be seen in certain
sections"of the capill markets in the Member States. The supply of funds reaching
these markets teflects primarily the follorving points:
i) Savers generally  prefer to hold cash or shott-term assets and it would be difficult
to alter tliis liquidity preference  radically in the short terml
ii) Savings which take the form of deposits will remain ? mgiot fac-tor in the suppJy
oi .apituT. The financial institutioni rvhich collect this form of saving; should
ih"r.for" be able to ofier medium- and long-term loans and to use their funds on
the capital market;
t7iii) Saving through institutional  investors, particularly contractual saving, is inade-
quate in all member countries  except the Nethedands. This inadequacy in part
explains why markets are not able to function satisfactorily  (ser:s. 20-27).
(;. This state of aflairs does not seem likely to undergo a s1]ontaneous  change,
especially now that income redistribution  to the advantage oli wage-earners  has
raised the savings potential of social classes still unprepared to take a direct
interest in the capital market.  Consequently,  several Member States are stimulating
the consolidation of savings and the various forms of contractual saving (sec.28).
i/. In addition to government  intervention,  there are two sets of mechanisms
rvhich are of particular importance in adapting supply to demand on the European
capital markets: the redistribution of long-term savings (secs. 129-33) and "trans-
{ormation", i.e. the use of short-term funds for longet-term finarrcing  (secs. 34-37).
lfhese operations are carried out both by private institutions and by specialized
Iinancial intermediaries set up or supervised by the authorities.
8. The optimum utilization  of available funds demands an easier flow of capital
{rom one financial channel to another, alignment of the tax sy$tems afiecting the
various types of investment,  enlargement of the opportunities for savings institutions
to employ the funds they collect and, lastly, markets vride en,cugh to ensure in
practice greater liquidity of investments. Savings entrusted to financial institutions
exceed by far the sums directly invested by individuals on the securities markets.
The key to improvements in the financing of productive investment and social
infrastructure lies therefore in better adaptation of these institutions to their
functions  (secs. 38-40).
Chapter 3: Existing  links between  the capital matkets
1. In the period 1,960-L965 the net import of private medium- and long-term
capital by the Community amounted to slightly more than $6 500 million; this
balance was more or less ofiset by net export of oficial capit:al and short-term
funds. Intra-Community  movements of medium- and long-term capital were
relatively modest: Germany  and France imported capital from the Benelux  countries
and probably from ltaly. Financial  transactions were mainly in the fotm of portfolio
inveitment in the Nethedands and in Germanv, and of direct inl,estment in France
and Italy (secs. 1-4).
2'. The volume of international  borrowing by bond issues has increased  sharply,
particularly since 1963, when Euro-bond  issues started to expand. On the other
hand issues abroad denominated in the curfency of the country of issue have not
shown a comparable  rise. Borrowing by Community residents on the markets of
non-member  countries - 
including the Euro-bond market - 
was several times
higher than borrowing by residents of non-member countries or by intetnational
organizations  on the markets of Member States, the balance arnounting to more
than $570 million for the period 196l-65 ( sec. 5 ).
3. The official data available  give a very incomplete  picture of the real geographical
b,reakdown  of capital movements because of the redistribution, efiected through
1rlinternational  financial institutions, certain financial  centres and the Euro-bond
market.  Consequently,  financial relations with markets in non-member  countries are
over-estimated  compared  with those between the markets in the Member States;
the true degtee of integration  already attained in the Community is therefore
difficult to assess (secs. 6-8).
4.  Intra-Community  capital movements  are governed by reciprocal obligations
assumed by the Member States in accordance with the Rome Treaty; these are
appreciably stricter than those in the OECD "Code of Libelr.lization of Capital
Movements".  Two directives have already been adopted to implement  Article 67
of the Treaty. They provide for total freedom of movement of capital in the
fields of direct investment, operations in listed securities,  investment in real estate,
transactions  of a personal nature and short- and medium-term  credits linked with
commercial transactions or with the supply of services.  For other categories  of
transaction, such as the issue of securities, financial loans and short-term capital
movements of a purelv financial nature. restrictions continue to exist in ceitain
Member States; un orrtiine of these restrictions  is given in the annex. A proposed
third directive, at present under discussion, is intended to establish a better
balance between the liberalization measures taken by the various Member States
in accordance with the previous  directives, and at the same time to remove a number
of obstacles not arising {rom exchange control regulations  but of equally  fundamental
importance (secs. 9-11).
5.  The exchange restrictions still in force seem to be maintained  for reasons
other than those for which thev wete originally  adopted; they are now intended
rather to ensure the autonomy of domestic  monetary policies than to safeguard the
balance of international  payments.  This trend, however, involves a risk of Member
States moving further and further away from convertibility  (secs. 1,I and l2).
Chapter 4: Policies for control of aggregate monetary  demand and regulation ol
the capital  market
1  Radical  changes in the circumstances influencing the implementation of policies
for regulating  aggregate monetary demand have been brought about by the ihcrease
in international trade.and  capital movements: the establishment of a European
capital market will add impetus to this trend. A reappraisal of the extent to which
the various instruments of short-term economic policy can still be used in the light
of the changes that are occurring is urgently required if the essential objectives-of
this policy are to be maintained (secs. 1-7).
?._ Nq* that enterprises  enjoy increased facilities for obtaining  capital abroad and
links have been forged betu/een the markets for short-term commercial  credit,
the range of domestic  monetary policies is more narrowly circumscribed. This
limitation becomes particularly  evident when difierent economic trends lead Member
States to adopt basically  divetgent policies. Yet until co-ordination has been camied
further and certain harmonization  measures have taken efiect. it is natural that
monetafy authorities ',vill feel concern when they see certain'capital  movements
running counter to the objectives  which they are pursuing (secs. 8-14).)i. There seems to be a need for greater speed in coping with cyclical imbalances
a.nd for more flexible and more systematic  use of the instrumerots of fiscal policy.
l\s a restrictive budget policy bears directly on aggregate demand and does not
concenttate on the iivestment demand of enterprGs,-it is in fact less likely to
e'ngender compensatory  capital movements.  With this in view:
i) The public authorities should establish greater {lexibility in their current
expenditure on goods and services and in their ttansfer payments, but should at
thi same time take steps to ensure that their investment  programmes could, if
necessary, be employed  more efiectively in smoothing out the business cycle;
ii) The authorities should have powers of immediate action, in the interest of
stabilization, by varying - 
within previously established limits -- both ditect and
indirect taxes and depreciation allowances (secs. 15-19).
4. Credit policy would, however, retain a key role both in countering undesir-gble
Iluctuations  in international payments and, by bolstering budget policy, in conffolling
aggtegate  monetary demand. Credit policy would be made more efiective  by
lessening the diflerences  that still exist between the circumstances in which it can
<,per"t. -in the various Member States and between the instruments by which it
is applied (secs. 20-22).
:r. Oficial intervention on the capital market and the establishment  of. a "queue"
to avoid shoft-tefm fluctuations  due to bad timing of issues could, if necessary,
be co-ordinated. Meetings of representatives of the authorities  supervising  the
capital markets could be held af regular intervals and provide the institutional
liramework for such co-ordination. lWhatever  is done in this connection, the ttend
of rates on the various capital markets should be kept in mincl and there should
lrc no discrimination  in the "queLre" against non-tesidents wistring to float issues
Gecs. 24-26).
ti.  The use of the "queue" fot the purpose of channelling  capital towards the
linancing of priority investments  might - 
as will be shown in dhe next chapter - lrc repliced by otL.r methods moie likely to prove efiective in the context of
linancial integtation  (sec. 27).
(Jhapter 5: Policies fot stimulation of saving and direction of capital investment
.1. In all member counffies the authorities provide selective encouragement  for
certain types of investment,  and accord priority to the mobilization of funds for
specific rectors and regions  (secs. 1-4). Some of the instruments used result in the
fiagmentation  of ea.h- market into separate sectors and hamper the international
*o-bility of capital. A co-ordinated adjustment of the techniques used, witholt
necessaiily endangering the objectives pursued, would there{rore appear to be
,lesirable (secs. 5-16).
.2. Savings incentives  which form part of social policy or represent counter-
r:yclical measures can readily be adjusted to render them mor:e "neutral": such
radvantages  must be secured for the saver no matter rvhere he makes his investment
or what type of outlet he chooses (secs. 17-18).
t203. Incentives which tend to confine saving within specific channels can be
justified only if there are serious structural imbalances - 
the housing  sector in
some countries might be quoted as an example - 
and on condition that additional
saving is elicited by these incentives (sec. 19).
4. The development of long-term fotms of financial saving is sought by most
of the Member States. The incentives used, however,  need to be harmonized in
order that:
i) The institutions  collecting  privileged savings have greater latitude in investing
them outside the domestic market;
ii) Inducements to put money into the securities markets apply to foreign and
domestic securities  alike;
iii) The development of contractual savings - 
in particular  those linked with
employment conmacts - 
is given top priority  (sec. 20).
5. Measures intended to steer investment in a given ditection should in principle
be applied by means of instruments which influence  enuepreneufs'  demand for
capital - 
suc.,h as tax advantages, investment allowances, interest subsidies and
credit guarantees - 
rather than through direct action on the allocation of funds
(secs. 22 and23). The only condition that would have to be met if an investment
is to benefit under these measures is that it should be in line with regional  and
sectoral objectives: administration of the funds set aside by the authorities to
finance some of these incentives should not be left exclusivelv in the hands of one
particular type of institution (sec. 25).
6. It would hardly be possible, however, to limit these instruments to those
that act on the demand for capital, since such action will be of litde value if
the necessary funds are not available on the market. Direct government  lending and,
even more, lending by specialized credit institutions would not appear to be
incompatible with financial integration  provided  that - 
where the necessary funds
are collected bv means of a loan issus - 
the Government  and the intermediaries
concerned rerort to the market on conditions  comparable to those that apply to
other issuers (secs. 24 and 26).
7. Closer co-ordination  of regional and sectoral policies within the Community
should enable the High Authority of the ECSC and the European Investment Bank
to make a more active conribution to these policies (sec. 29). But i{ action by
these bodies is to be efiective while remaining compatible  with the operational
requirements  of a European capital market:
i) Their access to the capital markets of Member States should be facilitated by
governments;
ii) The conditions governing their tecourse to the various markets  should be aligned
on those applicable to comparable borrowers resident in the country concernedl
iii) The granting of interest  subsidies to recipients of ECSC and EIB loans should
be allowed in specific circumstances (secs. 3032).Chapter 6: Finance policies of public authorities  and public enterprises
1. The insufficiency  of the savings rcalized by public authorities  when compared
rdth their planned capital expenditure used to be characteristic of certain member
countries only, but is now becoming more general and leading these authorities
to make increasing calls on the capital market (secs. 4-6). The fi:xing of "political"
prices fot certain public services  means that the enterprises  supplying them are not
able to finance any significant portion of their investment out o{ retained earnings
--  sometimes  indeed not even to meet their operating costs - 
and accounts
essentially for their large-scale  recourse to outside borrowing (secs. 7-9).
2. The advantages  enjoyed by the authorities and public enterprises  on the capital
market often exceed those that derive naturally from the type and size of the
borrower.  These special advantages  include the favoured posi.tion  reserved for
their issues in the pottfolios of institutional investors, various tax exemptions,
preferential  treatment in the timing of issues, and low rates of commission and
other issue charges  (secs. 10-12).
3. An increase in the financing tequirements of the public sector in one Member
State may result in extra pressure being felt directly or indirectly in other capital
markets of the Community. Inelasticity of demand makes it  unlikely  that
equilibrium will be achieved'by the interpiay  of market forces alone. The d'ecision
as to whether or not priority should be given to calls on the capital market by the
public sector is of a political  nature and cannot be guided by any genetal rules.
In the present state of the economy,  however, with all member countries vitally
concerned in maintaining  equilibrium, it seems that the public sector will have to
bear the brunt of the adjustments to be made in aggregate demand (secs. 13-17).
4. An adjustment  of the financing terms accorded to authorities  and public
enterprises  would make it possible to contain the pressure  which the public and
the private sectors exert on each market within the limits and forms compatible
udth the progress of financial integration. It would be helpful, first of all, if a
higher proportion  of public investment were financed by tax receipts. Greater
autonomy for local authotities in tax matters would mean, among other things,
that they would be better able to adapt their income to their neecls. Any additional
calls on the capital market could be made under conditions  less likely to disturb
its balance if budgetary planning were extended to cover a period of years,
and if the borro'wing  operations of local authorities were co-ordinated - 
either
on a permanent  basis or merely at periods when markets came runder pressure - by a special institution vrhose calls on the market  could be better timed (secs. 18-24).
5. Rates charged for public services must be adapted to cover, at the very least,
operating costs and renewal of the plant and machinery of production enterprises.
If certain public enterprises  were unable to achieve, in addition to the above, the
profitability  tequired for a normal degree of self-financing,  contibutions should be
made from public funds, financed out of taxation, in order to avoid excessive  calls
being made on the capital market. In any event, these calls wouldl be more eflective
and less likely to upset the market if greater diversity in the types of security
ofiered by public enterprises enabled them to avoid weighing only on the bond
markets. Possible solutions would be the issue of ordinary shares, preference
slhares or "participating"  bonds (secs. 25-29).
226. Direct access by public authorities to the capital market of another  member
country is governed by Article 68(3) of the Treaty, which however  contains
procedural provisions only. The criteria to be applied in practice can only be
worked out gradually.  Nevertheless, suict limits on the special  advantages to be
ofiered with loans floated abroad by public authorities could be laid down here
and now, while the conditions under which the authorities in each member  country
have recourse to their home markets ought also to be progressively harmonized
(secs. 30 and 31).
Chapter 7: Medium- and long-term ctedit to indusry
1. Indusrial investment  is financed under widely difiering conditions  from one
Community country to the next: in all of them, however, the specialization of
credit institutions is tending to diminish, and the difierences can thetefore be
expected to grow smaller. This will help to broaden the flow of medium-  and
long-term credit in Europe, though progress in this direction vdll be largely
dependent on the adjustments  made in the techniques  by which the public
authorities  intervene  (secs. L-7).
2. The establishment of a European  market in this field may result from an
increase in the volume of direct international lending, from the interconnection
of banking systems, and from international  refinancing  of national credit institutions
(secs. 8 and 9).
3. The grant of direct international  credits presupposes the removal of the
exchange ionuol restrictions now in fotce and a gfeater willingness  on_ the pat of
borrowirs to assume the risks attendant  upon engagements expfessed in foreign
currencies,  though these risks are themselves  tending to fade (secs. 10 and 19).
4.  On the institutional plane there are certain specialized public ctedit institutions
which will probably be- able to Europeanize iheir activities only by means 
- of
refinancing operations. Banking institutions  could, however, mere easily develop
their foreign-business,  as some of them are already quite active in the field of
short-term credit; an expansion of their activities might, however,  raise problems
of competition  (secs. Il-14).
5. The problems relating to the nse in international  operations of the guarantees
and sureiies now used internally must be examined. The backing of a credit
institution in the borrower's own counffy would facilitate his access to external
sources of finance, and no obstacles should therefore be placed in the way of
giving such guarantees. \07ith regard to real estate charges, the, gqnqr4 adoption
of a -uniform and fexible surety such as the German Grundschuldbriel  (land
charge deed) is to be recommended  (secs. 15-17).
6. It is essential that the activities of "central risk ofEces" should be co-ordinated
so as to increase  the exchange  of information on borrowing by companies (sec. 18).
Finally, in the tax field, arrangements ought to be made to. eliminate  double
taxation of interest on loans to borrowers abroad (secs. 20 and Zt).7. Apart from granting direct international loans, banks could extend their
operations to other member countries by setting up subsidiaries  or branches and
by collaborating more closely with institutions in these countries. It would appear,
hbwever, that the founding of subsidiaries and branches is not likely to be
undertaken  on any great scale in the near future, even if notable ,advances  are made
vrith harmonization of the rules on right of establishment (secs. 22-24). On the
other hand, the flexible ties provided by co-operation among financial institutions
in various countries  seem both better adapted to the situation today and more
appropriate for extension  in the future (sec. 25).
8. Refinancing by medium- and long-term credit institutions on the European
market would-enable  these institutions to increase their "stable" resoutces by
recourse to traditional techniques - 
such as public and private  pXacing of bonds - and by employing new techniques  such as European refinancing ,consortia or cross-
frontier mobilization  of medium-term paper (sec. 27).
9'. Such bond flotatiohs abroad would be facilitated if tax discrimination were
eliminated and if the rules governing the operations of institutional  investors
were gtadually  relaxed.  Consideration should also be given to the quotation  on
tlrre exchanges of other member countries of domestic loans issued by institutions
specializing in medium- and long-term credit (secs. 28 and 29).
10. The introduction of medium-term refinancing techniques, thtough the estab-
lishment of European  bank consortia to issue securities with appropriate maturities
and tailored to the pteferences of the various markets, and also thtough the
establishment  of systems for mobilizing medium-term instruments of indebtedness,
would help to provide financial institutions with ne'uv resources (secs. 10-34).
Cihapter 8: Credit for housing and local authorities' capital expenditure
1. Because of the scale of the expenditure  involved, the financing of housing
and of investment undertaken  by local authorities has a particular impact on
the functioning of the capital matket in each member counuy and consequently
on the relationships that may be built up between them (secs. I  and 2).
2. Subsidies given by Member States to the housing sector are granted either
in support of the investment itself, thus reducing the cost trc the builder,_  ot
to stimulate saving that will be applied to housing, or direct to the user, thus
reducing the rent or the cost of acquiring the property (secs. 4 and 5).
3. Direct subsidizing of users seems preferable to the other forms of State aid,
since this method does not involve any distortions in the chc,ice of sources of
finance and does not impede  a return to a free housing market. In countries which
are still experiencing  a housing shortage, however,  other forms of encouragement
may be necessary. It would be best if subsidies which stimulate investment  and
saving simultaneously were used, thus preventing artificial movements of capital
between the membet counmies. Methods such as subsidized  loans financed  out of
public sector savings, and subsidies paid to the saver on condition that he really
builds, would meet the case (secs. 4-9).
2'l4. In certain member ccuntries it would be dificult, in view of their nature,
for institutions specializing in finance for housing and local au-thofity works .to
operate outside ttreir own .i.rntty; refinancing  is, thlrefore, the only means whereby
they could be fitted into a Euiopean capital mafket. Although- the situation  is
difierent for institutions in other rirember iountries,  the fact that they can normally
accept only guarantees  and sureties originating in their own country constitutes
" 
rnulor obsticle to the extension of their activities. A first move towards greater
n."iUitity would consist in giving these institutions  freedom, within the limits of
their capital and reserves, t6 grant loans covered by sureties from other member
countries (secs. 10-14).
j.  Savings banks, their central institutions,  building societies.and life assurance
companies"also contdbute - 
tq a varying but-always considerable.degree - 
to the
financing of housing  andf ot public woqki undertaken-by-local.authorities. Greater
freedom" of action-couli be accorded the savings banks: they could be given
authoritv to undertake in other member countrieJ - 
within the limits of a small
percentage  of their funds - 
the same types of investment they uldertake  at home.
it.  ..nTtd institutions of these savingi banks should be freed of most of the
restrictions  on their external investments, and flexible co-opetation  arrangements,
.rp..irtty on projects of interest to mcre than one country, should be established
(secs. 15-18).
6. The obstacles to international  refinancing  are doubtless  easier to overcome
itrun-ttot. h"mpering the granting of credit -acrott frontiers. In addition to the
floating of loani abr5ad, tliis refinlncing_  could be efiected indirectly by allowing
non-reiidents to invest in securities issued on the domestic market. Such purchases
would be facilitated if:
i) These securities (ordinary  bonds, mortgage bonds, communal  bonds) were quoted
on the stock exchanges  of other member countries;
ii) Co-operation was established between the financial establishments  dealing with
"tap" issuesl
iii) Terms and conditions of issues were harmonized and the restrictions  on
advertising made less severe.
The shares of real estate companies and "propetty  trust certificates" (cettifi.cats-
imnobiliers)  are particularly efiictive instrumenis  for building-  up the international
mobilitv of 
'capital 
in this i.ctor. The obstacles - 
particularly tax barriers - 
to
the ciriulation of these securities  should be eliminated'
Finallv. the establishment  of an international  artangement for mobilization  of paper
d;;  in tespect of medium-term  credit might also be helpful' The technical
problems - 
a"d consequently possible solutions - 
are substantially the 
-same
as wouldbe encounteredln  a rimilar arrangement for industrial credit (secs. 19-25).
Chapter 9: Structure of fixed'interest'secutities  matkets
j..  The conditions in which the markets in fixed-interest  secutities  operate  are
*or. o, less strictly regulated in all Member State-s. The equilibrium of these
markets is supervised b! the public authorities in the interest of the saver and,in ce^rtain cases, in.order to ensure that what are regarded as priority needs are
satisfied. It should, however, be possible to integiate these-markets without
prejudice to these aims (secs. I and 2).
2. On the supply side, better balance on the fixed-interest-securities  markets would
be. helped by making them less isolated from each other. one way of achieving
d:is result would be by a4justins the rules which govern rhe operations  oT
irrstitutional investors in such a way that:
a) The difierences in the reatment of industrial bonds and public-sector securities
u'ould be reduced to the minimum  consonant with the nature of the risks involved:
b) The bonds issued by borrowers in other member countries  would be on the
same footing as domestic securities provided they presented sirnilar features  and
v'ere quoted on a stock exchange  in the lender's home countfy (sec. l).
3.  Insurance  companies, social security otganizations  and local savings banks
should, under the conditions set our in the 
-preceding 
chapter, be auth6rized  to
invest a p€rcentage of their available  funds even in bonds quoted only on foreign
stock_ exchang_es. This percentage, which should be modest zrt firjt, could Ee
raised gradually.  The centr_al organizations  of savings banks,  sa.vings 6anks with
a centralized structure  and banks in general could already be giren wider powers
o:[ this sort (secs. 4-7).
4.  E-ncouragement_  should be given to the development of investment  companies
specializing  in fixed-interest portfolios and to the-disribution of their shaies or
certificates  throughout  the Community  (sec. 8).
5.  As yield considerations  plav a vital part in the choice of fixed-interest  invest-
flrents, disparities in the taxation of bond interest artificiallv a:fiect international
capital flows.on the_markets in fixed-interest securities  and impe,:le the integration
oli these markets. The abolition of double taxation of income is a priorit! aim:
br:cause of its urgency, an efiort should be made to find solutions that will bL more
ellec-tive.and quicker_ to_apply  than bilateral agreements.  \Tithholding taxes should
be abolished or standardized at a level not likely to distort capital fois.  Internally,
any tax advantages  accorded to bond income should be part and parcel of measurei
to stimulate long-term saving and should apply to any invest?nent exceeding a
given minimum  period (secs. 9-Li).
6._ Fro,m the point of view of demand for capital, difierences  inL size or structure
of the fixed-interest-securities  markets in the Member  States cannot by themselves
be a reason for limiting the access of foreign borrowers to these markets. Nor,
asi and when these difierences  are reduced,  can divergences in yield on the various
m.arkets be invoked to justify the maintenance of reJtrictions. 
- 
At most there will
be a transitilnal pr-oblem,  and this could be solved by openinpl up the markets
gradually  and by making certain adjustments of a technical  nature-(seis. 14 and 15).
7.  F.xisting exchange control restrictions  could be removed by authorizing other
member countries to place issues within limits that would be fixed on the 5'asis of
obfective criteria and gradually raised (secs. 16-18).
268. Laws and regulations  u'hich discriminate against issues by the tesidents  of
other member counuies should be amended  and the ctiteria according to which
the supervisofy  authorities intervene to even out the flow of issues should be
defined- objectively. By means of regular meetings  between representatives,  of
these authorities in the various countries it should be possible to co-ordinate their
supervision  of and action on the markets (secs. 19 and 20).
9. Even if all the restrictions hampering free, reciprocal access to the bond
markets of Member States are abolished, issuers will benefit from the increased
opportunities only to the extent that the material conditions for loan flotations
are improved.  This presupposes that:
a) Grcatet use is made of certain efiective and inexpensive techniques (private
placing of bonds, selection by tender of the syndicate to manage the issues,  etc.);
b) The problems of competition with tap issues in the various countries can
be solved;
c) Placing o{ securities with institutional investors is facilitated, for instance_  by
enabling foreign subscribers  to a domestic loan to apply for bonds exptessed  in
their own currency;
d) The employment  of techniques having special characteristics - 
index-linked
bonds, "participating" bonds, cbnvertible bonds or premium bonds - 
is stand-
atdized at Community  level (secs. 2I-25).
10. Although the interpenetration of markets has been relatively slow among
member counries, the Euro-bond market, which has developed  more rapidly,
fulfils a number of functions that should be the province of a European market
in fixed-interest  securities; taxation factors and special circumstances  linked with
the policies of the public authorities in certain countries have contributed to its
succers. These Eurb-bonds  have brought additional funds into the market and
provided financial  institutions  inside and outside the Community with an oppor-
tunity for fruitful co-operation (secs. 27-32).
11. In the past a certain instability has been noticeable on the secondary,market,
in part becairse some of the secuiities in circulation  were financed with funds
boriowed at short term and in part because institutional  investors were not
showing much interest. A lack of clarity concerning  the.operation of the secondary
marketJ and insuficient arbitrage have also contributed to this instability. These
vreaknesses could be corrected to a certain extent by having the securities concerned
officially quoted in several  exchanges and creating broadly based issue syndicates
interestedln the maintenance of equilibrium on the secondary  markets  (secs. 33-36).
Chapter 10: Structute  of the equity markets
1. In several Community countries, the equity markets ate sufiering  both from
a shortage of available  capital and from a rather unsatisfactory.  pattern of business
demand-for capital, as reflected in the t-vpes of security and the terms offered.
Consequently,  Eusiness firms often find it hatd to obtain risk capital  and at the sametime the investing public does not always find attractive  opportunities on the
rnarket (sec. 1).
21. Expansion of the supply of capital on equity markets should in the first
i:nstance be sought by enhancing the role played by institutional  investors on
these markets. For this purpose, the r.ules governing the activities of these
investors should be amended (sec. 2).
)t. The remaining  limitations on purchases of foreign securit:ies by investment
companies  should be removed along with the restrictions on the acquisition of
their shares or certificates bv residents of other Communitv countries. Greater
alignment of the rules on management, information for the plblic and supervision
c'f these companies and funds would help them to expand their business by doing
away with the uncertainties caused by the the present diversity of rules aflecting
the distribution of income and the terms on which these shares or certificates are
t,ought and sold. Tax arrangements at the national and international  levels should
t,e so devised that income passing  through these institutions should not be penalized
(secs.3-7).
4. In several member  countries, insutance  and provident institutions, particulady
li.fe assurance companies, still have their choice of investments  in equitiei restricted
f,y rules which are no longer entirely consonant with the intelests of the saver.
llhe contribution  which thesE institutions make to the equity market could be
made more substantial  if they were alloured to ofler - 
in addition to current wpes
of contract - 
policies linked"with investments  in shares or certificates  of investmint
companies. All discrimination  between investment in national securities  and invest-
ment in the securities of other member  countries listed on a stock exchange in the
country where the insutance or provident institutions are established could be
abolished forthwith (secs. 8-10).
5. The savings banks could participate more actively in the equity market i{
cr3rtain adiustments were made in the regulations which apply to them. In this
crcnnection  the recommendation  already made to the efiect that local savings banks
be authodzed to earmatk a fraction of their assets for investment in other member
countries would also promote investment in shares. A greater degree of freedom
sleould be granted  here and now to the central organizations  and to savings banks
udth a cenralized structure. The right - 
already enjoyed by savings 6anks in
certain member countries - 
to set up open-end investment  funds and faciitate
investments by their customers in shares should now be extended (secs. 11 and tZ1.
6. The participation of banks in stock market transactions is subject in the
Nlember States to laws and regulations  often based on radically di'vergent principles.
A.lthough  credit institutions could undoubtedly  make an active cr:ntiibuti,on  to the
broadening  of these markets at the European level and to the inrprovement of the
srrpply of risk capital to private enterprise, the possibility that ,operations of this
kind could lead to conflicts of interest should not be ovedookerJ. It is thereforb
not possible without detailed study to express an opinion on the advisability of
e:rtending - 
61 lsdusing - 
the right of banks to take particiipations  and hold
slrare portfolios  (secs. t3-16).
2fl7. Certain investofs may have been turned away from the equity markets of the
Community owing to the low yields oIfered. The tax incentives to which some
Member States have resorted in order to increase such yields to the investor
may, in principle, improve the flow of risk capital to -the- market;  however.,  the
faci that-thesJ ta* reliefs are confined to residents or holders of domestic shares
- 
and even mofe the combination  of these two conditions - 
tends to keep the
domestic markets  separate and, in the end, lessens the efficacy of the measufes
themselves. Shareholders residing in other member countries should  therefore
receive advantages  equivalent to the "tax credit" enjoyed by residents  (secs. 17-21).
8. For a number of reasons,  business firms prefer to seek loans rather than raise
additional  share capital. fmprovement of tle structural  balance of the capital
market calls, inter ilia, f.or griater diversity in the forms of tecourse to the matket
and better techniques  for the placing of securities  (sec' 23).
9. Greatef recourse to preference shares with limited voting rights and, under
certain conditions, to sharis carrying more than one vote should enable management
groups anxious to retain their tonirolling interest to overcome theit distaste for
ihuti itt.r.r. However. a strict balance  Jhould be maintained between changes in
voting rights and the advantages  or restrictions involved for the shareholders. -Aty
steps"tak-en to deal with this*problem should be hatmonized at Community level
(secs. 24-26).
10. The issue of convertible bonds often enables enterprises to obtain capital
on better terms than bv an issue of ordinary shares. Holders of convertible  bonds
can benefit if a company's  shares rise in value, while they ale protec-ted  against a
possible decline in prices and assured of a satisfactory yield. Such bonds are an
ideal instrument  for a first approach to the matkets of other member  countries and
also make it easier to interesl^institutional  investors, who are not allowed to invest
in foreign shares. Here too the statutory rules on this type of issue should  be
harmonized (sec. 27).
1.1. In order to provide the saver vrith better protection  and improve the financial
structure of enterprises, the public authotities should not facilitate borrowing by
firms in c"r., -fi"r. it appiars that their capital and reserves position needs
s6engthening;  decisions in ihis field should be based on objective citeria laid
down in advance  (sec. 28).
L2. Financing through the issue of shares would be made easier if for tax purposes
firms were, foi a givEn period, allorved to tteat dividends on newly issrled shares
in the same way 
-as interest on bonds by deducting them {rom tgxable profits.
Also, the distribution of stock dividends would satisfy both the need of companies
to increase their own capital and the ciesire of shareholders to be remunerated  in a
tangible form that can eisily be converted into cash (secs' 29-11).
1.3. The improvement  of distribution netwoqks might reduce_the difficulty and
cost of new i3sues. If specialized intermediaries are to operate e{ectively, however,
the matket must be correspondingly large and they must be able to count on a
substantial contribution  from insiitutional investors:  these are conditions which
can more easily be achieved  in the framework of a Eutopean  capital market (sec. 32).chapter 11.: operation of a European securities market: Information for the
public, dealing in and movement of securities
1i.. _Structural  changes in the supply of and demand for capital on the securities
rnarkets  constitute  one of a number of conditions that muJt be fulfilled if these
rnarkets are to be properly integrated.  The quality and quanlity of information
rnade available to the public should also be improved, while foi the negotiation
and movement of securities of other member countries conditions  similar -to 
those
obtaining on the domestic  marker should be established  (sec. 1),
21. The problem of ensuring that full information is available to investors is a
Farticularly  important aspect of the development of a European securities market.
Uleasures designed to f.amiliatize  the public with investment in securities and
with the stock exchange mechanisms appear to be necessary; so also is the laying
ilown of rules to ensure 
- 
apart from the annual publication of accounts --  i
continuous  flow of information on company operationi. More detailed information
should be published when securities are issued or quoted on a stock exchange.
Itlthough it has been noted in recent years that the information supplied by
companies  has improved, entirely voluntary arrangements will probably not be
sufficient  to ensure further progress in this direction: for this rearson several reform
schemes, abeady adopted or still under study, seek to lay down prescribed  standards
in this field (secs. 2-10).
3.  The content and scope of the disclosure  and information rules relating to new
issues and to applications  for quotation  on a stock exchange should be harmonized
in the various member  counties  and given the same legal status: the model
prospectus  proposed in the annex to this chapter might be a suitable basis for
sr-rch harmonization (secs.  1 1-15).
4.  The institutional arrangements for independent  control of the information
sr:pplied  should not be neglected either; work on their harmoniz:.ation could begin
forthwith in a committee  bringing together representatives  of the various categories
of institutions concerned and of the supervisory authorities. If the legal require-
ments and procedures used were more closely aligned in the Member Siates,
co-opeJation. in this field could latet be given a more organic basis and its scope
crruld be vddened. The advisabiliq' of setting up at Community level an organization
similar to the Belgian Commission bancairi of the American Securities and
E,xchange Commission should also be considered  (secs. 16-23).
5.  On account of their narrowness,  the securities markets in the EEC counffies
are all beset with similar operating problems.  These can be solved only by providing
irrstitutional investors with opportunities for expanding  their operations  on th;
c_apital market,, by ffansacting on the stock exchinges business that is at present
drone outside the exchanges, and by establishing closer communications bitween
the markets of the various countries. The latter aim could be pursued by listing
a greater number of foreign securities and by developing  inter-national  irbitrage
(stecs. 26-32).
6,. Listing the securities of other member  countries on the \/arious exchanses
would facilitate  dfalings jn these securities and reduce costs. For this purpose, ihe
discriminatory  rulings which in certain countries  make it more difficult-or more
JLIcostly to secure the quotation  of foreign securities  than that of domestic securities
should be eliminated. Requirements concerning information for the public and
procedures for admission to quotation should also be harmonized (secs. 34-38).
7. The securities of other member countries could also be quoted in larger
numbers on those markets which have simpler admission  procedures  (marchd
hors cote, aentes publiques suppbmentaires, Freiuerkebr,  mercato ristretto). They
should be admitted without formality if they are already oficially quoted on
a stock exchange in their country of origin. Simplification and harmonization  of
the techniques of establishing and presenting quotations would increase knowledge
of the markets of other member countries and would encourage  arbitrage  (secs.
39-41).
8. In order to facilitate  the movement  of and dealing in securities, certain technical
adjustments  could also be made. These include:
i) The institution of European clearing arrangements for securities;
ii) The adoption of tax measures designed to encourage the release of shares at
present ftozen in company portfolios, together with the reduction of indirect taxes
on stock exchange transactions;
iii) Harmonization  of the rules governing  credit institutions as intermediaries  in
transactions involving  securities,  and the search for ansv/ers to the problems
raised by the operations of directors or executives dealing in the securities of their
ovrn companies ("insider trading");
iv) Amendment of the measutes
blocks of shares, so as to ensure
comparable  degree of efficiency
(secs. 42-48).
rvhich, in certain countries,  hamper dealings in
that these operations can be carried out with a
and safety in the various member countries
Chapter L2: Disparities in the working and supetvision of the financial insti
tutions
L.  Active participation  by the various types of financial institution in the creation
of a European capital market may be hampered by the rules under which they
operate  and the supervisory controls to which they are subjected.  The difierences
in these rules and controls are, moreover,  liable to distort competition  and therefore
constitute  an obstacle to the process of integration (secs. 1-9).
2.  The main dificulty  facing the banks in the task of attracting funds is the
diversity of the regulations on the rates of interest they may ofier on deposits.
As regards employment of the funds, the difierences  concern not so much interest
rate regulations as the obligatory  minimum and maximum holdings of certain types
of asset (secs. 10-17).
3.  The need to achieve a certain balance between the rules on management of a
bank's liabilities and those dealing with the assets it may hold makes harmonization
even more necessary:  the diversity of the existing systems could, if it were not
31reduced, create bet$/een the banks of difierent countries competition  ptoblems
analogous to those which have already arisen between different institutions within
the same country (sec. 18).
'1. No change in the working rules of specialized credit institutions can be
lecommended until the activity of each institution has been examined  individually,
for only in this way can allowance be made for its special role in the economic
and financial system of the counmy in which it is located. The general  pdnciple,
however, could be laid down that any special advantages granted to these institutions
are justified only in relation to specific burdens  or obligations imposed  upon them.
ffhese advantages  should therefore be extended to all institutions subject to similar
restrictions  and obligations  (secs. L9-23).
.1. Owing to the size of their resources  and their wide network of branches,
r;avings banks cannot be considereC to be purely local institutions:  they have an
essential tole to play in the development o{ a European capital market. To this
end the first step in harmonizing their investment des should, as alrcady pointed
out in Chapters  8, 9 and 10, be to broaden their authorized tange of operations.
'$Thereas the local savings banks would - 
up to a specified  percentage of their
funds - 
be allowed to make exactly the same investments in other member
countries as those open to them at home, the central organizations  and the savings
franks vdth a centralized structure could here and now be granted greater freedom
r:f action for operations in other member  countries (secs. 24-30)t.
ti.  The principles for harmonizing the investment des of life a,ssurance companies
have already been set forth; one particular proposal put forward was that the
r:ligibility requirements  as far as listed securities are concerned should be liberalized.
,Also the rules preventing subsidiaries or branches of life assurance companies from
entrusting all or part of their technical  feserves to their parent ,companies in other
member countries should gradually be relaxed (secs. 31-35).
',7. The right to conclude life assurance conracts directly with non-residents  could
efiectively promote the expansion  of capital flows between Community countries.
'[he administrative  obstacles to the direct writing of contracts a,cross frontiers and
to advetising and canvassing by companies in other Membet States should be
lemoved. To prevent these developments  giving rise to problems of competition
between  the companies of difierent countries cettain steps woul:l be necessary:
i) Indirect taxes on life assurance premiums should be abolished in those Member
litates where they are still levied;
j.i) Any fiscal advantages granted to insured  persons should be the same, irrespective
of whether contracts are concluded with domestic  comoanies or those of other
member countries:
the "seoaration" of the various branches c,f insurance should
i.v) The current principles underlying  control of investment shotrld be harmonized:
i:n the long run, the greatest possible freedom should be sought in this field, while
strict requirements  ought to he imposed for the information to be made available
rro the public (secs. 36-38).
JZ
iiii) The problem of
be solved;Chapter 13: The exchange tisk - 
an obstacle to ttansactions
1.  Although it will gradually  lessen,as a European  capital market develops, the
.,..frunJ. ti-J wifi not"disappsar completely until {ormal monetary union has been
achieved.  Intra-Comm,rtity  fitun.ial iransactions will still be afiected by this risk
during the transitional period (sec' 1)'
2.  This obstacle is particularly serious for institutional  investors such as savings
banks and insurance iompanies  and - 
in connection with medium- and long-term
ooerations which cannot be covered by forward foreign exchange transactions  -
for the commercial banks as well (secs. 2 and 3).
3.  The seriousness of the exchange risk has alteady decreased for borrowers as
;h. ;*i"t;i.rrrr.rr.i.,  making up"thefu  receipts. has-increased; as for the financial
i"i.r..Jiiti.s,'where  they carinoi themselves shoulder  this risk, they can.often
,rrung. to pass it on to the ultimate borrower or to a public authority not directly
party to the contract (secs. 2-4).
4.  The cautious  liberalization  of the rules for institutional investors recommended
i" th. pt.*ding .hapt.rs could include authorizing them, within sp.ecified  limits,
io prrr.'hur. seciritiei expressed in foreign.currencies, perhaps through instruments
such as investment  companies, that enable risks to be- spread' These investors
.""Ta ^;i  ;;  be giv;; the freedom to purchase any for-eign securities listed on
the stock exchanges in their own country  (sec' 5)'
5.  The unification of these foreign exchange markets where. a distinction is still
-"a. il.rvr.." u^ "ofi.iui'i rate foicurrent tiansactions and a"free",rate for capital
transactions  appears to te feasible and v,ould be decidedly-beneficial. In the longer
i..*,  tt.  n".ro* margins within which the Member  States'currencies  are 
^t ;;;";  ;id.J  to fl".t'"ute with respect to one another might even be eliminated
altogether  (secs. 6 and 7)'
6.  In international  loan issues, the conditions  governing distribution of the
.*.h"nn. risk between Lo.rour.tr'und lenders meritilose examination;-this  applies
il;;?;i;;  br;;  which contain a currency option (sec. 9), those denominated
il if;;;;d  ;i rh" rnurl.t on which the issue is made (sec. 10), loans.expressed
irr.r"i,r of aciount (secs. 11 and 12) and loans denominated in a "third" cufrency
(sec.1l).
7.  Experience has been helpful in diversifying  the, investment  outlets  available
;. r;";;r ;[to"gh th. adoption of forms thai meet their preferences;  at the same
i1--l. tf,. ea.. #th which capital can flow across frontiers has increased' However,
iir. li*pp*r"r..-"f  it-t. 
""itrung" 
risk should in future make it unnecessary  to faii
back on iuch curency clauses  (sec. 14)'
Chapter 14 Tax obstacles
L.  The setting up and smooth _working of a European  capital market require
Urrt ,ft. ry*-"t  oi tu*utiott  should not ;ilitate -against the cre.ation of conditions
;;;i";";';  ,hot. o[tui"ing o" a domestic market. The re-quis-ite neutrality will
h;;;il;  ".ti.".a 
ygh.n th'. tax system no longer afiects the choice of the place
JJwhere the investment is made or the transaction carried out an,d does not influence
the saver's choice between making the investment direct or relying on an interme-
diary acting as a collector of savings. This kind of neutraliiy also presupposes
greater unifotmity in the tax incentives given to various types of inveitmeni and
methods of financing (secs. 1-7).
2.  At present the main obstacles in the way of this neutrality are as follo'urs:
i) International double taxation of income from securities (ser:s. 8-10);
ii) The existence of tax advantages or charges applying  selectlively to invesrments
made in certain countries (sec. 11);
iii) The difierent attitudes of the Member States in connection with the tax
treatment of income from securities accruing to non-residents or to persons who
do not file an income tax return. (secs. 12 and tl).
In order to minimize these obstacles, certain adjustments  in the tax systems of the
member countries are necessary,
3.  \fhere international  agreements for avoidance of double taxation do not exist
or, if they exist, do not apply to_ income from securities or are no longer suited to
present systems- of taxa!.ion, fresh st lutions should be sought througli multilateral
agreement or thr_ough the simultaneous adoption of appropriate  measures by all
Member States. It could, for insrance, be ag?eed to tu* th.i. in.omes only in one
of the two countries  concerned; or it mighibe preferred  to share the tax revenue
by imposing a withholding tax in the- rourcd country and making systematic
allowance for it in the beneficiary's  country  (secs. L0 and'14-19',1.
4.  As noted in Chapter L0, certain counuies grant, to their residents only, a
"tax credit" on the dividends of companies incorporated in that country; in 
-fact
this is a refund of part of the corporate.income  tax. This means a diiparity of
fteatment between income from shares of companies  incorporated in the .ounuy
concerned  and income from shares of companies incorporated abroad, and also
discrimination  between residents and non-residents.  To avoid such discrimination
the authorities might consider  granting the same tax credit on the dividends paid
by foreign-  companie_s.  A solution more in keeping with the required eficient
wotking-of the market would be to establish  appiopriate procedures to cedit
non-residents with a sum equal to the "tax creditt" this solution would have the
same efect as the current German  arrangement under which tax is levied at a
reduced rate on the disributed portion of company profits (secs. 20-24).
.5. Harmonization of the difierent types of tax treatment of income from securities
accruing to non-residents  or to persons rvho do not file an inr:ome tax return is
,especially important for the bond market, owing to the direct influence of yields
rtn the choice of fixed-interest  investments. This harmonizatjion might lead to
complete  abolition of withholding taxes on bond interest or to the introduction of
a uniform tax in all Member States. In any case, it would be adlvisable  to examine
carefully the problems which might occut when the change is ma,Ce to a harmonized
system of this kind, so that the introduction  of these reforms, should not cause
r:listurbances  on the market or distortions in the flow of capital (secs. 25-lL).
it46. The problem of how to refund or "cfedit" tax withheld in a foreign countfy
is sometimes  even less satisfactorily solved for institutional investors (insurance
companies and pension funds) than for individuals.  None the le_ss,_  the_ basic
diffiiulties are tG same and in general terms the same solutions should be adopted
(secs. 32-34).
7. The tax disadvantages  at pfesent attaching to investments made in other
member  countries through the intermediary  of financial institutions, notably invest-
ment companies,  should be eliminated.  \X/hat solutions prove to be possible will
depend on the basic choices made by the Member States concerning taxation of
iniome from foreign securities.  Furthermore,  owing to the complexity of the legal
relationships  betw-een the various parties involved in such investments, it will
probably be possible to attain an entirely satisfactory  degree of fiscal "transpar€ncy"
onlv within ih. fru-evlork of a multiiateral  convention  for avoidance of double
taxation which explicitly caters for the special case of investment companies
(secs. 35-44).
8. The indirect taxes which norv most directly hinder the setting up of a European
market are those levied on the collection and uansfer of capital.
These obstacles could be removed either by abolishing the taxes in question or by
all countries adopting uniform fates, the other conditions being harmonized  in
such a v/ay as to avoid any double taxation.
Under a ltaf.t directive now before the Council, stamp duty on the issue of
securities and on their admission to quotation on a stock exchange is to be abolished
and is not to be replaced by any other tax; the draft also provides for a uniform
low duty on the initial capital of companies or on any subsequent  incease in
their capital (secs. 45-48).
35 hbPART ONE
THE ELEMENTS OF THE PROBLEM
For the reader's guidance in studying the problem examined in this Report, a word
must first be saij concerning  the nalture of the needs felt at the,present. time, the
upprou.l"t recommended  by ihe Group of experts for meeting -them and the data
."ii1to"l which it would not be possible to unterstand the initjal situation in which
action will be taken to develop a European  capital market.  Such- is the purqoie
oi Fur, I of the Report. Becarlse of its^introdr,titory natufe, this first part, unljke
the others, contains no specific  recommendations;  it is-none the less essential that
itr" n.ooti should .orrtrin a definition of the principles on which the Group of
""p.ttt'worked 
and the Group's assessment  of-the problems likely to arise from
the diversity of the present  situation.
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37-38CHAPTER 1
A EUROPEAN CAPITAL  MARKET:  ITS FOUNDATIONS
AND THE CONDITIONS FOR ITS DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
1.  The carefully balanced provisioris of the Treaty of Rome necessitate  a measure
of oarallel deveiopment in 
-the 
rcalization of its economic objectives.  Inevitably,
ho.ireu.r, the rates of progress made in the difierent fields have sometimes got
t.*poruiity out of phar.,"the  free movement of capital, for instance,  has not
"iti"*a 
as rapidly as establishment  of the customs union, freedom of movement
for person and services, of the introduction of common policies'- In fact, -the
;;#;;  ;"rk.t  for capital is at present little more than a preliminary  plan;
-rr..".t,  the difierenc& in the attitudes adopted by the various Member States
r.g"riirg',tr. probl.- of free movement  of capilal cannot be maintained  indefinitely
without risk.
If this situation were to continue, it could not but delay or ieopardize the establish-
ment of a true economic  union among the Member States.- Just.as there can be
"o ti.uar"ni balanced expansion in alountry's  economy unless,it has the requisite
fi"*.iui'machinery, so too the expansion  of- produciion and rade within the
Community  requir'es a financial syst;m adapted io att economy of Eutopean scale.
The problem would doubtless  be less acute if the national  markets were fully able
;;;;;-rh;  financing needs which occur in each country- T!is-i_s apparently not
the case at present, io judge by the eflorts being made. in all Membef States to
it"Ot;; tii.'.ffi.i.n.y of th".ir markets and so to cope with the new situation that
is developing.
2.  This situation can be approached from two entirely difierent points- of view'
I; ;  L; ;G;J  that the shortcomings of the national  markets are an obstacle to
the establishirent of a Community  capital market that will be difficult to overcome.
ij;  ;hil-il.1y  ".g"ti". 
attitude .un b. rejec-ted,. ard it iun bi argued that the
;i";t  6"ing'ph;n.d or already put in hand.by the var.ious Governments make
this an uppr6pii"t. moment ut *hi.h to lay the foundations  of, a capital market
on the Euiop.an scale, there being no conflict between the wish to imProve.the
;iii.t.;.;;T;;ii";;i;"rkets  and ihe aim of developins a truly Furopean market,
in fact,'the measufes that can help to imptove the national  market will as a rule
[. .*uirtv the same as those needtd to divelop a European market.
A study of the general conditions of economic balance in the Member States shows
iil-#.  ,..oni approach is both feasible and desirable. The rates of -saving
attained in the various .orr.rlier of the Common Market compare favourably with
ilror. of other countries. The shortcomings of the capital markets in the various
member  countries ,r., in reality, due not io tny lack of overall savings, but rather
i"-1" l*Uriance between  supply and demand for capital, the markets being too
narrow and the investors' liquidity preference  too strong'The establishment  of a broad European  market would mean that the supply of and
demand for funds could be.qrruted itr competitive conditions and at miriimum cost.
A more diversified  market would offer borrowers and lenders a wide choice of
type and period of ransaction.  Finally, an integrated market would not entail
distortion or hindrance of the flow of capital on grounds of the country of residence
of the operators.
3.  It should not be forgotten that market mechanisms  make' their contribution
to..economic .growth and balance within the framework of policies reflecting
collective preferences and long-term economic  4nd social desiderata.  Consequently,
a broader  capital market should be accornpanied by inueased  facilities for- impll-
menting Community  economic policy. It cannot be denied, moreover, that some
of the instruments of financial policy used in each country are better suited than
others to the gradual creation of capital markets that are more ,cpen to the outside
world. The specific measures  which the experts advocate for the development of
a European capital market must therefore be such that the fina:ncial structures and
policies of the Member  States can gradually be adapted. In prart these measures
rvill be based on a conception of the economic  foundations of a European market
to be outlined in Part I of this chapter; in part they will depend on the procedure
envisaged to achieve this aim - 
and this will be dealt with in the second part of
the chaoter.
I.  Economic foundations of a European capitall market
A. BROADENING OF MARKETS AND ECONOMIC  EXI'ANSION
'4.- I" every community co-untry the capital market 
- 
i.e. the machinery through
which resources  are collected  and channelled towards the financirrg of inveitment I-
is again playing_ a role which is considerably more significant  than in the early
'postwar years. During the period of reconsffuction, recourse to the market was of
:modest proportions, both the collection of funds and the choice of investment
being largely in -the hands of the State. The low level of persrenal  savings meanr
that investment had to be financed either through direct aciion on the pa"rt of the
public authorities,  or from savings  accumulated  by the firms irhemselv^es.  Today
the situation is differenr.
l\,low that-.personal saving,has  come into its own again, the cap.ital market is once
more. fulfillilg its role of intermediary;  governments, for their part, have pro-
gressively reduced the amount of direct assistance for the finanr;ing  of enterpriies.
,{t the same time the efect of keen competition has been to narr-ow considirably
the- margins from 'which enterprises_  can ,find their own finance. Consequently
their financing potential, and hence their ability to compete,  harre come to d.p.ni
in _large_ mea,sure  on how easily and at what cost they ian borr,rw on the *"ik.t,
either directly or with the aid of institutions acting as intermediaries.
IJnder these circumstances the development of a European marllet would improve
the situation on three main counts.
40A) ADVANTAGES TO THE BORROWER
). Such a capital market woulC help to meet the increased needs entailed in
adapting enteiprises to the new demands of the common market. The rcorganiza'
tions and -ergerc considered  desirable to enable industrial  and commercial firms
to reach the dimensions needed in the common marker do in fact entail greater
recourse to outside finance.
The competitive distortions engendered by dif{erences  _ between the member
countfies 6r, for that matter, within each country,  as regafds the supply of business
finance could thus be reduced. In the still embryonic stage of international  organ-
ization of the capital markets, it is in fact only the big companies that can tap
foreign markets, often at rates rvhich are more. advantageous  than those they
rvo,lli have obiained in their own colrntfy. These opportunities  are for the
Dresent almost entirelv denied to other companies. One of the main consequences
of u gt."t"r cross-frontier flovr of capital - 
and of the resultant  equalization  of
the c6st of financing - 
would therefore be the lessening of this disadvantage  to
the small and medium-sized enterprises, though it could not be expected to eliminate
this disadvantage.
.B) ADVANTAGES TO THE LENDER
6.  Establishment of a European  capital market is not the mefe aggregation of the
markets of the six Member-states;-the  fact of ofiering the individual saver and
institutional investof a wider choice will bring out money which, for lack of-a
satisfactory investment outlet, has so fat been used to purchase  consumef  goods,
to hoard, ior speculation  or to purchase material assets as a hedge against inflation.
If competition betv/een intermediaries  were. free thtoughout- the Community, the
potential  investor would be more efiectively, courted than before and a greater
iotal of savings would reach the market. This has in fact been happening for
some time pasi and has led to the introduction and development  in certain countries
of new forms of investment which have subsequently  enjoyed gfeat success. This
has been the case, fot instance, for real estaG investment companies,  opel-end
investment  funds, 
'and 
life-assurance  policies inclu&ng indexation clauses and the
like. This stimulation of competition- among  intermediaries  and a mote sustained
savings campaign would indeed figure among the main soufces of strength of a
future European market.
C) 'ITTE ADJUSTMENT  OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND  FOR CAPITAL
7.  In economic terms, it can be said that the purpose of a European  capital
market would be to provide greater capacity for mutual adaptation of demand  and
supply than is ut prit.ttt tJ be found in- the capital markets of the individual
.o.t.rtii.t. Today ihe volume of transactions on these markets is weak, and tle
circulation  of financial instruments is not as smooth as it should be. Consequently
any unexpected variation in demand or supply produces disproportionate  fluctua-
tions in the cost of capital.
41llhe efiects of creating a broad capital market, which will be th,: more positive in
s,r fat as they are backed by close co-ordination of economic  and. financial policies,
can be looked at from two angles, the structural and the cyclical,
Irirst, it has been found that the exchange of certain  classes of linancial  assets for
others can improve the balance among various markets. Suctr is the case, for
example,  when in a given country a growing preference  for liquid assets leads to
bigher rates on the long-term capital market: this leads to export of securities
(and a comesponding  inflow of long-term  capital ) and at the same time accumulation
of short-term claims. Market conditions would obviously be subject to more
violent disturbances if there were no such possibility of arbitrage, no safety-valve
allowing contact vrith other capital markeis. Such- exchang.t iif  financial assets
arc paft of the normal activity of a market where dealing is free. There is no
difierence in character betvreen them and the merchandise  trade flows which have
evolved since the comrnon market was established 
- 
and no c,ne today contests
the economic  advantage of this latter development.
Fears are, however, frequently expressed that in the present situation the strains
that build up inside national markets 
- 
often because of their narrowness,  of the
difierences in the way the various types of investment are ta:Ked and of other
distortions which have not yet been eliminated 
- 
could, as markets are integrated,
unleash "perverse" capital movements.  Some of these dificulties must be looked
on as transitional problems of adjustment  to a nev/ situation; the play of the
market itself would tend to whittle rhem away rapidly. other rislis could be
reduced if each Member State of the Community were to speed up the improvements
being made in the existing machinery, bring investment  oppoitunities  more into
line with the preferences of savers and eliminate  fiscal discrimination, particularly
between investment at home and investment in other membef ,countriis.
A.gain from the structural aspect, the creation of an integrated  nnarket would also
facilitate tbe balancing of long-term capital supply and demand in another way.
In view of the preference  strown by savers for liquid investments, this balancing
would necessitate  the "transformation"  of short-term into longer-term investments,
tlrrough financing institutions,  in all member countries. This ffansformation is,
hrf,w€ver,  limited by the liquidity requirements  of the financing institutions respon-
sible for it - 
requirements that are the more restrictive the srnaller the volume
of funds to which they apply. The ueation of a financial system of European
p:roportions would thus increase the general transformation potential of a glven
volume of liquid savings, by giving these establishments more scop,e and by stepping
up capital flows from country to countfy.
The_ second angle from which the smoother  adaptation of supply and demand
resulting from-integration  of capital markets needs to be consideied'is  the cyclical:
diivergences,  of economic  trend among the various Member States are unlii<ely to
d:isappear altogether, even when they have gone a long way in harmonizing  iheir
prclicies. This will be directly reflected in the conditions  prevailing on the lapital
n':Larkets; the resultant fluctuations  could be considerably reduced- if the balance
br:tween supply and demand were sought not in the framework  of national markets,
which are in many cases too nartow, but vdthin a broader frame.work  where  these
ttends would tend to cancel each other out.
421The practical significance of these two sets of considerations  is immediately appar-ent
when the discussion moves to a highly topical problem 
- 
that of the steadily
mounting cost of money noted bolh in -the eommunity and in non-membet
countries.
This phenomenon  can liardly be looked upon as sometbing pure-ly cyclical, as it
lingeri on even when expansion shows signs of levelling ofi. It would seem therefore
to be linked with more fundamental factors such as:
i)  The increased  recourse  to borrowing  to finance the activities of private enterprises
and the investment  programmes  of the public sector;
ii) Lenders' expectation of higher nominal yields protecting the real yield of their
investments against the risks of erosion of the value of money;
iii) The deliberate raising of interest rates by counuies forced, on balance-of-
payments grounds,  to pnth rates up to a level that is no longer consonant with the
situation at home.
In fact. in almost all the countries there has for some time been a noticeable  trend
- 
which forms the backcloth to these developments - 
to push public and private
investment expenditure beyond the limit of available resources. A European-scale
widening of the frame witirin which capital supply and demand.are  equated would
no doub"t help to moderate the often undesira6le efiects of this trend on capital
markets.
First, the increase in the supply of funds and the better functioning of the.distri-
butive machinery would t.nif.i the efiects produced_ on the cost of -money by the
increasing  demand for capital - 
efiects which _could be particularly  unfortunate
if markels continue to be as nartowly circumscribed as they are today.
Secondly, a bidding-up of interest rates_ on balanc!:-of-payments  grounds.would
become'pointless ind, i"deed, impossible in the_community.  The problem of
relations-with  markets outside the Community would of course persist, but it could
be more successfully solved by joint action on the part of all Member  States than
by the sporadic  measures  taken at present.
B. REALIZATION OF ECONOMIC UNION ,AMONG MEMBER  STATES
8.  To these general comments on the assistance  an integrate{.  c.anital. market is
intended to giie to economic expansion in the Community  should be added certain
observations"on  particular facets of the economic unign being_ established  between
Member States. Th. firrt of these facets to be considered will be the conffibution
u E,,rtop.utt  capital market can make to the execution of joint measures.  The
second q,r.rtion dealt with is how far such a market could improve the working
of the international pavments system; in this connection,  however, no detailed
examination has been made of tlre overall machinery for adjusting  the balance of
payments,  as such a study lies outside the scope of this Report',4) EXECUTION OF JOINT MEASURES
9.  In addition to the budgetary  subsidies  accorded by governments as part of
their regional and agricultural policl', a considerable  amount c,f additional^money
is collected for these purposes  through the capital markets. One need only looi<
at the activities of the various  bodies specializing in the financing of the agricultural
credit institutions and of the investments made in the less developed regions. At
community level one of the functions of the European  Investment Bank is to
finance schemes which contribute to the development-of  such regions; to raise the
necessary money it floats loans on the various capital  markets.
The common ag_ricultural  policy, tho'rgh financed  predominantly by machinery
outside tt e market, must also be able to rely on help from 
' 
thq institutioni
mentioned. Mobility_ of capital itself plays an importani role in regional policy
since,,with goods and manpower circulating  freely, "compartmr:ntalizition"  of thb
capital markets could aggravate rather than mitigate exisiing irnbalances.
Here, the Group feels that it must refute the argument fairly frequently  heard
that freedom of movement_ for capital could make-the less-favoured'regions  even
poorer _because of the pull which more developed regions exert on any money
available for investment.  Freedom of movement for iapital is an essential, but
not by itself sufficient condition for the carrying orrt of a regional development
policy; is is clear that regional policy will noi be a succesii unless .otrdition,
favourable to investment have been eitablished.  Unless this isr done nothins ean
prevent the flight of capital from _the regions concerned  even in existing ciicum-
stances;  once however these conditions have been establishecl,  the gre-ater ease
with which capitalcan flow in from outside will considerably  speed up ichievement
of the aims of regional policy.
.A European capital market should be of great assistance in implementing  the
common ffansport  go1igf. A great deal of capital will be needed if the expa-nsion
rand-imp{ovement  of infrastructure  is to be camied through in co-ordinatediashion
in the community; much of the money will have to be raisecl by borrowing,  as
rthe execution of the programme vrill undoubtedly involve surns'that canno"t' be
liound. from government budgets. There has *oreov.r been a growing  tendency
in various  member countries  to turn to the capital markets for the-money  needed to
linance ce19in types of public works which were previously consridered investments
to be paid for from the budget (motorways, pipelines, inland water uansport).
lMention  should also be made of the financial aid rvhich the Community  has pledged
to the associated  African States and Madagascar, and to Greece and iurkey. Tiis
aid is in the main to be drawn from budget appropriations, bur to the sums thus
made available are added others from thJEuropean  I.rv.rt-.nr Bank, which will
have to raise the money for its loans on the capital markets.
lVlore important perhaps, so far as relations with non-mem.ber countries are
concerned, is the burden imposed on the capital markets bl' the considerable
€Fowth of medium- and long-term export cr.iits, and also by financial aid to
developing-countries, whether this is given direct or through iniernational institu-
tions. In the case of export credit, difierences  in the conditlions ofiered can distort
44the competitive climate, and from this angle it is clear that nothing-but  a sufficiently
far-reaching  integration of the matkets can re-establish_ equality o{ opponunlty  for
those enteiprisei whose expofts  depend on the credit terms they can ofier to
buyets. It is evident too th;t only a suficiently  b-road -capital matket can make it
possible for Member  States to export capital in all its forms to the less-developed
countries on terms and in quantities consonant with the economic importance of
the Community as a whole.
B) IMPROVEMENT OF INTERNATIONT\L  PAYMENTS RELATIONS
10. It is generally accepted that monetary union will have become a reallty once
goods,..rui.., and'perso-ns can move freely, capital movements and current financial
iranractionr are free of all restrictions,  and thE members of the union have under-
taken not to alter existing  exchange rates betu/een  their cuffencies. Among these
various conditions,  the sti'bility ofexchange rates has not been the subject of any
formal undertaking by the Member States. There are, however, .ample. grounds
for supposing  thai they already attach, far greater importance to_the maintenance
of exiiiing larities thin could have been foteseen when the Treaty came into
force. Sin"ce 1959 it has been found that exchange rates can be kept stable even
in an economic  area where major structural changis are occuring; apart ftom the
small revaluation of the mark and of the guilder in t96l there have been no
changes. Despite fears that certain disequilibria could prove to-be p-ermanent,
these"were more a matter of relations with non-member  countries than of relations
b.t-..n the Member States. The policv pursued in Italy, for instance, during the
difficulties that occurred in 1963-64 reem to shovr that the authorities are,ready
to tackle disturbances  without tesorting to testrictions  or to altering the exchange
tu,.r. ttr. Member States have in ad-dition agreed that all the other con4itions
rt o"ta be met before the end of the transitional period laid down in the Treaty
of Rome.
Once freedom of movement for goods and complete mobility of -capital have heen
achieved and the stability of exchange rates assured, it is clear that the supply ot
and demand for capital in each individual Member State will become very sensitive
tu .hutrg.r in interest fates; the capital account in the balance of payments  could
then eaiilv be nudged in the desired direction by appropriate monetafv  mea-sures'
ftr. "..Jio 
call o.r"the reserves  of central banks as in indirect result of imbalances
in intra-Community  payments will no-longer arise; it can even.be said that mobility
of capital is one of^ tt.  conditions for ihe smooth- functioning of a Community
..ono-y in which exchange  rates are fixed and the freedom of curent transactions
is absolute. The temporiy financing o{ any imbalances  that might occur would
thus be arranged through movements  of capital.
1L. Similar considerations seem to apply to payments between  the Community
,nd non-t"rnber counries. These havJ sometimes  been seriously afiected.by the
i;ttitt  of th" European markets to meet internal demand in the desited form'
Clearlv. if there is to te a common monetary policy vis-i-vis non.-member  countries'
,h#,L;;irt.,  *.rrt have at their disposal iapital markets which are both efficient
and responsive to any stimuli intended to elicit corrective capital movements.
45In relations with these countries, it is possible that satisfactory co-ordination  of
economic  policies will not be obtained  and that the elimination of taxation dis-
parities and achievement of exchange  rate stability will not necessarily be ensured.
It has been held that movements  of. capital can, under such circumstances, constitute
an element of imbalance in international payments and it may than be necessary,
in the interest of maintaining  freedom of current transactions,, to impose certain
limits on international  capital  transactions.
The points made in section 7 above have already thrown light on the position
which the Group has adopted in this delicate  matter; here it should only b-e added
that, where resffictive measures  are taken on short-term  grouncls in face of imme-
diate threats, they must not be part of a policy which systenoatically places the
burden of adjustment  on the capital account of the balance of pa'yments.  Resmictive
measures of this tvpe often take root and grow more severe in the course of time,
giving rise to incteasing distortions; correction of any such imbalances should
therefore be-sought  through correction of the policies which were in the first place
responsible for creating the imbalances.
II. Role of the public authorities and of the financial institutions
12. To the foregoing sketch of the role that an integrated  carpital market could
play in the life of the Community should be added a review-of  the conditions
which must be met by such a market.
'Ihe Treaty has don_e no more than fix the objectives 
- 
which, incidentally, are
somewhat imprecisely defined 
- 
and indicate the procedure to be followed in
freeing capital- mo-rements  and pgtting an end to discrimination. The gradual
construction of a European capital market will, however, prove a success only if
r:ertain reforms and adaptations have been made in the tecliniques used and in-the
institutional  framework. While these changes should be as far as possible spon-
taneous, it is evident that their speed and efiectiveness will depend in part on the
conscious efiorts made by the Governments  of the Member-istates and bv the
Iinancial institutions.
A. THE ROLE OF THE AUTHORITIES
.t3. - The public autlorities  are involved in the creation of a European  capital
market at two complementary levels. On the one hand, the publii authorities
determine the conditions under which resources are allocated  bl'-the machinerv of
the market. In the framework  of a harmonized economic policy, the "rules of the
game" which have to be obeyed by the market institutions slhould be clarified.
i[he- drawing -up of a "medium-term economic  policy programme" at Community
Ievel will.make it possible to plan out rhis framework.
lrlew laws or regulations  of various types will be needed to speedl the establishment
of an integrated  European capital mirket. Their general tinor can be indicated
here, fuller details being left to later chapters in this Repon.
46The reforms advocated by the Group are essentially technical points; they do not
call into question the political objectives of governments, but only the choice of
economic policy instruments.
.4) ADAPTATION  OF INSTRUMENTS
14. The adaptations that most urgently  need to be made belong to five main
fields:
i) In the fiscal field, those measures which at present discriminate between internal
investment on the one hand, and investment efiected in or by other member
countries  on the other, will need to be revoked. It will also be necessary to
adjust any difierences  in the tax treatment  accorded to the various types of invest-
ment and to reduce or abolish certain indirect  taxes on the operations bv which
capital is collected.
ii) The internal segmentation of domestic capital markets will decline in impot-
tance as financial channels are broadened on the European  scale. The national
authorities  ought, however, to encouiage  this rend by reconsidering the arrange-
ments {or certain specialized financing channels.
iii) The regulations applicable to institutional  investors are often out o{ date and
therefore ill-adapted to current cle-relopments; they need to be amended. As
investment through this channel is still insufficiently developed in Community
countries.  action should be taken to make it easier to remove certain obstacles
which prevent these institutions from undertaking a wider range o{ investment
operations  both in other member  countries and at home.
iv) The exchange conuol regulations  governing  capital movements ought also to
be reviewed, in the light of the firll convertibility already achieved for current
transactions.  On the basis of this review it would be possible to assess, on the
one hand, the eficacy of the existing controls,  and on the other the gravity of the
obstacles which these regulations may place in the way of rational and equitable
ordering of financial  transactions  betrveen  countries.
v) There are also certain adminisffative measures that involve discretionary  de-
cisions; by and large these should be replaced by clearly defined operational  rules
that would make it possible to eliminate any risk - 
real or imaginary - 
of
discriminatory treatment.
B) }IARMONIZATION OF ECONOMIC POLICIES
L5. The exigencies and special features of national policies will diminish in
importance as experience with Community  action produces formulas for co-ordina-
ting and harmonizing  these policies, both in the field of short-term  measures and
in connection with longer-term  growth. By pinpointing  possible imbalances  and
spelling out the priorities to be observed, the introduction of a Community pro-
gramme of medium-term economic  policy will clarify the bases of financial policy.
It will then be possible to make a sounder assessment  of financial  needs and of
ways and means of meeting them.
47Ihis "financial  programming" by the public authorities will enable two main
,objectives to be achieved. At home it will be possible to prevent excessive  pressure
,on the market by borrowers insulficiently sensitive to changes in interest  rates
- 
either because profitability considerations do not apply to them or perhaps
because their view of development prospects makes them temporarily more impru-
dent - 
from upsetting the markets and leading to a system of "rationing by cost"
of those applications for finance that rvould really be more in line with economic
policy requirements.
At the same time it will be easier to assess the likely scale and direction of any
.redistribution of financial resources that may occur among the ldember States and,
if the redistribution is considered undesirable, to take concertedl  measures  in order
to correct it. Nor should it be assumed that the redisribution of resources would
be solely within the Community;  this problem has already been ,:liscussed in section
11 above.
'There ought also to be harmonization of the policies behind certain measures by
which the public authorities act on the operations of the credit institutions or
directly on the capital markets in the broad sense to ensure that funds will be
available for priority or privileged borrowers.  Such harmonizal:ion,  which will be
discussed  in Chapters 5 and 6, is hampered  by the difficulty of determining  how
far the measures taken really afiect market conditions and urhat repercussions they
can have abroad.
For this reason and for others of a strictly domestic character, any subsidies  that
are to be given should be clearly recognizable  as such in the budget and should
be allocated to the beneficiaries either directly or through approved financial
institutions.  As the rates of interest ruling on the various markets will then
correspond more closely with the real supply and demand situation, one major
objection to integration  of the markets would lose much of its force. It is not as
easy - 
and here the reasons are political rather than technical -- to grant assistance
from the budget as it is to intervene in the credit field. It  may, howevet, be
wondered if the very ease with which the authorities can influ.ence the supply of
,credit has not contributed to the maintenance in budgetary systems and, even
more, in fiscal systems of certain rigidities which are harmful both from the point
of view of fairness and from that of the eficacy of economic poliicy.
B, THE ROLE OF THE IIINANCIAT  INSTITUT/ONS
E) CHANGES THAT SHOULD BE MADE
16. The financial institutions  can adapt their activities to the new situation in
three main ways:
i) Certain financial techniques in curtent use on the markets of one or more
countries but unfamiliar in others could be adopted generally;  they would extend
both the range of investments  open to savers and the methods  oli financing available
to borrowers;
48ii) Specialization among the various categories of financial intermediary is often
excessive; this not only limits their ability to attract funds, but also excludes them
from certain types of business that could benefit the economy.  The expansion  and
diversification of their operations 
- 
both as borrowers  and as lenders 
- 
that will
ensue once they are part of a rvider market vdll contribute to the establishment
of the conditions which are needed for efiective competition between financial
institutions;
iii) The links between the financial institutions rvill be reinforced by the establish-
ment of common services covering the entire Community.  The widening of
financial contacts will incidentally facilitate refinancing by national institutioni  on
the European capital market and, conversely,  the te*po.aty investment of surplus
funds when supply tends to outrun  demand.
As the changes  are made, those financial intermediaries which at present have the
greatest  experience  in the field of international operations will set the pace {or
the rest. The measures  taken to stimulate  savings must not therefore lead to their
being frozen in internal  investment;  to guard against this possibility,  the investment
rights and opportunities possessed by institutions  collecting these savings should
be extended to embrace the markets of other member countries.
The scope for adaptation is not, of course, the same for all types of institution;
it is true that there are financial intermediades, such as investment companies and,
within certain limits, insurance companies,  which naturally turn to international
markets both for the collection of funds and fot their investments. This is also
true of certain banking institutions such as the banques  d'affaires and for part
of theit activities,  particulady  short-term currency operations, the deposit banks.
Although  other institutions  may only employ the funds at their disposal within
their own country, they can none the less use the refinancing facilities ofiered by
the international market. In certain cases these facilities can be of very great
importance:  one example is provided by institutions which specialize in the
financing of short- and medium-term  loans vrhich are re-financed  by the issue of
bonds on the international market - 
a practice which is already assuming consid-
erable proportions. Conversely, certain types of intermediary or even "initial"
lenders find on the international  market opportunities for investing their own
money without turning to the market as borrowers.
To sum up, there are only a few institutions which will have difficulties in extending
the field of their activities to include direct operations in other Member States.
Among those still encountering difficulties are the savings banks and certain
insurance  and provident institutions, but here too new developments  are possible,
as will be apparent from Chapters 8 and 12.
B) THE MARKET  OF TOMORRO\r
L7. Broader horizons, the impetus given to competition,  and the introduction of
techniques  that arc alteady current practice in other markets will provide the main
drive in the changes that will be necessary before an integrated capital market
49rtan be established. It must nevertheless be recognized  that this ptocess will not
,oiodrrce  a truly single market unless and until it has proved 'possible to femove
,ln.-oi t[.  maierial"obstacles that is still of vital importance: the exchange risk-
,Cnly when monetary  union in the true sense has been established will the financial
ii."..Jiuti.s, borrowerc  and lenders be able to operat€ on the Eutopean  capital
rurk.r as if ihey were dealing on their domestic-markets'  -Steps to reduce the
"UrJit. 
presentei by exchange"rirkr u.. however possible  and several have already
been taken. This problem will be examined in Chapter  L3.
18. The question arises whether the development  of a.capital market on a
Errroo.ul scale will necessarily involve supremacy of one of tl,e financial  centres,
with'the other markets relegaied to the role of satellites. There are two reasons
whv this is unlikely: in the:first place, in an 
^ge 
of increasing\'  rapid communica-
tions, concentration  of the instituiions in one place is of less significance;  secondly,
;;r;;i. i";.stic  financial  channels in each member country v'ill retain much of
ih.ir i.pott"nce for a very long while to come. The pattern -most likely to.develop
*itt U. i  gronp of frnancial .J.t..r retaining their_ "national"-characters but knit
bv an incieasinslv close network of international  financial links. In the more
ait,""t luture i'hi, n"t*otk may well embrace all financial flows and in fact
.otrtri,nt" a European market on which more and more institutions, bursting the
narrov/ limits of lheir domestic markets, will operate.
The Group feels that this clarification should remove any misunderstanding.  as to
tlr. n"t1rt. of the emergent European  market. It is not a qr-restion- of encroachment
by the existing "intertiational  market" (Euro-currenc)'  and. Euro-bond  market) on
ili.  nor-ul bilsiness of the national markets, sapping their strength. Oq the
.".,rrty, as the present markets thrive and as their- operations are gradually
fr".*"riii.a and integr"ted the European market will- develop,  stimulated  by
.o*p.titio" from the' international  riarket, which will have its place in the
Eur6pean  market in process of development.
The tightening of financial links betrveen the Community  countries must moreover
not be at th; expense of the maintenance  or development-  ofr relations betvreen
each of these cou-ntries  and the capital markets of non-member  countries. On the
contrary, as was the case in the ic'tmmercial .sectof, where the build-up of ttade
betw..n'member  countries was accompanied by increased trade with non-member
countfies, the removal of obstacles to capital movements between the member
countries will also encourage financial flovrs between member countries  and non-
member countries. In fact, the maintenance of links between the financial centres
of the Community and those of non-member, coultries_may even make a useful
contribution to the process of integration within the EEC.
As, however, the development of a market involves mofe than decisions to lib-
,rili"r, and calls for new organizational  measures, particulady-measufes  harmonizing
taxes, administrative  rules,-etc., there.is no guarantee that the forging of financial
links'will progress at the'same pace between member countries as between  these
countfies ind-non-member couniries. Should the two developments get out of
phase, some "deflection of ttade", may ocflIr; _but it is- reasonable to assume, on
ih. b"rir of experience gained in the commercial  sector, that the "creation of trade"
efiect will far outweigh any deflectic'n  that may occur.
50CONCLUSlON
19. , rt has already been pointed-out that efiorts to develop a European capital
market can succeed only if a number of general  economic  conditions  are fulfiiled.
For example,  the expansion of savings must be sustained and even increased. The
means to this end are price stabilitn  which must be maintained, broader murk.tt
and, perhaps, offcial incentives, which should however be more neutral than in
the p.ast with regard to the place where the money is invested. As and vrhen the
growing volnme of savings and their greater mobility help to dispel the impression
of_ a general dearth_ of capital now_ plevailing  on certain m"rkei, tthir ir'in-ir.i
e_vidence only of a lack of balance between sEctors  and of maladiusiment between
demand  and supply), the authorities will be able to adopt u -ot. liberal attitude,
as they will have less reason to fear upheavals when 
^the 
barriers between  the
Community countries  are removed
Secondly, the alignment of market conditions in the various financial centres must
p9 pu_rsued. The first moves in this direction were taken under the impetus of
libenlization measures aheady adopted  and of the economic integration process
in general,  and they have already done much to reduce the difiere*ntials  between
interest_rates and, on c_ertain markets, betrveen the f.ees charged for services by the
financial institutions.  Ncne the less, there are still pronou"nced disparities:'it is
reasonabh to suppose that the intensification of _capital  movements^  will help to
narrow them,_ but there is always a risk that divergent official measures ctuld
compromise the p,rogtess .akeady made and so give t[e authorities fresh grounds
for seeking to. isolate_ their national markets. Everything must be done, ihen, to
harmonize policy on interest rates.
The third main condition to be met would seem to be that the external payments
position of the various Member States should correspond with the long-term
balance aimed at by each State (this does not, of corirse, rule out theirieing
structural exporters  or importers of capital): the external payments  situation shoulj
not constitute  an incentive for the authorities to influence the conditions governing
long-term  international movements of capital between Member states.
20. Throrrghout  this report the Group has endeavoured to define 
- 
from the
angle of financial techniques 
- 
the conditions which it feels must be met if a
Erropean capital market is to be developed and the financial links binding the
difierent parts of the Community are to be permanently  strengthened.  Alth"ough
it has. treated purely political considerations as lying outside i6 purview, it do"es
feel that governments must keep_in mind certain broad principles: if a European
capital market is to be developed,_ vigorous action is required-to promote ruuing,
cunency- and price stability must be maintained  and the public finances must b*i
kept in balance.
In an attempt to pinpoint more precisgly the action to be taken, the Group has
examined  the main features of the ptoblems common to the capital markets of th.
various countries and has assessed the importance of the financial links which have
akeady been forged between the Community  countries. This survey of the prerenl
situation is contained  in the remaining two chapters of part. L
51CHAPTER  2
STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS COMMON TO THE I{ARKETS
OF THE EEC MEMBER.  STATES
Introduction
1.. This chapter deals with those features of ,the- capital markets which would
,...  *ort siinificant in connection with the development  of a European qapilll
market. The"aim is not, however, to provide a discription - 
this would lie
outside the terms of reference given to the Group - 
and the::e is no attempt to
sive a full account of the struclure and working of the Memtrcr States' markets.
the intention is to bring out the main difierences bet"veen the markets which
might hamper  the process of integration.
The analysis will focus on capital markels as defined-in Chapter  1. - 
that is, as the
comolex'of  machinery throuih which funds are collected and channelled towards
the hnancing of productiv. i.ru"tt..ttt and of economic and social infrastructure.
This means"essentially  the securities markets and medium- and long-term credit
machinery; but it does not mean neglecting the movements of short-term capital
in so far'as they supplement  of adjuJt the balance of saving and investment'
The tables annexed to this Chapter bring out the main chatacteristics_ of the capital
markets and provide adequate material-for  assessing the scale. of the phenomena
under consid&ation, but they do not allow of detailed compari.sons  of the institu-
tions or of the machinery,  since definitions do not tally in all car;es.
The structural  problems of the member counuies'  markets will be examined from
{our points of vierv in the difierent sections of this Chapter:
L Savings-investment  equilibtium, i.e. the problem of gross capital formation and
its financing;
IL The pattern of demand for funds;
III. The salient features of the supply of funds;
IV. The role of financial intetmediaries in the adjustment of s;upply and demand.
I. Gross capital formation and its financi:ng:
savings-investment  equilibtium
A. THE LEVEL OF SAVING
2.  The prospect of integrating capital markets hitherto practically independent
of each oiher^raises  fromlhe o-utset the problem  posed by thr: difierent  levels of
gross capital formation and the conditions under which saving and investment  can
be brought into balance.
Theoretically, it might be thought that these macro-economic_magnitudes were not
directly relevant to I  study of ihe capital flows which will link the vatious markets
52Jnce- presext obstacles have been eliminated. Indeed, if savings and investment
ate basically- in_balance in a given market, whether the balancJis at a high or a
low level is likely to have only a slight impact on capital flows.
It is only when there is a tendency to disequilibrium on the markets of one or
more countries that stimuli 
- 
in the form of variations in interest rates and of
changes in the level of demand for capital - 
are generated  which encourage an
inflow or outflow of capital.
In practice, it is difficult to distinguish between these two cases; statistics  show
only developments which have taken place and cannot therefore  yield direct
information on the existence of a tendency to disequilibrium.  None the-less, certain
features can be elicited from Tables r  and 2, which give details of gross capital
formation  and its financing It is a reasonable  hypothesis  that the rates of investment
needed to attain the grorvth objectives set ought not in principle to difier widely
among the Community countries  except in Italy and (to a lesser extent) in the
Nethedands,  where a higher rate of investment may be necessary to help real
incomes per head catch up with those in other countries. On this assumption it
may be conjectured that counffies whete the rate of saving is abnormally low are
those whete there is the greatest  likelihood of strain afiecting the capital market,
particularly in the cases of the two countries mentioned above, where the need for
an above-average  rate of investment is presumed (conversely,  it would be wrong to
regard a belorv-average rate of formation of savings as a probable  source of dis-
equilibrium in "mature" economies).
The figures in Tables 1 and 2 show:
i) Rates of saving broadly in line with this assumption, since they are appreciably
higher in Italy and the Netherlands than in Belgium  and France and, even more,
the United Kingdom and the United States, countries with "mature" economies:
most remarkable  of all is the extremely high rate of saving in Germany, due in part
to a high rate of public-sector  saving, which however declined  considerably in L965.
ii) A total Community saving, per annum, calculated on the basis of the average
of. 1,962-t964, of about $59 000 million, compared  with $109 000 million in the
United States and $15 000 million in the United Kingdom.  The very size of these
figures indicates how important it will be for the development of a European
capital market to maintain  satisfactory  links with the international  financial centres
outside the Community.
iii) A pattern of Community saving giving Germany pride of place with 447o of.
the Community total, followed b)' France with 27%o,Italy  167o and Benelux L37o.
B. S.AylNG  S-INV  EST MENT EQtr I LIBRTU M
3.  There are in fact two savings-investment  equilibria:
i) In overall terms, the adjustment  of gross domestic saving and gross capital
formation  takes place through the external balance on current aicount (net financial
surplus or deficit of the economl/ as a whole) (see Tables I  and 2);
ii) At economic sector level, the "net financial surplus" of some sectors ofisets the
"net financial deficit" of others.
JJ,4) OVERALL EQUILIBRIUM
,4. The "net financial surplus or deficit of the economy  as a whole" fepfesents  the
,contibution  made or received by a given country in its dealings with the rest o{
the world. This concept  di{fers irom what is often known as the "basic balance"
in balance-of-payments analysis: neither unrequited transfets,of capital-to. o1 fr1lm
the rest of the world nor capital movements  properly so called are included. The
surplus or deficit does not therefore provide direct informatiLon o!  the_ impact
rvhich dealings with the rest of the world may have had on the capital market of a
given counmy: it simply provides  a pointer to the ovetall financing potentialities
6r requirements of thi'.iotto-y, witl due regard to the levels_ of savin-g and of
nrort lo-.ttic  capital formation achieved. An examination of the capital account
in the balance t  payments, which shows more directly the interrelationships
between markets, will-b. made in the next Chapter.
Table 2, in which the above-mentioned  surplus or deficit is re:lated firstly to the
average gross national  product and secondly  to.average gross caPital formation in
the yEari L962-1,964,  tlggertr that, apart from France and the United States,  the
relative imDortance of tfii balance hai been small. Howevef,  examination of the
annual figuies corrects this impression  slightly, since_they reveal that the three-year
uu.rug.r-ior Italy and the Neiherlands are in fact the result of equating relatively
high surpluses and deficits.
In general, the evidence suggests that savings-investment eqrrilibrium  has been
achiived ui-ott wholly at national level: this does not however prevent  there
already being some degree of interpenetfation of marlets, as s'horvn by the gross
capitai mov&nents strrdied in Chapter J. Moreover, this situation will change as
thi greater mobility of capital brings the objective of harmonized  growth throughout
the Community  nearer fruition.
B) EQUILIBRIA BET\flEEN  SECTORS
5.  The financing equilibrium that is established between economic  sectors in
each counry is a reiult of adjustment  between the net finarncial _surpluses and
deficits in the several sectors. This equilibrium is not achieved in the same ways
in the difierent member countries. Now, the conditions under .which it is achieved
are highly relevant to the integration of capital markets: the various__savings
categoiiej do not have the same fluidity. Public-sector saving iri undoubtedly  more
tied to the country of origin than personal saving and less sensitive to market
stimuli; to a lessei degree, this may be mue of the saving of enterprises.  Thus it
may be expected thai the countries where saving in the public sector and in
entlrprisesis heavy will prove less vrell fitted to play the_role which-they would
otherwise fill in view of their relatively  high level of overall sa,/ing. The converse,
of course, applies to the countries in'whlch households accollnt for the bulk of
overall saving, even if the total is relatively  small.
Another point is that the conditions under '*'hich equilibrium lbetween the sectors
is achieved have an impact on the rate of overall saving. The,re is no doubt, for
example, that in a period of reconstruction, marked by a shortap;e of capital,, overall
saving cannot reach a high level unless the public sector and enterprises  save heavily.
54(l) General
6. The analysis of the adjustment between sectofs is normally based on an
examination  of the financiaf surpluses or deficits of three distinct sectors: the
administrative  authorities, enterp;ises and households.  As the boundary  between
the two latter sectors is drawn-difierently in the various counffies, the two have
been aggregated in Tables I  and 2; in what follows below, _however, an attempt
will be made to separate  the two categories. \7ith regard, to^ the govemment
sector, it should be noted that Tables t aid Z indicate net public financial surpluses
or deficits before capital uansfers to other sectors;  .this-conceqt is more significant
from the economic point of view, since it shows what funds the public authorities
would be able to supply to other sectors for financing  investments,  vrhile the balance
after capital transf.is io other sectors eliminates some of the overall savings which
the autirorities could; if they wished, use for investment.  For purp,ose-s of com-
parison, the balances'before  ind after capital transfers are shown in Table l.
This said, an examination must. no,ur be made of the general conditions under which
the adjusiment takes place between the "government" sector and the "enterprises
and households"  sect6rs. In the past, it seems, the situation of some countries
appeafs to have been almost diamelrically opposed to that oJ others. In Germany
the authorities  have had a very large finaniial surplus; in Belgium, o-n the other
hand, the financial deficit of th-e pu6lic sector has been,fairly hea-vi'. In.the other
*..b.t  countfies, the trends have been less marked. The financial qurplgs of the
p"Uti. sector has increased steadily  from year-to-yeaf inTrance, and there has been
oracticallv constant equilibrium in the Netherlinds. In the United States and
ijnit.d Kingdom fairly^wide fluctuations have been observed. The detailed analysis
by sector requires the {ollowing comments.
(2) The gouerftftzent sector
7.  Table 3 shows the scale of capiml transfers in France, Italy and-Germany.
In these three countries, there is a srlbstantial  diflerence  between  the public sav'W/
public investment  fatio before transfers and the same ratio alter tansf.ers' The
t.y to this disparity is the importance  attaching to the various forms of cenffal
government aid^, i.e. capital arsist"n.e to enterprises - 
s5pssially  grants to public
Enterprises, support for backward areas, arrangements for compensating special
costs incurred  and various benefits  paid to households.
Consequently, although in all the member countries save Belgium  and in the
Netherlands-since 1963 gross saving in the public sector is more than enough to
cover public capital forriation, in Ilaly, the-Netherlands  (and in France in 1962
and tiel) thes6 ransfers have led to a net deficit which has had to be covered by
borrowing from the capital market; more recent, incom,plete data also indicate a
decline in*the governm&t's financial surplus in several Member States'
These disparities  could seriously  hamper the establishment of a European capital
market. ihor. *.-ber countries whose public saving is least developed are
apparently also those whose overall saving is weakest. They might therefore  betempted to prefer the contracting  of debt on the markets of other Community
countries to the budgetary and tax measures  which would be needed if the level
of public saving were to be brought into line with the volume of public investment.
llhe danger of such action is all the greater since the volume of public investment
is tending to increase rapidly in Community  countries: in additi,on to the demands
of social policy (the need to improve collective equipment) there is a growing  urge
to encourage  more rapid economic development  by improvements in infrastructure,
education  and research. The Group has therefore set out in Chapter 6 the
guidelines  which it feels should be followed in the field of publilc finance if capital
markets are to be integrated,
(3) The enterprises  sector
{1. The level and the trend of the net financial deficit of enterorises - 
i.e. of
their calls on the capital surpluses of the other sectors - 
can only be assessed  on
very approximate lines. Problems of definition (data available lefer sometimes  to
arll enterprises, sometimes  exclude farming, or public enterprir;es, or self-owned
businesses,  or certain of these) and the varying sizes of the sa.mples used, mean
that the figures given in Table 4 can be considered  only as ordeis of magnitude
rnainly useful for assessing the trend of a given series in recent years. None the
less it seems that one general point can be made: the rate of srelf-financing in all
rnember  countries is steadily declining.  Another is that there are significant
clifferences between the situation of enterprises in the EEC and in the United States.
In the United States, depreciation and the undistributed profits of companies in
the private sector cover virtually all fixed investment and itocks formation.  Since
enterprises' need for capital is in great part met from self-financing, increases in
registered capital in the form of fresh money from shareholders  are on a small
scale (in 1964, 0.37o of market valuation, compared with 5%o in France). Con-
sequently,  industy makes very little call on the capital market and obtains funds
e,asily ftom that market in time of need. In Community countries, on the other
hrand, enterprises run a permanent  net financial deficit. It is uue that the situation
irs not equally serious in all member countries. In Germany and Belgium self-
financing rates are relatively high, in France and the Nethedan,ls  average, but in
Italian enterpdses they are abnormally  lorv (see Table 4). fn terms of national
accounting, it is quite clear that the financial deficits of enterp:rises are ofiset by
surpluses in other sectors, but the diftculties of ensuring a s:mooth  adjustment
tretween these deficits and surpluses are precisely what lie at tlhe root of all the
capital market problems.
I\[oreover, the very concept of self-financing  conceals factual situations which vary
fqirly substantially  from one country to another. In this connection, the importance
of pension funds constituted within German and Italian companies as a source
of the internal financing of enterprises should be stressed. Their contribution  is
included in statistics on self-financing, and the incomplete  figures available show
tlrat it is far from negligible; in Germany, pension reserves represent 8.57o of the
total of the balance-sheets of the 2 000 enterprises making up the Federal Statistical
C)ffice's  sample. In Italy, for the group of 233 manufacturing companies  analysed
by the Banca d'Italia, this item acceunted for more than l77o of the gross self-
financing of enterprises in the period 1960-1964.
5bLu,rlly' to complete the picture,  mention must be made of the vital influence  which publlc ent€rprises in certain countries exert on the financing needs of the companv
secror. This applies particularly in Italy and in France; iot oniy-ir-;h. ;;i-.-;?
publrc .enterprrses in the economies of these- countries very important, but the
available figures for France and the estimates for Italy,torvituiil,;;;f_fi.;;;;
rate of public undertakings is 1ulstantia_ll;, l9w9r tf,rri *rt fol-p.iu.," .nr.rprir.rl in France it fell from 30% in 1962 to zilqo in L964. The sutsidie, u..ori.J-to
public. enterprises  for. plant and machinery or for current ;p;;;;"", de not suffice to make good-this disparitv;  consequentlj/, to cover their financial  deficits oublii
enterprises  make considerable  calls on thi -capital market - 
calls tl,"r r..rri 
""rv bislt lg-p.red with tbeir share in capital for-rtion'--in prun.., in tl,. f.rioi 1962'L964, the financial deficit of publii enterprises  represented 40Vo of th.'n..d,
of the en-tire company sector,,whereas their share in ."p'itrl i;;;;tment was between 25 and 307o. similarly,  unde_r the Fifth plan, the inuertments "i tl,. ud p"uii.
service concerns in the period of the Fifth Plan were to be less tt r" trrjf itor.
:J ih.,. "competitive sec-tor"' -  ?n4 yet their r.q,rit...r,ir- of outside fi,run."
(Inctuctrng  subsrdres) would exceed that sector's financial requirements.
The deterioration in the financial structure of production  units, the divergences in the amounts which enterprises  contribute to saving, and the pioblems .uiid bu
the financing of public enterprises.are all factors r''"firg io;;ir-.^q""ilifii"*l;ttl
development of a European  capital market. $7ays _and means of iemedying  these
difficulties will be disculsed inihe second part oi this R;t";. 
-
(4) Households  sector
9' ft is very difficult to assess acctrrately  the level and trend of the net financial surplus of households.  Apart from the. difficulty or Jiriinluishing Lil;;;
households  and enterprises a difficulty  due largeiy ,o ,t.-.u'ny difi"erent *.v, ln whlch the lndlvldual entrepreneur is treated - 
there is the unreliability or the
sheer laclc o[. data on the savings of households invested Jit*tfy i" t.iia*iirl
construction, which is in fact the main non-financial  use of ,urring, fr";  tl;i;
source. (r)
1"_r :!i:, -.to1, then.the only course open is to draw indirect concrusions  from
obsetvatlon ot the hnancing requirements - 
kno'wn to varying degrees of
accuracy - 
of the other sectors. A consideration of the forms of. fiXuniil invest-
ment by households (Section III  below) will provide f.rrther- material for the
necessary  assessment.
II.  Demand for capital
10' The sffucture of demand for capital is determined by the needs of rransactors,
the ability of the various sectors oi the market to rrtirfy ,r-,Lr. "..ar, u;j ih;
(') It is,not possible-just to take the gtoss saving of households,  to subtract the figures in Table I which show the scale of residential  ionstructioi, 
""a i. i" "tit;i"";il?;;;inf 
surplus "riiri, sector. The main reason {or,this is that the d^t^ on residential .;;;;;i.,  cover not onlv dwellings acquired through  the direct .auines ;i ho".J.iJr,'--urt-;i;;^;*.lit#;#".:d-il;
administrative  authorities  and drvellings acquiied  uy houser,ota-J  *iri1 Loir#.o -on.u.
57c,lav of the various control and regulation  devices  eslablished by the authofities'
ir'# ;",ii1 #i];  ir'."r.*r.a ;dtrly with "final demand" for funds, i'e'- that
.;f if,"^ **;;;^;il,  ih.*r.lrr., ."i.y o,rt real investment: the role of the
intermediary  institutioris ;i.h  il;v;-irtlat from the markets for the purpose of
i.i.rairn is discussed i'  5.rtion IV of this Chapter. Our- first task, then, is to
.;;;;ril;;;ii;"t"n.  una the structure of'demand in the various sections
;,f rh";;i;l  market, u"J ,n ult.-pt will then be made to elicit some information
;#;#;it.'.rirr'**th.  6i;f 
-market 
made by the various sectors of the
economv.
.A, OVERALL SCALE OF THE CAPITAL ]/IARKETS AND RELATIVE
fupoxreNcE oF THF, vARIous .tECTIoNs
.A) SCALE OF THE MARKETS
L1. The concept of "capital market" used in Tables 5 and (' (discussed below)
difi.., fro* thai generally nt.d in the rest of this study, where the-capital  matket
is deemed to cover *.di.r-- and long-term financing machinery only: in view ,of
the nature of available  statistics it has been found necessary to adopt here a wrder
J.n"iii"" i".f"ding the short-term credils granted to the various sectors' With this
;;;;il;-*h[f  "f1;;;;; 
t.na..r the"an_alysis  less satisfactory  than if it had
L."n porrible to isolate ihe muchin.ry for financing investment,  the overall  scale
;i;i-,.l;i;  *"rtar l"  the Membei States will 6e assessed, first bv comparing
,lr"irr. 
""f"es, 
and secondly in relation to gross domestic capital formation'
Table 5 shows that in Germany,  France and in the Netherlands  the amount of
.1pil"fi"ppti;d bt,h. market r..*t to have grown fairly.consistently  over the
fiu'. u"urr^ under consideration (1960-t964).  In Italy- and in le.lsium (counffies
for #hich, however,  the data are not complete)  cyclical factors.and factofs connectect
;irh;h; i;;;oa"aifn of new tu* u..ung.*ents have afiected trends, and no such
steady expansion is discernible'
The addition of funds obtained  on the various national markets is only an indication
of what misht be the initial scale of a future integrated European market, as-!a1
il;;;;i;fi;J ilii;;ffi.  rii. r""a' supplied  by"the capital markets of the EEC
countries have in the'aggregat.  .orr.rponi.d to upptoximate\'  ,5\qr'o of the funds
supplied  on average over the same period by the Amertcan marKet'
As for the contribution  made by the market to the financiqg of g-ros-s domestic
,ipitulformarion,  the rates re.ori.d in Germany,-France  and the Netherlands, trave
iii"g.i"iriii.'"*i-,tl.  v.ars, and they are much the same in each of the three
.""ri.i.r. In Belgiumli.c"pitut market has made an exceptic,nally  lqtg:,.ol,rtl-bl;
tion to the financing  of real investment. In this resp€ct, average fates 1n the Unlteo
fingdo* and in th"e United States do not vary much from the average  Community
tate.
58B) RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE VARIOUS SECTIONS
12.. Table ,6, which analyses _the funds supplied by the various secrions of the capital market, shorvs, wide .disp-arities within tt.'BEc ,nd-urro between the member  countries on the one hand and the u"ii"J rirg.r". ,ia the United states on the other.
i) Issues of securities  by ultimate investors of capital (i.e. excluding intermediary institutions)  have been-on a.relatively modest-ri"i. i" 
"rr"'i]rJ 
.orrr,ries except Belgium, where thev account for near-(y loro o! th. f,*dr l"ppriJ6;;  ;;tr;i market, and to a lesser extent the Netherrarar,'.t"i."ir,."i5rr.rponding  figure is 237-o. This may seem.surprising in view of ,t",."t"-"i t-uns floated on the capital marke.t by ihe public u'lrthoriti.r i., *or, 
"r tn. ."""tri.rl'trr.  reason is the assumption that - 
except in Belgium - 
these 1"";;;i;-ilig.  -.ur,rre floated bv tbg public authorities in their Jpacity ur ,,i;;erm"Ji"iv i*tii.,'tionr,,.  The funds supplied .br $e public sector are on a conside*ut. ,.rr.'i;'H;;;;.,  Germany and, outside the Community,  in the United Kingdom.
ii) The bankins svstem accounts for roughly 20 to 40vo, according  to counrry, of the financial reiorrrce,  supplied ,o *"-..'onorny.
iii) The other financial intermedialiss 
- 
savings banks, the specialized institutions financing- credit for indqstry and_housing,  i*.r.ur.. companies and pension funds - gupglv_1bott lalf the.finance placed_ui'tn.  airp*;i;iililrri, 
"na 
individuals in the Netherlands and in the United States.
C)-^ANA-UTSIS  OF THE MARKET IN SECURITIES  AND IN MEDIUM. AND SHORT-TERM CREDIT
13. To filI in this very broad outline, € more detailed  rreatment is given below
3l f.e 
various sections of the capital market, putti..rlarly  oiifr.-tn".f..t in securities ano ln meclrum- and long_term  credit,
Te  I .*ll:s 
a p.icture of the volume of issues on the securities  markets (r960-6j
averages)' ('),A, first point to be made in connection with this table .on..r*-tt.
comparison  of the abso-lYte  figures for all securities issues in the EgC .ourtri., unJ in the united States. The to"tal for the united states is ;il;  l, ,o-. three and a half times that of the community totat. e", thi; i, ;.i;i";;;ntecl  for bv the very great scale of mortgage  bond issues in the Unitea jt"iJr,-i".f"a.J'i"  T'"ilf.'i
1li:: ?":-"lities 
issues, 
"1t!9"s5 
they.are not, in fr.i J;rl,l;;r'ril  market (on the omer hand securltles which, from this angle, are somewhat similar, such as the scbuldscheine in Germany and the securiiies .representin g onderhanis;- i";;r;;; in the Netherlands, are not included in the iable il;;;;;?.";;i;r,,  issued on the markets ot Community States).
The breakdorvn  between- issues of shares and issues of fixed-interest securities difiers very substantially from country to country. In the EEC as a whole. issues
(t) These data difler from those given in Table 6 on "Funds supplied by _the securities  market',, since the latter included only tfre irs"e. oi final-inrr.rtom wheiea, tialr-l  covers all issues, including those of "financial int....airii.r;. 
**^ '
59o:[ shares are on an appreciably  heavier scale than in the unit-ed States but are of
less importance than r# ,n. iifui.-J rritgJ".. tttit could well b'e due in the first
place to the greatef r..p"j.r l.if-firr"niing enioved bv United istates enterprises'
iince eve' the absoluii';"il.;-;f-itt*t"of  shares in the. United States seems
modesr in comparisot *itir"lfr"'LBi,otuf,  utd t..ondly, to the elfrciencv of United
K.inedom  machinery f";^;;r,id;ti,"  ,outtir"i;;-t#; of even relaiivelv  small
:;#?;;r;i^.t"t'.t'Lr"f;iii?;; i""i"e ".ii'ity 
o" th. United Kingdom  market'
\{/ithintheEECcountries,itisinterestingtonotetheefiortmadebyFrenchand
Italian enterprises ," "r. il*"r of shares i*o restore financial s6uctufes thrown out
.'t.""rtittiuil-in  th. past by undue recourse to borrowing'
It has already been noted that issues of, securities as a way of covering  financial
ileficits are on u .oo,p'ui^iiu.ty  ,,,,"11 ,.u1., -particularly if only those issues consti-
tutine demand of .rlti,riut.*l;:,1|;;r,rt"t ,tiu" all issues are counted'  (1) lyhatever
i#,fi;#;:; ;ffi ];'fi;;;;;G 
- 
t-h. 
- 
-a.hinery of. the. securit:ies markets in the
'arious 
member .""r,ri.ti^irr. 
-i.*d 
u..ruing directly to transactors will be
t:.r"iirir^rrifiiL A";;n io iri" advantages  thef would derive from the-expansion
;#-;# ffiili-iffiil;-J  rrc i",.r*.iaiary  institutions, which provide
;;d;ir.;;irh  ih. bulk of tfr'e outside finance  needed'
]B.THEDEMANDFoRFIN, NCEBYTHErARI?USSE.CTjRSoFTHE
,gcoNoMY
14. Demand for capital may come,from  the public sector, frorn- enterprises,  from
.households,  or from ffi";il  fft"-f^ti',.t"-t5.iott  are not de'alt witi here: the
;.;*r;i-ilr,.iut ,.turiJttl ;  J;h .i the markets  are discussed  in the next chapter'
;fil^;;;;;;  of fto"r.-f,old" to the capital market occurs 'ivhen thev purchase
,consumer durables on credit or buy a flat o, ho,rse. There are no detailed financial
;;ffi;;  i" 
-trit 
n.iJ^;;J 
-it ir-,t'"Joi. extremelv difficult to analvse  these
transactions,
The demand for capital by the public sector and by the enterptises  sector is
discussed  below.
A) THE PUBLIC  SECTOR
15. The public sector's demand for capital  seems to be gainirrg in impotance  in
the various member ."""iri*.-1'he authorities are "ntiont 
to make Sood.lhp
il;;;;;rf;;;iJ.q;id;ni  "qd _to improve the collective infrastructure,  which
i;;il16;..ono,,,i.;;;,h;  ";Jthis 
is ieading to an increasirrglvrapiSl  expansion
of public investment, ;htil;bii;;ditc  g.n.tully rises more sl-o1vlv' In.addition,
;;#;'h".;; ,h.-?;;;.i;;-;fa;;; Ji'".i i"u.'tments is covered by public saving,
the authorities often pi;; ;"";;i;  oi-ini"t..diary by borrowi'g- gapital to finance
economic operations i";il.'f;;;f  i"r*  t" p.itui. .nt.tptite. ea[J on the capital
(r) The issues used to amass funds fot
analysed in Table 8.
60
the granting o{ credit by financial intetmediaries aremarket by enterprises directly dependent ol or conffolled by the public authorities
can also be included in the publiC sector's demand for capital'
Table 9 deals with the bonds which the public sector issues to meet the needs of
both central and local govefnments and-of public enterprises. It  is difficult to
.rtrUtitt-r .."ctly where lrsrr., for centfal government purposes. eld and issues for
public enterpriies  begin, for while certain e.rterprises - 
particularly in. transport
und t.lecom-unicatio-ns  - 
enjoy financial independence in_certain  counffies, others
come directly under the financial administration of central government.
Nor has it been possible to take account in the table of the fact that certain
inrrir,rtionr, rvhose primary function is to finance -the -pt'l'lic sector' distribute  to
the company or houiehold sectofs_part of the funds which tfiey amass' However,
in view tt  itr. sectors for which the funds they borrow are intended, the- interme-
Ji"i. i"riit"tions of the public sectof are noi included in the table; if it were
J.ti..a to take stock of the public authorities'  influence on the market, the activities
of these institutions would also have to be taken into account'
In view o{ the above, it is interesting to look at the percentage of total issues
orininrtirrs in the pubfic sector; in cerlin member couniries  this brings to light 
-a
pro"bl.- oi bulun.. between  the opportunities  available on the market to the pubtic
;;.t*-;;d  ifrot. 
"tuituUl. 
to.nt.?itises,  u,hose need to borrow is also rising fast'
These general  problems will be examined in Chapter 6'
The bulk of the financing requirements of the local authorities  are covered, in the
N"i1,.rt".J" ,nd G.r-"tiy, by obtaining credit from_ specialized financial interme-
diaries which in,"rn o[r'ui" ih.it fnttdiby issues of bonds; direct issues by.local
"",-f.iiti* "r" 
-f 
s..orrduty  importance. But there is another source - 
not shown
i;,h;i"ai.;  I  which is very iirportant, particularly  in France a-nd Italy: it consists
i; 
-d;r;;G 
grunt.a by inlermediariei_-u'hich obtain their funds by collecting
J.porits t"ih.i thun by-issuing bonds (the Caisse de.s Dtp6ts.et Consignations.and
;i[ C";t; T;t;";;];rdrestiti)."The dem-and  for funds by.local authorities, which in
certain coun;ies is a very substantial factor in the capital market, also competes
fnor. ot less directly with the financing requirements of the company sectof.
Similar considerations apply to the use of the,market by public-enterprises: the
factors to be examit.d^b.io*  in Chapter 6 (the reduced scope for self-financing
r.r"tiirj-fr"--a foli.y on charges designed.to  keep. prices stable,  -and the limited
ooooriu""i,i.s for issuing sharesfmay mean that the importanc-e  of these enterprises
"li1t. 
capital market *ill in.r""r. well beyond their real significance in the economy
u, " 
*frotl.. Nor should it be forgotten that the public enterprises often receive
ait.., capital contributions  from the Tr.asrrry and long-term. loans (sometimes
;;;Li";i;iih  rp".iuiuJvantages) granted to them by the public authorities  or bv
it.  ,p..i"ti^d credit instituti"ons.-  They therefore enjoy particularly important
advantages  over the private enterprises.
B) THE ENTERPRISES SECTOR
16. The net financial deficit which enterprises have to cover by borrowing, and
.onr.qu.ntly the calls they make on the..1plt.tl market, have increased sharply.ot
late. ihere'are several ,"uron, for this. A high volume of investment is demanded
6'1,by the tempo of_technological  progre-ss  and by the need to adapt  rto a larger market.
lihe profits available for ploughing back,are-smaller  now thai profit mirgin, huu"
b'een.reduced by the pressure on prices due to keener externaliompetitio"n  (or, in
certain member  countries, by price pegging measures  forming part bf stabilizaiion
programmes)  and-higher costs. The increase in these stems fiom the higher wages
generatedby the full employment  situation achieved in recent year:s. Theimmediite
eftect of this ftend is to cause enterprises to make heavier calis on external sources
of finance, at the cost, in the long run, of a deterioration in their :financial structure.
T'able. L0 gives estimates of. the ,pattern of $e borrowing  by which enterprises
have in recent years covered theii financial deficits (it hai not been posibl. i"
separate  enterprises in the public sector from enterprises  in the private sector). (r)
sTith this reservation,  the member counries can be classified in t.wo groups: in the
fitst - 
France, Italy and Belgium - 
the issue of securities u..ount, Tor -ot. th""
a quarter oj the sums borrowed by enterprises from outside sources. In the second
group - 
Germany and the Netherlands - 
this method of financing is appreciably
less important.  The distinction would be sharper if, instead o{ c6nsidering only
the funds sup.plled directly by the securities rrlrket to enterprises, accoun! were
also taken of the funds which this market supplies indirectl.v, thanks to the
":intermediary" institutions which redistribuite  ui lou.rr the moirey they raise by
Dorrowlng.
This situation  demonstrates the relative weakness of the contribu:tion made by the
securities  markets to the external  financing of enterprises and the importanie  of
the .role. played Fy th. financial institution-s;  by collicting  savin;gs a.poritr or Uy
issuing bonds, these do much to ensure the financine 5f .nt.,iprisei in certain
ccluntrie.s.. This suggests th-at the development  of a European capi.Ll market would
br: ot all the gr-eater value for enterprises if it involved not only an improvement  in
the working  of. the securities  market but also an improvement  i,n the role plrv.j
b)' the intermediary institutions as suppliers  of finance.
The pattern of the_financing of enterprises as it appears in Tables 10 and 11 is
discussed  briefly below.
l) lssues ol sbares and bonds
7i'. The issue of new shares.varies in importance from country to counrry as an
external source of financing for enterprisis, and the use made of tni, in"trroJ
re:flects circumstances  which ar. pec,rliar io each of the Mernber  States. i;
Belgium,  where the contribution  oT share issues to total financi,,tg fro--.*t.rnri
(').Two  series of d^ta arc-given fot all counuies except  the Netherlands.  The first includes residential  construction  with enterprises, the second exciudes it. ft.;.-.;;r:l  series is orobablv the more significant: investment  in residential  .otrrtt".ilon,-*tri.t,-"..""rir-f.r--io  i"'i66"rlt
:-:!E F_t":: capital  formation, is generally. fnanced.  by machinery difiering ap,preciably  rro- 1t-,.i
i:j'1_1?_9,1T.,P19!t1ctt.ve  investment. The inclusion  of housingin an analysis of the borrowing by enterprrses  is liable to give a distorted picture of the scalc of medium- 
-a:nd 
long-term credit] wlrich consritutes the maininstrument fof financing  housin!. ihe-p;;bl;; 
"iif,i, 
prrii.J"i
sector will be examined  in Chapter 8 and no furthe"r space ii a.uotJi" ih. ,"bG.i fi....----
62sources is higher than in any other country of the Community,  the situation  may be
interpreted is a reflection of the dilficulties faced by enterprises iJ they resort to
othei forms of financing, because of the pressure which the public sector exerts
on the bond market. A similar explanation may well apply to France,  .where
financing through the issue of shares is carried out on a considerable scale and
fluctuates remar-kably  little. In Germany  and in Italy, on the other hand, enterprises
were at the beginning of the period under consideration.procuring  almost a quarter
of the funds rlquire-d from the capital market through the issue of sbares, but
here the situation has deteriorated rapidly, owing very probably to the unfavourable
climate on the stock exchanges.  Thl Netherlands is a special case, since the_ scale
of year-to-year fluctuations ln the relative importance of financing thrgugh the
issue of shares is almost certainly to be attribuGd to variations in the calls on the
market made each year by the big international  companies with headquarters in that
countfy,
It appears (as the more detailed analysis in Chapter 10 -will c_o1firp) that_ the supply
of tirk capit"l in the Community  countries is hampered  by- dificulties  which, added
ro the pr;blem of reduced r.op. fot self-financingf  are liable to undermine set'iously
the financial structure of enterprises.
Table 11 shows that for a relatively early year,'J.963, the sructure of German,
French and Italian enterprises  vras markedly inferior to that of enterprises  in the
United States or the United Kingdom.
Other evidence  suggests that the disparity grew still_wider  from 1960 to 1'964:
while the indices tlh-at show the finaniial soundness  of enterprises  v/ere unchanged
in the United States and in the United Kingdom, they developed unfavourably
in the three EEC countties mentioned. The ratios of debt to fixed assets, to own
resources and cash flovr show that the tendency for indebtedness  to increase  is
gathering momentum: if this tendency were to continue, it would be bound to
cause concern.
The issue of bonds by non-financial  enterprises  also varies very widely in scale from
member country to member counffY.
In Germany and the Nethedands - 
in the former country, mainly for tax reasons
which were valid in the past, in the latter because of the lovrer cost and the
flexibility of this form of financing - 
enterprises have_tended to prefer private
loans against borrowers' notes (Scbuldscbeindailehen  in,Gercrlany and onderhandse
leningen in the Netherlands)  to public issues of bonds. The large resoufces at
the dlsposal of banks, savings insiitutions  and institutional  investors have enabled
this foim of financing to develop considerably, and the need for public issues  has
been reduced  accordingly.
In Italy the specialized  credit institutions,  which have authority to issue bonds
on privileged tirms, arc in a position to lend at medium and at long term on lnor_e
favourablJ terms than those which enterprises  would obtain directly on the fixed'
interest securities  market, given the heavier incidence of taxation on the issue of
industrial  bonds. The latter therefore play a subordinate role.
63l-n France and in Belgium it is likely that two factors - 
regulation of access to the
market by financial authorities  anxious to assure priority for public or semi-public
issues and the reticence of the public, who may be induced by tax incentives and
investing habits to buy public-sector paper or paper guaranter:d  by the govern-
ment - 
account for the relatively modest growth of bond issues by private
enterprises.  In the case of Belgium, it should also be said that interest subsidies
granted to enterprises  may apply only to loans of financing establishments  and not
to issues of bonds.
ilhese factors which afiect the readiness of enterprises to call on the securities
rnarket explain why borrowing from the various financial  inter:mediaries  provides
two-thirds or more of the money enterprises obtain from outsiide sources. This
characteristic - 
common to all the countries - 
should not, however, be allowed
to mask impotant difierences between the sources and the nature of the credit
obtained in the various member countries. On the nature of the credits. it is
clificult to say much on the difierences  to be found between the various countries
in the ratio of short-term credit to medium- and long-term crediit provided by the
credit establishments  and bv institutional investors. It is. howerrer.  certain that in
Italy the exceptionally higtr share of short-term credit in the total'sums bomowed
try enterprises ftom outside sources is connected with the Italian bank law which
forbids ordinary credit institutions to grant advances for mole than one year.
Siince these institutions dispose of considerable funds, it is not suprising that
they grant advances to their customers on current account with no specified  date
fxed for repayment; these advances in fact play the same rr:le as the formal
nledium-term credit granted by other institutions and thus ,contribute to the
financing of capital investment.
2) Medium- and long-ternt credit
18. The bulk of the loans required for plant and equipment  in France and in
Italy reaches botrowers  from public or semipublic institritions granting aid direct
or acting as intgrmediaries.  Institutional investors,  particularly  inirurancJcompanies,
play only a subordinate role in this field. In Germany, on the other hand, most
of this medium-term or. long-term credit is accorded by the banks - 
the powerful
network of savings banks being a part of. the banking system -- with appreciable
support from the insurance  companies: it is often granted in the- iorm of
Schuldscheindarlet.'en,  which are roughly comparable  with bonds, placed privately.
I:n the N_etherlands, institutional investors, insurance companies and pensi,on  funds
a:re the chief source of direct medium- and long-term loani to enterprises,  although
the contribution  from the banks is far from negligible. In llelgium, lastly, it
looks as if the situation is undergolng  a complete change since, although iemi-
public institutions still dominate the field, they have declined  in rr:lative importance
in recent years nov/ that the banks have shaken oI[ their resejrve over granting
loans for more than two vears.
CONCLUSIONS
L9. To conclude this study of the demand for finance, two points of some
iroportance  for the rest of the analysis may be made.
&iIn the first place, the distribution of the demand for funds among the various
sectofs, and notably the administratirre authorities, public enterprises, enterprises
in the private sector and residential construction, reflects choices made by the
public authorities rather than the impact of the machinery of the market in the
accepted sense of the term. The study has shown not only the importance of the
investments made directly by the public authorities (or under their auspices by
public enterprises), but also the role played by the semi-public  financial inter-
mediaries. It may be added that intervention  by the authorities in the arrangements
for issues on the securities markets leaves a relatively small area in which the
allocation of resources depends on the play of machinery not directly subject to
official control.
Secondly, the point made at the very beginning of this section, i.e. that the way
in which finaniial deficits are covered depends to a large extent on the pattern of
the supply of capital to the market, merits special emphasis. Hence the need for
an analysis of the supply side of the market; it should yield a more detailed
explanation of the origins of the machinery by which financing deficits are
covered.
III. The supply of capital
20. This section is concerned  not with the volume but with the pattern of the
supply of capital. After a summary account of the role of the main contributors
to-saningr formation, an analysis will be made of the composition of their financial
investments,  and this will be follorved by an attempt to bring out clearly the
problems raised by the widening of the capital market to European dimensions.
A. THE SOURCES OF SAVINGS
21. Basically  the pattern of the supply of capital on the market is determined by
thar of the iourcei of savings. The following considerations are helpful to an
understanding o{ the relation betv/een the two:
i) Saving by the public authorities is normally intended for investment without
passing ihro"eh the market, although public iaving may in fact sometimes  heln
io -rf,. more* fnnds available on the matket; this ilement in saving is relatively
immobile in international terms;
ii) Nor is company saving normally likely to boost the supply of capital !o qhe
market, although it may do so more than public saving' This is true only f9r
the company J..tot taken as a whole: investments  by enterprises  temporarily
disposing of idle balances may be of considerable importance. International mobility
may also be quite pronounced;
iii) Saving by households remains, however, the major factor- to be taken into
consideration  in any assessment of the potentialities  of the capital market of a given
countrv. This is true, of corlrse, only to the extent that non-financial investments--  investments in self-owned businesses and in residential construction - 
and
hoarding do not absorb too high a proportion of household sa',ting.
liubject to the above reservation it can be considered  that, with saving by louseholls
torming a larger propoftion  of overall saving in the EEC countries than in the
UnitedKingdom  and-the United States (where the share is onl/ about 207o), the
structure oi overall EEC saving is satisfactory from the point- of view of normal
r;upply of the capital markets and of mobility of capital across frontiers.
JJowever, something more is needed than this mere general statement. For example,
'whether 
'public-sector 
saving passes through  the_ b_anking s'fstem or 
_ through
i.ndepende-nt  channels afiectJ the conditions in which the market works. The
r;ituaiion in this respect varies appreciably from Member State to Member State.
.[n the case of enterprises  the level of their indebtedness  and the nature of their
relations with financial institutions  also influence their capacity to make a
r:ontribution  to the capital market.
Jlastly and most important, the way saving by households is; divided between
i.nvestments  on the market and non-financial  investment mav have more importance
than the actual volume of this saving. In France, for instance,  certain  deficiencies
in the supply of funds to the capital market are probably to b,: explained by the
lLact that diti.t puyrn.nts for housing absorb  a much larger proportion of personal
r;avings in this-country  than elsevrhere.  The desire to own one's own home
may f,rovide a stimului to saving, thus increasing  its -volume without  encroa-ching
on'dnancial  investment. Beyond a certain limit, howevef, the scale of the
r:on6ibutions  necessary  to th; financing of construction  may b,:come such that a
fiousehold  has to give up any other form of investment, and- as a result the capital
rnarket will sufier] The same is trrle vrhere there is an undue tendency  to hoard'
Itn this connection it is, however, important to make a clear ilistinction between
r:auses and efiects, since in many instinces it is clear that the g;rowth of hoarding
or of investment in housing is in fact due to the inability of the capital markets
to oflet attractive  investment opportunities.  This point must be kept in mind _in
the follovdng  analysis o{ the unsatisfactory  distribution of sa'i'ings between the
r/arious forms of investment.
]]. THE DISTRIBUTION  OF FINANCIAL INVE,STMENT
:22. The pattern of investments made by the various non-finarrcial sectors of the
economy  rLveals that among the member counmies there are :marked  diflerences
in financing flows; these difierences are brought out in Table 12, which deals
rvith financial investment bv the non-financial sectors.
u1) CASH HOLDINGS
t?.3. The proportion of cash (notes, coin and sight deposits) to all net financial
investment by the non-financial sectors difiers significantly  betrveen France, Italy
and Belgium, where it ranges from 20 to 30%o, and the Netherla'nds  and Germany,
66where it is only 12 to I4%o. The difierence is even more marked between  the
Community  countries and the United States, where cash holdings account for only
67o of the annual inctease in financial invesrmenr.
The reasons for the public's strong liquiditv preference  can be listed here but not
analysed in detail. A first point is that the holding of deposits  has still not made
much headway with households, as is evidenced by the importance  they attach
to notes and coin. More generally, the tendency to hold ready money may be seen as
a corollary of the public's reluctance to commit funds to long-term investments
which in the past have entailed considerable  losses due to erosion of the cuffency.
The public's reaction to this threat is probably due to a desire to be in a position
to cope rapidly with new situations and to take early advantage of speculative
opportunities. Tax factors and defects in the working of the capital markets have
also almost certainly played a role. In this connection, it may be noted that liquidity
preference on this scale suggests a certain indifierence  among households  to
considerations  of yield.
B) SAVINGS  DEPOSITS
24. For an assessment of the scale of deposit saving, some rearrangement  of the
headings "Savings  deposits entrusted to the banking system", "Funds entrusted
to savings institutions"  and "Funds entrusted to specialized credit institutions"
is required, since, in Table 12, the savings banks system is included in the banking
system in Germany but among the specialized institutions in France. In the banking
system, time deposits  are often grouped with savings deposits: but these t'il/o sorts
of deposit frequently come from rather diflerent sources, since in many cases the
time deposits are merely a more profitable way for enterprises to employ their
idle balances.  None the less, they represent relatively stable resources for the
banking sector and can therefore be propedy classified with deposit saving.
It may be noted that the scale of deposit saving as a proportion of all net financial
investment of the non-financial  sectors varies in the several member countries
between 25 and 37 7o and that it therefore  constitutes the most important  single
source of funds for the capital market. It rnay be added that deposit saving is
even more developed in the United States, where it  accounts for about 52%o
of the total.
The item "Othet funds entrusted to the banks" must also be taken into account.
This item, which is relatively important in Germany and in Belgium, covers funds
obtained by the banking system in the form of "credits received" and issues of
deposit receipts:  from the economic point of view these funds are comparable with
time deposits.
If it has been possible to speak of all these funds as contributions to the capital
market, this is of course because  they are "transformed"  into medium- and long-
term investments by certain institutions; the process by which this is done will
be discussed in the next section of this Chaoter.
67C) FUNDS ENTRUSTED TO THE PUBLIC  SECTOR
25. The "Funds  enffusted to the public financial sector" under forms othet than
tJre purchase of bonds ate o{ real importance only in France (about L87o of. all
investment), where the role of the Treasury and of the public furancial  institutions
as collectors of liquid savings is well known. Difierences in the definitions of
"public financial  sectot" from counffy to country must not, howel'er, be overlooke4,
since they mean that the figures given in this line in Table 12 arc n9t fufly
.omparable. In this respect-the  importance of the "Miscellaneou_s"_heading-f-or
Germany should be noted; it represents in the main the {unds which the-public
s,:ctor places at the disposal of firms engaged in residential  construction through
public financial institutions.
1I; THE SECURITIES MARKETS
26. In the Community,  the funds invested on the securities  markets account for
proportions  ranging ftom 1.57o (France) to 32%o (Belgium) of all financial  invest-
mentr it should, 
-however, be recalled that these figures ref,:r only to direct
investment  by the non-financial  sectors  and that investments  made, by intermediaries
on the securities markets are therefore not included.
T'his also explains the net sales of securities shown in the United Kingdom and
-- in respeci of shares only - 
in the United States, where, in the years- under
c,cnsideration,  the non-financial sectors sold securities which we,re bought by the
financial intermediaries.  The tendency in the UK and USA for clirect purchases of
s,:curities  to decline in favour of indirect  purchases by savers contrasts with the
sjituation in the EEC, and particularly in Belgium  and in Italy, where direct
purchases  still play a major role: the consequences of this situation will emerge in
Clhapters 9 and 10.
E) CONTRACTUAL  SAVING
27. A similar situation is apparent in very marked diflerences to be seen in the
scale o{ funds entrusted to pension funds and insurance companies:  contractual
srrving of this kind accounts for scarcely 37o of the total in Fra:nce, 9 to t07o in
Ciermany and Italy, l57o in Belgium and 397o in the Netherlands. Except in the
Irlethedands, therefore,  this form of saving is much less developed in the Community
tlran in the United States and in the United Kingdom,  where it accounts for 20%o
a:ad 40%o respectively of all financial investment.  Such a situation calls for more
detailed  consideration.
T'he fact that in most of the countries the social insurance  institutions have
a,:lopted the "assessment",  method of assurance  means that socia.l security pension
reserves are very small. Certain  estimates suggest that they repres€:nt  only about 57o
of the total they would reach if the level premium  method wer used. These
reserves represent three to five times the total of annual expenditure in the Benelux
countries, are equal to total expenditure in Germany and are actually lower than
tr:tal expenditure in France and in Italy. It is known that the reserves of life-
6Bassurance companies  represent, however, several times their annual expenditure.
The adoption of the assessment  procedure has had the result of increasing the
importance of the social security pension as an instrument for the redisffibution
of incomes, particularly  in the Nethedands and in France. In recent years, however,
the current total of social security pension investment  has increased in Belgium,
Germany and Italy, particulady investment  in government bonds and the bonds
of public undertakings or of semi-public  credit institutions. It should also be noted
that the contribution made to the capital market is sometimes more apparent than
real, where reserves are invested in public securities while the government  subsidizes
social security to the same or a gteatet extent. This is then an internal accounting
circuit of the public sector, the only result of which is to swell the volume of
public loan paper in circulation, but not that of the real financing resources  existing
on the market.
Unless changes occur in the existing trends, it  seems that in the future the
"assessment"  method may corne to be used even more extensively than at present.
If this should happen, there would be little chance of a rise in social-security
pension reserves and of the contribution  made by social security_  pelsion schemes
io the capital market. On the contfary, social security pension funds might_ even
call for larger subsidies from the State in order to balance income and expenditure.
This faidy general tend in the Community countries is a result o! political and
social decisions  rvhich the Group is not required to evaluate. The public authorities,
hovrever, should be aware of ihe consequences  of these decisions for the capital
markets.
Structural factors also account for the modest contribution  to the capital market
made by various forms of insurance saving linked with the employment contract.
It has been thought advisable to devote special attention, even at this early stage
of the report, tolhe problem of contractu;l  saving, since this is one of the basic
prerequisites  for the good functioning  of the capital market; the situation  described
i.veali marked difier-ences  in this reipect between the markets of Member States
- 
with the exception  of the Netherlands  - 
and the British and American markets.
The problem of 
-how to stimulate conttactual savings, particularly  savings linked
with-the employment contract, will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 5.
Social insurance saving has developed in various ways in all the member  countries:
it is designed to ensuie a supplementary tetirement pension or a form of savings
for employees through voluntary payments  made by them and a contribution made
by employers.
In the interests of the employee  and of the capital market, it would be advisable
that the funds set aside for the pensions of employees in the enterprise  should
be available through the capital markets for the financing of enterprises generally
rather than being directly invested in the entetprise where they arise: in the latter
case, they raise the same problems as does self-financing- To facilitate the mobility
of laboui, it would also seem preferable that the benefits granted to an employee
should not be conditional  on his remaining in the same firm until retirement.
It is certain that the various forms of social insurance  saving have in any case the
basic advantage, since they are voluntary (but advantageous for the employee sincehre gains a contribution from the employer as well), of inculcating the habit of
saving in social groups which now enjoy higher incomes but whose propensity
t0 save has so far been low.
Structural  factors also explain the difierence in the extent to which life-assurance
companies invest on the capital markets of the various member countries.  These
companies  provide substantial  support for the capital market in thr: Netherlands and
irr Germany, whereas  their conmibution  is relatively lorv in France and in Italy,
and lies somewhere between the two gtoups for Belgium.  One of the reasons for
this is that cenain types of contract, particulady annuities and endowment
asisurance for which the companies have to build up large reserves, have developed
irr the Netherlands and in Germany, whereas others, like term assurance or whole-
life assurance, vrhich involve the constitution  of lower reserv,es, are the most
common in France.
C.THE DEVELOPMENT  OF AEUROPEAN  CAPITAL MARRET: PROBLEMS
RAISED BY THE PATTERN OF SUPPLY
2i9. The main features of the supply of capital on the European capital markets
can be summarized  as follows:
i) In several countries savers prefer to hold cash or short-term  investments. This
p:ieferelce,must be accepted as a fact and cannot be substantially  changed just
b'r establishing a European_ market. The efiorts already undertaken to encourage
progressive consolidation of personal  savings must therefore be s'tepped up.
ii) In all member countties, deposit saving is still an essential factor in the supply
of funds to the capital market. It would seem necessary, in conjunction with
development of the instruments for collecting the funds used by the financial
institutions  active in this field, to encourage  the channelling of deposit savings
tcrwards medium- and long-term financing and employment on the capital markel.
iii ) Lastly, and most important,  the member counffies' capital markets are still
sufiering very seriously from the inadequacy of contractual  saving.
The situation on the supply side does not seem to have improve,C in recent years,
and the main reason for this is that the redistribution of incomes to the advantage
oli wage-earners has increased the opportunities for saving open to social classls
re,latively ill prepared  to play an active role on the capital market.
Aware of the obstacles to the smooth working of the capital nnarkets raised by
thLe nature of the supply of capital, the authorities in most Mermber  States havi
endeavoured  to encourage consolidation of savings and to prornote the difierent
fc,rms of contractual saving. The main purpose of measures  on these lines, which
have assumed some importance in Germany and in the Nether:lands  and which
have just been introduced in France, is to ensure the stability of .newly constituted
savings for a minimum period and so to help f.amiliarize the saver with the idea
of not keeping his funds perfectly liquid. The various measures  will be examined
in Chapter 5.
70Secondlv. the Community's first medium-term economic policy programme  contains
re.om-Lndations for a ';property policy". Implementation  of -this poliry alongside
the incomes policy should 
-encourage - 
houseliolds to channel their savings into
financial invesimenls. Until this poliiy is implemented and is prodPcing  results, the
oossibilitv that savings rvill be riade available  in the form needed to cover capital
'..o,rit.t.nrs wifl cJntinue to rest mainly on the work done by the financial
intLrmediaries.
IV. The adjustment of supply and demand on the c pital market
29. A useful way of examining the conditions under which the supply.of capital
is adjusted to demand is to make a broad distinction  between the roles played
bv eovernment  intervention,  the machinery  for the redistribution of long-term
saviig, and the machinery for "transforming" short-term  deposit saving.
A, BALANCE OF THE MARKETS  AND GOVERNI4ENT /NTERYENTION
30. In each Community country the supply of capital is adjusted more or less
fully to demand with the-aid of central government  intervention,  whigh supplemexts
and corrects the distribution of funds made by the market machinery. As has
just been mentioned, one of the ways in which governments influe_nce $9 suppJy
fi  capitul is by stimulating  savin1 an4 guiding it_tow-ards  privileged c$ryeJs'
Anoth.t point'that mav bie ment-ioned ii  the-scale of the funds supplied by
sou"61n.irt5, either directly or thtough specialized financial intermediaries; in
E ttrin countries these funis r.pt.r.ttl a substantial  contribution to the supply
of capital.
However, the most important operations  carried out by the public authorities
io adjust'supply  and demand take the form of direct action on investment demand
and action on'the cost of financing. The main instfuments used to infuence
investment demand are the decisions concerning  budgetary expenditure'  the control
of exoenditure bv local authorities  and nationalized industries,  and restrictions  on
buildi'ng. The cost of financing can be adjusted by measures  (especially  subsidies)
to afiect interest  rates and by tax measures.
If all the instruments mentioned above are taken into consideration it would seem
that government intervention has assumed relatively greater proportions  in France
and italy than in Germany and the Nethedands,  with Belgium somewhere in
t.t-..n.  But it is of courie difficult to assess more accurately  the scale o{ these
p"tii. op.t"tions  when they take non-quantifiable {orms, such as the control of
;;**  #  the market through the establishment of a "queue" of issues and by
directives to the financial intermediaries.
Alongside government intervention, two_ types -of machinery are,.of .,particular
imooitance"on  the European  markets: the machinery  for the redistribution of
long-terrn saving and "transformation"  machinery, i.e. arrangements enabling short-t,erm resources to be allocated to longer-term uses. These have been operated by
p'rivate institutions and by specialized financial intermediaries set up or conrolled
b,y governments. On the action taken to adapt these institutions to their functions
depends the greater part of the improvemenis to be hoped {or in the financing of
p,roductive  investment and social infrastructure.
Ei. MACHINERY  FOR REDIST/{IBUTING  IONG-TERM  SIIVING
Of the institutions engaged in redistributing long-term  savinp;, the first to be
examined hete will be those which administer contractual saving, followed by those
vrhich redistribute  capital collected  through the securities  market.
I.) INSURANCE COMPANIES AND PENSION  FUNDS
3L. These institutions collect contractual savings directly or indirectly from
households  and thus dispose of technical reserves which it is their task to administer.
In carrying out this task, they redistribute the savings they have collected between
various forms of financial and non-financial  investment. This opelation  can to some
e:xtent be regarded as a process o{ "transformation"  which afieits the nature of the
srrvings since, by entrusting their money to these institutions,  subscribers  to life-
assurance policies or supplementary pension  schemes intend to secure for themselves
^ 
c pital sum at ot from a specific date, while the intermediary  institutions in fact
use this capital in a way which is not determined by the saversi  themselves.
It is admittedly  dificult to compare the exact scale and nature of intervention by
social-insurance  institutions  from one country to another. Certain marked  difierences
in the way these institutions dismibute their resources can, however, be discerned.
Figures collected by the OECD Committee for Invisible Transactions  and referrine
chiefly to period between  1960 and 1964 show thar investmenrs in the form oI
a<lvances,  mainly at medium  and long term, account in Germany tot about 66%6
and in the Netherlands  for 69Vo of the increase in the financial aLssets of insurance
companies  and independent  pension funds, whereas this type of investment accounts
for between 1' and 47o of the increase in France,  Belgium  and the United States,
and about l37o in the United Kingdom. The disparities  are, however,  narrower
irr r_eality  than these figures might suggest,  since they include for Germany and the
Nethedands  loans against promissory notes 
- 
a type of operation which,-from the
economic point of view, does not difier from the private placing of bonds made
in other countries. On the other hand, investment in fixed-imterest  securities
accounts fot 637o of the increase in the assets of these organizations in France
and 567o in Belgium, compared with only 207o in Germany  and 9%o in the
Netherlands. In the United Kingdom  and the United States the corresponding
lgrrr"r arc 437o and 377o. In France and Belgium the high proportion of money
ttrese organizations put into bonds is due first and foremost to thb rules governing
ttreir investments, rules which have the efiect of channelling most of thiir fundi
to'wards the public sector.
72fnvestment in shares accounted for between 3 and 7 Vo of the increase in the
financial  assets of these institutions from 1960 to 1963 in Germany,  the Netherlands
and Belgium, about 207o in France, about 267o in the United States and 37%o in
the United Kingdom. This shows that, despite the increase in recent years, the
social-insurance  institutions of the EEC countties apply a relatively  small proportion
of their resources to risk investment  compared with their counterparts in the UK
and the USA.
In general, therefore, the contribution of these institutions to the financing of
corporate investment in the private sector is much lower in the EEC countries,
since their investment  in shares is low and their purchases of bonds are mainly
confined to government  bonds. In addition to the above financial investments,  these
institutions devote a sometimes considerable Dortion of their resources to the
purchase of real estate, particularly in Italy.
B) TI_IE SPECIALIZED CREDIT  INSTITUTIONS
32. The specialized uedit institutions fulfil a double role: they carry out technical
operations and serve as an instrument of economic  policy.
Their economic policy function, which consists in encouraging the financing of
investment in certain economic secrors,  explains why they more often than not
have public or semi-public status and sometimes  enjoy certain privileges (special
facilities for their loan issues and for dealing with institutional investors, public
guarantees, tax benefits).
They also have a purely technical function, which consists in collecting  funds on
the securities market and redistributing them to certain users of capital (enterprises
and public authorities) which have no direct access to the market, or at any rate
cannot obtain favourable  terms when borrowing in the ordinary way.
Another  argument therefore for the above-mentioned  advantages which these
institutions  enjoy in the Community counuies is that their operations have the
aim of offsetting the handicap faced by these usets (for example, small and medium-
sized enterprises) when they wish to draw directly on sources of finance. It
would seem, in fact, that the technical aspect o{ the functions of the specialized
credit institutions predominates in Germany and in the Netherlands, whereas  the
policy function is more to the fore in Belgium, Italy and France, where these
institutions play a major role in collecting long-term savings or in distributing
medium- and long-term  credit, or in both.
The scale of their operations is considerable, and the funds they draw from the
bond market account f.or a large proportion of total issues: for t960 to 1964 the
figure was 657o of total net issues in Italy, and more than 507o in Germany;
in France, the Netherlands  and Belgium it varied ftom )7 to 457o. This is all
the more significant since the use of the funds concerned is narrowly  specialized.
In Germany, the institutions  specializing in the financing of local authorities and
residential consmuction are appreciably more important  than those specializing in
industrial or agricultural  credit. The dominant place of the securities of the
73specialized institutions on the market obviously afiects the private sector's scope
for borrowing against bond issues, and this influence is enhancecl by the fact that
the securities are available on tao.
C) THE TREASURY
3.3. In practically all EEC countries,  the Treasury  also acts as a body redistributing
long-term capital by issuing bonds and granting medium- and long-term credit to
p,ublic or private enterptises  either directly or through credit institutions.
The economic policy function is particularly marked in this .kind of Treasury
olleration. To the extent that the Government  accords special terms to its ourn
issues, the Treasury is in a position to grant funds on more favourable conditions
than those available on the market.
c. MACHINERY FOR "7R.4NJFORI4.rNG"  LTQUID FUNDS AND DE?OSIT
s.4vlNGS
3,4. The financial intermediaries  canv out their "ffansformation"  function  bv
arJapting  the supply of capital to demand  from the standpoint  c,f duration of thl
investment. "Ttansformation"  may be defined as investment  for a longer period
than that of the deposits received. Xfith a view to integration of the iapital
rrrarkets, this process needs to be examined from three points of view:
a.) Scope,
b) The institutions involved and the sectors that will benefit,
c.) Its success in adjusting the supply of capital to demand.
il  TIIE SCOPE OF TRANSFORMATION
3r.  It is not easy to assess accurately the scope of ffansformation,  and even less
easy to compare its relative importance  in the financial systems of the various
member  counries. One teason for this is the absence in three member countries
-- Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands - 
of annual accounts co\/ering all financial
operations and classifying them according to period. The second reason is that
irr the other member countries the definitions of "short-term" do not coincide
and that in Germany figures on Treasury operations are a'v'ailable. A  third
factor is that, even if  such a standard definition were available, the legal
classification  of the period for which funds are committed is nLot a standard by
w'hich the stability of deposit saving can be assessed. Lastly, :;ystematic studies
on the subject have been camied out only for France, Germany, the United
Kingdom  and the United States. The comparisons  made below must therefore  be
treated with some caution.
7ISubject to these reservations, it is clear that transformation of short-term into
medium-  and long-term funds is carried out on varying scales in the difi-ering
financial systems. For the years 1960 to 1963 more than 507o of the long-term
capital requirements of business and private borrowers in France $rere met in this
\r/ay, compared  with less than 30Vo in Germany; the corresponding figures were
50%o for ihe United States and less than 207o f.ot the United Kingdorn  (1).
In some of these countries, in particular Italy, a number of loans shown in balance
sheets as "short-term loans" or "advances" are in fact often automatically renewed
and this amounts to their ransfotmation by the users of the loans. It  ruould
seem that in recent years the volume of funds transformed has tended to increase,
at least in France, Germany and in the United States, since the increase in the
long-term investment of the non-financial sectors has apparently been smaller than
the increase in the long-term capital requirements of the economy.
B) ORIGIN AND APPLICATION OF THE SHORT-TERM  FUNDS " TRANSFORMED "
36. In theory tansformation can be carried out by any financial intermediary
administering iight ot short-term funds who is in a position to accept th_e risk
of immobilizing  these funds for a period exceeding the period for which the deposit
is received; three technical factors make transformation  possible:
i) Sight deposits  have a certain foreseeable degree of stability, while time deposits
are rinewed and here too the extent of renerval can be foreseen;
ii) New deposits replace withdrawals,  so that the institutions have at their disposal
a working fund which is to all intents and purposes permanent;
iii) The volume of deposits  increases, so that there is a tendency fot this working
capital to increase.
In practice, three types of financial intermediary,actually  cary o-ut ttansformation:
savings institutions,  banks and, in certain member countfies, the Treasury.
The savings institutions  are the most important,  since their share in the total of
these oper-ations  ranges from 60 to 100% in the various member countries. The
natufe bf th. resouries (almost exclusively  savings deposits) accruing to them,. as
experience shows, with marked regularity dimitrirher_th-  importance of the liquidity
prbbl.m, while tlre public gnuruti..  they enjoy explains why they are partictilarly
well placed to transflorm  shbrt-term funds. Their activity in this direction  is also a
trrtrr.ul result of the regulations  v'hich encourage  them to invest in bonds, mortgage
claims and long-term loans to public authorities.
The distribution of the saving institutions' resources among the various form of
investment is influenced  to a great extent by the nature - 
which varies in liberality
from country to country - 
of the regulations  referred to above. In most EEC
(t) Source: "Etude de la transformation  des capitaux i court tetme en emplois financiers i long
ierme dans les divers pays" drafted by a \{/orking Patty in the Caisse des Ddp6ts et Consigna-
tions, Paris 1966 (unpublished).
75(ountries these funds are channelled  mainly towards  the financing of housing and
public authority. investment, and sometimes towards the investments  of public
undertakings, either in the form of long-term loans or through  purchases of 6onds.
lihe extent to which the savings institutions  assist in the financing of productive
investment in the private sector is therefore  somewhat  limited. The reslriction of
the funds made available by transformation  to certain types of investment  sets a
serious problem, of course, in the context of a European  capital market: on such
a. market the conditions in which the savings  institutions  work should vary less
from country to counffy than they do at present.
lihe banks contribute in smaller measure to total transformation.  This is mainly
clue to the stricter liquidity rules applied to them, parricularly in Italy and, until
recently, in France. They use the funds derived from transfotrmation mainly to
finance private and sometimes public enterprises.
If  economic policy considerations, which in certain circumsta,nces may require
special liquidity rules to be imposed on banks, are disregaided, it would s-em,
from 
- the purely technical point of view, that more short-ternn funds might be
transformed by banks in certain member countries where the scope is particularly
limited by regulations concerning the employment of funds. A{ore flexible  rules
rvould help to increase the volume of transformed  funds channelled towards the
financing of productive investment.
In the EEC countries  the Treasury plays an active part in tleis transformation
Frrocess  only in France; outside it does so in the United Kingdom  and in the United
Sltates. But even in France the part played by the Treasury  hers in fact declined
steeply over the last ten years, dropping from 707o of. total transformation to
c,nly I07o. The funds mansformed  by the Treasury have been channelled mainly
into housing and public enterprises and, at times, to local infrastructure.
C:) TRANSFORMATION AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND SITIUATION  ON THE
CAPITAL MARKET
37. In what way transformation helps to balance the supply ancl demand situation
on the c pital,market depends largely on the conditions in which, the process takes
place. According to whether the transformed funds are applied to investment  in
securities or to medium- and long-term loans, the equation of d,emand  and supply
irr one or other of these sections of the capital market is facilitated
Investment in securities ofiers the advantage  of greater liquidi:ty, but may lead
!? .th. security market trend becoming exceisively"dependeni  orr 
'monetary 
policy.
T'his -risk is all the greater because of the possibility ihat the institutions  camying
out the ttansformation  may find their own liquidity directly affr:cted by decisioni
of the_ monetary, authorities,,  and also becauselhey'ffansform  resources'(sight  and
ti:me deposits)_the  mend of which itself reflects changes in monetary poliiy. On
tl:e other hand, transformation  has enabled several Member States io make good
a temporary sho_rtage in the supply of long-term capital,  and has thus come to pluy
a'n important  role_in determining the general business mend. In )[taly, for example,
at a time when the public's interest in bonds had waned, banks invested in t6em
on a large scale.
ll)Investment in medium- and long-term  loans has the disadvantage of immobilizing
funds for too long, although this disadvantage can be mitigated_by qhe organization
of a market or 6y the .-*isten.. of mobilization facilities. On the other hand,
these investments often have a higher yield than investments in securities.
Thus, if the transformation of shcrt-term funds is to take place_ in conditions ofiering
the requisite level of liquidity, safety and profitability, a combination of these tvzo
typ"t of investment is needed;  and ihere should also be some spread of individual
inrrertments among the various sectors of the economy.  The development of this
machinery in a Eiropean capital market would be facilitated if the transformed
funds were not tied to specific uses. However, transformation  cannot be regarded
as an end in itself; it ii  merely an expedient  to counteract the public's  urr'due
liquidity preference.'  It is therefore impoitant  that the institutions which transform
rhorrterm funds should at the same time encourage the public to make more use
of the longer-term forms of investment.
Conclusions
j8.  To conclude this analysis of the main features and structural  problems  of
the capital markets in the various countries of the Community,  it is- important  to
considir the real natufe of the defects which, as is genetally  agreed, hamper the
operation of most of these markets.
a) The examination  of demand brought out the rapid grorrth of the financial
deficitr which enterprises, because of the narrowing of profit matgins  caused by
wage increases,  keeier competition  and - 
in some iaset - 
frozen prices., have,to
cov".r by borrowing. To these requirements of private enterprise must be added
the also steadily riounting  demani of public authorities' This growing  demand
for capital is in the last inalysis due to the fact that the Member States must
rapidly move up to the level of the best-equipped  economies_with  -whigh they are
nol"ud"yt  in direct competition,  without being-able to put ofi indefinitely expendi-
ture on social requirements and on economic  infrastructure'
h) As for the supply of capital, the inadequacies  that have been noted certainly
.unnot be atributed to u.ry general  lack -of 
savings, the growth of which is
satirfactory.  The fault lies iatf,er in the extent to which and the way in which
these savings feed the supply of capital on the market; it is these factots urhich
h"u. .""t"i  the structufai disequilibria that exist between demand and supply on
the capital markets of several N{ember  States.
39. It has already been shown that the supply problems are essentially  connected
lvith th. e*cessivi bias towards liquidity "na 
tne reluctance to engage in risk
investment and contractual  saving'
It is not certain, however, that these {eatures of saving really reflect the preferences
of transactors  so much as the nature of present financial structures. It is contrary
to the very logic of a market to speakf without amp-lification,  of a "shoftage of
long-term capilal". For this woul{ imply a very marked inelasticity of saving in
r"lriion to tir. terms ofiered and would suggest that any attempt to restore thebalance by improving the return on long-term  saving would harve to increase  the
r:ost of capital so much that investment  would almost certainly be discouraged.
,[n p_oint of fact, it is not possible to relate elasticity simply to yield; there are a
,vhole series of other, f?ctors of importancb to the saver t.liquidity,  ease of
investment) which are diffcult to quantify and so to express simply as "elasticity".
lit would seems, _then, that optimum use of available capital depends on four main
Iactors-: the mobility- of 
_ capital from one financial cl-rannel i,c another, greater
neutrality as regards fiscal treatment of the various types of investment, imlroved
s'cope for the collection and emplovment  of funds-by the financial instiiutions
rvhich collect and redistribute  savings, and, lastly, the development  of market
techniques which will enable savers io rcalize their investment$ more easily.
,10. The otganization and operation of these markets today is the outcome of a
tfeat-many factots which emerged  from two periods of fundaimental imbalance.
ilhe first was in the nineteen thirties and led to restriction of competition in the
{ield of credit and to rigid compartmentalization of the various nafional markets.
llhe second was the reconstruction  period after the war, wtren the dearth of
savings in relation to the swollen requirements led the authorities to introduce
measures for compulsory direction of available resources.
Itor the most part, the measures adopted  were unavoidable  at the time. The
p,roblem  alises because they still survive though the need for them has largely
ilisappeared.
lihe present arrangements  are therefore being, subjected to increasing  criticism. 'llhe measures  taken in the past succeeded in adjusting demand  and suiply within
each market, and.the authorities  hesitate to_abandon  machinery which,^though it
may.not  be enlirely satisfactory,  did enable _the rapid growth of the Euiopean"eco-
nomies to be adequately. financed. l{o!. the less, a review of these arrangefrents  has
in.recent yeats appear-ed.nece_ssary if _the markets are to cope with the rEquirements
arising within each of the Member  States and to allow for the new circ-umstances
and nevr. prospects opened up by the establishment of the European  Economic
Clommunity.
7fiCHAPTER ?
EXISTING LINKS BET\rEEN CAPITAL MARKETS
1.  The existing relations between, on the one.hand, the capital markets of the
Member States-and, on the other, between these markets and those in non-
Community counffies, will be examined from two main viewpoints.
First an attempt will be made to calculate the scale of those medium--  and long-
term private capital  movements  nou' already well-established between the various
countiies  and to define their principal characteristics.
Secondly, an account v'ill be given of the decisions  taken, or -about to be taken,
by the'Governments  to faciliiate capital movements,-in implementation of the
principles set out in the Treaty of Rome, and to descibe.the nature of the
r.-uining obstacles which must be overcome in order to further the progress  of
financial relations in the European framework.
I. Analysis of movements of pfivate medium-  and long-term capital
A. /NFORMATION FROM OFFICIAL SOURCES
2.  This information is obtained from balance-of-payments  statistics and from
data provided by the Member States under Article 72 of the Rome Treaty.
,4) GENERAL
The oficial clata given in Table 13 provide an overall view of pfivat€ capital
-ou"tn.",r from t!60 to 1965 between each member  country  and other countries;
*.  ng"..r for operations u,ith other Community countries only are ,also given.
ft  a;t, obtainei seem to be satisfactory for three countries; Federal Germany,
Fru".. and the Netherlands.  For Italy the oficial figures for 1962 and 1963
;  F;rty  airltt.a by spurious ,cap,iial movements. (r) The Belgo-Luxembourg
Econ"omic'Union communicates  only ihe balance of capital operations with foreign
.o.rntri., without details of the movements  themselves,  except for transactions  in
securities.
C) F "- 
116, a  7964 Italian residents made large transfers in banknotes to Srvitzeriand.
t'fr.i.-iiunrf."  haue bee"'.rti-ut.J-io l" g762 miiton in 1962, $1 456 million in 1963 and
$;l-;il#;-ls6+.  tL. u"tk of th" f".'dr transferred (759b,in 1962 and 657o in 7961
;;;";dirg; ihe-Bank "f-rt.it" 
ann.ral report) was repatriated,-by the ownets under the
cover of"swiss nr*"r, to nt.n.J portfolio rnd dit .t inves&nent in Itaiy. This procedure greatly
i;.;*d,  in a purely artificial il"nner, the volume of Iong-term  capital imports  recorded  tn
Italian oficial  statistics.
79r\llowing for these imperfections, the table calls for the following  comments:
i) Ouerall capital moaerftents witb foreign countries
ilhe official figures for private long-term capital movements  reveal that from 1960
to 1965 the EEC countries as a whole were net importers of capital to the tune
of g8 100 million. In fact, if the spurious  Italian imports are allowed for, the
rret figure would almost certainlv be no more than somd $6 500 million. But even
reduced to this level the figure still looks very high. it  must be remembered,
however,_that_  it applies only to movements  of iong-1s1rn private capital and thai
the overall balance of the Community's  capital operations also irrcludls movements
c,f public and short-term  private capital. -If 
all-these movements are taken into
account, there remains a net capital import o{ some $50 million.
iti) Capital mouerflents witbin the Commwnity
llhe volume of capital  movements  between the Communitv countries is relativelv
modest. In conffast vrith commercial trade flows, inffa-Community capital move-
nrent_s form only a small proportion of the total capital movements to ihich each
member counry.is a party. The only exception to the rule is the Netherlands.
Dutch residents  have exported more iapital io Community  countries than to non-
member counffies.
Two countries  had a net inflow of private long-term capital: Germany, some
$716 million, and France, a little over 9439 million. over a third of the total.
a.6out $432 million, came from the Nethetlands;  in the absence of precise data ii
may be estimate4 that the re_st was supplied by the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic
Ltnion and to a lesser extent by Italy.
1., It  is, difficult,. in conclusion, to discern in capital movements between the
Ivlember States and non-member  countries trends which may be associated with the
process of economic  in-tegration  in the Community,  in particular the development
o:[ commetcial ttade. Nor can the influence  be distinguisied of certain fundailental
economic_factors,  such 
-as- the difierent degree of eco=nomic development in the six
lvlember States; cyclical factors are reflected more cleady, it is rriue, but still not
v,:ry cleady.
I't would, however, be a mistake to infer that capital movements, are the result of
purely accidental factors in the economic life bf the Member  States and that
consequently they should be kept in checlc as far as possible or submitted to
controls intended to force them.into a given direction. It appears,  on the contrary,
that this characteristic  of capital movements  must be atribuied lirst and foremosi
to the lack of harmony between the policies applied by the ldember  States in
this sphere - 
total freedom in some and a restrictive attitude in others 
- 
and
to the efiects of certain measures, mainly fiscal or monetary,  v,hich on occasion
have unleashed heavy movements of capital which were neitlher foreseen  nor
perhaps desirable.
It is therefore  certain that the q9n{ oJ capital movements - 
in the past apparently
erratic - 
would undergo a rudical change if the liberalization and-harmbnization
measures  recommended in this report v/ere put into efiect.B) ANALYSIS OF THE VARIOUS CATEGORIES  OF CAPITAL  MOVEMENT
4.  Table 14 breaks down by sectors capital transactions made by residents and
non-residents. They fall under four headings:
i)  Direct investment;
ii)  Portfolio investments;
iii) Credits and loans for over one year;
iv) Sundry (for example,  investments in real estate).
The following observations can be made:
i) For all countries direct and portfolio investments account for the bulk of
capital uansactions.  Portfolio  investments  are particularly important in the Nether-
lands and in Germany. In France and Italy direct investments predominate (for
the latter country an estimate is made which eliminates the spurious movements
already tefered to).
ii) The trend of direct foreign investments, inrvard ot outward, is steadier than
that of portfolio investmentsl in all the countries  they have increased  regularly,
in contrast with the considerable  fluctuations  in long-term capital ffansactions as
a whole.
Analysis country by country calls for the following comments:
In the Netherlands  capital has been imported  chiefly in the form of portfolio
investments while the bperations of Dutch residents have often taken the form
of direct investments. This di{ference  reflects both the importance of the Nether-
lands as an international financial centre and the considerable role played there
by certain big international  companies.
Non-resident  poftfolio investment in Germany was vefy substantial  from 1960
to 1963. The movement  slackened  considerably from April 1964 following the
establishment  of a 25%o withhoiding  tax on the income from German bonds paid
to non-residents  (KuPons teuer).
In France operations in securities by residents  resulted in relatively heavy net
disinvestmeni due to the weakness  of new investments  and the sale of considerable
holdings of securities  previously built up abroad.
The incomplete data available for the Belgo-Luxembourg  Economic Union concern
solely the net purchases  of foreign securities by residents and of domestic  securities
by non-residents. Throughout the period there was a heavy deficit on these
transactions.
As mentioned  above, oficial data f.ot: Italy do not show the real movements of
long-term capital. It must be noted then that while Italy, according to the figures
givin in Table2, has been the recipient of a growing,volume  of direct investment,
Italian residents, contrafy to the trends indicated by the table, have made relatively
substantial portfolio  investments  abroad.
81') 
ISSUES OF BONDED LOANS
5. The placing of bonds on foreign markets, which is the traditional insttument
:for integrating capital markets, has made particular progress in recent years. It
has therefore  been considered useful to make a special analysis of capital movements
under this form. The information  available in this field is rnore complete and
more satisfactory than that on other capital transactions.
Two statistical  tables have been prepared: Table 15 gives a breakdown  year by
year of public loan flotations made for foreign account from 1961 to 1965 on
the European  and American markets; Table L6 breaks down these issues into two
main groups: according to the nationality of the borrowers and accotding to the
markets on which the loans are raised.
In order to define the diflerent categories of issue more cleady a distinction  has
been made in the two tables between "foreign loans in local cu:rrency" and "Euro-
bond issues". The latter term needs some explanation. By Euro-bond  issues are
meant issues to be placed mainly on markets other than that of the reference
currency (see note ai the foot of Table 15 and fuller details in Ch. 9, III). The
scale of such issues has increased considerably in recent y€ars and the issue
syndicates  have made efiorts to extend their international  client,:l constantly. That
,is why it is extremely difficult to break down issues geograph,ically  according to
the place of.residence  of the actual subscribers; it has been found preferable to use
the ierm "Euro-bond  issues;', which covers loans with very similar conditions
igoverning remuneration.  These loans are the beginning of an international  market.
Iables  'J.5 and L6 call for the following comments for the E.EC counries:
'.i\ Tbe aolume of issues
'The volume of foreign issues has jncreased sharply since 1"963 as a result of the
Cevelopment of Euro-bond  issues while "traditional" issues denominated in local
currency  have not advanced.
.Loans issued by Community residents on the markets of nonnmembet  countries
,or on Euro-bond  markets have in recent years reached a volume  several times
igreater than that of loans issued by non-member countries or by international
icrganizations  (excluding the European Investment Bank and the ECSC, which
are counted as borrovrers resident in the Community) on the markets of the
.Member States. The balance in favour of the Community is ,over $570 million.
'Ihis figure, however, must be interpreted with caution in view of the contribution
,tf Community residents to the Euro-bond market, and does not therefore represent
:net real imports of external capital through {oreign  issues.
.lssues by Community residents - 
including  the EIB and ECSC - 
on the markets
of other member countries have been relatively small. From '196L to L965 they
rrotalled $320 million, or some 6.77o of all foreign loan issues irr the period, which
totalled nearly $4 800 million.
:ii) Tbe beneficiaries
'Ihe EIB and ECSC are the leading issuers among Communit,r  residents.  Loans
placed by them represented )57o ol all issues by Commulity residents; Italy,
'whose share amounted to 187o, was the next largest beneficiary of such loans.
82iii) The rnain subscribing countries
rf an.exception_is-made {or Germany, for which country issues since April 1964
have been included in the total o{ Euro-bond issues, the Netherlands is the countrv
in which by f.ar the larges_t volume, of foreign issues was placed. It is, moreover,
the. only country for which loans floated by non-residents  exceed those issued by
residents in foreign markets.
B. THE INADEQUACY OF OFFICIAL DATA FOR ANALYSI.'  OF CAPITAL
FLO\YS
6. The interptetation of official data on international movements of capital sets
difficult problems_. Statistics  account for direct uansactions, but provide  no
information on the part played by redistribution or what may be- called the
"turntable" role of international financial bodies and certain finaniial centres. We
therefore have a very imperfect knowledge of the geographical distribution of
capital movements.
It is also clear that numerous transactions are by-passed by official records, thus
mak-ing the volume and range of financial relations efiectively established'  seem
smaller than they are.
A) THE REDISTRIBUTION  ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL  BODIES AND
OF THE CAPITAL  MARKETS IN NON-MEMBER  COUNTRIES
7. From 1954 to 1'964 the EIB and the ECSC together granted long-term credit to
atotal of $1 000 million and raised nearly $650 million in loan capltal, in addition
to the $250 million making up the EIBts paid-up capital.
Of the loan funds taken up, $300 million v/as raised in the markets of non-
Community countries,  while almost all the credit granted went to beneficiaries
residing in the Member States. In this way the two bodies channelled  considerable
external resources into the Community. In the Community itself they played
a very important  role_in redistributing capital placed at their disposal eithir 6y ihe
governments in the shape of capital payments or by subscribers to bonded loans.
The other international financial bodies - 
the World Bank. the Inter-American
Development Bank, the Council of Europe Resettlement  Fund, Eurofima - 
played
a similar part as redistributors, but the bulk of the funds lent by them weni to
non-member  countfies.
Certain financial  centres play a-traditional role in the redistribution of capital. This
is the case of Switzedand,  which figutes largely in capital transactioris betvreen
Community  residents and in movements between the residents of Member States
and those of non-member countries.
The ne_ed to_ adjust the statistics relating to Italy in view of the movements of
notes through the Swiss banks has already been mentioned. It must be added inrrhis connection  that the fraction of Italian {unds uansferred  to Switzerland which
amounted to a tfue expoft of capital was not used on Swiss territory; actually,
rnuch of this money *ud. itt wuy to the markets of non-membt:r  countries and to
counffies in the Community, especially, it seems, Germany  an,J the Nethedands.
'Ihe Euro-issues market sets similar problems in connection  wittr the determination
,rf the origin and true geographical-destination of the c_apital.passing  _through.it.
'Iable 16 ihows that "i 
tJthe end of 1965 issues totalling about $1 800 million
lhad been placed on thG market. Out of this sum borrowers  resident in the EEC
,cbtained nearly $400 million, of which no less than 407o went to the EIB and
.ECSC. To thii amonnt must be added at least part of the issueri placed by holding
,companies in order to finance the Europ_ean subsidiaries of Arnedcan  companies;
while such borrowers are not as a ruLe EEt residents, it is certain that a considetable
part of the capital raised in this manner  has financed investmerrt in the EEC.
.[t is impossible to estimate the efiective contribution to this matket in the shape
,cf subscriptions  by EEC residents. It can only be said that the Euro-issues market
.has playei an important role as a centre for the distribution of capital in. the
,Cominunity; but ihere is no way of determining_whether  these operations  have
resulted in a net export or a net import of capital by the EEC counries.
Finallv. teference must be made to a further "turntable", which is even more
important from the angle of volume, the E.uro-curle_lcy  madr:et. Operations.in
thii market are generafiy short term and do not fall within the scope -of this
study. Transfers of funds for mofe than a yeaf,_ho$/ever,  afe not unusual and it
111nri b. bome in mind that short-term facilities have been systematically  tenewed
by borrowers and must be considered  as long-term financing. Estimates have been
made by the Bank for International Settlements of contributions and recourse  to
this market by lendets and borrowers  resident in the EEC. I'he position-of -the
sevcral Member States rvith regard to this market, howevet, has 'i'aried considerably,
particularly where Italy is conierned, a_countfy which has succe,ssively appeated.on
ih. Errro-*.r.n.y tnurk.t as cteditor, debtor and again as creditor. This is anothef
imoortant element in the financial relations between the member countries of the
Community  which does not always appear clearly in official clata.
B) DEFECTS  OF OFFICIAL  DATA
8.  Most of the Member States have made notable  progress :in developing  their
statistical machinery over the last few years. The situation now appears satisfactory
in Germany, Franie, Italy and the Nethedands. As has been noted, this- is 
-not
the case for'the BLEU. At any rate much remains to be done here in the field
of harmonization,  especially  as regards the distinction  between the various types
of capital movement and their geographical breakdown.
Another  point is that there are many gaps in official statistics which a-re.apparently
difficult to eliminate. The most serious are not omissions  of a technical  nature
(minimum amounts, enors of classification)  but intentional  omissions in the
reDortins of transactions.  The motive is sometimes  the desire to avoid red tape,
br-tt muJh more often tax and exchange-conrol  evasion.
84II. Measures taken ot planned under the Treaty of Rome
to facilitate capital movements
9. A brief account will be given here of the reciprocal undertakings  agreed to
by Member States, or being f,lanned, in order to make capital movements freer.
i;  ;ili  hinge on' the p.Jble*s of relaxing exchange control regulations -
or"Ui"*t "p!n 
th. solution of which depends ihe development  of relations between
ih;;;;ir"i';ril.t,  of the Member States. Fiscal obstacles will be dealt with in
Chapter 14.
/)  PRESENT SITUATION
10. At present direct investments,_opefations in listed securities, investment.in
;;  ;;[;;;;;;;i  ;;actions and short- and medium-term credits linked vrith
.o.-"r.iui iransactions ot th. rendering of services are all completely free .of
;;;l;i;;i;;;.  Fo" oth". categories of traisactions,.such  as .the issue of secufities
"r 
-iir. 
rn".t .tt of th. othe"r Member States, medium-  and long-term "financial"
loans (i.e. ,ro, .orrrr..,.a y7i,tt commercial  transactions),  -transactions in unlisted
r.l"aiti.t and movements  of short-term "financial" capital, restrictions survive in
;;ir  Member States. A brief list of the restrictions  in que-stion-is  given.in an
;;;;;-.  ilrit-.tt"pr.r. It  must be pointed out, however, that the situation  is
;i;;;gitg all ihe time a.,d thai now liberalization  measures are being planned. They
rvill be examined  in section 11.
The measures already adopted to implement the provisions.of  .the Rome Treaty
.""..t"-i.rg ,ite eli-ination'of  exchange restrictions  are contained in two directives
;;ildpii.rri"r  .i erlicle 67 whi"ch were.adop!:d by.the C^ouncil on n.rogos,1l,s
from th.'commission  on 11 May 1960 and 18 Decembet  1962 respectively(').
From the technical  point of view these directives constitute minimum commitments
;hi.i, ;h. M..U.t Siates have honoured by changing thejr domestic legislation'
Certrin Member St"t.s haue gone far beyond ihit. Moti of them, furthermore,  have
extended to non-memb.t .J"ntri"s th; [beralization measures adopted to meet
Community  commitments.
The resulting system of liberalization difiers appreciably  {rom that set out in the
;c"a. 
"i 
riAriutir tiii';-io. .upirul mov.m.nm adopted by .the oECD Council
";2ti l"t,  lgeq. 1'fr. C"r"-"nity comorit-.nt, atJ distinctly stricter from the
il;.i;"'-ill  A Nrr.-[.r Siu* ir not free to withdrarv the measures of unconditional
i;ffi.jir";;;.;;;btt'h;J tv it-,. Council except-in  accordanci. with -the safeguard
.fr"r.r-."rrained in Arti.i., 73 and 109 of the Treaty' .These clauses can be
i"t.f..a "tiy 
-t tp..ift.-.onaiiio"r  and follorving Community procedures. In the
OICO system, o" ti"- oth.t hr"d, a 
- member 
*state 
may unilaterally  withdraw
liberalization  measures already adopted " if they result- in sefious economic or
financial  disturbanceJ" ;d -;ry 
tJmporarily srripend their application "if  the
[;il;;  "i 
payments  position ...-develops adversely 
^t 
n rute and in circumstances
which it considers  serious ..."
c) s.. "fi.trl c-ette of the European communities, 12 Jaly 1960 and 22 Jantary 196).llhe difierent forms of capital operations  are broken down in the directives refered
to into four categories, each subject to difierent rules:
i) "Unconditional" liberal?ation, yhlch can be revoked only on the strict conditions
set out in Articles 73 and 109 of the Treaty, applies to capital movements listed
i:n the first and second categories.  These twb'categories  buti.uliy consist of direct
investment, operations-in  listed _securities,  personaf  capital movements, investment
irn real estate and short- and medium-ierm  crediis linked with' commercial
t:ransactions  or with the rendering of services.
iiL) A "conditional" system of libe?lization is in force for the r:apital movements
of the third category: the issue of foreign securities on the capiial markets and
tnancial loans and credits. The Nlember  States may apply reitrictions to such
operations  or maintain  restrictions  existing on the daie of entry into force of the
directive "if these movements are such -as to impede the achievement of the
objectives of their economic policy". Three Memb.r stut.s - 
rrunce, Itriy 
"nJ tl:re Netherlands - 
have taken advantage of this clause and continue to maintain
partial 9r- total restrictions.on such capital movements;  general licences u.., ho*.u.r,
granted {or ffansactions for s,rms and periods not eiceeding certain limits fixed
in advanc_e  (see Annex). For the othef Memb_er  s_rates, 'wtti.t trrJ ,i;;;  i;tj;
liberalized these operations  by 11 May 1960, liberalization has become irrevocabll
unless the sateguard clauses previously  referred to are invoked.
iii) For. capital . movements of the fourth category, which includes  short-term
financial operations, including the constitution of deposits abrc,ad, no particular
oirligation regatding  liberalization has been taid dorvn and thenefor" tt'. -"it.t is. still oPen; su^ch operations are in fact fully or almost fully liberalized  in three
or: tne lvlember btates.
B,} FURTHER  PROGRESS
1-1. As three of the Member States sdll ap_ply exchange-control  restrictions,  a third
directive  under Article 67 has been considlrld n"..ri"rij 
""J 
ir'-u, present under
discussion..  The object is to establish a better balance';o;;- the commitments ot the various Member States and to eliminate at the same time a number of
obstacles  which do not arise from exchange  control bur are oieqJuily f";a;;.;,.I
importance.
More specifically,  the proposed directive provides for a relaxarion of exchanse
control in France, Italy and the Netherlands, first with regard ;;-;h. ;;;rffi'[; toreign issues on the national markets up to a specifii ceiline, and secondlv
concerning the granting to residents of medium- und tong-t"rtri'n"lr.i"i-  r""r',
and credits.
The ditective is also designed -to eliminate.laws and regulations discriminating
against the access of issuers o{ other member .ourlri.r'to iil  ,";.;;i ;rpt;T
Tj4:1r or against the admission o.f foreign securities to official quotation on the stock €xchanges. It provides-, in adCition, for the elimination  of dir;irimination with
:^.,iiffl_r: ,at:fjrghase of toreign securities b"y €nancial institutions,  a necessary corollary ot -Eh'c integration,  Liberulization  of the rules governing investment by
86financial institutions is indispensable if the measures liberalizing  foreign--  issues
,t ."ay in force or proposed, in the third directive are to be efiective. By allowing
financial institutionj to^buv foreign securities denominated  in the domestic  currenc-y
;?;;" ;f .*.hung. risks by virtu"e of special  clauses, the directive will help towards
building up a sufficiently  large market for these issues'
L2. The Group would like the regulations impeding the free movement  of capital
.  b. ."*oued progressively.  Such"restrictions as survive seem all the less justified
'q7h.r. th.y upp.ur"to  be maintained for reasons other than those for which they
;;;; 
";Giir"ttjiuJopt"a. 
Exchange-control  restrictions have, as a rule, ceased to be
"JJ ir-l"f.!iltta il.  balance oi payments and seem nowzdays intended .mainly
to ensure th"e autonomy of domeitii  monetary policies. Besides the traditional
;;.i;G;.ontroi in.,ruments,  i.e. the b.an o1- the purchase,  by non-residents of
..rtrin"ki.tds of money market paper and on the contracting by residents of loans
uUroua, and rules governing time-limits  for payments to abroad and,the repatriatiorr
of foreign currency acquired, measures have been introduced whrch -spec-rflcarly
;;t;d,?  th. io#ui" of rnon.t"ry policy: they fix. limits to the banks' foreign
.,rrr.ri.u holdinss, provide for minimum r.tetv. requirements.or rediscount ceiling-s
;;-;h;-1.;;;;i ffitl  defending on the banks' net- 
-foreign liabilities, and. establish
i..-t - 
which vary in^ generisity - 
governing the swap opefations of the banks'
The consequences of this tendency wefe explained in the 36th Annual Report
of the BanL for International Settlements:
"Currency  convertibility  requires that domestic deqrand, cost and credit conditions
b. conristent with balance-of-payments  needs. For monetar;l PolicY,, wlich is
relativelv more efiective in influincing  the particular channels through which tunds
;;;;  t("" the actual level of .*p.idit,rri, this normally-implies  an orientation
;;ir";riil-;.**ar curbing excessirie inflows or outflovr's of capfal. - By .the same
;;il;;;"";.rtibility  indu"ces countries to make greater.use of fiscal and incomes
;;tt." in ,tvtne simultaneously to achieve both domestic and external oliectives.
i; i-i"; 117ri; it tend, to direct the various poJi.cy  instruments  towafds their most
efficient  uses, thereb)' contributing to sustainable  expansion'
"In practice, however, most collnlies  have been reluctant or unable to accept the
ai*iifi*ltt-t.t""t  i" convetibilily.  Instead, in order to make more use of moneta-ry
poti& fot domestic ptrrpor.r, they have sought in va-rious ways to weaken the
iii'f.t'U.i*.."-ao*.rii. iredii conditions  and external flows of capital. The,result
hur b...t a gradual drift away,from convertibility, confined up to now largely
to selective  controlt over capital transactions".
Conclusions
13. The present state of knowledge  of the extent of integration between the
iroitri .ri[ets of Member  States Is very imperfect' Data are incomplete and
i.iii"ty'-"rit"rii."r.  G  .cale of intia-C&nm-unily  gapital movementsl the
*."*"oii.A br.akdovrn ,il. ngut"t indicate is radica{y- diJtorted by a group. of
F""."r?rJ*ii.i ,;"il;  ou.r*.igtir Enancial relations with ihe markets of non-member
countries as compared with ihose betvreen  Community markets'
87.[t is true that measures adopted rvithin the Community to gi're greater freedom
to financial  flows have abeady been appreciable. However, the development of the
iiuropean capital market requires further progress both in respect of exchange
r:ontrols and of domestic controls of the machinery of the mar.kets in the reveral
lVlember  States. Such progress can only be achieved if certain adjustments  are
made to economic policy instruments now in use. The second part of this report js devoted to these adjustments and in it an eflort is madr: to establish the
conditions under which economic  policv instruments  can be made effective in the
framework of a capital market extended to European scale.
8BANNEX TO CHAPTER i
Survey of exchange-control  systems  applicable  to the main
categoties  of capital movement between the Member States
GERMANY
Direct inuestment : unrestricted
Operations in listed securities: unrestricted
Operations in unlisted securities: unrestricted
Issue and placing ol securities ol a loreign cotnpany on the domestic capital market:
unrestricted
Issue and placing ol secttities ol a domestic cornpany on a loreign capital market:
unrestricted
Inuestment  in real estate: unrestricted
Sltort- and naediant-term  credits linked with contmercial transactions or with the
rendering  ol seruices in ubicb a resident  participates: unrestricted
Medium- and long-terrn loans and credits not linked witb commercial transactions
or the rendering ol seruices: unrestricted
Short-tern  loans and credits not linked uith comraercial  transactions  or the
rendering of seraices: unrestricted
Opening ol and translers to cuffe?tt accounts, deposit accounts and other shott'ternt
inuestments  on the rnoney market:
i)  By residents on a foreign market: unrestricted
ii) By non-residents on the domestic  market: the opening of and transfers to
curfent and deposit  accounts are free of restriction; however, German credit
institutions are forbidden to pay interest on time deposits held on behalf of non-
residents (whether they belong to the banking sector of not), with the exception
of saving accounts held by individuals. As for other short-term  investments, non-
residents* may not b,ty German treasury bonds or similar paper (this rule is
designed to prevent the circumvention  of the ban_ on the payment of interest on
shorl-term  deposits). Nor may residents buy fixed-interest-bearing domestic stock
rvith a clause providing for redemption at a specified price.
BELGIUM - 
LUXEMBOURG
Direct inuestment : unresricted (1)
Ooerations  in listed securities: unresmicted (For residents  settlements for such
operations  must be made through the free market. For non-residents  the settlement
#av be efiected at choice via i-he official or the free matket. In order to transfer
iiioua the proceeds of a sale of securities it is necessary  to go through the free
market .u.i  if the funds for the purchase had originally been imported into
89the country through the oficial market. The redemption proceeds of B.L.E.U. listed
bonds denominated in Belgian or l-.uxembourg  francs may be mansfered through
the official market. The only formality is a veiification procedur:e).
Operations. in unlis-ted  securities: unrestricted (For residents  these operations must
be efiected through the free market. For non-residents they .un b. efiected at
choice through the oficial market or the free market. In order to transfer the sale
proceeds 
"t-pqd 
the frce marker must be used even if the funds for the purchase
had originally been imported into the country through the oficial market)i
Issue and. placiye of securities 9l a foreign cornpuny on the domestic capital market:
(From 
-the_ point of view of exchange control,-  issues on foreign account are
unresfficted. However, any public issue of foreign securities or tf,eir sale to the
;public by foreigners  is subjecf to authorization from the Ministry of Finance.)
Issue and placing of securities  of a loreign company on a fore,ign  capital market:
unrestricted
.[nuesttnent is real estate: unrestricted (1)
,Sbort- and. ruediurn-term credits linked. uith comrnercial transactions or with the
irendering ol seraices in whicb a resident participates: unresrjicted. (1) Transfers
by non-residents  to resident  su_pplie,rs under the heading of advance payments or
rthe rendering of services  must 6e efiected via the officiaf markerr.
'Medium- and long-term loans and credits not linked with conntercial transactions
or tb.e rendering of seruices: unresfficted  (The corresponding transfers are effected
'i'ia the {ree market; for non-residents,  transfers  may be madJ via the official market
or the free market.)
ifbort-term  loans and credits not linked uitb commercial  trunsactions  or tbe render-
ing gf seruices: unresuicted  (The corresponding transfers are ellected via the free
market; for non-residents,  the ffansfers may bJmade via the official market or the
Iree market.)
l)pening and supply of cunent accounts, deposit accoants antl other short-term
inuestrnents  on the money market:
i) By tesidents on a foreign market: unrestricted  (The settlem,ent must be made
through the free market);
ii) By non-residents  on the domestic  market: the opening of current accounts  and
deposit accounts  is untestricted. rWhere other short-ierm i-nvestm,ents are concerned.
non-tesidents  may not buy Treasury bonds.
(') Since 1 October I96J, B.L.E.U. residents have been free to efiect transfers linked to these
cperations at their option either via the official market  (i.e. at rates establis;hed within the limits
l,aid down in the framework-of theEMA),,or  via the free market  (i.e. where rates may fuctuate
outside. these limits). Transfers made via the oficial market require individual authoiization by
the- Belgo-Luxembourg  .Exchane-e  Intitgte; applicants  mFst giv? reasons for theii r.q"iri a"i
authorizations  to ffansfer via the oficial marliet are _subjeci to c€rtain conditions cdncerning,
i:n _particular,  the repatriation of income and capital through the oficial market. For noil
residents,  transfers linked to these operations may 5e made via the olficial rnarket of free market
as the investor  chooses,
90FR,4NCE
Direct inue stment : unrestristed
Operations in listed securities: unrestricted apart from operations  in the certificates
of open-end  investment  funds.
Operations in unlisted securities:
i) Purchase abroad by residents: unrestricted apat from the certificates of open-
end investment funds;
ii) Purchase in France by non-residents: unresricted  apart from foreign securities
held on French territory.
lssue and placing of securities ol a loreign cornpany on tbe dornestic capital rnarket:
special authorization
Issue and placing ot' securities ol a dorxestic corTtpany on a loreign copital market:
special authorization
Inuestment in real estate: unrestticted
Sbort- and rnediuru-term uedits linked with comnercial transactions or with the
rendering ol seruices in ubicb a resident participates:  unrestricted
Medium-  and long-term loans and credits not linked with coraraercial  transactions
or the rendering of seruices:
Import: special authorization, except for operations where the amount does not
excied FF 1 000 000, the rate of interest is not higher than 47o per annum, and
the life of the loan does not exceed 2 years. The total amount of loans obtained
by a resident under the general authorization may not at afiy moment exceed
FF 1 000 000.
Export: special authorization,  except fot banks, which c,n their own responsibility
ma), ,.tse Toreign currency balances held for their account with correspondents
abroad for their own investment opetations abroad and for all investment operations
efiected abroad on behalf of non-residents.
Short-terrn loans and credits not linked with commercial  transactions  or tbe render-
ing ol seruices:
lnport: special authorization, except for operations where the amount does not
exceed FF 1 000 000 and the interest rate does not exceed 4%o per annum' The
total amount of loans obtained by a resident under the genetal authorization  may
not at any moment exceed FF 1 000 000.
Export: special authorization,  except fot banks, which on their own responsibility
may,rse foreign currency balances held for their account with correspondents  abroad
for' their own investment operations abroad and for all investment operations
abroad efiected on behalf of non-residents.
Banks may also, without limit as to amount and whatever the purpose of the
operation, grant loans in francs to non-residents in the form of overdrafts on
e*ternal franc accounts on the sole condition that their commitments do not
exceed 6 months (but at the end of the 6-month period there is nothing to prevent
a further credit being granted for a further 6 months)'Opening ol and transt'ers  to curreflt accouftts, deposit accounts and other short-tern
inuestments  on the money rnarket:
i) By tesidents on a foreign market:  special authorization,  except for banks, which
may hold direct balances abroad and use their own foreign currency available with
thefu correspondents  abroad;
ii) By non-residents on the domestic market: the opening of and transfers to
current and deposit accounts are urtrestricted;  French banks, however, are prohi-
bited from paying interest on time deposits  held on behalf of non-residents  other
than central banks and international  organizations. Short-term investments are
subject to special authorization.
ITALY
Direc t inue s trnent i unrestricted
Operations in listed securities:  unresricted
Operations in unlisted. securities:  special authorization
lssue and placjng ol securities ol a loreign conpan! on tlre donestic capital
market: special authorization
Issue and placing of secarities  of a domestic  company  on a loretign copital narket:
special authorization
Inoestnent in real estate: unrestricted
Short- and mediurn-term credits linked with conrnercial transrtctions or witb tbe
rendering ol seruices in which a resident participates:  unrestricted
Mediam-  and long-ternz loans and cretiits not linked uitb cominercial tra:nsactions
or uitb the rendering ol seruices:
Import: special authorization,  except for operations where the amount does not
exceed Lit. 50 million, the life of the loan does not exceed 5 years and the interest
rate does not exceed 67o pet annum.
Export: special authorization,  except for operations where the amount does not
exceed Lit. 50 million and the life of the loan does not exceed 5 vears. (Financial
institutions may not engage in such operations.)
Short-term loans and credits not linked with cornmercial transttctions or uith the
rendering ol seruices:
Import: special authoization,  except for operations where the amount does not
exceed Lit. 50 million and the rate of interest does not exceed 67o per annum;
Export: special authorization,  except for operations where the amount does not
exceed Lit. 50 million.
Opening ol and translers to curlent accoants, deposit accounts and other sbort-term
inuestments  on the mone! rnarket:
i)  By residents  on a foreign market: special authorization  except for banks;
ii) By non-residents  on the domestic market: unresricted
'92NETHERLANDS
Direc t inae stment : unrestricted
operati.ons in listed. securities: unrestricted  (Non-residents may-buy.securities.by
selling foreign .,rrr"n.y--ori-both  th. oficial market and on the K-account  tree
market:  euilders ou,uii.i'r.I-^ilr.-tqi. of these secutities must be *edited to
ia;;.r,-;il;;;"#;;i;;,;e-.;i  ui" ih" i.." market. Residents mav buv
foreien securities r"l; *l;l-";;;;;t  ireld in reinvestment  accounts or guilders
;*.t'fi;;'i"".t.aii.a  to the K-account-oi-u-no.t-tttident; on.the other hand'
foreign curfency oUr^iilai.o,o *.  t"f.- of ,.*titi.t is convetible on the oficial
markit. There is rft. p"riiUifiiy o-f t.it.tirrg b.,*."n the tvro-categories  of,account
and hence, in practicll ffi.'it  i- ti"Jl. itu"aard rate' Liberalization  does not
cover bonds tirt.d ub'ro*d,- a1"o*i*r.i in suilders or linked in any other way
;;';'";;;;r;h"  l"ijali,;i;i.h;;  not ried in the Netherlands')
O p er ation s in unlis ted s ecuritie  s : special authorization
Issueand.placingo|securitieso|a|oreigncorlpunyonthedomesticcapitalmark'et:
special authorization
lssue and placing o| securities  o| a d.onestic  cornpully  on a foreign c6pit4l market:
special authorization.
lnaestment  in real estate: unrestricted
Sbort- and rnedium-ternt credits tinked witb conmercial transactions or uitb the
rendering ol seruices")"' it iii,  resident participates: unrestricted
Med'ium.andlong-ternloansandcreditsnotlinkeduithconruercialtransactions
or the rendering  ol seroices:
Import: special authorization  except for an annual total not exceeding Fl 10 000'
Export: special authorization  except for an annual total not exceeding Fl 10 000'
For banks: special authorization and on condition  that the life of the loan or credit
does not exceed 5 Years'
sbort-ternt loans and credits not linked. uitb corurnercial  transactions  or with the
rendering ol seraices:
lrnDort: special authorization  except for an annual total
Foi banksr unrestricted.
not exceeding Fl 10 000.
Export:specialauthorizationexceptforanannualtotalnotexceedingFll0000.
Foi bankJ: unrestricted.
openingot'andtrans|erstocurrentkccounts,depositaccountsandothersbort-terrrl
inoestru"eris on tbe moneY market:
i)Byresidentsonaforeignmarket:specialauthorizationexceptforbanks;
*fr'f
ii) By non-residents  on the domestic  market: unresricted'PART T\7O
CONDITIONS FOR EFFICIENT USE OF ECONOMIC POLICY
INSTRUMENTS  IN AN INTEGRATED  MARKET
The problem of developing a European capital market has to be seen first and
foremost as a matter of e'ionomic policy rather than of adaptation o{ lnancing
;il;;tr  Financial measures loom s6 large in the putsuit g! th. planned  objectives
;l;;;;;;;;;  in all Member  States thai there would be little value in discussing
;h.-;;.h;i;;i ,rp..r, of the problem without prior examination  of its economic
policy aspects.
But this logical sequence of priorities should not be interpreted  as implying
that oolicv frarmonization must^take precedence also in time over the broadlning
;-Hr"ci,a1-A;;i;.  E*peri.nce in'other fields of Community life has shown
ihat policv harmonizatiot^.o-., about only under the.pfessufe  of-new problems,
ilh;X  b"ffi ,; arise in connection with the establishment of-.a Larye capital
fu.ilt  ;;  ;[" European scale. The broadening  of the. financial channels and
hur*onirution of ecoiomic policies must therefore  proceed in step.
The development of international  capital movements requires adaptation .f l!:
..ono-i. pilicy instruments  now in use, some of them to be given up altogether
;;J lil  rrr. of oth.tt lo Le intensified - 
in short, a new pattefn in the choice
.?l..fr"iq".r uJ *.tnoas of application. By contrast, it hal been found that the
J;.b;#;i  of a E"rope"n cupitul market would in no way aftect the policy
;E;ff;;t".a  ty i-r-t.-."",.J.i overall demand, the. regulrtion of the capital
,rru.k.t, savings inceniive* and investment  guidance, and the financing of govern-
ment and public undertakings.
%lot6CHAPTER 4
POLICIES  FOR CONTROL  OF OVERALL MONETARY DEMAND
AND REGULATION  OF THE CAPITAL MARKET
Introduction
L.  The development of a European  capital market will necessitate a revision of
regulations whiih, by the resttictions and discrimination they entail, hamper -or
distott capital movements. The channels through which capital flows will also
have to be enlarged and improved.  Whatever  the methods of the process,may  be,
it will give firmJ greater independence in the choice of finance as a result of the
improved scope for recourse to capital markets in the other member  countries
*h.n.uer domestic  sources of finance prove either insufficient or comparatively
more costly.
2.  Vhile recent years have seen some pfogress, discriminatory- provisions and
obstacles to capitai movements persist on most markets; most often it is argued
that these havi to be kept for ieasons of economic  policy. In this lh_gpter, _the
Group endeavours to define the precise nature of the ptoblems which full freedom
of caiital movements  might set for these policies, assuming- them to be conceived
and ipplied solely on the national level. Having marked out the relevant
limitations,  the Gioup  suggests  improvements  and adaptations which it might be
possible and desirable to inuodu.e i.rto the- measure-s -adgnted by monetary  and
hnancial authorities  so as to safeguard the efficiency of their policies in the context
of an integrated market. The Gioup's comments  on this nexus of problems must
be considered only in this context.
Credit policy, balance-of-payments  policy -and capital 
- market- policy overlap a
great deal. fhis applies eipicially to the-first two, and -for this.reason  these are
lrouped together in what iollowi in a first_ section dealing with the conuol of
iggr.gut. ion.t"ty demand, and a second examining the role of the public
authorities  on the capital market.
I. Conttol of aggregate monetary demand
A. THE NEW CONTEXT OF SHORT-TERN4  ECONOMIC  POLICY
3. The process of economic  integration among Member States has made fluctua-
tions of tie business trend more and more interdependent.  But while the gradual
removal of obstacles to the free movement  of goods, setvices and labour has
greatly reduced the likelihood of divergent_ rends,.there.may  still be difierences
6f ti.i"g as between one country and another.  Indeed,  these difierencs are likely
to be pirticularly pronounced  so long as insufficient co-ordination of economicpolicies leaves Member States free to take, each for itself, such measutes as may
influence  short-term developments, while the growth of intra-Community  trade
at the same time steadily makes each economy more directly sensitive to the fortunes
of the others.
The interdependence  of the economies  may automatically help to facilitate the
correction of such imbalances as may appear. Thus, in 19ti5 excess domestic
demand in the Netherlands  and Germany  was comfortably met try increased imports
from other Member  States, and for Italy and France,  where t,usiness at the time
had become sluggish, the expansion of sales to other member countries proved
a valuable stimulus to recovery.
However, cases have also been seen where the imbalance is expoted.  This
happened,  for instance, in'1.963, when the trade balances of France and Italy
deteriorated sharply under the impact of domestic inflationary pressures,  and the
Belgo-Luxembourg  Economic Union (BLEU) and Germany, wtrich up to then had
remained stable, consequently savr their tade surpluses witlr other Community
countries almost double, with the obvious danger that inflationrary  pressure would
spread by contamination.
Clearly, therefore, the present lack of uniformity in the bur;iness rend in the
difierent countties is a potential  problem  since it may, at a given moment, require
relatively contradictory corrective measures in the countries in question. It  is
hence necessary  to examine whether the instruments  employecl to conuol overall
demand and adjust it to the desired level can still be used in a system under
which freedom of capital movements  enhances  the independenr:e of demand. The
problem is most clear-cut when the instruments involved are those of credit policy.
4.  The fear that an inflow of foreign capital may weaken the irnpact of restrictions
on credit supply andf or demand has, in fact, long been advan,ced as an argument
in favour of the maintenance of obstacles to freedom of capiital movements. It
is true that the kind of capital in question here is short-termL and therefore not
the main concern of the Group; however, even restrictions on movements  of
medium- and long-term capital are often defended  by reference to the necessities
of credit conrol policy.
Capital movements  would, no doubt, be a source of less concern to the monetary
authorities if the fundamental  economic data determining such movements were
less disparate in the difierent Member States. As things are, these economic
factors are conditioned, in varying  degrees from country to counffy, by diflerences
in public intervention arrangements, in the institutional  framevrork  and in the tax
system. Disparities in the levels and structures of interest  rates likewise originate
in difierences in the ways in which overall monetary  demanil is controlled. To
a great extent, these national disparties will lessen or disappear altogether in the
integration process; nevertheless,  the policies of the public authorities will also
need to be adjusted,  and suggestions  on how this should be do,ne are given in the
remaining part of the Group's report. Thus the role of non+conomic  factots in
capital movements  could be reduced and the fundamental  economic data aligned.
One of the arguments  used to justify certain restrictions on capiterl movements would
thus lose in importance.
98In the meantime it wor4d be wrong to ignore the concern  caused to the monetary
authorities by the f.act that certain capital movements  run counter to the objectives
of their monetary  policy.
5.  Even now, in spite of surviving limitations,  international financial  operations
are considerably more developed than they used to be. lVhether they relate to
portfolio investments,  direct credits on the Euro-dollar market, or commercial
credits in the form of "leads and tags", capital movements are already such that
they can undermine a policy of demand  restraint acting solely through credit
resffiction.
How far financial integration  has already progressed is shown clearly by the extent
to which atbitrage  operations between the national capital markets and the Euro-
bond market result in the spteading of interest rate movements  from one counfty
to another, and especially by the interdependence  of short-term  credit conditions
on national marketi and on ihe Euro-bond market. Capital movements  are directlv
geared to the growth of international  economic relations. To restrict them in
order to restore domestic liquidity control to the monetary authorities  would
not only jeopardize the measures already taken to liberalize financial  transactions,
but would also entail a reversion to restrictions  on currenr  rransactions - 
a move
which is hardly feasible.
6,  As economic and financial  integration between  the Member States proceeds,
there is much less scope for independent monetary policies in the several countries.
In some situations this change is more apparent than in others. It  becomes
particularly evident when difiering  economic  trends lead Member  States to pursue
basically divergent policies of credit contol. The value of maintaining partial
restrictions on the freedom of capital movements is therefore open to doubt.
To do so might seem justified if --  through credit restrictions  applied on the do-
mestic ssals 
- 
it enabled Member States more efiectively to forestall any major
divergences in their economic trends. In this case it could be argued that it is
morelmportant for the progress and functioning of the Common Market to keep
economic developments  better in step throughout the Community  than to do away
with such resrictions as still apply to certain categories of capital movements.
The Group realizes that il  this respect restrictions on capital movements may
sometimes  have been useful. The lessons of recent years, however, suggest that
there has in fact been little scope for suengthening monetary policy in this way.
This will apply more and more as the Common Market gradually nears completion.
In step vrith the growing interdependence  of the markets for goods and services,
with the free movement of persons and freedom of establishment, the economic
trend in any one Member State vdll make itself felt in the partner countries much
faster than in the past. The complete freeing of capital movements is therefore
scarcely likely to speed the spreading of disequilibria,  nor - 
conversely 
- 
could
the maintenance of resuictions enable monetary policy to be sufficiently  insulated
from outside influences. In view of this trend, some signs of which are already
discernible, close co-ordination of the measures of monetary and short-term
economic policy would be called for: this would be the only way of preventing,
99rat an early stage, the spreading of disequilibria  to the other Member States. In the
past these measures were taken on a national plane, and often at a time when
iierious dificulties had already arisen. In such circumstances capiLtal movements  and
,credit policy tended to conflict.
'7. When all is said and done, free movement of capital would alter only some
,cf the general conditions for balanced policies - 
conditions whir:h the development
of the 
-Common Market has in any case already radically changed. The Group
,discusses below the specific limitations which freedom of capital movements may
:impose upon traditionil  monetary policy, and the measures  of adaptation therefore
,needed in the choice of instruments of short-term economic policy and in the way
this policy is applied.
B. THE EFFICIENCY OF CREDIT CONTROLS /N /J\T INTEGRATED
MARKET
8. In the countries of the Community, control of aggregate monetary demand
works usually through a combination of measures  designed to influence credit
demand and iredit supplv - 
the former through changes in rates of interest and
the latter through tightening  of bank liquidity or direct resttictions  on the volume
of bank credit. Wiih progressive integration of the capital nnarkets and in the
absence of a common monetary authority, the conditions  under which credit
policy is implemented  are gradually changing, producing a paradoxical  situation
in which mon.tary powers are still exercised by national authr:tities, and yet the
financial  resources  thty are seeking to control can be shifted more and more easily,
particularly within the Community  arca.
9. In a situation of free movement of capital, borrowers  wouLld be free to draw
on foreign sources of finance,  and would especially  tend to do so if interest rates
abroad were lower than on the domestic  money and capital market. Now, a
contraction of domestic supply as a result of monetary measures will normally
tend to force interest rates up, and will thus become an adclitional  inducement
to bortorvets to look fot cheaper funds abroad.
It is rue that up to a certain point the credit supply may som.etimes be curtailed
without causing interest rates to rise. Banks usually charge their customefs  a fate
more or less closely linked with the discount rate of the cenmal bank; when the
cenual bank restrilts the credit capacity of the banking system vrithout at the
same time raising discount rate, this can no doubt have the efiect of making
credit scarce without making it dearet. \fhen official regulations or banking  usage
establish a fixed link between discount rate and the maximum  lending rates
charged to customers, the banks are of course free to keep their rates below the
permissible upper limit, but in practice they usually charge the maximum rates on
most of their small and medium-sized loans. Consequently, if bank liquidity
is reduced or a direct ceiling is imposed on bank credit, the borrowers  who
aheady pay the top rate will not be charged a higher rate, but there is every
likelihood that the volume of credit extended will be cut. In this case too, therefore,
borrowers may ultimately be led to look for funds abroad, erten though no cost
considerations  point in that direction,  given that domestic  interest rates cannot rise.
100For the rest it must be noted that any quantitative restriction on credit supply
is bound to raise the cost of money after a time. No complete separation is
possible, at all events for any length of time, between  interest rate policy and
policies imposing liquidity controls or credit ceilings. In all cases these latter must
normally induce the banks to tevise the terms they previously  quoted their
customefs.
Even though the timeJag and the intensity of the e{Iect may difier, therefore,
credit restrictions will strengthen the tendency for borrowers to satisfy credit
demand by turning to foreign sources of finance - 
and will do so whether they
work through changes in interest rates or through action on bank liquidity or
the volume of ctedit.
10. Admittedly, not every borrower has ready access to foreign markets. Usually
only large firms find it easy to raise funds abroad. Therefore,  where the first to
sufier from the higher costs of domestic credit are small and medium-sized  firms,
and where restrictions  on bank liquidity or the volume of credit mean that loans
to these categories of customers will be the first to shrink or expand less fast,
it would seem possible, if not to avoid capital imports, at least to contain them
within fairly narrow limits. In most cases the banks will, in fact, be led to give
priority to the requirements of their major customers, for fear that they may
turn to foreign competitors instead.
But this situation is itself tending to change. In the first place, as integration
proceeds  firms are being induced to develop their business  contacts in other member
countries, so that they can not only elude domestic credit restrictions  by drawing
more heavily on trade credits, but also make arrangements  for direct borrowing
from foreign credit institutions. Certain other practices not unknown in the past
are also gaining popularity. Certain firms, for instance, which do not have easy
access to foreign sources of finance, can yet draw on the latter through the bank
with 'which they usually deal; if this bank should, for liquidity reasons,  be unable
to accommodate its customers, it can arrange for credit from a foreign bank against
a guarantee which does not aflect its liquidity. \When the central bank tightens
bank liquidity, the banks can use this means of raising resources for lending and
thus avoid losing some of theit customers to competitors. Although these practices
seem at first sight no more than temporary expedients, they may give rise to
durable financial relations between the beneficiaries of these credits - 
even if thev
are only medium-sized firms 
- 
and certain foreign banks.
L1. As regards large firms, with their numerous business  and financial contacts
abroad, the slightest deterioration in domestic credit terms is often enough  to
divert them to foreign markets. Although in general  relatively few firms actually
do raise funds abroad directly in times of a domestic ctedit squeeze, the quantitative
impact of their behaviour on business and bank liquidity may be quite considerable.
By eluding quantitative  credit restrictions,  large firms have an appreciable influence
on the eflectiveness of the central bank's policy in matters of interest rates and
bank liquidity.
12. There is yet another rvay in which freedom of capital movement  may alter
the conditions  governing the control of liquidity. In most countries central bank
policy does in fact play a part in determining the conditions on the market forlong-term capital; as a general rule, its influence is specially marked where
commercial banks engage not only in ordinary credit business but also invest in
securities  or lend at long term. Other things being equal, the banks respond to
tighter liquidity by cutting down on the latter operations, and this will have the
consequence of raising interest rates on the capital market, Transactions in
s;ecurities, especially, may then stimulate capital imports which urill tend to expand
the liquid resources of banks and to hold back the tise in interesti rates.
i!.3. Finally, it is only to be expected that, in times of monetrrry smingency,  the
banks will take steps on their own account to procure liquid resources  abroad.
llo this end, they may repattiate assets hitherto employed on foreign money markets
or botrow directly ftom foreign credit institutions.
llhere will be all the more encouragement for transactions of t.his kind as money
rnarket rates themselves will tend to rise as a result of tighter liiquidity.
)!.4. To sum up, with the growing integration of capital markets the efficiency
of credit contfol measures is coming to depend more and more on credit conditions
zrbroad.
llhis does not mean, however, t]rat national monetary policies have lost all eficacy.
l\s long as domestic monetary policy does not run counter to the tendencies  on
{oreign markets, it remains efiective. Even if this is not the case owing to a
counteracting inflow of foteign capital, it may still have a temporary  and limited
impact on foreign trade.
In several countries current business conditions give the cental banks relatively
broad scope for intervention,  arising, on the one hand, from, the existence of
current payments deficits and, on the other, because - 
as a result of deliberate
policy or simply of an international  contamination efiect - 
therr: is a tendency  {or
credit conditions to line up with those obtaining on the principal money and
capital markets abroad.
'l[he fact remains that in recent years such situations have been rather exceptional
in the Member States and that conditions in which cental banli: policies can have
only limited efiect may, and probably will, return. In the long run, of course,
p,_rogressive  integration  and the gradual  formulation o{ Community  economic policy
crbjectives will make periods in which business trends in the 
-six 
countriel ari
rnarkedly divergent more and more infrequent. It can therefore  be expected  that
the sources of conflict betvreen the monetary policies of the individual Member
Sltates will decline in gravity; in addition, in the spacious and integrated economic
unit the _Community will- eventually present, a co-ordinated  nnonetary policy is
likely to be much more eflective than it would be in present conditions. 
-
llhe main problems will, therefore, arise during the transition  peri.od when disparate
itevelopments are inevitable. The discussion  below concernJ  ways and means of
solving these problems.
ttJ2C. SHORT-TERM ECONOMIC POLICY: THE RIGHT "POLICY MIX"
15. In the opinion of the Group, three conditions must be met if the control
of overall -onltury demand is to have the desired degree_ of efficiency in the setting
of an integrated European  capital market. The first conCition concerns the prompt
timing of iction. The second  and third conditions, on the-other  hand, concern the
"econ"omic policy mix" and involve, first, a more diversified  and more systematic
;;;i  ih"^brrdg"t,  and secondly, a choice a_mo_ng  the diferent instruments of
monetary policylviih  the emphasis on those which are free from the shortcomings
described  above.
16. The ability to take corrective action more promptly is of vital importance in
all cases. Given the susceptibility of each economy to influence originating  in,other
member  countries, *.urrri.t should be taken to cofrect an imbalance  immediately
it is seen to be more than incidental and ephemeral.  Such measures ought to be
-o..  u"a more closely co-ordinated at Cdmmunity level. Once an inflatio-nary
oro..r, has gone b.vond a certain point, selective measures which might have been
iftective init'ially are powerless  to hold back its further course. In such cases, the
lorrg.r corrective actiin has been delayed, the m_ore vigorous it has to be, and
iffi;t;;i*ty  "irtrir irrnctrrr. that untimely capital.movements might develop and
frustiate the purposei of short-term economic policy. -Prompt action is equally
;;;r;".t  ior it.'reason  that, in an open economy, price. rises may- spread_very
q"Lt ty-ilt."ghout all member countiies.  - Apart-from  its domestic ill  efiects,
ifr.t.T6t., ,r inflatiott,rry process not brought under control fairly quickly. would
constitute an immediat. ihr.ut to the stability of other member  countries and
-igfri it-r"..ly jeopardize  not only the achievement of the Community's  objectives
bui even the cohesion of the six countries'
17. More intensive use of the budget as an instrument  of short-term policy
,pp.urr to,ti n.l.tt*V and desirable i[_ a situation in which, at one and the same
time, there is more 
"6.J 
of f.ornpt and vigotous  action to coffe€t imbalances, the
rppli.;;i;; of .r.ai, policy^encdunters  nJw limitations and the use of certain
i;'i;;;;;,  G*iiv  t.t'i.d ,-rpon in the past 
- 
such as import quotas, export. aids,
;;-il;d;;n;;l  -  ill;  iit turn ftuJtrated because it ii in direct conradiction
;tri-;-if; llil"r u"d tt " 
rpi.lt of the Treaty of Rome. By refining and developing
il,. "r. 
of the ins6umenti of budget policy, each Member State could to advantagc
ofir.t th"r. limitations  and keep "itr genei,al policy for control of business  trends
ui*u"i."*  eftciency within the framework iettythe integration  process'  Quite
abart from the above considerations,  a numbef of other factors and arguments  also
support this view.
A policv of demand restriction based mainly on monetary instruments can achieve
i;'"lj;ltir.;;it  ay -."nr of a reduction in bank lending.  The."squeeze"  mainly
ufi..tt private firmi and hence their investment. \ilere it only {rom the point of
vie1 oi gfov/th, it seems a questionable  procedure to have to depress investment
in order 
"to rein in consumption - 
at selond hand only and of.ren in insufhcient
J.gt.". Research carried out by the Medium-term Economic  Policy Committee
,,rEn.rt, that in the course of the next few years it will be necessary  to-contain
the"expansion of consumption  but not of investment expenditure' There is theretore
103a case for adopting a system bv which part of the public's purchasing power is
skimmed ofi directly through fiscal policy measures  rather than through monetary
policy.
Recommendations  along these lines have been put forward more than once both
by the Monetary Committee  and the Short-term  Economic  Policy Committee of
the EEC. These committees emphasize that the budgetary :instrument  has not
always  been used to the desired extent and that, for this reason, the process of
adjustment  has had to depend essentially on credit restraint.
18. From the specific point of view of capital market integration,  direct action on
overall demand is less likely to engender an inflow of foreil;n capital than are
cedit restrictions. Taxation policy has too little influence ,rn cridit terms to
cause such an infow. The opposite may indeed happen  whLere the authorities
finance alarget proportion  of public investment by raising taxes and can thus reduce
their calls on private savings on the money and capital malkets. In terms of
international capital movements, therefore, this instrument  crf budget policy is
clearly preferable to monetary  measures.
In other respects,  too, budgetary  policy can provide  a suitable  basis for measures
capable of influencing  overall demand without hatming  capiteLl movements. For
example, in the framework of short-term  economic policy, efiective pressure can
be brought to bear on private investment through changes in fiscal depreciation
allowances. This is a useful alternative to dearer credit.
19. \fhile a wider use of budget policy in controlling businesr; fuctuations  seems
desirable, a -number of obstacles will have to be overcome.  The most important of
these are of a political nature and derive, among other things, from t6e fear of
certain social gtoups that the distribution  of the tax burden rrray be permanently
altered !y m.urnr.t represented  as temporary and defended t,y reference to th;
current business trend.
.Even with these political obstacles out of the way, there woulcl still remain some
technical, impediments - 
closely associated, incidentally, with the former. These
clerive, first of all, from the habitual  cumbersomeneis o{ fiscal and budgetary
procedures. In this connection it would be highly desirable {or: the authorities to
lbe given_ the right to .sary, in line with the requirements of the business situation,
r:ertain ditect and indirect tax rates and depreciation allowance,s.  In certain non-
:member countries the authorities  already 
-have this right --  naturally within
precise limits laid down by Parliament - 
and it is receiving iinceasingly  careful
consideration within the Community as well.
Other problems derive from the steady increase in the consumption  and income
transfer expenditures of the authorities. Their automatic expansion,  which is
almost universally taken for granted, narrows the authorities' rcbm for'manoeuvre
and forces them to concentrate their action on investment  exp,enditure.  On this
point the Group feels that an effective and at the same time 6alanced use of the
budgetary instrumelt  reqgire_s greater flexibility in adjusting  cu:rrent expenditure;
otherwise there is the risk of neglecting the foundations of futrrre growth for the
s;ake of the immediate requirements of economic balance.
10420. The importance which the budgetary insgument  assumes in the context of
;;;""rtd il;gr"ti;r do.t 
"ot, 
how"lr".r, mean that exclusive  reliance can or should
i. pir."a 
"po"n it in redressing imbalances. Although th.e authorities  should cease
basins action to .ontroi trrineis fluctuations on credlt policy alone, this policy  does
ie't-afi u"-.tt."tiut function. The aim should be to use the various instruments in
.""iUi*,i"t so that thth;ip io 
"u.n 
out fluctuations of trend and mitigate as much
,r- 
""rriUf. 
Jirtrrrburr# e.;.rut.d by the balance of payments, for example, ,as
;"r5r"1,;i ."pi;J;;;;ti.nrr.' Ciu"n there objectives] ii.may,well prove useful
;,rd ;;;.;;r;v'ro  tuv the emphasis on the instruments of credit policy in some
.ir.rlrnrrun.., und or thor. of budget policy in others. But even in the latter case
ii;;t  ;fr.; be necessary to b,rt-tresi  measnres of budget policy by monetary
measures.
21.. Monetary policy has an uncontested  part to-play in.counteracting  undesirable
fluctuations in e*ternal payments. It is^true that-unilateral  application of the
i;rr;il;ir  oi *.dit .ot ttbl may in many cases give rise to capital mo.vements
.""ni.G 1l,ill tft. purposes of 
'short-term_ economic policy; .it is equallY  ,.r..t.,
["*.t.t,it  "i i" otft.i cares credit policy, andrnore  partiiularly interest rate.policy,
;';;il:,  ."piiri no'"t i" specific dir.ctions- There may even be a case for helping
,o ,EJr.r, tJmporary puy-!",r imbalance_s by provoking capital  movements  in the
opposite direction ir'*d;; io pror... the iomesti. eionomy from the liquidity
eifi.t. of these disequilibria.
The choice of instruments for use in such cases will depend on the origin of the
imbalances in capital movements. A policy of allowing currency  reseJves  to
fluctuate mor. wid.ly than is now acceptable would seem to commend itselt to
ij.];;il  *iit " 
a.nJit on capital u..onri. On the other hand, authorities  wishing
i, 
"iir.i"tft" 
gfi..,, of tempor"ry capital inflovrs on the volume of domestic liqYidity
-igii f"-',"11-uJuir.d to engage^ in gnen market operations  .and especiall'.to
.ri.rrug" investment abroad ti it. banks, as has been-the  practice in several EEC
countries in recent Years.
If such capital movements wefe to become too large, the countries  concerned should
;;;;.;h:t;  tt irtrt ground gained in the field of integration would not have to
;; ;f;;. 
" S;h .[-;p.iu,?on might consist in more widespread international
;.fi;;'r;?.-orr.,i*r'-*tioned  ibou., which are closely akin to open market
operatlons.
22. In general,  measures of monetary policy oughl t9 ,b: subject to. certain
conditions"concerning  the choice of instrlmentsi they should, in other words, mofe
it", i, the past, haie a direct impact on consumption tather than on investment.
Action to control the supply of credit to business  enterprise  must not on that
;;;;;;,Ie  ruled out, bui"ii should not be allowed to jeopardize  growth objectives'
d|1i;;,; 
"djust 
consumer  credit, on ihe,other  hand_, has th-e.efiect  of restraini{rg
ol e*parrdinn  d.rnunJ *itho,rt iirectly impairing the equilibrium of the credit
;"r];;;';;"ro  itul "" 
harmful side-efiects..In-the opinion.of the Group this
i"ttr"*."t should, therefore, be used more often for stabilization  purposes'
\fhat is cerrain is that alignment of the conditions  in which cedit cortrol policy
i; ;;il;;tJ  i. req,rirei to iron out.certain difierentials in the level of interest
;ft;;iiin!  in ri-Uer countries which appear to be sructural but are in fact
105clue to difierences in the use of available insmuments. Some member  countries,
like Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, choose relativerly more often to
naanipulate  discount rate, while others, like' France or Italy, 'more often take
dlirect action to influence the credit supply to firms. The" i.esult may be an
inducement to capital transfers.
Similar prob]ems  may arise in connection rvith minimum reserve requirements. In
France and Italy, for instance,  the immobilized  bank assets earn. i"i...rt, *h...r,
tlhey do not,in the Netherlands and Germany, and do so only partially in Belgium.
flhere are also diflerences  in the size and composition of th.r. ,.r..u., ttr"fr"rv
give rise to difierentials in the rates charged foi cedit and paid on deposits. 
--'-'
Finally, the rules - 
sometimes widely divergent - 
which govern borrowing  and
It:nding rates may in turn engender interestiate difierenti"G *r,i.t t.*;;:,h;;
at ^lI to do with current business conditions. In some memt,er  countries, fikE
the Netherlands and Belgium, interesr rates are -left entirely or very l^tg;itl;.;-i;
.find. th9.ir. own level, thii freednm being limited only by tir. pru.ti.. ;#Jt1h;
banks link their charges to the oficial discount tut . 1It Belgium, ti"*.u.r, ifr.r.
isi an -ana,ngement  under which maximum rates for interesi on deposits ian be
irrtroduced.)  other member countries have a^variety of systems; in d.r-uny it.r.
a:re limitations to the banks' discretion in fixing llnding rates, while i;l.;d  ;;
deposits is strictly subject to certain maxima; ii France"lendine  rates are subiect to regulations while deposit rates are free; in Italy both are rlled Uy int.rUl"[
agreements  and minimum  rates are fixed for interesi on deposits.
This report is not the place for a detailed examination of these problems and their
te:chnical aspects; nevertheless the Group feels that there is',a need for more
co-ordination of credit policies  and closef co-operation among central banks with
a view to standardizing the various instrumenti of credit coritro[ and the interesi
rarte regulations.
coNcrus/oNs
23. Examination of the new circumstances  determining policies for control of
overall. money demand  h.as brought t_o light profo.rnd .h;G;; rooted in the
expansion of internarional trade and finaniial ielations. The'Jevelop-.nl oi--"
E'ropean  .capital mgke.t is bound. to speed- up this trend. In ih. cioup', uL*
the new sltuatlon  calls for reconsideration  of the pattern in which the insiruments
of short-term  economic  policy are combined ro 
"r-td 
tuf.g,rurd ii, .rr"nti"f obJ;&;;;,
nermely,  price stability, stable employment 
"ttd .*t"rfiul t;.;;,  balance. The
rorrowlng  concluslons  may be draurn:
1) Given that firms now have increased opportunities to draw on foreign sources
of .capjtal and that the markets for short-ierm trade credits already il'.;.;;;;;;; it is often dificult to control ovetall monetary  demand by u.tion ori ih. uot.r1n. ut i
cost of credit.
2) This objegt could, however, be achieved by instruments of budget policy
without entailing comparable disadvantages.
106a) These instruments would bear directly on the volume of overail demand  and,
since the effect would not be concentrated  upon the investment  demand of firms.
a restrictive  policy would not cutomaticaily  engender ofisetting  capital *ou...ntrj
b) The authorities should introduce more flexibility into their consumption  and
transfer expenditures and take fuller advantage of the opportunities  of uiing their
investment  pfogrammes as an anti-cyclical  weapon.
c) To enable them to act rvith the necessary speed, the authorities should be
empowered, for stabilization  purposes, to vary direct and indirect taxes and
depreciation allovrances  within certain limits.
3) Nevertheless  credit policy retains an essential function,  both in counteracting
undesirable fluctuations in external payments and in helping to control overall
monetary demand by buttressing  the measures of budget 
-pol-icy. To this end it
would be wise to give more weight to instruments which directly afiect the public's
demand (control of consumet  credit); furthermore, eficient monetary conffol calls
for co-ordinated action by cenral banks to reduce certain divergences  urhich still
exist in the conditions in which uedit policy is implemented and in the instruments
used in various Member States.
II.  Capital market policies
24. The capital markets are still fairly rigidly separated from one another and
official action may have difiering  objectives. Although official measures  will more
often than not have several aims, it u'ould seem that one or other of the following
is as a rule the primary concern: control of interest rate movements,  insulation  of
these movements against outside influences, or direction of investible funds to
specific uses by means of demand lationing.  The removal of dividing bamiers will
automatically  get rid of some of these worries, while necessitating,  in respect of
others, an adaptation of intervention techniques to the new situation of a
European market.
A. CONTROL  OF MARKET TRENDS
25. One of the commonest objectives  of official intervention on the capital market
is to curb short-term fluctuations in bond Drices. The authorities take care not
to interfere with more long-term uends and most often concentrate  on the market
in government stock. It is mostly a question, therefore, of forestalling the
dislocation that might result from bad timing of flotations  and of cushioning  violent
fluctuations  when investors are temporarily holding ofi from the market.
Problems of stabilizing  the bond market trend will no doubt arise even after the
capital markets are integrated.  Their solution should then present no dificulties
other than technical ones; so long as the purpose is not to channel the supply of
capital in any particular direction nor to interfere deliberately with the price trend
107but merely to dampen fluctuations due to ill-planned bond iss,ues, the establishment
o,f a co-oriinated isiue queue would make it easy enough to achieve this limited end.
A. number of obstacles must, however, be overcome during the transition period.
At priori, the progressive liberalization of intra-Comruunity capital movements
sfto"ld not, it 'wo"-ld seem, raise any particular problems in connection with the
qrpe of poiicy under discussion. It is irue that the intensificatio,n of international
financial^ transactions is almost bound to afiect the long-term trend of interest
riltes on each market; but provided that no attempt is made to oppose- this
slrontaneous  trend, oficial measures to steady the- market lr,culd be Perfectly
c,rmpatible with progtessive integration. Nor should there be any difficulty  in
inseiting the claims of foreign borrowers into a queue of loan issues.
Irtrevertheless.  an efiort should be made to standardize the methods used by the
I\dember States to influence the short-term  trend of interest rates on the markets.
If it were decided to appoint a special authority to handle official intervention on
tihe market, the Group-feels  that such action should be closely (concefted.
E;. ATJTONOMOUS /NTEREST LEVELS
26. Beyond the mere dampening of short-term fluctuation of bond prices and
yields, iapital market policy mav tly to influence interest fates with a view to
i.I.eeping tlem at a levei deemed in line with economic  requirements.  _In the past,
att.mpit have sometimes been made to achieve this result- through direct control
of intirest rate and other terms of bond issues. In none of the member  countries'
hrow€v€r,  has official action of this kind proved really effective'
Certain countries have also sought to insulate the domestic capital market from
outside influences.  Instead of aiting directly on interest rates as in the preceding
case, oficial intervention left the rates free to find their own level through the
apparently  {ree play of capital demand  and_ supply. However, while domestic
l:nders and boriowers were subject to no kind of testriction on the domestic
market, the grant or refusal of exchange permits was used as ia means of acting
on domestic-demand  for foreign securities and on foreign de,mand for domes-
dc funds.
Such policies, festing as they do on the retention of barriers des:igned to safeguard
t.he autonomy of domestic interest rates, are incompatible  with the establishment
o,f an integrated capital market. External influences  cannot exert their full force
'orhere arbilrage facilities are unsatisfactory. Though there are still obstacles  and
inta-Community financial channels are still imperfectly  organiized, international
capital movements have already developed to the point of rendering policies of
this kind quite inefiective and of considerably reinforcing the tendency toward's
alignment  of interest rates. Thus, interest rates on the Dutch capital market, wlich
ureie long kept very low by the authorities  intent on protectinp; the market from
cutside influences, did ultimately rise to the international  level - 
under the impact,
irr is true, of a restrictive credit policy, but also because of an expansion of external
financial transactions  stimulated bv the interest rate diflerential.
108Although there is a natural tendency for the capital markets to merge, 
_ certain
Member  States might be unable to abandon overnight theit objectives in the field
of long-term financing and leave it  to market forces alone to determine the
internaiional allocation of finance funds. During a transitional petiod it will be
necessafy to adapt capital mafket policies to such progfess.as  has already been
achieved in liberalizing  capital movements and to prepare the subsequent stag_es
of integration.  This will entail less direct intervention and, at the saqre time, the
well-orlered  opening of the domestic markets. On this point, the Group refers
to Chapter 9 below, where it discusses the principal techniques 
. (including the
estabfishment of ceilings, which could be raised and within which the Member
States would undertakJ  to permit foreign security  issues) by which such barriers
between the markets as still exist can be gradually removed.
C. DIRECTING THE SUPPLY OF FUNDS
27. Most European capital markets  sufier {tom one fundamental weakness,  namely,
a chtonic  excess^ of demand for long-term capital over supply, and this is why the
authodties intervene to secure part cf available  funds for {avoured  borrowers. The
idea behind this kind of intervention is that, acting on a given level of supply, the
selective function of interest fates may lead to unsatisfactory results or, at least, to
results which do not fit in with the government's scale of priorities. Hence steps
are taken to facilitate access to the market to those bomowers vrhose projects are
of a particularly  pressing natufe. These bortowefs are _generally  of two types: first,
those' whose invistmenl is fikely to increase the productive capital equipment  of
regions or sectors which, in the absence,of government-action to channel resources
to"them, would be at a disadvantage when competing for funds on the market in
the ordinary way, and, second, public-sector  organizations.
Broadly speaking, means used to this end go far beyond anything. that can be done
within'the limiti'of capital market policy in the strict sense of the word. For this
reason the Group discuises below, in Chapters 5 and 6, the-whole nexus of policies
concerned  vrith 
-investment 
guidance and the financing of public authorities and
€nterprises in the context oI integration. The Group has suggested instruments
which could in this framework be used to guide investment. Certain measures
afiecting the functioning of the capital market may, e_ven under the new arrange-
ments, usefully serve suih policies  to the extent that a direct conffol over borrowers'
access to the tond markef sifts applications for funds in accordance  with predeter-
mined standards.
In many cases, the issues queue will in fact be so established  as to-satisfy simul-
taneousiy two important requirements:  namely, that of forestalling  fluctuations jn
prices and vieldsj and that bf channelling funds to chosen uses. The use of the
q,reue for purpor.r of "rationing"  demand for capital is much more developed  in
.bm. co,rnttiei than in others. In France, a system under which the Finance
Ministry's Cornitt du calendrier worked out a_queue of public and private issues
according to technical  considerations has gradually developed into a system of
individual licences  obtained from the Treasury,  which in each case assesses  the
economic  and financial expediency of the proposed  issue. The Italian system,
109operated by the Joint Ministerial Committee on Credit and Saving (Cornitato
interministeriale  per il credito e per il risparmio),  has a working  mechanism  fairly
siimilar to the French system.
In so far as they tended explicitly to set aside, for domestic uses, part of the
domestic capital supply, such practices would hardly be compatible with the correct
fr:nctioning  of a European capital market. The growing freedom of movement of
capital within the Community  will in any case deprive the instrr:ments considered
of theit efficacy, if not of their raison d'6tre. Rationing  of issues of bonds would
be liable to fail as firms would have an opportunity  to obtain abroad the funds
refused to them on the domestic market. Connertely, part of the supply of funds
may be diverted from the domestic  market to foreign investments.
T'he fact remains that, during a tansitional  period, the efiective integration  of
crapital markets could be delaired indirectly through the establishment of issue
queues. If  a low priority were deliberately allocated to foreign issues and to
domestic  ones judged to be less urgent, it would, in practice, be possible to delay
tlre opening-up of domestic  markets and at the same time to keep domestic capital
demand subject to a certain selective rationing. In these circumstances  crucial
irnportance attaches to the nature of the institutions responsible for scheduling
international  and national  issues and for making room for the liormer among the
latter, and to the techniques  employed in preparing  the queues.
T'he Group holds the view that queues shouid in all cases be establlished by objective
standards  and that their sole restrictive  objective should be to avoid excess  pressure
on the market, to be achieved through the technical  co-ordination of all prospective
domestic  and international  issues. To fulfil these conditions will require reform of
the system now current in certain member  countries and the willingness of govern-
ments to accept a certain degree of co-ordination in their capital market controls.
I;r Chapter 9 below, the Group specifies what reforms are desirable in this field.
coNcLU.rl0Ns
2'g. Policy instruments {or the conrol of the capital market, like those for
a<lapting  monetary demand, require certain adjustments.
1) As regards short-term  fluctuations  due to bad timing of issues, no particular
p:roblems are involved in curbing these fluctuations by oficial mrarket intervention
and the establishment  of an issues queue, provided  that:
a.) Official market intervention  makes due allowance for the irnpact on interest
rates of developments  on other capital markets, and
b) Foteign recourse to the market is fitted into the queue withc,ut discrimination.
2) In the past, the authorities have sometimes sought to countetact the long-term
tlend of interest rates by insulating capital supply anC demand on the domestic
market from outside influence; this objective is in conflict with the very concepr
110of a European capital market. Therefore, such barriers as still exist should be
removed.  They have in any case already lost much of their efiectiveness.
3) The technique of directing funds 
- 
notably through issue queues 
- 
with a
view to facilitating the financing  of investments  accorded priority, might be dropped
in favour of other, equally efiective instruments  designed to stimulate  investment
demand in specific regions and sectors while providing funds by means which do
not entail any rationing of supply.
111CHAPTER 5
POLICIES FOR STIMULATION OF SAVING AND DIRECTION
OF CAPITAL INVESTMENT
Introduction
L.  In none of the Member States does the matching of supply of and demand for
capital take place in "market conditions" in the traditional sense of the word.
Before they ever reach the market, capital supply and demand are influenced  by the
public authorities  through selective  encouragement  of certain types of investment
and direction of the country's saving to particular sectors and regions' These
nleasures,  taken to meet certain needs, led to the formation of privileged financial
ci.rcuits difiering in extent and nature in the several Member States. Though most
apparent - 
as-will be seen in the following chapter - 
where funds have to be
firund for investment by governments of public entetprises, the system none_ the
less also exerts an important influence in determining the conditions in which
investment is financed in other sectors of the economy'
2.  The objectives in view and the instruments used in stimulating  _saving and
guiding investment are not necessatily of identical  scope_  and nature in the difierent
[tember States; consequently, the adaptation of financial structures for the purpgge
of developing  a Europian capital market may come up.against obstacles, especially
as the irnplementation of the measufes concerned has been conceived  in a strictly
national setting.
3.  It would doubtless be unrealistic to try to remove  obstacles originating in the
diversity of government intervention by questioning  the policy aims themselves'
T'his is why this chapter concentrates  on trying to discover by wiat instruments
Nlember Governments  can pursue their suuctural policies without thereby  hindering
dre broadening  of financial florvs vrithin the Community. In on,e particular sector
--  residential consttuction - 
the instruments used overlap at a number o{ points
u'ith those employed more generally in the guidance of private investment.
Irievertheless, the forms of government action in this field are of a special kind and
thus seem to warrant separate  treatment.  This will be found in Chapter 8.
4.  The present chapter contains an analysis of the financial  instruments  custom-
arily used to encourage saving and channel part of private inv€:stment  to certain
sectofs or regions.
Flead I of the chapter deals, first in general terms and then for eeLch Member State,
u'ith the objectives and instruments of savings and investment  policies.
In Head II, the Group discusses:
a) The adaptation of savings incentives;
&) Improvements in the methods of investment guidance;
c) The ways and means by which the Community's financial institutions guide
investment.
112I. Selective incentives fot saving and investment
A. OBIECTTVES AND INSTRUi4ENTS
,4) SAVINGS  INCENTIVES
5.  Savings incentives may sefve social-policy  objectives, improvement of the
stfucture  of supply for long-term financing and even, in some cases, the immediate
needs of cyclical policy. In the first case, they are used to encourage  saving in
certain social or oicupational  gfoups (wage- and salary-earners, civil servants)  and,
mole generally,  the low-income gfoups. In the second case, the aim is to_ encourage
a swirch from liquid savings into longer-tefm  investments. Finally, of less impor-
tance because they are geaied to short-term problems rather.than-long-term  policy
needs, certain measures" designed to encourage  saving by households are to be
found in incomes policies.  \X/here rises in income seem inevitable but threaten to
cause an undue e-xpansion of consumption,  the authorities may try to sterilize
increases temporarily by means of a growth of savings  balances.
6.  Policies to encourage longer-term  saving by households  usually favour certain
forms of investment, suih as purchase of securities, time deposits and life assurance.
The incentives themselves vary and may include:
a) Tax benefits (as, for instance,  sums saved may be allowed as a deduction from
taxable income, of income from the investment may be exempt from income tax);
b) Capital premiums;
c) Preferential interest rates;
/)  Sale of securities  on tefms favourable to small investors (Volksaktien);
e) Matching contributions by emplo;lers under savings  schemes linked to labour
conuacts,
These benefits are usually subject to certain technical requirements and conditions
- 
sg6l as specified periods for immobilization of savings, a-ceiling on lhq benefits
accruing to utty individual, a yield ceiling for savers - 
which are intended to keep
down [1e financial costs of the operation and to limit its benefits to certain social
groups.
7.  As regards the overall level of saving, incentives  seem to have__had only a
limited efiEct so far. Hieher yields 
- 
the usual device for substantially increasing
the propensity  to save  arc incompatible  vdth the aim of providing borrowers
with additional funds at moderate cost. Technically,  savings  incentives can have
immediate  efiects on the overall position, but once the required period of im-
mobilization  is over, their usefulness seems at best marginal. Finally, acco'unt must
be taken of the harmful  efiects on the level of interest rates (or on savings formation
in the public secror) which follow when the government raises funds to finance its
incentives policy (or forgoes certain tax revenues)'
As regards the distribution of saving, on the other_ hand, incentives have proved
much"more  effective. If  special advantages are o{Iered to one or other type of
I13investment, the structure of household saving can eventually  be altered. Conse-
quently, if the authorities concentrate  on difierent forms of investment in difierent
countries, a problem arises as to how these incentives  are to coexist within an
integrated market.
B) DIRECTION  OF INVESTMENT
8.  All Member States have investment  guidance policies, by which they direct
investment  to certain sectors and regions, and policies  encouraginLg  certain categories
of producer (small and medium-sized  firms, for instance).
9.  The methods by which the authorities guide investment may be indirect.
Special importance attaches to public investment  in infrastructure, which creates
the conditions for the subsequent expansion of directly procluctive investment.
Similarly, public contracts may play a by no means negligible  part in promoting
the growth of certain industries.
However, the principal instruments used are financial.  Those employed most
frequently work through the credit mechanism:
a) Directives to credit institutions enjoining  them to accord preference  to lending
for the desired types of investment. This action is sometimes asisisted by improved
facilities for refinancing  at the centtal bank;
b) Direct central government loans;
c) Interest-rate subsidies;
/)  Government guarantees to back credits.
At least as important as instruments of investment guidance arr: the operations of
special credit institutions,  which more often than not are pulblic or semi-public
bodies enjoying particular  privileges.
.Financial instruments other than those coming under credit policy include:
,e) Investment  premiums paid by central government;
b) Tax benefits for the investor;
,:) Priority ranking in the timing of issues.
10. Broadly speaking, the efiects of these measures  on the vo[ume and structure
,rf capital formation are of two kinds. First, these measufes tend to shift to the
lbeneficiary regions and sectors investment  projects which wo,uld normally have
been carried out elsewhere.  Secondly, they tend to increase the aggregate volume
of investment. This second efiect is generally the more markr:d the greater the
number  of firms qualifying for the financial incentives and, consequently,  the bigger
the expansion of capital demand on the market.
J3y contrast, the change in the investment  pattern tends to be considerable, but
the ultimate  expansion of the volume of investment small, ,r,'henever a limited
114number  of regions and sectots enjoy preferential financing  facilities  and the measures
to this end go beyond ofisetting existing handicaps and put investment  in these
initially less-favoured  sectors and regions in a privileged position. Regardless of
the actual effects of these policies on the volume and disribution of investment,
there is here again, as in the case of savings incentives, the problem of the compa-
tibility of the various instruments with the smooth functioning of a European
capital market. But before examining the methods of encouraging saving and
directing investment from this point of view, the Group felt it  necessary to
describe the policies  pursued in the Member States, where - 
though the objectives
pursued have become  less varied - 
the range of instruments  employed remains
very wide indeed. (1)
B. S,AY/NGS  /NCENT/VES AND DIRECTION  OF ]NYESTi4ENTS
IN MEMBER STATES
L1. In Getmany, savings incentives  were used during the immediate postwar
years mainly as a means of expanding the supply of resources but now saving is
promoted as part of social policy and all sections of the population  are encouraged
to participate. Various means are used to stimulate interest in the longer-term
forms in particular:
a) In the case of life-assurance policies  and building-society  savings schemes, the
premiums and deposits are deductible  from taxable income within certain limits
and on certain conditions; (2)
&) Savings deposits and security purchases  are eligible for premium payments,
provided the balances are immobilized fot a certain time;
c) Shares in denationalized firms are ofiered at preferential prices to low-income
earners;
d) Save-as-you-earn  schemes are encouraged  by tax benefits and matching con-
tributions by employers.
For the purpose of directing  investment, the public authorities  (Federal and Land)
rely chiefly on tax benefits, guaranteeing  of cedits and provision of low-interest
cedits. The latter are handled by public and private credit institutions  which to
this end are supplied with funds allocated  through the budget; in addition to their
responsibilities as intermediaries  (they administer the funds assigned to them,
scrutinize  loan applications  and obtain the necessary security), these institutions
have wide discretionary  powers in the loan operations  financed by thes funds.
Interest-rate  subsidies from the Government  complete this range of instruments.
(1) For a more detailed  analysis  of methods o{ investment  guidance, especially at regional  level,
see: European Economic Community,  La politiqae rigionale dans la CEE, Brussels,  1964, Report
of Group  3.
(2) To encourage saving for housebuilding  purposes, low-income  depositors are given the option
between the above tax relief and receipt of a premium.
lrfil 2.  France recently adopted a systematic policy of encouraging  saving,.with
particular emphasis on lessening the preference of savers {or the most liqrrid forms
irf inu.rt*.ni. nr. means emf'lovedto this end are mainly of two kinds.
ar) First, policy afiecting interest rates has tended to make -longer-term  investments
(for moie'thun t*o yeais) more attractive by a better grading of yields,
li) Secondly, a number of tax changes were introduced whereby income.from
{ixed-interesi securities is now taxeJ at not more than 25o/o and distributed
company profits bear a considerably  lighter tax burden than they used to'
Ivleasures have also been taken to stimulate loilg-term  saving commitments  (the
minimum period being ten years) and saving for house-putchase.
llhe general direction of investment is laid down in the Economic and Social
Deveiopment Plan. Investment  in line rvith the Plan's objegtives is fostered -by 
a
numbei of techniques. These mainly take the form of capital_grants or cheap loans
supplied either by cenral governmint (through the intermediary of the Economic
and Social Deveiopment  Fund) or by pubfic-sector  credit institutions.  Special
benefits to investois also include inveitment  premiums  and tarr reliefs, including
in particular  the advantage o{ treating l07o of investment ,sxpenditute  as an
allowance  for purposes of company tax.
:t3. In Italy there is no systematic  policy to encoufage  saving, but only a few
s;pecific measures,  such as preferential  rates of interest on "small. savings" accounts
a^nd "special small savings" accounts --  with_ limitatiols, respectively, on size of
{eposiis and on categoiies of savers; in addition, life-assuramce premiums  are
allowed as a deduction from taxable  income.
Ily contrast, a far-reaching  system of investment guidance has been adopted, to the
benefit mostly of the less-favoured  regions. The main instruments of this policy
are outright grants and tax benefits, but above all ctedit facilities. Loans are
linanced eithei from public funds of ffom funds raised on the mafket, and they
generally carry 
^ 
pteferential  fate of interest; they are distributed by_quasi-govern-
inental financial institutions either of general scope or specialized by region or
industry.
:t4. In Belgium, too, incentives to personal saving are rare zrnd take the form
of tax benefils: interest on savings diposits up to a certain su:m is tax free, and
life-assurance ptemiums are deductible from taxable income.
lin this country, semipublic  credit institutions also play a key part in implementing
jnvestment  guidance policies. Although these policies  operate through a number
of othet means also - 
tax reliefs and investment premiums, for instance - 
the
most usual are credit facilities such as direct state loans on preferential terms,
government guarantees covering repayment of principal andf ot interest payments,
zrnd interest-rate  subsidies.  The extent of the government  guarantree  varies according
to the nature of the lending institution and is only partial when the latter is a
private credit establishment. fnterest-rate subsidies are independent of whether  the
lender is a private or semi-public credit institution, and thefu amount may cover
1.16a large part, but not all, of the normal cost of the money lent. \fhen a private
finaniiaf establishment grants a preferential loan which qualifies for the subsidy,
the amount of the latter is paid directly to the establishment in question'
15. In the Netherlands,  stimulation of savings stems almost exclusively  from
social considerations  and is therefore confined to relatively  few classes of beneficiary
(young civil servants, wage- and salary-earners  in the pdvate sector); but the range
of qualifying investments is very broad, including savings deposits, security
holdings 
-by-1ow-income 
investors, group life-assurance  policies, and saving- for
house-purchase.  Capital premiums constitute the major incentive, since the authori-
ties consider  them more likely to encourage the formation of personal  wealth than
indirect means, such as tax exemption for income from property already ac-
cumulated, would be.
For the direction of investment  the authorities rely exclusively on capital grants
for regional development. As regards specific  sectors, the government acts by
acquiring  pafticipatibns, granting tax reliefs and, above all, underwritin-g  certain
financiafoperations. Such government  guarantees  are limited_to projects of national
inrerest oi projects justified by social considerations  and are provided either
directly, ar in ih.  case of industrial loans extended by two 
- spe_cialized credit
instituiions, or indirectly, to two finance companies which raise funds on the bond
market in order to meet the tisk-capital  requirements  of firms which do not
themselves have easy access to the market.
L6. Luxembourg applies selective savings  incentives  for-some types of investment,
including savingJfoi-house-purchase - 
which qualify for an interest sup-plement
and a cipital piemium 
- 
and life-assurance policies, the premiums for which are
treated as a tax allowance.
A large number of instruments for direction of investment are provided for. in
cnrrent legislation. Apat from government guarantees of loan opefations, mention
may be m""de of interist-rate sub-sidies (paid out through the inte-rmediary of credit
insiitutions), investment premiums and a wide range of tax benefits.
II. Harmonization  of insttuments
A. ADAPTATION OF SAVINGS  INCENTIVES
17. The efiects of measures  to encourage saving on the overall volume of saving
may be totally disregarded.  As already pointed out, these efiects can be no mofe
than slight, uid itr iny event they rvould not cfeate any major problem for the
development of a European capital market.
The "distribution effect" resulting from the selective charactet of the incentives
considered might well raise problims,  however, if these incentives should:
a) Hinder the structural alignment of the capital markets of the member  countries
or even accentuate existing  divergences, ot
&) Benefit only domestic investments or cause savings to be concentrated  in
financial institutions obliged to invest the bulk of their resources at home.
Ll7lfhe Group studied what measufes were currently employed te encourage  saving
in the Member States and considered how far they were likely to raise problems
of this kind.
18. \When the only objectives  are to further social policy or to contain  con-
sumption as part of incomes policy, selective savings incentives  are unjustified:
these ends can more suitably be attained by stimuli of a general nature not likely
to upset the smooth working of the capital market. Member States should therefore
be led quite naturally  in their own interest to refashion their present instruments,
quite apart from the problem of market integration,  which is our primary concern
here.
lJut stimulation  of saving may also be prompted  by other consiclerations which do
in fact call for selective incentives. This is the case:
i) \X/hen savings are channelled  to specific uses in order to facilitate the financing
of investment  assigned a high priority;
ii) \X/hen the intention is to correct deficiencies in the structure or functioning of
the capital market, such as, notably, an undue preference of savers for liquid
assets and theh reluctance to invest in securities or enter into contractual  com-
mitments.
'19. In the Group's view, the separation  of financial flows thart may result from
selective  measures  encouraging  placing of capital with certain specialized  financial
intermediaries may seriously compromise the development of an efficient capital
market in Europe.  Selective incentives can, however, be justified in certain  special
circumstances; a case in point is the serious delay in satisfying demand for housing
in certain Member States, rvhich is the reason why such importance has been
attached in those countries to various systems of saving for housing purposes.
Iielective savings stimuli of this kind also have the peculiar feature that the
distribution  effect, which predominates in other measures, is here usually accom-
panied by an expansion  of the volume of saving. Nevertheless, a careful watch
needs to be kept on such measures  to make sure they are not maintained longer
than is required to satisfy the needs for which they were adopted and thereby
become an additional factor making for compartmentalization  of the market.
tl}.  On the other hand, measures  designed to cortect savers'excessive liquidity
preference  seem beneficial in the light of the needs studied he,re, since this is a
problem common to the capital markets of all Member States, though not of equal
intensity  eveq,-where. Nevertheless, Member States will still have to make an
eflort at harmonizing the difierent types of measures applied and at reducing to a
minimum  the barriers these measures  might create.
1[o put it more exactly, given the forms of investment which ale most frequently
to be encouraged, the following  observations  may be made.
a) ln the case of savings deposits, the immobilization of funds so collected with
Iinancial intermediaries  whose scope is strictly limited shoulcl be avoided. In
pres€nt circumstances this often happens; the remedy, as will be seen more par-
ticularly in Chapter 12, lies in broadening  the range of assers in which t6ese
intermediaries may invest. If this were done, the domestic financial institutions
118which receive privileged savings rvouid, admittedly, still enjoy a favoured position
in international  compltition,  but at least the movement towards integration  would
not be compromised.
b) In the case of measures  encouraging  investment in securities, it must be borne
in mind that their primary purpose is to accustom new groups of the population
to this form of investmeni. -In 
the light of this "educational" purpose and of the
growing internationalization of security markets, it does not seem wartanted to
exclude investment in foreign securities  from the inducements  given'
c) Incentives to contractual saving should be given a key part, because the
inadequate  contribution of resources ftom the institutions  collecting  these savings
sets pioblems for the smooth functioning  of most capital  markets_ in the Community.
These oroblems will become particularly  acute in connection  rvith securities markets
and, more especially, the plaiing of blocks of securities with institutional  investors
--  a technique  which might result in large cost reductions and more flexible  access
to the market. True, these are primarily problems of providing institutional in-
vestors, especially life-assurance companies, with greater opportunities  for collecting
and investing capital (for more details see Chapter 12). But this does not make it
any less des]rabie that incentives to savers entering into agreements with these
inititutions  should be both amplified  and harmonized within the Community.
/)  Savings incentives in labour conracts - 
pension funds, supplementary  fetire-
ment pen;ions and severance  payments -- 
have become increasingly important in
Comrnnnity firms. Secs. 8 and Z7 of Chapter 2 noted respectively the imponance
of pension'funds, especially in Italy and Girmany, and -the delicate problems raised
whin they are used within the firm rather than being deployed,  under independent
management, on the capital  market.
Again, several Member  States have studied or brought into force various  schemes
aiired'at expanding wage- and salary-earners'  savings by channelling  them into
long-term investments, ai giving employees a greater stake in the_firm's prosperity
by 
"promoting a communitly of lntetests and a_ go_od psvchological climate, and at
.nrnring thaiwage increases do not necessarily  lead to greater demand for consumer
goods.
These questions have been studied in depth, especially in Italy, .where the CISL
(Confeierazione  Italiana Sindacati Lauoritori) has proposed  the introduction  of a
system of negotiated savings written into the labour contract and administered by
a National Iivestment Fund. In France various solutions have been put forward
by a committee set up to study the problem of employ_ees'  rights to a share in the
increase of assets dul to self-financing (the Mathey Committee),  which teported
in 1966. But so far it is only in Germany that discussion on these matters has led
to material results. Here, fiscal concessions afe now available for this type of
saving and a group savings conffact was written into a 1965 wage agfeement in the
building trade.
The practical arrangements  for the many formulas _suggested,_ thougl outside the
scope of this report, will obviously be a decisive factol in determining how {at
thiJ form of saving can play a patt in a European capital market.
119In the immediate future the amounts saved in this fashion will probably be small,
but they must be expected to grow, and methods should preferably be selected
that will not allow such savings to be shut ofi in strictly national. channels.
CONCLUSIONS
2L. The Group recognizes that neutrality between the difieremt forms of invest-
ment encouraged  can only be a long-term aim to be approached by stages. But the
internal divisions of each market and the obstacles to international capital flows
resulting from savings incentives  cu.rrently applied could be consiiderably diminished
here and now.
1) \X/here the stimulation  of saving is no more than a facet of social policy or an
attempt to counter a worrying business mend, the measures could easily be
refashioned  so as to encourage property formation  and contain the expansion of
consumption without distinction  as to the assets in which adclitional  savings are
placed.
2) Incentives which have the efiect of channelling savings to s;pecific uses cannot
easily be reconciled  vdth the desired broadening of financial flc,vrs. However, the
:inducements  given to encourage  saving for house-purchase  can be justified in cettain
countries where there is a very marked lag between housing sr"rpply and demand,
especially if they do in fact call forth additional  saving.
3) The development of long-term forms of financial saving seems to be an aim
common to most Member States and may therefore warrant selective incentives.
However,  the measures  adopted to this end should be so harmonized that:
'z) The institutions collecting  privileged savings have greater latitude for investment
,cutside the domestic  market, and
,4) Inducements to invest in securities do not involve discrimin,ation regarding the
,rrigin of the securities but are applied to foreign and domestic securities  alike.
,4) Conractual saving is not playing its full part in ensuring the smooth {unctioning
,,lf the Community's capital markets. It  could be encouraged  by giving wider
jinvestment  powers to the institutions  handling it; and this 'luould broaden the
appeal of the contracts ofieted. Various incentives to this kind of saving could
1be provided, and it would be well to harmonize them throughorut  the Community.
.[ncentives  written into labour contracts  and representing an aspect of incomes
policy are suitable for promoting the saving habit among population groups  whose
i.ncome is increasing and for tapping new resources  for the financing of investment.
.lf this form of saving is to be geared to a European capital market, the result of
the formula  selected must not be to shut the funds in within en,terprises  or specific
national  channels.
120B. THE INSTRUMENTS FOR DIRECTING  INYESTMENT  AND THEIR
PLACE IN A EUROPEAN CAPITAL  TVTARKET
22. Member States employ a very u'ide range of instruments for directing  invest-
ment. In fact, they may make yet more and more diversified  use of them as the
Community  develops, in order to speed up the correction  of regional  imbalances
and to bring about the necessary structural  adaptation. In the context of the
present study, the problems  raised by the use o{ finarrcial insffuments to guide
investment must be seen in terms of two questions,  as follows.
a) Does not the use of such instruments necessarily perpetuate  the divisions which
now separate capital markets?
&) \Xlhich of these instuments can retain their eficacy, and hence make it possible
for policies steering investment to specific regions or sectofs to be continued,
within a capital market enlarged to the European scale?
These questions can be answered only by examining the method of application
and efiect of each separate instrnment.
23. The foregoing  description  of policies in Member States has shown that the
instruments  most frequently used are:
a) Investment premiums, which are not actual funds buc an incentive to investors;
D) Interest-tate  subsidies, which reduce the cost of borrou'ing;
c) Government  guarantees of credits granted to certain investors;
d) Tax benefits,  which can take the form of allowance of all or part of the invest-
ment expendituie  for tax purposes, or quicker depreciation allowances, or reduced
rates of tax on income from investment.
The use of these instruments does not notmally afiect the investor's choice between
difierent finance sources and has only slighi repercussions  on the structure of
capital markets. They can be used either inlhe- setting of a purely domestic  market
or in u broader, Euiopean-scale  market. In the context of this study, therefore,
these instruments seem at first to show up in a favourable  light, but it is not
always easy to apply them, nor is it certain that they will be efiective when used
in isolation.
24. The second category of insruments  examined  has the distinguishing  feature
of directly promoting the supply of funds for investment in the regions and
industries to be aided. The main insmuments  in this group are:
a) Ditect central government  loans;
b) Loans by special credit institutions, which most often enjoy various privileges
and tax reliifs to help them raise funds for lending;
c) Directives to credit institutions, sometimes accompanied  by special facilities
for rediscount at the central bar:k;
/)  Priority access to the capital market.
121On the whole, it may be said that these instruments have a more direct efiect than
those which do no more than stimulate demand for investment. On the other
hand, by virtue of the very nature of theit efiect on the disribution of capital
supply, their application  entails the creation of non-communicating  financing
channels; to make them communicate within a European  capital market would
in.volve some dificulties,  but it could be done. The Group tries to suggest below
what instruments can most readily be adapted to the new situation.
,4) INSTRUMENTS ACTING ON INVESTN4ENT DEMAND
2.r. To turn to a more detailed examination of the chatacteristics of the various
instruments mentioned,  certain distinctions should perhaps be made as regards
their compatibility with the development of a European capital  market.
Among the instruments designed to stimulate demand in specific sectors, investment
premiums  have the advantage that they show up plainly the exten.t of the contribu-
tion from the authorities  and the overall cost to the economy. This makes them
especially suitable for such harmonized  action as may be undertaken at Community
level, perhaps in collaboration with the financial institutions discuLssed  below.
The same considerations apply to interest-rate  subsidies, which can likewise  be
applied in such a way as to minimize any distorting eflects on the choice of financial
si,urces. However, ttese subsidies do raise three Jpecific problemr;.
Fi.rst, they may,by reducing  the cost of credit, stimulate the use of borrowed funds
in preference to self-financing or capital increases through the market. To this
e>Itent they may cause distortion in the financial structure not only of firms but
also of the market as a whole.
Secondly, interest-rate subsidies are usually administered  by credit institutions
vhich have to verify that the borrower uses this assistance in accordance  vdth the
purposes for which it was granted. To give one particular  credit institution a
monopoly  o{ the administration of these subsidies is tantamouLnt to creating a
sp,ecialized  finance channel. Their administration should therefore 
- 
subject to
plecise government directives 
- 
be in the hands of specialized  institutions and
ordinary banks, and also financial institutions in other Member States which might
be able to supply funds on better terms.
T.hirdly, the total cost of using interest-rate subsidies may not be immediately
evident. Because of this, intensive  recourse to this instrument mav become the
easy way out, at the cost of an excessive burden on future budgets.
Government guarantees to back credits to certain investors also raise the problem
that they might encourage borrowing; in addition, the required formalities  take
so, long and are so complicated as to be a very real hindrance;  and finally, their
effectiveness is not always certain when the borrower encountr3rs dificulties of
access to the market other than those deriving from his finanr:ial  standing and
sc,lvency. But even with these reservations,  there is no doubt that this instrument
is one of those that can be most easily reconciled  with a broadening of the capital
122market to European scale. Furthermore, since such guarantees  do not, at the
outset, involve any fund-raising by the authorities, they are less likely than other
instruments to disturb the functioning of the market.
Tax benefits connected with specific investment projects can take such varied forms
that it is impossible to go beyond a few general observations  here. The one point
to be made is that tax benefits are probably the instrument  which least afiects the
investor's choite of both the method and the source of finance.
Admittedly,  some tax reliefs have their incentive power reduced to the extent that
they apply to future profits and the firm cannot, therefore, comectly  calculate  their
incidence  on production cost. Nevertheless,  if part of the investment  expenditure
can be deducted  from taxable income, these tax benefits take on something  of the
character of a capital grant, rvhich is generally  regarded as more efiective. It should
be added, however,  that non-discriminatory  application of such tax benefits may
give rise to a particular problem. The principle that should be observed  without
exception, making the benefits dependent  solely upon the nature of the investment
regardless  of the nationality or domicile of the investor, would be difficult to apply
in this case, unless the foreign investor were already established in the country  and
thus had a taxable income there eligible {ot the relief.
To sum up, the whole range of instruments discussed above seems equally capable
of use urithout serious difficulty in the setting of a European capital market as on
existing national  markets. But these insttuments  presuppose that the beneficiaries
can draw either on their own resources or on the matket for the funds required
for the proposed investment. This condition is not always fulfilled in practice.
If, therefore, the direction of investment consisted  solely in investment premiums,
interest-rate subsidies, official credit guarantees or tax benefits, it could not always
achieve the desired end. It is this shortcoming which has in most cases been the
reason for the adoption of instruments  acting directly on the allocation  of funds
for financing investment  in specific regions and sectors.
B) INSTRUMENTS  AFFECTING THE ALLOCATION OF FUNDS
26. In these circumstances it  is inconceivable  that governments will simply
refrain from using instruments vhich by their vety nature seem likely to perpetrate
certain divisions betvreen caoital markets. Nevertheless.  althoueh public inter-
vention in the allocation of futtdr reems to be essential if policies ur". to b. effective,
an improvement  in methods is desirable  and may, to a large extent, remove the
conflict between such action and the aim of creating a large European  capital
market.
Direct central government lending, fina"nced by market issues, and the operations
of specialized credit institutions  are cleady a potential impediment to integration
of capital markets. Indeed, certain member countries might argue that the volume
of their market recourse  and the various privileges and tax benefits attaching to
the issues of the authorities  and specialized credit institutions would preclude fair
competitive  conditions.  The objection is valid enough, but it may be pointed out
in reply that there is no reason why these privileges and tax benefits - 
where
LZJthey are judged indispensable - 
should not be aligned at Community  level. This
possibility  is not merely theoretical, since the tendency is to redu,ce these privileges
and benefits, and so to bring them into line throughout the Community.  Belgium
and, more recently,  France have already taken steps to reduce, some disparities
between the terms granted to privileged and other issuers.
It needs to be recalled that, subject to the above improvements, s;pecial institutions
for medium- and long-term credit can make a most useful conffibution not only to
irrvestment guidance, but also to the proper functioning of the capital market as
a whole. Direct access to the capital market through bond issues is confined to a
small number of large firms. The others may, of course, raise funds from such
banks as are authorized  to lend at long term. But the links which in some countries
e:rist betvreen banks and certain firms mav result in verv imperfect conditions  of
competition for sources of finance, at least as far as independeni  fir'ms are concerned.
Institutions specializing in medium-and long-term credit and raising the bulk of
their funds on the market on behalf of their customers  are thelefore a means of
establishing  mote equitable conditions  for entrepreneurs' access to finance.
T'here is no need to dwell at length on directives instructing credit institutions  to
g:ive certain investors priority in obtaining loans: it is indeed hard to imagine that
an insrument of this kind could still be used in an integrated market where, among
other things, banks so obliged to neglect some of iheir customers would risk losing
them to lenders in other member  countries.
The problem of priority  access to the market for certain borrowers  was discussed
irr the previous chapter. It remains to be added that the eficacy ,cf this instrument
irr the direction of investment will probably decline as financial  channels  expand.
To the extent, however, that it is still rvidely used to influence the mechanisms of
the capital market, the timing of issues should at least be based on clearly stated
priorities and should in no way discriminate between prospective issuers meeting
the stated conditions, whatever the investor's  country of residence.
27. The above analysis of the various instruments should not be allowed to
obscure the problems  which might attend the ordedy development  of links between
curpital markets as a result of present difierences in the intensity and eficiency of
inrvestment guidance policies in the various Member States. However, the conflicts
of interest - 
particularly  those that arise because all forms of investment guidance
tend to drive up market rates - 
will no doubt diminish under the impact of
economic policy co-ordination,  which today is recognized as one of the essential
conditions  for the continuing advance of the Community.
CONCLUSIONS
2il.  In the view of the Group, a redistribution of the weight girren to the various
in.struments  of investment  guidance and a reform of certain of the methods by
which they are applied would make it possible to pursue an efiective investment
guidance policy without foregoing the development of a capitaLl market on the
European scale. \7ith this in view;
124I ) Selective incentives to stimulate capital demand by investors seem preferable
to any other technique {or guiding financial investment, and there is a case,
therefore, for imptoving their efiectiveness.
2) The concessions  should be granted regardless of the investor's  country o{ resi
dence or of the origin of the funds, the sole citerion of eligibility being whether
the project will help attainment of the regional and secioral  objectives in view.
I ) To enable these policies to go forward in conditions of fair competition  between
financial institutions, the administration  of the financial facilities provided by the
authorities  should not be enrusted exclusively to one category of institution.  The
investof should remain free to approach the lender of his choice, and the latter
should apply the general criteria laid down by law with complete impartiality  and
should 
"iso-mak. 
s,rre that the investment  concerned is carried out in conformity
with the approved  project.
4) Governments intent on enhancing the eficacy oJ investment  guid-ance  cannot
limit the range of usable insruments to direct or indirect subsidizing  of investmelt
demand, for-the eficacy of the subsidies depends on the ease- with which the
n"..rrriy funds can be obtained on the market. In vierv of the frequent  difficulp
of access to the ordinary sources of finance, achievement of the obj_ectives  of specific
regions or sectors is oiten dependent upon preferential or supplementary credits
frJm public or semi-public speiial credit-instiiutions, or ildeed upon direct central
sovernment loans. If  such- credits are to be compatible with capital market
i"ntegration,  any bond issues on which loanable funds are raised should be floated
on ih. mafket-on terms comparable  with those applicable to other issues.
C, COMMUNTY FIN,4NCIAL  INSTTTUTIONS  ,AND INVESTMENT
GUIDANCE
29. The aim of the individual countries'policies  of investment guidance is to
bring about a difierent disttibution of inveslment.-  A problem o{ the same kind
arise"s in the European context; v/ith international competition becoming keener
and the mobility of lubour increasing, the already -developed regions and sectors
exert more and'more power of attraition on the factors, of production and thus
aggravate existing inequalities. Intra-Community  capital fl9ys are -already  -ex-
piidine in spite 6f tn. continuing existence of obstacles. Although the complete
i.-ouu'i of barriers betvreen capital markets is not likely to aggravate  the previous
imbalances fundamentally, it does lend added urgency to the need for co-ordination
of national guidance  policies.
This point is stressed in the Preliminary  Draft of the Fitst Medium-term  Econornic
Policy Programme,  which the Commission  submitted to the Council in Apll 1966.
The bbjectives and methods of tegional policy are_ essential-  aspects of this pro-
gtr.-.,  while recognizhg  that."respon_sibility  ... lies mainly with the Member
Stut.r",.it goes on to say that "the co-ordination of regional policies at Community
level is paiticularly necessary [in order to] contribute to hatmonious  economic
developnient...". Likewise, "although a detailed treatment of policy on the
125smucture of industry is being held over for a later programme",  the general
p,rinciples outlined in this first document emphasize the need for measureJ to be
adopted and applied by joint agreement.
lihe gradual definition of Community  objectives in no way alte:rs, at the level of
l4ember  States, the conditions in rvhich the use of financial guidance  instruments
r,3mains compatible with the development of a European capital market. But once
common objectives are defined, European institutions will be able to expand their
frnancial operations alongside those of central governments and institutions in the
member countries.
hs regards the efiects of their operations on the capital market, a distinction may
be made between two types of institution. The activities of some, like th-e
Eluropean Agricultural  Guidance and Guarantee Fund, r'emain outside the market
mechanism  inasmuch as the Fund's guidance operations  are financed by import
kvies. By contrast, institutions like the ECSC High Authority or the European
Lnvestment Bank draw heavily on the market for refinancing and keep their opera-
tions in line with market conditions.
30. The ECSC Treaty requires the High Authority to encourag,e the co-ordinated
development  o{ inve_stment in the industries for which it is respl,nsible.  The High
A.uthority periodically establishes "general objectives"; thesd are drawn .tp In
consultation with all interested parties and with governments, and help to guide
their actions. It is in the light of tl'rese general obfectives  that the High Auth-"ority
issues opinion-s on _firms' investm,ent  programmes and assists thLe implementation
o[ some of them by long-term loans. (t) This special concern with- investment
gruidance is explained  _by th. nature of the sectors coming under the Treaty: they
ale basic industries, where investment expenditure is exceptionall,i, heaw. 
^ttd 
th.it
production  trcnds are closely  geared to th. general  trend of the'economy.
rnvestment  loans are covered by the proceeds of bond issues floated, for some
years past, mainly on European capital markets. By raising a growing proportion
of its_resources directly on these markets,  the High Authority aniicipat.i a siluation
irr which integration of capital markets will be an accomplished fact and the
connection  between where savings are formed and where thiy are employed will
br:come increasingly tenuous.
Arrangements  of this kind, making it possible 
- 
without separatiion  of marlcets 
- for investment to be directed to key industries  chosen for iheir specific  character-
istics, in line with a medium-term  economic policy defined at r3bmmunity  level,
could only be to the Community's  advantage.
31. - The European Investment  Bank has only tv/o types of ope:ration open to it
-- lending and guaranteeing. Although the Bank operates on a non-profit-muking
basis, it has to adapt the price it charges for its services to marllet conditions: ii
no case may _the lank itself reduce the interest rate on its loans. The proceeds of
loan issues floated on_ the Community's capital markets account for-a growing
ploportion  of the Bank's resources. Thus, the EIB complies with the machinery
(l) ECSC. budgetary aids to finance research are also an instrument of investment  guidance, but
they are beyond the scope of this report.
126of the capital markets and yet finds finance for projects considered to be deserving
of priority.
So far the absence of any co-ordinated  structural policy within the Community
has meant that the only basis on which the EIB coulcl rely for the direction of
investment was the general directives of Article 130 of the Treaty of Rome. For
this reason, the Bank has mainly been concerned with helping the implementation
of regional policy objectives pursued independently by the several Member  States.
The draft medium-term economic policy programme  suggests that the time has now
come to expand the operations  of the Bank, which is to contribute,  in close collab-
oration with the various institutions in the member countries, to the implementa-
tion of regional programmes  that have first been "confronted and as fat as possible
co-ordinated  at Community level". To this end it is suggested  that Member  States
take steps to give the Bank easier access to the capital market and thus enable it
to adapt its resources  better to policy requirements.  The programme  also proposes
a study to determine whether the charges and interest rates paid by the Bank's
bortowers  should be reduced.
On this point, and rvith reference to a provision in the Bank's Statute authorizing
Member States or a third pafty to grant rebates on the interest on loans extended
by the Bank, the suggestion  had been made that the Commission might assume
this third-party role. In its first memorandum  on regional policy Commission
submitted to the Council,  the Commission mentioned this proposal and envisaged
a study of the technical aspects of the application of such interest rebates. The
Group considers that this proposal should be taken up again, in so far as it would
enable the EIB to contribute more actively to the realization  of future common
policy objectives.
32. It is true that neither the High Authority nor thc EIB is on an absolutely
equal footing with other financial intermediaries: they enjoy fiscal and financial
privileges and can therefore approach the capital market in exceptionally favourable
conditions. By and large, the privileges conceded to the ECSC and the Bank
corresoond to those allowed in each Member State of the most-favoured public
issues] This deliberate assimilation is justified by the fact that the High Aut^hority
and the EIB likewise have functions to fulfil rvhich private establishments  could
not cope with to best advantage. Given, then, that these Community institutions
and certain specialized financial intermediaries of a public character are in a similar
position, it would be best if the market problems they set were solved in identical
manner. It was seen, in preceding  sections of this repori, that the gradual  elimina-
tion of internal market divisions presupposed  the achievement  of more equitable
treatment of issuers. It  would therefore be logical if  any improvements the
Member States might introduce  to this end were followed up by alignment of the
conditions on which the High Authority and the EIB now have access to the
market.
Conclusions
33.  1) Closer co-ordination of regional and sectoral policies within the Com-
munity should enable the ECSC l{igh Authority and the EIB to make a more
active contribution to realization of the objectives.
1272) If action by these institutions is to gain in efiectiveness  and at the same time
remain compatible  with the operational requirements  of a European  capital market:
a) Their access to the capital markets of Member States should be {acilitated by
th,e States concerned;
b,l The conditions  governing  their operations on the various markets should be
aligned on those applicable to comparable issuers resident in the country concerned;
c) The granting of interest-rate  rebates to recipients of ECSC and EIB loans
should be considered in specific circumstances.
12,8CHAPTER 6
FINANCE POLICIES OF PUtsLIC  AUTHORITIEiS AND ENTERPRISES
Introduction
1.  The extension of the powers  and responsibilities of central and local government
and the development of public enterprises  have brought vrith them in all member
countries an increase in public calls on the capital market.
Administrative authorities  and pubiic enterptises afiect the sructure of the market
directly through their borrowing  and lending operations and through redemption
or conversion of public debt. It  is because of the scale and nature of these
operations that central government  and institutions  in the public sector are such
a-crucial  factor in the capital market; where they also establish the priorities fot
access to the market, thus inditectly regulating the allocation of funds to the
private sector, they largely determine the level and pattem of interest  rates.
2.  Although they make themselves  srongly felt in all member countries, oficial
financial policies do not have the satne impact everywhere. While public-sector
recourse io the matket is small in some member countries, r.vhere taxes yield
sufficient revenue and the rates charged for public services are at an adequate level,
the situation is quite difierent in others. Countries in dre first group, then, might
feat that, if progress towards financial integration were too rapid, it might result
in excessive  ialls on their own markets; and they might therefore be tempted  to
drag their feet.
It seems, then, that the creation of a Eulopean capital market, and the ability to
forestall obsnuctive  disequilibria  generated in the process, implicitly depend on the
adoption by the authorities  and public enterprises  of harmonized financial policies
thai will enable the difierences in the development of the individual markets  to
be reduced.
3.  The present study of the financing of the public sector, approached from the
angle of the impact of public financing on the equilibtium  of the capital market,
is obviously  not intended to tackle all the problems raised by public botrowing,
much less to provide conclusions  laying down general rules for the administration
of public finances. The object is solely to establish- cettain principles which, if
complied with, would ensure harmonious operation of the markets in the member
countries and thus facilitate their gtadual  integration.
Head I will examine  the principal features  and trends <lf public-sector recourse to
the capital market. Head II  will review the financing o{ the administrative
authorities and public enterprises in the light of the requirements  of financial
integration.  This last rvill entail a study of:
i) \Ways in which imbalances  associated u'ith excess_ aggregate demand for funds
and the inadequacy  of automatic  correctors  spread from one market to another;
129ii) The special role that may be played bv public institutions,  by adjustment  of
their financial policies, in pteventing or correcting  these imbalances;
iii) The organization,  under the Treatll, of direct and gradual  accr3ss to the European
capital market by central and local government'
L Recourse to the c Pital market
by public authorities and public enterprises
4. The transactions of central and local government and public enterprises  on the
capital market can be so arranged that their overall impact harmonizes with that
of^the pdvate sectof. In many; cases, however,  capital calls by tbe public. sector
are often - 
whether because of their size or of the terms arranged - 
21 ths 1e.1
of disequilibria in the structure and operation of the market. Prior to an examina-
tion of these problems, the current siiuation in the member  countries and its likely
development -in the coming years. if  present tendencies are not adjusted, are
reviewed below.
A. RECOURSE TO THE MARKET : CURRENT  TRENDS
.4) CENTRAL  AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
5.  The rapid and general increase in capital expenditure by' central and local
governments  explains why they are drawing more and mofe oln p_rivate saving -to
meet theit financial requirements. These growing  expenditures, linked with the
expansion of economic and social infrasttucture (itself the key to sustaingd growth
of-the economy),  can be covered by funds from a variety of sources. This report
is not designed to provide a theoretical analysis of the teasons why one or other of
these souices of finance - 
particularly borrowing or taxation 
- 
should be
prefemed. But one fact cannoi be ignored: the inadequacy c,f public -saving in
ielation to planned capital expenditure  and the gtowing fecourse to the capital
rmarket that is entailed, while restricted to some of the member countries hitherto,
iare phenomena novr tending to become general.
'5. These are the conclusions  to be drawn from the Budget JPolicy  Committee's
:forecasts f.or L966-70,  referred to in the proposals for the harmonization of public
.financing policies in the Community contained in the "Preliminary Draft of the
.First Medium-term  Economic Policy Programme".  "Public expenditure  as a
whole ... should grow rapidly in all the Member  States; in general it is expected
that its growth will exceed the increases in the gross nationall product". If  the
tendencies already noted persist, "the rapid growth of public capital expenditure
will be particularly pronounced in all the countries".
"Current expenditure is expected to increase less rapidlv than capital expenditure;
:none the leJs it is in most cases likely that it rvill continue to grow more rapidly
than gross national product..." It  is also quite possible that the. expansion of
,:,rrren1  expenditure in several member countfies  has been estimated at too low a
:rate because of the methods used and the initial assumptions,  in which case the
balance of the budget will of course be afiected.
r.30"l.'he main source of danger to the balance of budgets is likely to be the fact that,
according to the estimates, revenue n'ill be increasing more slowly than expenditure:
most member countries have assumed essentially unchanged tax rates, with the
result that revenue from taxation will develop on lines roughly parallel to the
trend of the gross national  product, or at best 
- 
given the progressive  nature of
some taxes 
- 
will grow a little more rapidly.
"The assumptions used therefore point to a substential increase in public financing
needs. At the same time a notevrorthy deterioration in the current  accounts  of
almost all member countries is to be feared, so that public saving as a means of
financing  capital expenditure will ter-rd to decline in importance".
If things remain as they are, especially tax legislation, it will therefore be necessary
in all the member countries " to borrow even larger sums to cover the growing
need for public infrastructr.rre  investment;  this will be necessary even in counffies
like the Netherlands, where central government  investment  is in principle to be
financed out of current  revenue, by far the greater part of public investment being
generally  canied out by the local authorities". This need is not stated as a
general thesis, of course, since the structure and financing of the budgets  should in
principle  be determined  by the economic situation: the Committee is simply stating
its views in connection  with inflationary  pressures arising from an excess of public
spending over income. The conclusions of the draft medium-term economic policy
progrutn--e  are therefore  that the interests of the public authorities as issu6rs oi
loans will compete with those of industry, which may also need to make increased
calls on the capital markets to finance its investment".
B) PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
7.  The diversity of the conditions in which public enterprises have deveioped,
the large numbet of industries in rvhich they operate,  and the multiplicity of ligal
atrd administrative  regulations governing them are all factors explaining  why the
financial  problems of these enterprises difier widely and why it is not easy to
classify them all on the basis of their financial  situation.
The legal status of the public enterprise always  aflects the means whereby it can
cover its financial requirements.  \fhere the cental or local government is engaged
directly in an economic  activity, the enterprise concerned has individuality  only in
a technical  sense: its asseis eind financial  operations  merse with those of the cenftal
or local government involved. Sometimes the public eiterprise is given a limited
degree of independent management;  here, however, there is generally an organic
link with the finance department of the authority so far as the covering of finance
requirements  is concerned. In both cases the incidence  of the financial administra-
tion of the enterptise on the capital market mav be reflected in increased official
indebtedness. A difierent situation arises with public enterprises that have their
own legal personality and operate on the same footing as private firms. As this type
of public enterprise has a budget and a finance department  quite separate from
those of the supervisory authority, it has a clear problem of choice in the matter
of outside finance: it can call either on the Treasurv or on the capital market.
131r\ more important  distinction  is that made between the public enterprises that
compete with private enterprises,  and those providing  a public service, which are
Irequently monopolies. In the light of this distinction  the genetal considerations
siet out in Chapter 2 (secs. 8-L6) can be qualified and given rnore particular ap'
plication.
8. Generally, there are no real difierences  in kind between the financial problems
of public enterprises  competing on the market and those of private enterprises of
thJ same type. Although the variet;' of situations and the inadequacy  and lack of
uniformity in financial accounts  make any generalization  impossible,  certain constant
llactors in this matter can be derived from as yet incomplete  data collected fot a
r;urvey carried out under the auspices of the Centre earop6en  de I'entreprise  pil-
tblique. This shows that in some cases self-financing  by public enterprises compet-
i.ng on the market is developing on much the same lines as that of private enter-
prises in the same sector. Additional needs for outside funds are met either by
i:entral government  conributions,  or by recourse to the capital market, or by some
combination  of the two. Cental government conttibutions  most often take the
{orm of long-term credits or capital contributions  (participations  in the enterptise's
capital or contributions to an endowment  fund, conversion of previous loans to
endowments).  As such assistance has been on a small scale in recent yeats in both
:lbsolute and rclative terms, direct recourse to the market has usually been the
chief method of bortovring adopted by this type of public enterprise.  Howevet,
procedures whereby these enterprises obtain access to the capital market have
r:ertain special features to be examined  in secs. lL and L2.
:). The situation of public enterprises providing a public service is completely
different. The policy with regard to charges putsued by these enterprises - 
er
i.mposed on them - 
is at the root of theit financial problems. These charges may
be "political"  i.e. not based on ordinary economic  and financial criteria alone, but
r:egulated by the public authorities with due regard to the probable social and
political efiects of a given pattern of charges for public services.,  Consequently,
jrolicies vary not only from country to country, but even from public enterprise  -to
i:nterprise in a single country. The multiplicity of differing situations may be
leduced to a few typical cases. The two extremes are (a) where charges are too
l.ow even to cover operating costs and (b) where the charges ensure that the
r:nterprise has suficient revenue to meet costs and to finance additions-to  plant
and equipment. Since the fixing of charges for public services is genetally  deter-
mined-by extraneous  factors - 
particulady the need to keep the cost of liv-ing
$teady - 
most public enterprisei providing  a public service come into the first
category. As they have no real means of self- financing and sometimes  even have
to operate at a loss, these enterprises  draw substantially on the capital market.
:8. BORROWING PROCEDTIRE.'
L0. \fhen required to make capital expenditures  and transfers that cannot be
tfinanced from the surplus on current account, the administrativ€:  authorities,  as we
Jhave seen, have to call on private savings.  Through financing channels  that vary
'132from country to country bui serve identical  purposes, the authorities can tap
certain kinds of saving - 
post office saving, saving through social security schemes,
and so on, A process of "transformation"  enables excessively liquid savings to be
made suitable for long-term financing. However, the scale of oficial requirements
and the limited use to which such liquid savings can be put explain why the
flotation of loans on the capital market is still the main channel through which
private saving flows to the public authorities.
1L. When obliged to resort to the capital market, public enterprises can use a
variety of approaches, not all of them of the same importance. Apart from a few
exceptions  rvhich Italy may be mentioned - 
the bank credit that
constitutes  the normal source of financing for small and medium-sized firms is
usually only a subsidiary source for public enterprises - 
generally used for pre-
iiminary financing. \X/ith the financing of the enterprises  forming the IRI concern,
financing by means of issues of stock to the public is a technique which has been
most fully developed  and carefully defined in Italy. In most cases, however, public
enterprises  generally  borrow from the public by issuing bonds.
12. For several reasons,  recourse to this market by administrative  authorities  and
public enterprises takes place on special terms: the issue and distribution  of
iecurities enfoy benefits and privileges  intended to ensure that they have priority
u'ith investors.
Some of these advantages derive solely from the nature and size of the issuer.
Other things being equal, securities ofiered by public bonowers  are superior 
_ t-o
bonds issud by the private sector in that holdets have an investment  in which
they run no riiks othLr than monetary.  Because of its size, the market in public
bonds also tends to sufier less from sudden fluctuations.  Certain agencies - 
the
Belgian Fonds des rentes aod the French Caisse des dtp)ts et consignations - intervene in any case to steady prices.
As well as these natural advantages enjoyed by public borrowers,  there are certain
facilities and privileges whose chief purpose is to ensure that their issues are given
priority. These facilities and privileges vary from one member country to the next.
Tl'tey may even vafy as between central govefnment, local government and public
enterprises.  The benefits available to all are numerous:
a) Laws and regulations facilitating the placing of secutities  with institutional
investors;
6) Various tax exemptions, particularly  as regards  certain direct taxes and estate
duty;
c) Reduction of or exemption  from stamp duties;
/)  Central government  guarantees  fot interest payments andf or capital repayments;
e) Priority as regards timing of issues;
l)  Exemption from certain bank commissions, and moderate advertising and
flotation costs.
IJJII. Financing of public authorities
and enterprises and development  of a European  capital market
13. Though it is the bond market that bears the brunt of public-sector financing,
the rend of the capital market as a whole is directly or indirectll' determined by it.
Consequently,  the advantages  accorded authorities  and public enterprises  and their
l,eading position on the market place upon them a special responsibility  to forestall
and correct any disequilibria, though this does not mean thirt they alone are
responsible  for adjustment.
}\. INADEQUACY OF MACHINERY  FOR REGULATING  T'HE MARKET
1,4. Freedom to borrow on the capital markets of the other member  countries
u'ould enable some member countries to satisfy their public and private finance
requirements more fully and on better terms than on thefu oli'n home markets.
One possibility would be for the public sector to be the principal borower on
foreign markets. As the "transformation"  of cash savings through public finance
channels is subject to quantitative  limits, cenmal and local government might then
regard borrowing abroad as the only acceptable alternative  to either tightening up
cedit facilities for private enterprises (which might be undesirable) or obtaining
additional  funds on the money market (which might also prove undesirable).
[Jnder a policy tending to reserve an adequate proportion of the domestic supply
c'f capital to private enterprise,  public enterprises might likewise be urged to
b'orrow on foreign matkets, which they could enter relatively easily because of
t.heir size and the implicit or explicit glrarantee provided by the central government.
f'he cost of capital, which largely determines the indebtedness of private enterprises,
afiects the borrowing decisions of adminisuative  authotities and public enterprises
t,c a limited degree only, since their demand for funds is relatively inelastic. With
tlhe home market already srained,  considetable  use could be mrrde of the facility
of borrovring abroad.
I'he converse might be likely to occur even more frequently: tlhe authorities and
p,ublic enterptises raising theit finance requirements  on the home market and
Frivate enterprises bomowing abroad. This borrowing might be no more than the
logical consequence  of the strain and rising interest rates imposed on the home
market by the public sector's pdority claims, or it might be the outcome of
deliberate government policy. It must be pointed out that in case of a relative
rise in interest  tates, disequilibria can also spread through the purchase of bonds
on the market of one country by residents of other member courruies. fn practice,
t.his contamination process will often prove even more important  than the direct
issues made by the country involved on the markets of other Connmunity  countries.
15. Irrespective of the means by which they finally spread, strains on the home
capital market would thus be reflected in the nansfer of some of the demand for
f,unds to other Communitv markets.
134It is possible that on one or more of these markets, on which the supply of- funds
is noimally thin, {unds will temporarily be plentiful. In that event the arrival of
foreign borrow.rs would ttot ottil' .unt. to-rrpset in the market resorted to-, but
their"transactions would also make it possible to teduce the sffain on their home
markets.
This additional demand, however,  may reinforce existing disequilibria on certain
markets or cause disturbances  on others where the balance is precarious.
A rapid increase in supplies of capital on the European.marlet rvould be the only
means of combating ihese tisks -by 
meeting the combined requirements  of all
cenral and local government authorities and public and private enterprises. Yet
even on the assuription  that the propensity  to save in the Community  grows and
that the volume of savings available for long-term  investment incfeases more
rapidly 
- 
in step with the-process of financial integration - 
it_ would still remain
problematic wheiher the deiirable balance could automatical|y be achieved.
16. Consequently, if the European capital market is to expand without serious
strain, work on aiigning conditions  on the various markets must be continued, in
ordet to minimize 
-disturbance 
as the markets merge. This seems all the more
necessary because in recent years, despite the existence of definite obstacles to the
movement of capital, wherq strain hai occurred on one market of anothef, it has
spread uzith incieasing  rapidity thtough the Community. Helce, when the g.ap
Gt-..n  overall demand for funds from the private and public sectofs and the
supply of capital tends to increase on a given maJket, the restoration  of balance
becomes  a problem of common interest to all member  counffies.
The key problem to be solved in restoring equilibrium  is vrhether  demand ftom
administrative  authorities  and public enterprises should still be given more or less
priority treatment  or whether this should be given to private- en_terprises instead.
the choice is a political one: it may bring the chief burde. of adjustment to bear
on either the public or the private sector by inducing  a reduction in their demand
for capital. The prevailing situation in the Community - 
and budgetary analysis
and forecasting show that it is part of a long-term  trend 
- 
indicates that at the
present stage of the business  cycle the burden of adjustment_  should fall chiefly
-on 
the public secror. The "Preliminary Draft of the First Medium-term  Economic
Policy Programme"  shows that this would not entail a reduction of public
investment  - 
for growing collective needs make public investment indispensable - but only an overall adjustment of the terms and conditions  on which investment
as a whole is financed.' This adiustment, essential if there is to be lasting gfowth
without strain, requires, among other things, a slowdown in the rise of consumefs'
expenditure and the acceptance  of certain principles by administrative  authorities
ani public enterprises.  Hbwever, a certain part of Pgblig expenditure regarded .as
.o.rri-.. ."p..tiitrrt. (education, research, etc.) is clearly attributable to policies
aiming at structural reforms and therefore merits the same priority treatm€nt as
invesinent expenditure.  An essential in the establishment of -greater_ budgetaty
stringency  is therefore a breakdown of public spending showing the total additional
capital and operating expenditures eligible for financing by priority.
The fixing of these principles 
- 
the rules for the adminisuation  of public finance
and for c"overing  the financial requirements of public enterprises - 
is the central
element in the passages on public linance policy contained  in the Draft Programme.
135I:ONCLUSIONS
1.7, More rigorous financial restraint on the part of central and local government
rand public enterprises would make a real conffibution to preventing or slowing
r:lown the development  of local strain and its spread to other capital markets. This
r:onclusion by the Group is based on the following considerations;
1) The intensification of contacts between the capital markets of the member
countries  may enable any excess demand for capital by the public and private
sectors to be satisfied  and at the same time lessen the risk of strain that misht
rlrise on an isolated market.
12) However, the extent of potential demand is not such as to justify the assumption
rthat balance on the European capital market can be attained automatically.  The
integration  process consequently seems to be dependent largell' on the reduction
of the strain on national markets engendered by the various t;ypes of borrower.
.i) In the present economic situation the burden of the adjustments  needed on each
rnarket should fall chiefly on public agencies, which should reappraise certain
aspects of their finance policies.
IJ, THE /NFLUENCE OF FINANCING PROCEDURES  ON MARKET
)3ALANCE
'! 8.  The situation  on most of the caoital markets is such that conclusions can be
clrawn as to the spheres in which cetttr"l and local government  ancl public enterprises
should  exercise  restraint for the next few years: first, the scale oli their borrowings,
rvhich should be reduced where they are so heavy as to restrict the opportunities
crf private enterprises to draw funds from the market; second, the metbods by
uthich they borrow, which should be modified so as to reduce the diflerences in the
terms laid down for the various categories of bortower and to introduce a greater
clegree of diversification  in methods of attracting private savings.
Ii) CENTRAL  GOVERNMENT
19. A reduction in cenral government demand  on the capital market cannot be
efiected merely through market machinery.  For a restriction - 
however necessary
and desirable - 
of the special privileges that help to give prior:ity to the placing
of government securities cannot remove from the public authorities the natural
advantages  they enjoy in any case. Moreover,  the options underlying the govern-
nlent's finance requirements  are political in nature: public demand for capital will
not therefore be significently affected by the ttend of interest  rates.
20. A diminution of government pressure on the market must therefore  proceed
flom a political choice intended to improve budgetary equilibrium.
Since public investment is given priority in most member countries, this aim can
only be achieved  through economies on public consumption  and through better-
fai6balanced  social security  systems. However, there are limits to restriction of the
growth of certain public expenditures,  and increases in taxation may well be
inevitable.  This higher taxation, needed "from the point of view both of general
economic  equilibrium  and of the particular financial  requirement", should, as the
"Preliminary Draft of the First Medium-term  Economic Policy Programme"  recom-
tnends, be raised at the cost of private consumef spending,  "so as to avoid as far
as possible compromising the formation of private savings and the industrial
investment  drive".
Considering the adjustment  of central government  finances, the Group believes
that budgetary planning extending over a number of years and relating particulatly
to public investment in the broader seuse would be a useful means of enabling the
combination of taxation and recourse to the market to be planned over long perlods.
This could lead to a distribution of public investment  in two groups. The first
would include investment which, forming part of a determined  efiort to carry
through vital structural  reforms, could not be postponed and for which funds must
definitely be found, either by taxation or borrowing.  The second, on the other
hand, would include investments  which would be implemented only in the light of
the situation on the caoital market: loans to cover those would not be issued
unless they were unlikely to encroach unduly on capital available  for other sectors
of the economy. A distinction of this kind between two kinds of public investment
would satisfy the requirements of economic policy and make it possible to steady
the tends on the capital market.
B) LOCAL GOVERNMENT
21. The attainment of these aims presupposes  rigorous discipline on the part
of all public authorities.  Certain obstacles may be put in the way of this by the
financial autonomy of local governments: the requirement of a balanced budgei and
the general rule in local government  finance that expenditures  should be fully
covered by revenues do not provide a real guarantee against structural  disequilibria
occurring. Normally the quantity of funds to be amassed is geared to the expend-
itures deemed  necessary. However, the broad measure of autonomy actually enjoyed
by local government  in the matter of expenditure is not matched by similar freedom
in choosing means of ensuring that expenditure is covered, and in most cases local
tax systems cannot readily be adapted to changes in requirements. The amount
of central government  subsidy is also beyond the conrol of local authorities, so
that the only means of supplementing inadequate  resources is by borrowing.
Irrespective  of means employed, local government demand is at present a factor
that adds greatly to the pressure on the capital market. Vhile this is quite evident
when borrowing is in the form of a bond issue, it is no less real, though less
apparent, when local authorities call on specialized public or semipublic oedit
institutions, savings banks and their central institutions, or private bodies such as
insurance companies or mortgage banks. For the resources of public credit institu-
tions and savings banks are themselves  largely built up from capital drawn from
the market by bonded loans or funds which, mustered through specific  financing
channels, could have contributed directly to supply on the capital market.
LJI212. Some limitation of the incurrence of debt by local government  should be
sought, taking due account of the tv'ofold necessity for the local authorities to
adapt their borrowing constantly to the general economic situation and for priority
investments to be carried out rvhatever the circumstances. The problem can be
tackled from two angles.
tl3. First of all, increased autonomy in taxation matters would enable local
€iovernments  to reduce the sums they would have to borrow for any given total of
expenditure.
tL4. Secondly, there is a good case for a more rational arrangement  of the power
to borrow additional capital needed. A relevant factor here is tire low elasticity of
demand for capital by local government in relation to market conditions: local
authorities often have to call on the matket  as a result of political imperatives even
rvhen the market situation is unfavourable. The existence  of a soecialized  credit
institution as an intermediary  to centralize demand  from local go'o'.rnm.nt  and to
satisfy it by tefinancing  on the capital market might help to improve the borrowing
methods open to local authorities,  as is done by the agency operating in this field
in the Netherlands  - 
the Bank uoor Nederlandsche  Gemeenten. This would have
the advantage of showing precisely  what requirements had to be satisfied,  and the
institution could then arrange the capital drawings, simultaneously  taking into
account overall demand from local authorities and the need to avoid any disturbance
on the market. An organization  of this kind could also refrain from operating on
the market other than in special situations, defined on the basis of objective
criteria such as the tend of interest rates or the rate of increase of local government
lrcrrowing. In situations of this kind, even authorities  that normally finance
t.hemselves by floating loans would be invited to turn to this organization, which
,vould borrow on th; market within limits comoatible  with th6 maintenance of
cquilibrium and then allocate the funds among the various local a.uthorities.
'Iwo problems remain which can probably not be ignored: in the first place this
procedure should not be restricted to local government authorities  alone but should
i.nclude companies in which local government has a majority :interest. Secondly,
there should be powets to impose similar restraint on the receurse to sources of
linance other than bonded loans.
'While technically feasible, the organization of a specialized  crr:dit institution for
the local authorities would nevertheless  have the disadvantage of changing  the
:relations between central and local government. Moreover,  in ra Member  State of
ra federal stfucture such as Germany it would only be practicable  if. otganized at
.Liindet level. Nevertheless  this solution would be conducive to greater restraint
on the part of the public authorities, in spite of the obstacles which stand in its
'way and in spite of the fact that it would create a specialized  financing  channel.
'Ihe refinancing  operations of this specialized institution  might also have favourable
,efiects on the development of a European capital market, where the issues of a
borrower of considerable financial weight and vety probably equipped with a cenral
ilovernment guarantee vould 
^ttract 
investors even on markets other than its own.
138C) PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
25. Bond issues are an important means of financing  public enterprises for reasons
that vary with the nature of the enterprise and its operation: a reduction in their
overall recoLrrse  to the bond market, which, as will be shovrn below, is a desirable
objective, presupposes that adjustments  adapted to each case will be made in their
financial  administration.
Fundamental  in this respect is the distinction between public enterptises  competing
with private firms and those providing a public service and having charges fixed
irrespective of operating costs.
26. Public enterprises of the first type often have self-financing  margins approach-
ing in size those of their private counterparts.
Public enterprises providing services at charges not determined by costs are the
more numerous. They include gas and electricity producing  and distibuting
companies  and state railway systems.  Research should make it possible to distinguish
those managerial decisions determined by the logic of the market and those dictated
by considerations of social and political distribution. Consequently,  enterprises  may
be divided into two groups.
The first of these includes all enterprises which could move gradually from a
system of fixed, "political" charges to a system of market ptices geared to the cost
of services rendered. Eventually  the revenue of these enterprises should, in addition
to ordinary operating  expenditures, cover normal depreciation  and even provide
a net margin for self-financing.
If, for the enterprises  in the second group, the maintenance of "political" charges
still seemed  necessary, the problem of covering operating expenditure and of
financing  investment would remain, as would the ptoblem of limiting their recourse
to the iapital market. On this assumption, the revenue authotized by the level
of chargei should at least cover operating expenditures, and if  this minimum
cover should in certain cases not even be ensured, the deficit should be financed
from taxation.
A slight or non-existent  margin for self-financing would leave the problem of
covering  capital expenditure. Finding the necessary  funds, whether by grant from
the supervisory  authority or by a direct call on the market by the enterprise
concerned, implies pressure on the market in both cases: at the moment  grants from
cenral or local government  necessarilv  entail, in view of the deficits on their overall
capital transactions,  increased drawings on the capital market. Direct bond issues
by public enterprises produce identical results.
In sum, given that the maintenance of "socio-political"  charges for various public
services is inevitable and there is a need to limit excessive incurrence of debt by
enterprises  providing such services, it may be considered  that this latter objective
will be the more easily attainable if  cettain basic rules of administration  are
respected. For instance, it would be particularly desirable for charges to be fixed
in such a way that, in addition to covering its operating expenditute, the enterprise
would be able to rene$/ its plant and equipment.
1391!7. Even if bonowing by pubiic enterprises were reduced to tolerable proportions
in this way without excessive smain on the capital market, the problem of procedure
tvould remain in that borrou'ing  would still be chiefly on the bond markei. In this
respect the recent example of ENEL in Italy is particularly significant.  Since the
elecmicity  industry came under government  control, ENEL has acquired funds
cxclusively  by means of loan issues, whereas before its constituent  companies
issued shates in much greater volume than bonds. The consequence of national-
ization has thus been to introduce an element of imbaiance onto the capital market.
lihe strain on the capital market arising from the financing of public enterprises  by
bond issues alone might be reduced if securities  were issued which, while having
some of the features of the shares to which the public is a.ccustomed, would
nevertheless not detract from the principle of public control of these enterprises.
Of the procedures  tied out, the one linking the loan capital andf ot interest to
the performance of the public enterprise is perhaps the most interesting.  These
clevices will be examined in Chapter  9.
tl9. \With the same objective of diversifying ancl balancing the various ways of
borrowing on the capital market, public enterprises should make more systematic
calls on the share market. But, except where the enterprise is to be restored to
prrivate ownership and where, in consequence,  there would be no quantitative limit
on the issue of ordinary shares, habitual recourse  to risk capital presupposes  the
issue of secufities with some original features. The issue of preference  shares  and
non-voting shares would be a way of enabling public enterprises constituted  as
j,cint-stock companies to finance themselves extensively  on the stock market without
the problem of public control being posed. At all events 
- 
and there are many
convincing examples of this in Italy (IRI companies)  and Germany - 
the
rnaintenance of public control is by no means incompatible  with a large measure
of private participation  in such enterprises.
llhrs arrangement  seems to be particulary suited to enterprises competing directly
with qrivate firms. Conversely, it seems less suitable for the financing  of enterprisei
p,roviding a public service. For even if the fixing of their rates is not influinced
t'y extraneous  social and political  factors,  these enterprises are not managed with
a view to the interests of shareholders.  Consequently,  in certain cases the dividends
that they could ofier holders of their shares might difier only moderately from the
income guaranteed to mere bondholders.  If  this were so, the issue of such
securities would make only a small crack in the general predominance  of financing
b,y bond issue.
2'9. However this may be, the financing of public enterprises by bond issues
'urould remain essential for public enterprises,  and it would therefore be necessary
to minimize the potential dislocation of the market caused by the method and
tr3rms of recourse,
Of the various advantages enjoyed by issues by public enterprises,  some (low
advertising costs, exemption from bank commission, etc.) are not due to the fact
tlhat the borrower is a public agency but to the fact that the borrower is a big
one. Private borrowers of equal size benefit from advantages of the same order-,
srr these advantages  cannot be regarded  as constituting any form of discrimination
a,gainst the private sector.
140The grant of tax or financial privileges  and or the use of procedute5 
- 
eush tt
adjusting the issue queue 
- 
do, however, result in discrimination where they
favour public issues. It rvill be difficult simply to abolish these advantages, nor
would it necessarily  be advisable, for they may constitute the counterpart of charges
or specific liabilities  burdening the public enterprise. In this case, far from arbi-
trarily favouring the public enterprise, they compensate it  for the drawbacks
occasioned by special opefating conditions. In consequence, the maintenance of
these advantages can be justified in this particular  case. In order to eliminate
discrimination between borrorvers  and the disequilibria that might result on the
matket, however, it would be advisable to extend their benefits to the private
enterprises subject to the same constraints and obligations and to ensure that
- 
once these constraints and obligations have disappeared - 
the compensatory
advantages  are modified accordingly.
C. ORG,ANIZATION  OF 'TIIE ACCESS OF CENTRAL AND LOCAL
GOYERNMENT  7O THE EUROPEAN CAPITAL MARKET
30. The Group sees harmonized reduction of the pressure  exerted on member
countries'  capital markets by the aggregate  demand of the public and private sectors
as one of the essential factors in the attainment of integration. The current business
situation in most member coutries suggests, as recommended  above, that calls on
the market by public agencies should be reduced.
This prior condition of access by these agencies to the markets in other member
countiies is not suficient,  however, to gnut-unt.. that their recourse  to the additional
financial facilities thus ofiered can be efiected without suain unless there is
voluntafy,  and subsequently concerted, restraint on the part of those countries.
There is room for doubt about the exact scope of Article 68 (l) of the Treaty
of Rome, which provides that "loans intended for the direct or indirect financing
of a Member  State or of its territorial sub-divisions may not be issued or placed
in other Member States save when the States concerned  have reached  agreement
in this respect": as has already been pointed out, any disequilibrium on a domestic
market due to excessive borrowing by administrative  authorities and public
enterprises m y 
- 
without these agencies themselves issuing loans abroad - spread to other markets as and when private enterprises  are obliged to shift their
demand for capital to these markets. It therefore  appears that the Treaty clause
quoted above governs only the procedute for mutual opening of markets to public
borrowers and that the problem remains  as to what criteria should be used, within
this fixed ptocedure,  to determine the timing and ways and means of opening
them up.
One possible objective criterion is the degree in which the "public" foteign loan
conforms to the general objectives of economic integtation. But in practice  this
degree of conformity cannot itself be assessed  except in the light of the aims of
an economic policy defined in a Community context. In  other words, the
possibility of referring to an objective criterion depends on how fat such a policy
has been elaborated. The actual criteria are bound to vary in step with the
t4rI'ormulation  of policy: during the transition period, during which the elements
rnaking-it possible,  at Community  level, to assess the advisability  of issuing public
loans_abroad-are gradually taking shape, a pragmatic approach to the prirblem
rvould seem the only valid one.
all.  Nevertheless,  some of the conditions and procedures  governing access to the
Iiuropean capital market by central and local government can be adjusted now.
Ilarmonization of the benefits  and privileges accorded public securities  seems to be
an essential condition. A first step would be to establish joint agreement  on the
special advantages,linked with issues of public loans on the market of a partner
country; this would prevent rival borrowers from outbidding  each other bn the
roarket. There is also a case for harmonizing the privileges linked vrith the issue
cf public securities  on domestic markets. In this ihe polnt would be to prevent
dlifierences in the nature and degree of privileges  frorn distorting  the distribution
c,f securities and to prevent any given member counffy from using these advantages
to place a proportion of its issues v'ith investors resident in the partner countriis,
though rvithout actually having direct recourse to the capital markets of those
countries.
f'his trvofold harmonization 
- 
which itself should eventually bring into line the
t3rms governing issues of public loans on the domestic market and on foreign
matkets 
- 
rvould thus help to establish  rules to be followed by the public
borrovrers of one member .onntry in calling on private savings in oiher member
c'luntries within an intesrated market.
Conclusions
32. The Group considers that the adjustment of the conditions on which the
qublic authorities  and enterprises  ate financed should make it possible to contain
the overall pressure of public and private borrowers on the various markets within
limits and forms compatible  with the development of their financial relations.
Some of the amangements needed to give cenffal and local government direct
access to the European capital market should be made at the same time. The
following measures might make a useful contribution to the attainment of
these aims:
1) Financing  a bigger proportion  of the investment of the administrative  authorities
fiom their own saving;
2.) Reconsideration  of the special treatment given to loans issued by these
authorities;
3,t Greater flexibility in programmes of public investment in the broader sense,
which would either defer certain projects if financing  them might unbalance the
securities  market, or encourage them if the economic  situation permitted;
4lt Granting local authorities wider tax autonomy;
5) Centtalizing local authority borrowing by means of 4 specialized institution that
would refinance itself on the market; this could be done solely in times of strain
or alternatively  could be a permanent arrangement;
1426) Fixing the charges of public service enterprises in a way that enables them at
least to cover operating expenses and renewal of plant and-equipment;
7) Contributions of government capital 
- 
to be financed by taxation 
- 
1yhs1s
the public enterprise cannot provide a normal margin of net self-financing;
8) Diversifying the securities ofiered by public enterprises, which rvould enable
them.- especially those competing with private enterprise 
- 
16 h6ys recourse
to risk capital;
9) Reducing discrimination  between bond issues of public concerns  and those of the
private sector;
10) Strictly defining the special benefits admissible  for public loans floated on the
market of another member country and harmonizing  the terms of issue of public
stock on the domestic  markets.
wld4PART THREE
$TIDENING CREDIT CHANNELS
One of the outstanding  features of the structure of the capital markets in the
Community countries is the importance of medium-term  and long-term credit as
a source of investment finance.
This suggests that thete can be no real European  capital market until the institutions
and channels  supplying such an important  part of the finance for economic expansion
in the Community  countries are closely interlinked.
There are, however, a number of obstacles to sufmount.
Credit techniques and, in particular,  the institutions using them have in many
cases difiering objectives. The contribution  of the public institutions,  which, in
Belgium, France and Italy, work alongside the banking system in providing medium-
and long-term finance, raises particularly  delicate institutional problems,  because
their main concern is with domestic operations.
Moreover, if the problems are looked at from the angle of the sectors benefiting
from medium- and long-term  credit assistance, namely industrial  and agricultural
equipment,  building and the capital expenditure of local authorities, it soon becomes
appafent  that in several of the countries housing and urban and rural infrastructure
still remain problems for the solution of which the authorities bear the principal
responsibility.
In addition to these institutional or political obstacles there are dificulties peculiar
to international financial operations 
- 
the exchange risk and the question of the
security ofiered to lenders.
Two studies have been made: the first concerns the development of indusffial
investment credit; the second deals with credit for housins and local authorities'
capital expenditure.
vs lH6CHAPTER 7
MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM CREDIT TO INDUSTRY
1.  The medium-  and long-term investment credits obtained by European  industrial
enterprises from banks, specialized  institutions or other financial institutions are
among their most important sources of external finance. In all the member
countries, industry's  need for external finance at medium and long term has grown
in recent years, mainly because profit margins 
- 
and therefore the scope for self-
financing 
- 
have shrunk and because the rather excessive  short-term indebtedness
incuned over several years of rapid expansion  has required  consolidation.
i) The first section of this chapter describes the main features of the distribution
of medium- 
_ and long-term credit and discusses official influence on the granting
of such credit.
ii) The second section describes the techniques likely to ensure the development
of international credit and the interpenetration  of banking networks.
iii) The third and final section deals with the field in which the advantaees of a
European capital market may well become most rapidly obvious: the utiliz'ation  of
refinancing techniques.
I. The distribution of medium- and long-term credit
2. Medium- and long-term credit to industry is provided not only by the banks.
Specialized institutions  (very often public or semi-public),  savings banks or their
central institutions,  insurance companies, and the central government  (where it
intervenes direcdy) also make their contribution.
It is not part of the purpose of this report to analyse in detail the medium- and
long-term credit markets in the various member countries. Certain particularly
significant factors should, however, be pointed out.
A. THE FINANCIAL INSTITUT/ONS
A) T}]E BANKING  SYSTEM
3.  In order to meet the increased demand for business finance. the banks have
endeavoured  to step up their medium-term lending as far as the often restrictive
regulations would allow them.
In I.uxembourg, virtually all the external finance obtained by indusuial enterprises
in the fotm of medium- and long-term credit seems to be provided  by the banks.
147flhe medium- and long-term credit supplied to industry by banks plopef accounts
for a high pfoportion of the total (about a third, in fact) in Germany,-  France
and the 
"Nett.riunds. In France, the bulk of the assistance granted is in the form
of rediscountable  medium-term credit.
lltalian and Belgian banks commit funds at medium or long term on a relatively
limited scale. In ltaly, for example, banks may not engage directly in medium-
term lending, but indirectly they help to finance investment by regularly  renewing
short-term ciedit and by contdbuting to the funds of the specialized  institutions
through the purchase of their bonds and by channelling to- them -deposits qadg !V
the p"ublic. in Belgium, the banks began opetating in this field only telatively
recently.
B) THE SPECIALIZED INSTITUTIONS
(.  The work o{ institutions specializing in medium- and long-term credit to
industry has expanded, particulatly in Italy and Belgium, but also in France. In
Jttaly, ihis trend has been strengthened  by the establishment, alongside  _th-e more
geniral institutions, of special institutions for the furtherance of regional develop-
inent. In Belgium,  on the other hand, the system of specialized institutions remains
|eavily concentrated,  with a single institution answering for about _three- quarters
of the total credit. In France, various specialized institutions extend medium- and
long-term  credit direct to enterprises, particularly  the nationalized  undertakings,
from their own funds, from resources  placed at their disposal by the central
{jovefnment  (the Economic  and Social Development  Fund) and from borrowed
]unds: thev also act as centres for the mobilization of medium-term  bank credit.
lfhe impoitance of the specialized institutions declined,_ in relative tetms, in
Germany and the Nethedinds, once the ttaditional credit establishments were
again able to muster enough funds for the purpose; but the p"Uli"- or semi-
pibti. financial institutions iontinued to play a major role in-Italy,.Belgjum  and
jlrun." 
- 
a role stfengthened  by the f.act that they serve as the main, if not the
<rnly, intermediary for"the disribution of public capital or ilvestment subsidies
ptouid.d by the 
-central 
government. This was the case in Belgium until 1959
:rnd is still largely the case in Italy and France.
C) THE SAVINGS BANKS, INSURANCE COMPANIES AND PRO\/IDENT
]:NSTITUTIONS
:i.  Throughout the Community, the bulk of the funds of these institutions is
directed to the financing of local authorities'  capital expenditure and housing,
r;ince these requirements  have official priority. Another teason lbr this investment
partern is thai laws and regulations originally iltended to ptotect the saver limit
i:he extent to which the resources  of institutional investors can be lent to industry.
lfhere are, however, notable exceptions  to this general rule: thus, in Germany the
savings banks, and particulady their central institutions,  are the most important
sources of medium- and long-term finance fot small business.
lln other member  countries too there seem now to be signs of a, tendency  towards
IJreater participation by savings banks in industrial  financing.
1486.  The life-assurance companies and pension funds are the main sources of
industrial  investment finance in the Netherlands,  their loans against borrowers'
notes (onderhandse  leningen) accounting for about half the total credit provided.
In Germany, life-assurance companies provide about a quarter of industrial equip-
rnent loans, using a technique with similar flexibility  (Schuldscbeindarleben).
It may also be noted that the contribution  of these institutions to the financing
of business enterprise is not confined to direct lending, since they also provide
industry with capital by purchasing securities.
B. THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES
7. The authorities help to finance industry either by direct lending or by making
credit available  indirectly through specific institutions. Privileged conditions in
the form of tax benefits, guarantees, or priority access to the capital market are
often granted to such institutions by the authorities. In almost all the Member
States the interest-rate rebates allowed for certain classes of borrower  have a strong
impact on industrial financing.
If some of the privileges enjoyed by public or semi-public specialized institutions
in the collection  of their funds were withdrawn, the conditions  of access to the
market by the various financial institutions would naturally become better aligned.
The Group is, however,  conscious of the needs which prompted the creation of
institutions for the specific  purpose of aiding investment  in certain economically
retarded areas or in industries  needing special help. The harmonization  of these
measures is covered by the Treaty clauses on state aids, which lie outside the
framework of this report.
As suggested in Chapter 5, any system that makes the provision of aid in the form
of interest rebates solely dependent on the use of a specific institution or type
of institution should be avoided. In view of the scale of these rebates in all the
member countries, action to remove this direct link would appear to be an essential
condition  for the establishment  of efiective competition  between credit institutions
on a European  market.
Lastly, the Group has noted that medium- and long-term credit, is supplied to
induitry in conditions di{fering widely from country to countfy in the Community:
however, there is a tendency for credit institutions to specialize less, and this
will make it easier for them io take their place in a system of international  capital
movements.  This trend remains,  however, largely dependent  on the way in which
official intervention measures  in this field are adiusted.
II. International bank lending and the interpenetration
of banking systems
8. The main aim of broadening the medium- and long-term credit supply is to
ofier Community  enterprises  better opportunities  of obtaining  credit for purchases
of plant and equipment on comparable terms and at the same time give the various
financial institutions  equal chances of expanding.
r49In this context the Group studied two particular aspects of the problem:
i) The development of direct international credit;
ii) The interpenettation of banking systems by establishment of branches or
subsidiaries in the other member countries, by development  of telations with
correspondents and by other forms of co-operation.
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIRECT INTERN,ATIONAL,  CREDIT
9. International  credit operations  are current practice in the short-term field,
especially on the Euto-currency markets. There are also examples in the medium-
term credit sphere, where the last two years in particulat  have seen a growing
number of German  firms borrowing  direct from foreign banks.
However, apart from credit drawn to finance commercial  transactions,  frnancial
operations  between banks and enterprises  located in diflerent countries  have
remained  relatively few in numbet.
The obstacles to be overcome and the solutions which the Group recommends
for the development of this type of lending are examined below.
,4) PROBLEMS CONNECTED NTITH EXCHANGE  CONTROL AND RESTRICTIONS
DERIVING FROM LA\TS. REGULATIONS. CHARTERS.  MEMORANDA  OF
ASSOCIATION,  ETC.
L0, \Tithout wishing to revert here to the points made in Chapter 3 on exchange-
conffol restrictions,  the Group does feel that the maintenance  of such tesffictions
in certain countries  is liable to prevent resident enterprises from obtaining  access to
the most profitable sources of finance and thus to put them at a disadvantage  in
international competition.
The removal of these restrictions  must therefote  be contemplated. To avoid any
risk that capital movements occasioned  by such action might upset market balance,
the objective  should be approached by stages through progressive raising. of the
limits of operations subject to authorization, as provided for in the draft third
directive, now under discussion, for the implementation of Article 67 oI the Treaty.
1"1. Major obstacles to the extension of the cross-frontier  operations of financial
institutions may also derive from laws or regulations other than exchange control,
or even from the charters or memoranda of association governing these institutions.
This problem particularly  afiects the credit ransactions o{ the public or -s9q1'
publiC institutions specializing in medium-and  long-term cedit, and it seems likely
io limit their role in international capital movements to refinancing  operations.
On the other hand, there is little evidence that obstacles of this nature generally
hamper  operations abroad by the banking institutions.
12. The "leasing" technique recently introduced into Europe and developing
rapidly in some of its counries  allows of opetations analogousi to the granting  of
150international credit: equipment  can be purchased  and hired out to an enterprise
domiciled in a foreign country. This type of indirect credit is free from some of
the problems of direct international lending at medium and long term, since it
takes the form of eithet an export of equipment or a purchase of equipment abroad,
followed by the payment of rentals constituting "current transactions". The
obstacles to the development of this technique lie mainly in the limited resources
of the "leasing" establishments,  in legal problems raised by the maintenance  of
the ownership rights of these enterprises  to the equipment leased, in difierences  in
fiscal legislation 
-and, 
where it  arises, in the exchange  risk connected with the
transfer of rentals.
B) PROBLEMS  CAUSED BY DIFFERENCES  OF FINANCIAL  STRUCTURE
13. It is not only with specialized institutions  that problems may arise because
of the diverse financial structure which has developed over the years; difierent
banking systems are to be found also in the competitive sector. Here, alongside
systemJ based on the principle of complete  separation of short-term credit, medium-
and long-term credit,- and the acquisition  of participations (as in Italy), we find
others in which the all-purpose  bank is still the most widespread  (Germany,
Netherlands,Luxembourg),andothersagaininwhichbanquesd,affaires
similar to all-purpose banks - 
operate alongside the commercial banks (France).
14. The Group is aware of the problems which may arise from these structural
difierences.  None the less, the pfesent  tendency in certain Community countries
tovrards less specialization  of banks should add to the variety and flexibility of the
methods of collecting savings and extend the range of services. oflered to customers'
This trend may wel-i make a substantial conri6ution  to_ reducing the dangets of
distortion of competition in this sector at European level.
Hitherto discussion of the problems of specialization  of banking institutions seems
to have concenttated almost exclusively on internal aspects. In the Group's view
there is now a case for considering  the matter from the viewpoint of the integration
of capital markets and for devising  arrangements  that will allow banks to exist
side by side even though their institutional organization  and operating  -rules _still
difier ippreciably. Theie problems will be discussed _in Chapter 12, which deals
with diiparities in the functioning and supervision  of financial institutions.
C) PROBLEMS  RESULTING  FRON{ THE DIVERSITY OF SYSTEMS IN FORCE AS
REGARDS SECURITY  AND GUARANTEE REQUIREMENTS
15. For many years credit was granted mainly on the strength of the security
ofiered;  and though nowadays lenders attach more importance  to considerations
of profitability than they used to, the question of the guarantees and security put
up still remains an impoftant  factot.
The Group has approached this problem with a view to examining what difficulties
the international application of techniques currently used at domestic level may
occasion  and which, it  any, among the current domestic practices are likely to
facilitate international  transactions.
151llhe guarantee of a credit establishment  belonging to another Member  State is the
rnost commonly used form of guarantee in international credit operations. There
are virtually no obstacles,  apaft from a few exchange-control  restrictions, to the
p;iving o{ a guarantee on behalf of a non-resident; this form of guarantee therefore
often takes the place of other types of guarantee or security the use of which in
international credit operations might raise dificulties.  This procedure  makes it
prossible for a guarantee  such as a mortgage - 
which the borrower  can provide
'rqithout dificulty to the establishment backing him, but coulcl not easily place
clirectly at the disposal of his creditor - 
to be "transmittecl" to the foteign
bank. The interposition of the guarantee  also facilitates solution of the problem
of mobilization.
Other guarantee techniques,  such as, for instance, an assignment of future claims
or other restrictions on a debtor's freedom of action (t), or the working capita,
a.rrangements  through which a parent company's undertaking to support its sub-
sidiary financially is suftcient guarantee  to the lender that the subsidiary can at
a.ny moment  discharge  its obligations, would seem particularll' vrs11 adapted  to
international  credit operations. Nevertheless,  the provision of such guarantees by
the parent company is sometimes  hampered  by tax obstacles or by the rules on
the presentation  of the company's  accounts.
In addition to the problem of their cost - 
which is often high - 
the granting of
these guarantees  is subject, in certain Member States, to an exchange-control permit
ryhich restricts their use. However, it  seems likely that these restrictions will
dLisappeat as exchange-control  regulations  concerning  the granting of credit are
relaxed.
L6. In all the Member States, real-estate  charges play an important tole as security
f,or long-term credit, despite the problems which may arise in enforcing a claim
li'here the buildings or land mortgaged form part of an industtial complex that
is dificult to split up.
()erman experience  suggests a technique which may be of particular  interest in
international credit operations.  In this counry the mortgage  has largely  been
supplanted  by the land charge (Grundschuld)  for industrial financing and for the
financing of housebuilding.
T'his procedure has proved simpler than that of mortgage regisuation,  which is often
both lengthy and costly. The land charge is an abstract lien on real estate, which
arises or is extinguished independently  of the claim it  secures.  $7here a land-
charge  deed is issued, it may be assigned without necessitating any new enry
irr the land register (Grundbuch). In the same way, once the loan has been repaid,
dhe deed is again transferred to the owner of the asset and is available to secure a
frurther credit. The land charge is divisible. It also lends itself to the securing  of
credit operations on cufrent account.
(l) Many variations  have been used, such as charter contracts for shipping companies and the
technique - 
as used when the two international loans were floated by the Portuguese company
SACOR - 
under which a company  may issue new loans only on the authorization  of a trustee.
The latter technique is often used by American  companies.
1!;2As the land charge technique  has proved so useful in Germany and elsewhere
(Switzerland, Austria), the Group {eels that the feasibility of introducing a
comparable form of security in all the member countries should be studied. The
exisience of such an insmument, which is particularly flexible in international
financial operations, rvould be an additional factor helping to fuce the lo4embcr
States' capital markets.
A closely related question is that of denominating  mortgages _in currencies other
than thai of the co,rnuy in which the asset is situated. In Italy and Luxembourg
this can already be done; if  similar legislation were intoduced by the other
member countries, the conclusion of international lending transactions backed by
real-estate liens would become easier.
L7. Rights of lien on movable assets also play an important role, i!  particular
where rnedium-term  loans are granted for the purchase of equipment. The diversity
of the legal regulations  gov.rning the pledging of such assets,  particularly  q9 {eg-a1ds
the holding oithe sec.rrit_v and notificition of the publicr m.ay giye rise to difficulties
rvhen the pledged assets are utilized in a country in vrhich difierent legal auange-
ments obtain.
Four membef countries - 
France, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg - 
have given
preference  in this respect to arrangements  providing  absolute certainty as to the
interpretation of the law: except in special cases, a mere agreement- (e.g. between
a bank and its debtor) under which a right of security is recognized for the bank
though the chattel secured remains in the possession  of the debtor is not enough
to constitute a guarantee.
On the other hand, in Germany and in the Netherlands, the existing legal systems
are simpler to apply and closer to practical requirements. In tbese countries, case-
law has contributed to the develipment  of the Sicherungsilbeteignung, a -form
of guarantee  rvhich, in the field oi credit for industrial equipment,  has almost
*pfrlunt.d  the tradiiional lien (where the object pl4ged musi pass into the actual
poriesrion of the creditot or of a third person). However, experts in Germany
and the Netherlands regret the lack of ceriainty as to the interpretation of the law
in this connection.
The Group feels that both systems have their advantages  _and^disadvantages.  It
misht therefore be possible to combine the advantages of the German and Dutch
,yri.., i.e. its broad application, rvith the advantages  of the rules governing public
notification applied in the other member countries'
There is already a precedent for an arrangem€nt such as tbit - 
the Geneva
Convention of t'l 1"ne 1948 on the International Recognition of Rights in Airuaft,
which all the member  countties have signed'
D) PROBLEMS CONNECTED \ilITH POSSIBLE CO-ORDINATION OF " CENTRAL
RISK OFFICES "
18. "Central risk offices" have been set up in all the member countries  except
the Netherlands and Luxembourg to provide  lenders with information on the total
indebtedness of their customers.
153'Ihe technique is the same everywhere:  financial  establishments  undertake  to
provide the central bank with information on loans granted, while the central
banks provide  the financial establishments  concerned with information on the total
,Jebts of their customers. These "cenffal risk offices" confine their activities to the
r:lomestic sector; thus, for example, a French bank granting credit to an Italian
r:nterprise can ascertain only whether other French  banks have also extended  credit
rto it and will have no information on its total indebtedness in respect o{ outstand-
iLng credits.
'fo prevent excessive  accumulation of risks by enterprises  borrowing from several
banks in difierent countries, fuller exchange of information is nlcessary. The
(3roup recommends co-ordination of the various central risk ofices already existing
in the EEC; this vrould enable information to be exchanged when a firm borrowed
r:utside its home counffy. The simplest arrangement  would consist in requiring all
declarations  concerning a given enterprise to be collected at the cental bank of
the country in which it  has its headquarters. This cenrral bank would then
periodically  inform all the financial establishments  concerned, including  those in
the other Member States. In order to increase  the efiectiveness of the co-ordination
'within the Community, it is desirable  that central risk offices should be set up in
both of the member  iountries vrhere thev to not vet exist.
]]) PROBLEMS ARISING  FROM T}IE EXCHANGE  RISK
"19. The exchange risk involved in the granting of international credit is one of
the reasons most commonly adduced for the weak development of direct lending
across frontiers.
lfhe financial institutions which lend abroad at medium  and long term in practice
<1o so solely in _curr-enclls they already hold, so as to comply i'itt  the glnerally
accepted  principle of _balancing  resources and commitments  in any given crrrrency.
Consequently, it is dificult, in the case of credit operations,  to 
-devise 
suitabie
techniques for spreading the exchange risk between the borower and the lender,
zrs is often done for bonded loans. The borrowing enterprise must there{ore
,'1-te11l4er the exchange risk in its entirety, unless it can get a third party to intervene.
ilhird-party action of_this kind, enabling the authorities where-necLssary  to take
over the exchange  risk, could conceivably  be brought into more frequent use than
at the present time-. Though the authorities,  conscious of the increased monetary
_stability deriving from the interdependence of the economies, would probably
be reluctant to make anangements of this type, the idea need not be shelved
on that account.
r\s will be explained. in more detail in Chapter 13, the exchange risk is probably
not an insurmountable obstacle to industrial borrowing in foreign currencies.
F) PROBLEMS DERIVING FROM FISCAL LEGISLATION
tl).  The fiscal obstacles  to international  lending include double taxation of interest
on direct loans and on securities  used in international financial  relations  (bills of
exchange,  promissory notes, etc.). The latter factor, however, is of only marginal
154importance. Another obstacle is to be found in the duties and charges connected
wiih guarantees and the putting up of security.
\X/ith regard to the taxation of interest on direct loans, a double-taxation problem
arises similar to that described for interest on bonds in Chapter 14, where  ways
and means of avoiding this particular dificulty are suggested.  In France and
Belgium all interest paid to non-residents  is normally taxed, though certain
exceptions are made for loans granted by foreign credit institutions. In ltaly,
where tax on income from movable wealth is a schedular  tax, interest paid by an
Italian debtor is generally taxed twice, though there are numerous exceptions to
this rule. On the other hand, there are no double-taxation problems in Germany
or Luxembourg, countries which make a deduction at soufce for interest on bonds
only. In the Netherlands  there is no withholding tax on interest.
21 .  The duties and charges levied on the constitution of mortgages  are particu-
larly heavy in France and ltaly. In France, the taxe de publicitt loncidre is 0.67o
on registration  of a mortgage and the same percentage on entry of satisfaction of
the mortgage. In Italy, the imposta ipotecaria is charged only once, on registration,
but amounts to 2.57o. A number of credit institutions and co-operatives are
exempt from this tax in ltaly: these exceptions may be harmful .to competing
foreign establishments  and should therefore be modified under EEC harmonization
arfangements.
B. THE INTERPENETRATION OF B,ANKING SYSTEMS, AND OTHER
FORN4S OF CO-OPER,  TION
22. Most banks confine their foreign operations  largely to short-term lending
and participation in investment  syndicates. It would be quite possible for them
to move into medium- and long-term  credit operations by setting up subsidiaries
or branches and by strengthening  their co-operation  arrangements with foreign
banks. This is particulady the case with a good many deposit banks which are
hampered  in their counries of origin by limitations  on the granting of medium-
and 
-long-term 
credit and which are not familiar with the often complex, credit
machineiy in force abroad or are kept out of these channels by local regulations.
A) THE ESTABLISHMENT  OF SUBSIDIARIES  OR BRANCHES IN THE EEC
COUNTRIES
23. Foreign banks were maintaining subsidiaries or branches in the Common
Market countries long before the Treaty came into force; it v/as reasonable  to
expect that the creation of the Community would lead to an appreciable  increase
in the number of new establishments  of European banks in each of the partner
counffies. This does not seem to have been the case, however, although more
branches or subsidiaries  of American banks have been opened.
There are several reasons why banks in the EEC have set up few branches or
subsidiaries in othet Community  countries. There are, first of all, legal and
administrative  obstacles: to establish  agencies in certain member  countries, foreign
155t,anks have had to obtain official authorization and, in general, to comply with
certain conditions relating to the nationality  of the directors, the form of the
company, and its capital. Their operations  are sometimes subject to special controls
and restrictions  because they are partly or wholly foreign-owned  companies.
l\ directive designed to abolish restrictions on the establishment of, and supply
o,f services by, banks and certain other financial establishments is now being
examined by the EEC Council.  The aim is to abolish the disciminatory  conditions
ruling in this matter, both in the country of origin and in the host country, in so
far as they afiect residents of Member  States. Once this discdmination has been
removed, co-ordination of the at present fairly divergent conditions of establishment
and operation in the various member countries will be necessary,  with a view to
enabling equal establishment  opportunities  to be provided in all the member
countries.
24. It  is not certain, however, that the banks will take advantage of the
opportunities ofiered to them. There ate obstacles other than legal and admih-
istrative  ones to an increase in the number of branches and subsidiaries.
l'he very same reasons that explain the expansion of American banks in the
Community  are to some extent, by their absence, the teasons why European banks
have been backward in opening new establishments.
f'he establishment of American banks in Europe went hand in hand with the
establishment of European  subsidiaries by the major American industrial companies.
Itmerican firms, anxious to avoid seeing their trade handicapped  by the common
external tatiff, set about acquiring production  cenffes in the Community  countries.
Iiy contrast, the major industrial firms of the Six have not felt the same need to
s(3t up in the other member countries, since thev know that the obstacles to the
ntouelment of goods within the Community  will 
-disappear 
altogether before long.
T'hus, American banks have followed their customers,  whereas  there has been no
c,orresponding inducement to European banks to expand, industrial enterprises of
the Six having set up relatively few subsidiaries  in other member countries.  The
e:xistence  of a ready-made  clientele  may be considered a prerequisite for profitability;
dre deposit and lending business that can be worked up with small local customers
urill not by itself provide a firm enough base for establishment abroad.
It may also be noted that while the lending capacity of American  banks has in
the past exceeded  their scope for domestic investment, banks in Community
c,f,untries  have sometimes found difficulty in satisfying the demand for credit from
their domestic customers. It has been pointed out above that this factor may have
hampered the development  of direct intirnational cedit. It is probably less relevant
as an explanation of the paucity of new establishments,  since foteign branches  or
subsidiaries  generally receive only small sums from the parent company and ate
normally intended to operate with funds obtained locally. None the less, it  is
cr:rtain that when a bank's lending capacity is smetched  at home, it has little
inducement to make efiorts to extend its activities abroad, whatever their form.
Lnother point is that the interest rate difierentials  between the American  market
a:nd the Community  markets implied high profits for American  banks setting up
in the Community. Conversely, as the disparity in interest rates between one
156Community  country and another is less than it is between the Comrnunity  ar-id the
United  States, the incentive for European banks to set up in other member colrnffies
has not been as strong.
There are also difierences connected with the concenration  of the funds available to
European  banks and to American banks, and again these difierences  tend to favour
the latter. It is certain that the setting-up of a network of branch offices abroad
entails operating on a scale that has been teached by a good many American banks
but by few European banks so far.
Recent mefgers, notably in Belgium, France and the Netherlands,  have enabled
certain establishments to expand their lending business to a size commensurate
with the credit demand of thi big industrial firms which are their customers, while
at the same time continuing  to respect the principle of risk-spreading.
Progress  made by the Community may in the future lead to mefgers of banks
in Jne member country with banks in another, but flexible forms of co-operation
seem to be best suited to the present situation.
A last reason why Community banks have set up relatively _fevr branches  abroad
is their hesitation to adopt direct methods of opirating on foreign markets, with
all the uncertainties this entails, in preference  to the well-tried method of transact-
ing business through foreign correspondents.
It should, however, be noted that the expansion  of the business being cajried-out
by existing branches and competition  from American banks may w4l induce
European  6anks to step up their activities in other member countries. The large
nrr*6"r of representativeJ' ofices set up in the various member countties  is
evidence of thi anxiety of the banks to expand operations in these countries.
B) CO.OPERATION  BET!{/EEN BANKS
2j.  There has long been some degree of systematic co-operation between banks
in a number of currint, and even alew medium- and long-term tfansactions.  This
arrangement  has the advantage of enabling a bank to benefit from its corfespond-
ent's network of offices and'experience,  and of ensuring any necessary-  spreading
of risks. It is also a method o{ timpering the disadvantages  arising from lack of full
information as to the foreign debtor's  creditworthiness.
Since the entfy into force of the Treaty of Rome,. the exchange of information on
customers  and other aspects of inter-bank  liaison have been the subject of general
agreements  the scope of which is dificult to ascertain exactly,- but which do sug.gest
tfrat habits of particularly close co-operation  have developed  between the establish-
ments subscribing to thim, for thJ various forms of co-operation almost always
extend beyond the framework of the EEC,
i) In certain cases, gfoups of banks have combined to set up companies to grant
investment credit.
ii) Syndicate  credit is a practice that makes possible a spread of risks in major
financing operations.
157iii) Financial establishments  have sometimes grouped to set up clubs (the Amstel
Club, for example) through which the international distribution of their services
can be improved; this form of co-operation often makes it possible to replace a
credit granted to an exporter by one granted directly to a purchaser by an
establishment  in his own country. There is a similar type of co-operation  between
leasing companies.
i'r) Joint research bureaux  have been set up by financial institutions of several
member countries; not only banks but also insurance companies and other establish-
ments afe concerned.
v) Arrangements  have been made for regular contact between administrative  per-
s,rnnel of some of the big institutions.
vi) Co-operation between bank boards has at times been put on a more direct
footing by reciprocal acquisition  of small participations.  Lastly, there are many
crxses of participation in jointly owned banking subsidiaries,  in holding companies
and in companies  managing open-end  investment  funds.
c:oNcrusroNs
26. Lending at medium and long term to other member countries, it seems, is
a _problem to be viewed in the light of the complicated inter$ank  relationships
u'hich the banks. hesitate to jeopardize by competing  more keenly among them-
_selves. Moreover, from the point of view of profitability, it often happJns that
business in a given country is not sufficiently developed to justify the establishment
o,[ a subsidiary  or branch, or that the handling of tiansactions through correspond-
ents is so smooth and reliable that there is little point in abandoning them in favour
o.[ an agency which may or may not succeed.
Nlone the less, the Group feels that:
1) The dismantling of currency restrictions barring domestic  enterprises from access
to the most advantageous  sources of finance should be set in motion by gradually
raising the limits of operations allowed.
2) Leasing already oflers considerable  scope for indirect granting of credit across
Irontlers.
3) The guarantee of a credit institution in the borrower's country allows readier
access to external sources of finance; it is therefore desirable that these guarantees
should be easier to obtain. The same recommendation needs to be made for
guarantees  furnished by parent companies to establishments  financing their foreign
srrbsidiaries.
4) The introduction of a standard  real-estate lien in all the Member  States would
crrntribute to the integration  of the capital markets. A general suggestion here is
a flexible technique  comparable to that of the German land charge.
5) The extension and co-ordination at European level of the "central risk offices"
system would facilitate the exchange of information  on enterprises using several
c:rpital markets.
15;86) Double taxation of interest on direct loans to foreign countries must be
completely eliminated  where it still exists. There is also a case for harmonization
of mortgage taxes.
7) The removal of resrictions  on the establishment of, and supply of services  by,
foreign banks and certain other financial establishments should be followed up
by co-ordination of the regulations on banking, thereby ensuring that banks have
real opportunities and incentive  to set up in any membet country.
III.  Development  of refinancing techniques on the European  market
27. The refinement of refinancing  techniques may well prove less of a hurdle
than the solution of the problems dealt vrith in the preceding  section.
fn response  to the growth in domestic  demand for medium- and long-term finance,
credit institutions have made efiorts to attract resources other than sight or short-
term deposits. Among the methods chosen to intensify the inflow of longer-
term funds are the opening of savings and deposit accounts  and the issue of medium-
term deposit certificates. In general there has also been more "transformation"
of funds, although it is often dificult to assess how far this has gone.
The collection of these funds has so far been mainly confined to individual countries.
The expansion  of the activities of medium- and long-term  credit institutions on a
European market presupposes that these establishments  vdll have access to new
sources of finance in member countries other than their own:
i) By the development of traditional techniques,  i.e. the issuing of bond loans for
public subsciption or private placing;
ii) By the employment of new techniques  such as "European refinancing  consortia"
or by enabling medium-term instruments of indebtedness  to be mobilized abroad.
A. T RADIT ION AL T ECHN IQUES
28. The bond is an instrument particularly well suited to dissemination abroad.
lWider European markets working more smoothly would enable  financial  institutions
to make more use of this type of refinancing.  The problems of the integration  and
expansion of bond markets are dealt with more fully in Chapter 9 and will
therefore be discussed here only in so far as the markets help the refinancing
operations of the medium- and long-term  credit institutions.
The technique of bond flotations abroad has been used by certain ltalian govern-
mental institutions and holding companies,  notably the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno,
IMI and IRI, but the main proponents of this technique have been the ECSC
High Authority and the Eutopean fnvestment Bank, which culled neatly
9215 million from the member  countries' capital markets from 1961 to 1965. The,credits financed by this technique are nowadays  one of the most important  ways
,of transferring  long-term capital between member countries.
'Ihis refinancing technique has also been used by financial  institutions of non-member
countries  on the capital markets of the Community  and by establishments  domiciled
:in the Community  6n the New York, London and Zurich markets  and, more recently,
,cn the Euro-bond  issue market.
.29. In addition to the issuing of loans abroad, the specialized financial institutions
also obtain capital from foreign markets when non-resident investors  subscribe  to
their domestic  issues. Such investments could well be considerably  encouraged by
the quotation on stock exchanges in other member countries  of domestic  loans issued
by the main institutions specializing in investment credit, which often enjoy special
prestige among international  customers because of their semipublic status.
iDevelopment of the facilities open to financial institutions for refinance  from
i.nstitutional investors in other member countries is a further point to bear in mind.
'fhis form of refinancing has already been employed by the ECSC, the European
-[nvestment  Bank, the Belgian Soci6t6 Nationale de Crddit i  I'Industrie and the
,[stituto Mobiliare ltaliano; the simplicity  and the flexibility of this arrangement
:nake it a natutal instrument  for approaching  a market. Private placing of bonds
j.n this way is a frequent  method of raising funds on the markets of certain non-
member countries where institutional investors are prominent and is acquiring
growing importance even on markets  such as the German and Dutch. Recourse
ro this instrument  is by no means limited to the refinancing of credit institutions,
siince industrial  borrowers are active participants in these markets. There have also
been more and more private placings on the Euto-bond  market.
]]. NEIT MACHINERY  FOR MEDIUM.TERM  REFINANC/NG
-J0. The issue of long-term loans is regarded by the banks as lying outside their
traditional activities,  mainly because  the cost of such long-term  borrowing would
be too high compared with that of the othet ways in which banks can attract
s;avings. There might also be a conflict between the placing of their own loans
and their participation  in syindicates for placing other loans.
IJowevet,  since the inadequacy of their "stable" resources is the main factor
preventing them from expanding their medium-  and long-term lending, it is probable
that the banks would show interest in new methods of refinancing.
llhe Group has considered certain new types of machinery  which might meet these
requitements.
,21) EUROPEAN BANK CONSORTIA
:11. The establishment  of European  bank consortia might ptovide a useful source
c,f refinance. Their aim would be to issue securities with spread maturities  and on
terms adapted to the conditions ding on the various matkets. The consottium
160would have the advantage of knowing the needs and capacity of a diversified
clientele embracing  several mafkets. Under the arrangement contemplated,  the
consortium would issue securities  to a given amount, and with a currency of, say,
eight to ten years, on an international mafket or on each of the markets of the
member couniries, and apply the proceeds to industrial loans for a coresponding
period backed by adequate guarantees.
The placing of this paper direct with institutional investors would obviate the need
for a publii issue; at ihe same time the participant b-anks would have to maintain
an active secondary market to ensure a high degree of liquidity for the investment.
Two choices would then have to be made: the nature of the collective  guarantee
oflered by the consortium  to the subscriber, and the cufrency in which the con-
sortium vrould opefate.
32. With regard to the guafantee,  a useful arrangement_ might be for the banks
to form u .oirpuny, witli low paid-up capital and a _relatively  large amount o{
subscribed but not paid-up capital, this part being on call to_ cover the consortium's
commitmentr rhonld a bbrrivet default. It iJ obvious that this capital would
constitute the maximum limit of the loans which the consortium could conffact on
the market.
Another affangement  would be for the banks to use a technique aheady employed
in France for ;grouped loans", which consists in setting aside a specilc piopoltion
(for example,t6Toiof"  the proceeds  of the issues to form a guarantee fund invested
in gilt-edged securities.
i3.  \With regard ro the choice of the currency in which the securities  would be
issued and th6 loans made, it would be too much to ask the banks participaling
in the consortium to assume the exchange risk, given the small margins on which
thev would be working.  Consequently,  the currency in which the securities would
be issued and the loani granted should be the same.
Initiallv. transactions could be in dollars, to which the banks and enterprises are
;1;;d;  u..,lrtorn.d on the Euro-dollar  and Euro-issues markets. Subseqrrently,
"O.turio"t 
carried out in a specific culrency of the Six (as l-s sometimes  the case
already) or in units of account could become_general.. The.choice of the currency
in whiih the consortium would operate could also be guided by considerations
arising from the situation of prospective subscribers or bofrowers.
B) THE MOBILIZATION  OF MEDIUM-TERi{ SECURITIES  OUTSIDE THE ISSUING
COUNTRY
34. The Group has also considered  the establishment_of a Eur_opean market for
refinancing of iecurities. This could be done _by facilitating_ the acquisition.by
financial institutions of paper representing  medium-term  credit granted in other
member countries. One way of lovering the exchange risk, the main obstacle  to
the use of this technique, could be through an ad boc body financed  by premium
payments,  on much the same lines as arrangements  already used for export credit
guafantees.
L6lEndorsement  of these securities  by some institution - 
the European Investment
Bank, perhaps, or the ad hoc body mentioned  above - 
would also facilitate  the
mobilization of paper; and the endorsement could be made conditional on the
"European interest" of the scheme financed.
The circulation  of these European secutities  would make possible an alignment of
European financial institutions and the gradual development  of techniques  and
experience  which would be very valuable for the functioning  of an integtated
market.
Mobilization would have the advantage of providing a more flexible procedure than
recourse to a loan issue and of linking the financial operation to a specific
investment.
However, this system, based on French and Belgian experience,  would be of less
value to countries with all-purpose banks which are not in the habit of relying
on mobilization  of their medium- and long-term loans. In Germany, for example,
the practice is to grant credits in current account (Buchkredite)  which, not being
represented by a security, are not mobilizable. It  would not, hov/ever,  be
impossible to find an instrument lending itself to mobilization: the Scbuld-
scdeindarlehen in Getmany or the onderhandse  leningen in the Netherlands  are
in fact loans against promissory  notes already negotiable within these countries,
and they could serve as mobilizable  securities under the arrangements  suggested.
In the Netherlands there is indeed an organized market for these securities. In
other Community  countries, notably Belgium, private issues are common practice,
but the securities so placed are not normally mobilizable until maturity, unless
otherwise  agreed by the parties concerned.
As for costs, it is likely that the charging of a commission  to covet the exchange
risk and a guarantee commission  would make this type of mobilization telatively
costly in comparison  with the other means of financing open to banks. None the
less, this arrangement  could widen the range of their activities.
CONCLUSIONS
35. All the refinancing techniques  that could be implemented at European level
would in fact be an extension  of practices  already currently  used - 
mainly within
individual  countries.
1) With regard to refinancing  by the issue of bonds abroad, the Group has set out
in Chapters 9 and L3 recommendations  relating to the problems posed by present
restrictions on these issues and by the exchange risk.
2) The purchase by non-residents of securities issued within a given country by
financial institutions specializing  in investment  credit should be encouraged,  espe-
cially by the quotation of loans issued by these institutions on the stock exchanges
of other member  countries.
3) The establishment  of new machinery, such as European bank consortia, or the
introduction of techniques for mobilizing medium-term securities outside the
country of issue, could be of appreciable  benefit to institutions looking for new
soufces of refinance.
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CREDIT FOR HOUSING AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES'
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE
Innoduction
L.  Credit for housing and credit for local authorities'  capital expenditure are
considered together in this chapter. These two items have several featutes in
common: they both involve immobilization of funds over relatively long periods,
they are both major components in the demand for long-term credit, and many
of the establishments and types of saving contributing to their financing are
the same.
In the six Member States considered as a whole, investment in residential consffuc-
tion alone was running at an annual average of nearly $13 800 million during the
period from L960 to 1.965 (Table 17). As a proportion of gross fixed investment,
it ranged fuom t7.77o (in the Netherlands)  to 3L7o (in Italy). In four of the
Member  States - 
France, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium - 
the percentage
reached its highest point in L965. The population  growth and the present situation
as regards the available housing and its quality suggest that demand for long-
term capital for residential consuuction will remain buoyant in coming years,
particularly  in these four countries.
No figures susceptible of country-to-country  comparison are available in respect
of investment by local authorities (schools, hospitals, water supply, etc.). Nor is
any information available on how the financing of this work is broken down into
budget resources and borrowing.
2.  The fact that credit for housing  and local authorities'  capital expenditure serves
to finance basic needs explains why such special political importance  attaches  to
decisions  on investment  and, more particularly, public programmes to encourage
investment in this field. In present  circumstances there is the risk that the balance
of investment  may be ,rps.i on this account, either by deferment of investment
schemes in other sectors of the economy or, where this does not arise, by over-
burdening of the capital market and consequent dislocation of the markets in
other Member  States. Should such a situation develop, the general principles set
out in Chapter 6 for the finance policies of administrative  authorities and public
enterprises  would appTy rnutatis  mutandis.
3.  The special problems connected  with government intervention in the field of
residentiaf construction  ate considered under Head I of this chapter. The Group
feels that official policy on residential construction should be dealt with in particular
detail, for the teihniques  employed often have a pronounced  impact on the capital
market.
Head II  of this chapter deals rvith problems arising from the development  of
European credit machinery for housing and local authorities' capital expenditure.
163llt looks at the obstacles which establishments  operating in this sector would have
to surmount and at ways and means of promoting wider scope {or their action.
lJead III deals more especially with the question of international refinancing  of
housing and local authority credit. Proposals are made whereby the interpenetration
of capital markets  can begin in this segment, where barriers separating the difierent
countries are still particularly high.
I. Official assistance in the financing of housing
zl. Beggg during the war, government  intervention  in the housing sector has
persisted longer than most of the other forms of wartime support of the economy.
l.t has enabled the share of expenditure allocated to housing to be kept down in
all household budgets in cetain counuies and in a proporrion of them in the
rest. At the same time, rent controls have generally necessitated oficial measures
to encourage construction  and thus ensure that the supply of housing was not
unduly afiected  thereby.
t\lthough public opinion in most member countries now accepts that the govern-
rnent has special responsibility in this field, it is sometimes dificult to discern any
clirect cause-and-efiect  link between the srength of oficial intervention  measures
and the number of dwellings constructed. In Italy, for example,  subsidies for
residential construction  have lagged behind those paid out in most of the other
Ivlember States, but construction in this country seems to have kept up fairly well
rvith that achieved elservhere in the Community.
:i.  In the other member countries, however,  where they have almost supplanted  the
rtsual market incentives, subsidies for residential  construction  have an appreciable
impact on investment and, given the scale o{ investment,  also a direct impact on
the links between  the capital markets of the Community. The Group has therefore
tried to ascertain which of these techniques could best be reconciled with the
c,perational requirements of a European capital market.
I{ousing subsidies are of three types:
i)  Subsidies to investment,  gtanted to persons wishing to have a house or flat built;
ii) Subsidies to the formation of saving - 
tied to certain fonns of saving from
urhich the housing sector benefits;
iiii) Subsidies to demand, in the form of lower rents (for rented housing) or financ-
ing charges (for owner-occupied  housing).
lr. JUBSIDIES TO INVESTMENT
6. For this form of subsidy, the situation in the EEC is one of remarkable
complexity  and diversity. The following  types of incentive may be noted:
i)  Credit at reduced interest rates (found in all the member  countries);
164ii)  Outright capital grants (Netherlands, Belgium);
iii)  Premiums granted for specific periods, including interest rebates (Germany,
France);
iv) Exemption  from fegistration  fees on conveyancing (mainly Germany and Italy)
or on mortgages (France);
v)  Exemption from or temporafy reductions in land taxes (Germany and' more
particularly,  Italy);
vi) Authorization of higher annual depreciation allowances against income tax than
are normally  claimable (Germany);
vii) Guarantees giving housing  investors easier  access to credit (mainly Netherlands
and Belgium).
B. SUBSID/ES  TO THE FORMATION OF SAVING
Z.  In Germany, deposits with building societies (Bausparkassen) atttact premiums
or, at the option of the saver, tax reliefs_, whether he commissions the construction
oi'a dwelling  himself, or wirether he leaves his savings with the society for a
period of at least six years.
In France, on the other hand, this kind of deposit attracts  premiums only when
the saver actually commissions the construction of a dwelling.
C, SUBSIDIES TO DEMAND
8.  Subsidies of this kind are paid in Germany and in France. In Germany,
where they were introduced in 1923, they are on a substantial  scale.and are granted
both to tenants and to families in owner-occupied housing. The level of the
subsidies  depends mainly on social considerations:  normally the authorities pay
all that part of the rent or of the financing charges exceeding a certain percentage
of the family's income (t).
In France a "housing  allowance" is granted in the form of, a personal contribution
paid by the caisses 
-d'allocations 
lailllales to ocqrpiers of new or old houses or
hutr. th".. are certain stipulations  connected with the tent and the income of the
beneficiary.
(1) For example, the rent or financing  charge which a family of -four with a monthly  income
irt pM S00 i's ionsidered able to p"v ir OM 180, i.e. 20ok of the monthly  incgme;,a  highet
rent will normally be fully subsidiied,  but that part of the dwelling  area exceeding  80. square
metres  does not ultract a subsidy. If, on the other hand, a family with the same income is made
.rf of nine persons,  the "statutbry"  rent or financing  charge is.only LlVo of theit income, i.e',
in the present example,  DIVI 99, and the arca attracting  a subsidy is 130 square  me6es'
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:). The Group feels that it is not part of its task to assess the value and efiec-
tiveness- of the policies pursued in-,the various Member  States with regard to
tesidential  construction.  However,. there is a move back towards full oipartial
freedom  on the housing market,_and the Group wishes to emphasize the advantages
the progressive  restoration of liberty could brlng for the integration of the capi"tal
rnarkets. In any case, harmonization of the {orms of governinent  interventio^n  in
this sector would doubtless help to break down the walls separating the capital
rnatkets of the diflerent countiies. In addition, the existing relati6ns bet'i'een
the national property markets would be strengthened by allowins member  countries
to carry out building opetations or conclude properiy purchise transactions  in
the others.
1) A .free housing market woul{ help appreciably  towards integration of the
capital markets. Preference should therefoie be given to subsidils  ailocated  in
such a way that they are not likely to impede a rEturn to free conditions  on the
trousing market. Hence the Group takes 
-the 
view that it is better to subsidize
Clemand. This method helps towards the establishment o{ a free housing market
L'y disposing of the argument that people with small incomes  rvould not'be able
t,o aflord the high rents asked in a fiee market. It also has the advantage of being
an arrangement free from ambiguity, which is essential when, as in ail tf,e membei
countries, official policy is to reserve  subsidizing for certain  classes of the population.
L,ast, and mo-st-important,  this type of subsidy obviates  any distortion in the choice
of sources of finance.
I'he Groug is, however,  aware that the application of demand subsidies in preference
to other forms may 
_ entail revision of ienain aspects of housing poliiy in the
member counuies and that this revision cannot be put through quiclily.
2) \x/here the Member States make use of investment subsidies, the methods
employed  should at the same time stimulate saving, in order to prevent the
sr:bsriies  generating  artificial movements  of capital beiween the membir  countries.
Of the subsidies meeting this requirem.nt,  credit at reduced interest, backed by
crrrresponding  public saving, would appeat to be the most '(neutral". fn certain
ciircumstances  the auth-orities might also contemplate the appropriation of budget
resources to residential  construction  sponsored by the ..nitrl gou"rn-.nt or iy
the- communes-,  with the.resale of part of the ironr"r construited  ensuring thl
rr:placement of public saving by private saving.
3) In respect of zubsidies to saving for housing, the Group has already noted
? m^l-ot difierence  between the techggues used iri Germany I  whereby the saver
benefits from premiums or tax relief even when he does noi actually U"lta 
" 
f,o"t.
or flat - 
and those used in- France, where premiums are granted t"ly to ; r;;;;
actually constructing a new dwelling. The firit system is a lorm ,cf general s,rbsidy
ttr saving which may enable the housing sector io tap capital whicli the saver dii
n,ot intend for construction;  it therefori conflicts wiih the principle advocated  in
Chapter 5, i.e. that measures  designed to stimulate saving should L. n.,rtt"i. il.
second technique is one of subsidizing investment in a s'ector in which there is a
large volume of unsatisfied demand: t6e above objection is therefore not applicable.
7(;6II.  Extension of ctedit machinety for housing
and local authotities' capital expenditure
10. Here the Group confined its examination  to financial institutions-  operating
ln thir sectof: it deait 
"Littt.t 
with loans issued by the communes - 
these being
;i;;;Jl;-hupt"r  6 - 
nor with the granting by.individuals of mortgage  loans
for residential c|nstruction.  This last type of credit is of some importance m
France and in Belgium.
A. THE SPECIALIZED INSTITUT/ONS
,4) STRUCTURE  AND FUNCTIONS
11. The institutions specializing  in,credit{or  houling and.local authorities'  capital
."p.nditnr. have certain note'iorthy technical characteristics: their claims  are
;;il;liy  il.t .J tv mortgages or by ihe guarantee of a public corporation..,  Sr1,t:
,;ry-;i.r ot p.ouitions 
-in" these institutions' regulations  specify in detail what
transactions are permissible  and in what geographical areas they may opefate.
12. Apart from these general-  features, the specialized credit institutions difier
"otubly'in 
s6ucture anJ size from one member country to another.
In Germany, where the two tyqes of credit under consideration are closely linked,
th. rp..iflilred institution.  tt.^bigg.r than.anywhere  else:,almost all the private
ura p"Ufi. mortgage banks, the Slate banks is.taatsbanken)  and the central giro
inr,iiriionr (Gir:ozT"triiii'",fr", both types of credit. These establishments-, of
*hi.h th.r.'afe more than 60, collectea an annual average of -$1-400  million
;ir;;;;h ,h; i*,r. of bonds from t960 to 1965. About 607o of. this sum was
il;;;il  i.-r"ria."ii"1-construction  and about 207o to local authorities'  capital
expenditure, in the form of loans extending over 30-40 years'
In Italy credit {or housing is not -as closely telated to credit for local authorities'
.uoi.ufi"o.nditure.  Houiing credit is granted by special credit institutions and
6;;;;"" Sezioni Speciali of iertain major banks and savings banks. These depart-
nie;;;;.-Ji.lt  tl, the same legislation and are all in fact cellile mortgage banks'
From 1960 to L965 they contriEuted on average  more than $300 million a yeat to
the financing of residential  consuuction.
The most important  sources of credit for local authorities'  capital expenditure are the
ir.ur".y ani th. Ca5sa Depositi -e Prestiti; the sp.ecialized institutions  (Consorzio
ai Criitt" per le Opere Pibbtiche,  Sezioni Speciali, real-estate cedit institutions)
are only of secondarY imPortance.
In Belgium and in the Netherlands,  the establishments speci3lizing in lo.ans to
lo.ul uithorities are separate from ihose financing  housing. The former have a
io"n ir"airi.n in their'field (the Crtdit Cornmuial de Bel.gique and the Bank -;;;, -i;i;;t;niith" 
Cemeenten),  while the contribution of Belgian_and  Dutch
*ortgug. banks to the financing of housing, unlike that of their German and
Italian counterparts, is relatively unimportant.
167In France and Luxembourg,.the  flow of credit from the specialized credit institutions
for financing housing and local authorities' capital expenditure  has been modest
since the end of the wa-r, apart- from low-interest  credil granted in France,  mainly
from public funds, by the Cr1dit Foncier.
B) PROBLEMS CONNECTED  WITH LENDING ABROAD
13. In present circumstances, the extent to vrhich the specialized institutions  in
any member.country  help- in the financing of housing and-local authorities' capital
expenditure  in other member countties is bound to be negligible. These institutions
are not designed to -provide help of this kind abroad,  an-d in any case the granting
of- guarlntees and the assumption of an exchange risk (discussed in chafter 13J
raise additional problems.
.[n Germany,  the.procef:ds of mortgage bond sales can only be used for the financing
,cf credit secured by first_ mortgagei on property in Germany. The proceeds o?
"'communal  bonds" must be used to finance German public coiporations or credits
lguaranteed by sur,ch bodies; the 1963 revision of tte special- laws in this field
:inffoduced  a^single exception to .this rule by authorizing ihe specialized  establish-
:ments to refinance loans granted to the ECSC High Authoriiy by issuing com-
munal bonds.
lln France, the CrAdit Foncier is prevented by its statute from granting loans against
any security other than domestic.
J[n Italy, the scope of the specializfd credit establishments  in financing housing is
in any case confirred, under special laws, to the territory of the Repiblic. sJm.
of these establishments  are aitually confined in their activities to specific areas
rvithin Italy.
l.n Belgium, the mortg-age banks are free to invest only up to the amount of their
c:apital  and reserves; if their loans abroad v/ere to excied^this  amount. thev would
c:ncounter adminisrative  dificulties when issuing  bonds.
]n the Netherlands, there are no legislative restrictions  on the activity of mortgage
banks, but all those of any size are required by their articles to"confirre fi.-ir
operations  to mortgages on real estate situated in the Netherlands.
CONCLUSIONS
14. In view of the situation revealed by ttrq above remarks, the Group's
tecommendations for extension of the international lending operationi  of institutions
specializing  in -the !n-1ncing.  of housing  and lolal authoiities' capital expenditure
a:re bound to be of limited scope. Ii  is in fact largely by means of 'r.n"un..
machinery that these establishments  can be fitted into"a Euiopean  capital -u.k.t. E;efore. passing to- examination _of this problem under Head III,  however, th;
following points should be noted:
1681) The approximation or harmonization of the legel status of the real-estate
sureties rEquired in the Member States should be given priority. More flexible
and less buidensome  than the mortgage, the "land-charge  deed" technique  described
in the preceding  chapter is an instiument which might usefully be adapted to the
financing of building. And arrangements should be made so that mortgage  or-
land-cha"rge deed reglistrations can be expressed in currencies other than that of
the country of registration.
2) Not only should the specialized credit establishments have power to accept
sureties from other Member States, but there should also be a relaxation  of the
rules on how these establishments may employ their resources.  The first step
could be general  adoption of the Belgian laws, which leave them- completely free
in their i-nvesting, &en abroad, up to an amount equal to their capital and
free teserves.
3) It might help to protect saving and consequently the s_tability of the _capital
markets  iT certaiir rulei were applied to the operations  of establishments  specializing
in credit for housing and local-authorities'capital  expenditure. These rules should
not, however, hamler the establishment  of firms engaging in mortgagg  bank
business;  the Group therefore  approves  legislation  on -the patte-rl of the German
outline iu* on -oitgrg. banks,-which it prefers to the special laws common in
other countries.
B. T HE OT HER F lN AN CI AL /NST/TUTIONS:  S.AVINGS B.ANKS, BU I LDIN G
SOCIET IES, LIFE-ASSURANCE  CO MP AN IES
,4) SAVINGS  BANKS AND THEIR CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS
1j.  The butk of the credit for housing or local authorites'  capital expenditure
deriving from the "transformation"  of short- and medium-term funds- is provided,
in mosi of the member countries, by the savings  banks or their central institutions.
Those banks which also accept savings deposits generally place the resources  accruing
at the disposal of other sectofs of the economy'
In the Netherlands and in Belgium, the savings banks and their central institutions
give preference to the financing of residential consuuction.  In France,  where -the
oppoiite  was the case until recently,  the situation is _changing: funds matshalled
by-the savings banks and administered by their central institution, the Caisse  d-es
DAp6* et Consignations,  ate still used mainly to.finance capital expenditure  by
the communes, 6ut allocations to housing,  particulady publicly assisted housing,
are swelling rapidly. In Germany, Italy and Luxembourg, both types of credit have
an importint place in the transactioni of the savings banks and of their central
institutions. In addition, in all the Member States, the savings institutions
contribute indirectly to the financing of housing  and of local authorities' capital
expenditure by purchasing bonds issued for this purpose; Italy is the county in
which this form of investment plays the most important role.
169.I}) BUILDING SOCIETIES
1i,6. Building societies arc financial institutions receiving money from their
rnembers at interest  and lending money to them when they wish to build or buy
a; dwelling. So fat the only Community country in rvhich they occupy an important
trrosition is Germany, where they account for about a frfth o{ the financing of
residential consruction by the granting of loans or by withdrawals from the
savings accounts they administer. A particular point to note is that they grant
loans even on second mortgages; this enables them to supplement the credit
p;ranted by lenders on first mortgages, vrith whom they often co-operate.  Overall,
zl0 to 65%o of building costs are covered by building-society loans.
C) LIFE-ASSURANCE COMPANIES
17. In all the Member States save France, life-assurance companies are an
i:mportant source o{ funds for residential  construction  and capital expenditure  by
lccal authodties. In the Nethedands, Germany and Luxembourg,  they contribute
as much to residential  construction as to investment by communes, whereas in
Ilelgium and Italy they concentrate on the direct or indirect financing of con-
sffuction.
In the Netherlalds, they are, ahead of the savings banks and the mortgage  banks,
the main providers o{ mortgage loans. In Italy, they invest directly about half
c'f their money in flats or houses {or letting, which they either 
-purchase 
on
completion or have built for their own account.
C:ONCLUSIONS
18. In the main, the conclusions  and recommendations  on the extension of the
activities of the specialized institutions contained in section 14 apply to the
institutions considered above as well. However, the following points should
be added:
1) Although restrictions on lending abroad by savings banks were justified when
these banks v/ere set up, the question does now arise whether a rvider field of
action should not be opened to them; they could be allowed to carry out abroad
all the operations permitted to them at home up to, say, a modesi tyo of the
funds available to them. But in any case it  would be wrong ro expecr any
c,onsiderable flow of funds in the form of direct lending abroad by savings banks;
it is mainly by purchasing bonds that they can contribute to the refinancing  of
extetnal operations and thus come to play an appreciable role on a European
market.
2) In view of the importar,'t  role played in long-term financing by the central
irrstitutions of the savings banks and by the savings banks with a centtalized
structure 
- 
including certain large,savings institutions which, in size and otganiza-
tion, are quite distinct from the traditional type of local savings bank 
- 
and in view
a.[so of the prudent methods of management prescribed in iheir statutes, and the
1',70composition  of their supervisory  boards, the_Group fe_elsthat.most of the restrictions
imposed on their external transactions  could gradually be abolished.  They. alrgady
have been in Germany, where the regional Girozentralen and the Deutsche  Giro-
zentrale are virtually fr". to enter into tfansactions abroad, and in France,  vrhere
the Caisse des D6p6ts has broadly similar powers'
3) The Group has also given thought to the question of co-operation  between the
central institutions and agencies and to the scope for extending such co-operation:
financing  consoftia for investment schemes "of European  interest"  (motorways,
rivers aid canals, housing for foreign workers,  etc.), investment  oJ acquisition  of
bonds issued by'Europein  instituti"ons, exchange of information  between central
institutions uni -..b.t  banks on developments connected with the EEC capi
tal markets.
To pave the way for such organized  co-operation,.  q fit:l  step. might be the
.rtrblirh-"nt of hexible contacti. Experience gained in this initial_stage rvou.ld
show whether a more lasting basis foi co-operation could be established in the
form, for example, of a corimon financial organization.  Tj this were the case,
the EEC saving^banks could be given the right to invest with such an organization
a specified pro"portion of the funds deriving from their savings deposits.
4) \X/ith regard to life-assurance companies, the proposal put forward in Chapter 12
that they Jhould be given the power to invest_ abroad up .to a given percentage
oJ their"internal inveitments should also include the granting of mortgage loans
and loan, to the communes  and the acquisition or consffuction in other member
countries of flats or houses intended for letting.
III. Refinancing techniques on the Eutopean  market
A. CURRENT REFIN,ANCING  TECHNIQUES
,4) BONDS
19. The issue of bonds is the main source of funds for credit institutions
rp..i"liri"g in the financing  of housing or the capital expenditure of local authorities.
These instltutions are often not allowed to accept deposits.
In Germany, the institutions  operating on the mortgage. market issue "mortgage
b;rJt;;;;;..JUy  first mortgages andr'communal  bondi" issued to finance credits
t" p"tfi. .otpofations;  these Lo"nds, which are usually list:d on the stock exchanges,
g;.;;ily  huu. u .rrrr.n.y period of 3O ye_ars and can be for periods  as lolg as
5O or 6O years - 
th.r, e*...ding  t-h9 
" 
ah.eady relatively long duration of the
credits to iorporations. Both types" of bond are sold- through the same channels,
;J;hJp;i;r;h;*  that the lenderc regard them as having-much the same value'
Italy is the second member countfy in which refinance via the bond market plays
a splcial role; the specialized credit institutions  issue mortgage bonds rvhich account
fof about a fifth of the bonds issued on the Italian market.
171In Belgium, the institution  specializing in credit to finance locai authorities' capital
expenditure - 
unlike its counterparts in other member counuies - 
refinancei its
long-term credit through the issue of medium-term  bonds.
In France, the volume of mortgage and communal  loans of the Cridit Foncier
refinanced by the issue of bonds is relatively small. It should be noted that this
has nothing to do vdth the nature of the institution, since the German mortgage
hanks, which were modelled to a great extent on the Cr1dit Foncier, do carry-out
their refinancing operations by this means.
B) TRANSFORMATION
20. Most of the cedit for housing or local authorities'capital  expenditure deriv-
ing_from "mansformation" is provided in all the Membef States-by the savings
banks or their central institutions. As has been noted above, however,  there aie
exceptions  to this general rule, especially in Belgium, where the mortgage banks
finance most of their loans by the "transformation"  of savings deposits, paiticularly
since the tax reform, and where a special credit institution foi local authorities'
capital expenditure, the Cridit Contntunal, amasses a large proportion of its
resources in the form of savings  deposits.
B. PROBLEMS POSED BY REFINANCING ON A EUROPEAN  CAPITAL
MARKET
21. It would be too costly, and would conflict with the traditions of the savings
banks, for them to establish btanches or subsidiaries in other member counmiEs
to collect  savings deposits from persons  residing there, even if they were empowered
to do so; no such obstacles  stand in the way of the insuranie companles, but
rtheir operations in other Member States are limited, on the one hand, by rules
preventing  their foreign subsidiaries or branches from transferring funds to the
lrarent company and, on the other, by the fact that in practice they are not free to
enter direct into insurance contracts  abroad.
lConsequently, the main instruments used in international refinancing of credit for
housing and local authorities' capital expenditure  remain:
,z) Bonds and loans against promissory notes,
t!) Shares of real-estate companies and "property certificates",
c) Rediscountable  medium-term  paper
Z1) BONDS AND LOANS AGAINST PROMISSORY NOTES
:l-2. Apart from an issue by the cr1dit Foncier de France in New York in 1959.
there are very few examples of issues of loans abroad made by establishments
specializing in credit for housing and local authorities' capital expenditure. Nor is
172it vety probable that this lype of loan rvill gain- much in importance,  for 
- the
,oe.iai &edit institutions ofien ittrre their securities on tap, a technique  which
dbes not lend itself to flotations abroad.
Purchases of domestic  bonds by non-residents,  on the other hand, are not without
imoortance in certain countries. For example, until 1964, when the Kuponsteuer
;;:il;;A;;d,  B.n.l"" residents  were regular buyer_s of German mortgage bolds
;r.l ;;;;al  tonds; arrd a.rother instancE, observable  since L965, is non-resident
inu"rtrn"nt in bonds issued by the Bank aoor Nederlandsche  Gemeenten.
It is very likely that putchases of this kind will grow. These bonds have in fact
u.q,rir"d'rnor.  i*pot,in.9 oq th..capital marketJof several Member States than
-*t  oth., categoiies oi bottd, including central government issues. In thl period
from 1960 to 1965, they accounted foi 607o of- net domestic issues in Germany
,"i-rU"*:OZo in th.-ffetherlands.  In Italy, bonds for,the financing of residential
."*"*iigr  (cartelle findl,ir;r) account by ihemt.lves fot 2OVo of the total.
lff/ith regard to refinancing by means of loans against promissory notes, it should
U. not.a"tUt this type of ioan is important  gnly lt th-e Netherlands,  w!'ere it serves
;r- ;-;;;;;;  of finance for mortgage banks 
-and 
the Bank aoor Nederlandscbe
Gemeenten and as a principal investment outlet for savings institutions.
B) THE SFIARES OF REAL.ESTATE  COMPANIES  AND " PROPERTY  CERTIFICATES "
23. The issue of shares of real-estate companies and of "property  certificates",is
no, "r*tty 
for the purpose of refinancing ciedit. But since the funds collected by
n'Lun, of ih.r. inrt*-!nt,  ulro help to frnut.. residential construction, the special
problems they raise need to be dealt with here.
The soci|tis anonyntes immobilibres and the real-property funds ofier investors
*".f  itr" same advantages  as ownership of property without its.disadvantages;.on
;h;;r;-ilJ  itt.y tuke'orrer the const'ructional and administrative  work entailed,
*frif. .* iii. other they mut. r.ul-.rtate investments easier- to liquidate and enable
,iriir-," U" rpread. They provide a response to the desire of certain savers to invest
i" r""L "rr.ir. 
These adu"ntages may be particularly  -appreciated by savers inter-
erted in investment in real estate abroad but with little experience and knowledge
of foreign markets.
In France, joint-stock companies (soci6t6s  immobilidres d'inaestissement)  have
been set up in recent;.;;t-i* the-ionstruction and administration  of housing and
il".  t";"y"a ,o-. ,,rl..rr. The abolition of double taxation of their profits and
..ttni.t ,blt"-.ntt on estate duties gave them fresh impetus'
In the other Member States, the double taxation efiect of- cofpofation  tax has
n.n.rullu prou.d Or"lriLi,i*, since it  often halves the already low yield on
i'rr.r.rt*Lnf in residential construction.
The real-property fund, which has become, particularly  in Switzerland-, an- important
i;;;;  ih.'fi"Jn.ing of inu"rtrn"nt  in housing,  has a rather complex legal structure,
I/Jnecessary in order to avoid double taxation of profits from letting and to ensure
accurate and regular valuation  of assets.
twithin the EEC, there are no real-property  funds save in Germany,  where the
first one was set up in 1959 and had collected DM 190 million by the-end of 1964.
In addition to shares of real-estate companies and "property certificates",  there are
other similar securities, such as the "real-estate certificates" issued for the first
time in Belgium in 1,965 and the "house ownership  deeds" (Hausbesitzbriele)  in
Germany.  A feature which these financing  instruments have in common and which
distinguishes them from property certificates is that they do not efiect a spread
of the investment. This disadvantage is not, however, a very serious one, sinie the
need to spread risks is not as essential for investment in property  as for investment
in shares. In all other respects, these forms of investment 
-huu" 
the same features
as those indicated above for shares of real-estate companies and for "property
certificates".
C) REDISCOUNTABLE  MEDIUM-TERM PAPER
24. In certain Member  States, medium-term bank credit plays an important  role
in the financing  of residential construction. This is particularly so in France, where
part of this credit is used to issue mobilization certificates, rediscountable under
the usual rules. But it cannot be ruled out that in the long run these techniques
may be replaced by conventional financing  methods. The intioduction of machinery
to ensure that mortgage-loan securities are negotiable  is evidence of the authoritiei'
gonggrn to improve and diversify the general conditions  applicable to finance for
building.
CONCLUSIONS
.25' 1) As recommended in theprevious chgpter for the institutions  specializing
in industrial  creiit, the Group feels it desirable that securities issued by the institul
tions financing housing and local authorities' capital expenditure  shouid be quoted
on member  countries' stock exchanges.
.2) Most of these institutions issue their bonds on tap and, since they do not
:normally  have a net'nrork of subsidiaries,  they use the iervices of banks'or other
:financial establishments  that act as sales agents. To facilitate such operations it
might _be useful to establish co-operative  linf,s between the establishmerits  perform-
in_g this function in the various Member States. Similarly, in those Member  States
'where the sale and advertising  of such bonds are still subject to special authorization,
rthis should be replaced by blanket authorization,  particularly in the case of bondi
'whose soundness  is guaranteed by the severity of-Member States' legislation.
-] ) The terms and conditions applicable to _these bonds vary even more widely
from one member country to another than they do for goveinment  loans. As an
example of this it is sufficient to compare the German  morlgage or communal  bonds
'vith the Italian cartelle-fondiarie.  Some degree of harmoniiaiion of the issue terms
of bonds would certainly exert a favourablE  influence on the integration of capital
matkets.
1744) Shares of real-estate  companies  and "property certificates." can be particularly
efiective insrruments  for enirancing the intelnaiional mobility of capital .in tbis
fi;H. H;.ver, their distribution ls still hampered  by unnecessary obstacles' .To
obviate double taxation stemming from corporation tax,,complicated  legal devtces
,r. oft"n necessary; now that thJhousing market is tending^to.become ftee again,
;i; G;;  i;;i; ;l1at do"ble taxation shoild be eliminated.  Such a measure  would
o."UrUfU not involve heavy revenue losses since the cofporation tax has in this
iur" u verv low vield,
5) The Group feels that in so far as medium-term financing is uFd for residential
.o"ri*aio", it should be possible for paper representing  such credit to be mobilized
""lria" 
tfr..orrntty in which it is drawn. The-problems  arising,are identical  with
ihor. tuir.d by th! mobilization of loans for- the equipment.of industry, sinc.e-the
i..ttti"". "t"i it the same and it is only the purpose of the credit that difiers'
Th. t;xd;r-.ir ih.t.iot" referred to the material on ihis subject given at the end of
the preceding  chapter
ns l(bPART FOUR
THE INTEGRATION OF SECURITY  MARKETS
Security  markets  are amongst those sections  of capital markets_where an appreciable
degree-of interpenetration  has already been achieved and where further prog{ess
.ui rnort easily be envisaged in the near future. They are, moreover,  markets
whose efficiency  can be notably improved  by integration.
Various official studies and reforms recently carried out or projected show that
the public authofities are fully aware of a number of ptoblems  afising from the
uns;isfactory state of the stock markets and above all from their narrowness'
The aim is io restore to the security  markets their former role as a magnet fof
savings and a source of finance for investments.
The erowth of these markets cannot be gauged solely from the volume of net
issues"of shares and bonds taken up by the-public, for their efficiency also depends
on the "secondary  markets", i.e. on the conditions in which investors can compare
ihe o.ralitv of the vafious securities in circulation and deal in them. The study of
these'two'closely  linked aspects of the problem is the main concern of this patt of
the report.
Chapters 9 and 10 deal with the means of improving  the capital supply and demand
Jr.t.t.rt" on the "pfimafy" fixed-interest  iecurities market and on the share
market, respectively.
\flays of improving the working of the markets are studied in Chapter 11, which
is ievoted io p.o6l.*t .onn..Ld with the supply of infotmation to the public
and with dealings in and movement of securities on the "secondary mafkets"'
rzz[fltCHAPTER 9
STRUCTURE  OF FIXED-INTEREST.SECURITIES  MARKETS
Introduction
1.  In all Member States the authorities regulate  the working of fixed-interest-
securities  markets and keep a close watch on their balance
official action bears primarily on issues; these are limited by means of various
techniques designed to adjust them to the supply of capital avaiable for investment
in bonds.
The authorities  also take measures afiecting the supply of capital, especially  from
institutional investors; exchange-control  regulations,  rules governing-the manage-
ment of certain institutions, "or 
other mithods ur. ,rr.i  to chalnnel availaile
resources to the market in a way that satisfies what are deemed to be priority
requirements,  and in particular  those of public-sector  borrowers. In some countries,
oficial intervention on the bond market has also involved  direct conuol of interest
rates, which the authorities have endeavoured  to maintain  at relativelv low levels.
in the belief that a rise in yields would not bring about an appreciable  increase in
the supply of capital.
2.  This situation  sets limits to the methods  which could be employed  to promote
the development of a European bond market. It would be uniealistic to expecr
that all the restrictions  on the issue of bonds by non-residents could quickly  be
dismantled when they remain in force even for certain residents, or th;t ali the
obstacles  to investment in foreign bonds could disappear while there are still a good
many restrictions on the investments of certain institutions on their home markets.
Moreover, it will still remain necessary for issues to be carefully timed so that
market conditions are not upset, and for the interests of savers to be protected and
their confidence in institutional  investors preserved  by setting certain management
rules for the latter.
Measures _to promote integration of the various national markets without jeop-
atdizing the equilibrium of any of them or the interests of savers would appeir,
however, feasible.
For.this purpose,  the Group has first of,all examined  ways and means of lowering
the baniers hampering  the flow of capital available for investment in other membei
countries' fixed-interest  secutities; the main requirement here would be a revision
of the investment rules applied to institutional  investors  and an adjustment of tax
legislation.
Further, the issue of bonds on markets in other member  counfties necessitates  not
only a relaxation of existing restrictions, but also a revision of issue terms and
techniques.
179Flowever, an international market which partly fulfils the functions to be-performed
by , n". European bond matket already _exists. -In the present phase, little
headway has been made in developing the placing_ of foreign issues on- any- of the
domestii markets of the partner iountries, and the development of this interna-
tional market has, in quantitative terms, been the more impressive., The Grouq
has accordingly  examined, at the end of this chapter, the main features, and
reasons for tlh6 expansion,  of the "Euro-bond"  mar[et and its relations with the
nlarkets in the Member States.
I. Supply of capital on fixed'interest'securities  markets
3'. On most of the member  countries' fixed-interest-securities markets, cettain
iinvestofs  afe apt to prefer particular  securities, with the _result that a separate
nnarket is deveioped for the latter. Cases in point are bonds exempted  from
certain taxes, go'Jetnment stock and - 
in certain countries _. mortgage.bonds.
l\s a result .ui1 do*.ttic market tends, to a gteater or' lesser degtee, to split into
separate compaftments.
llhis compartmentalization efiect is still more pronornced  as between the markets
c,f the serieral member countries,  since investorJ are frequently  encouraged to prefer
investment in home securities.
lllthough it is difficult to compare the extremely diverse statistics.on net purchases
c,f fixej-interest  securiries  (sei Table 18), it ii clear that the clientele for these
secufities  difiers appreciably  in structure from counuy to country. In France and
ii.t!i"*, the largisi p,rt.htt"tt are the personal sector and enterprises.. In the
l,letiedands, insrirance  companies, pension funds and other institutional investors
do-inrt. the demand for such secuiities.  Banks, including  saving banks, are leading
purchasers of bonds in Italy and, to a lesser extent, Germany.
]\. THE ROLE OF INSTTTIITIONAL  TNVESTORS  (1)
11. Although already considerable,  the supply of capital to the bond market.by
institutional investors - 
in the broad sensi of the tefm - 
seems at times capable
of increase,  and their tendency to concentrate investment on certain classes of
s;ecurity could be discouraged.
Ithe limited resources at the disposal of certain institutional  investors in the EEC
countries are no doubt a serious lmpediment to their activity on the capital market'
lVithout reverting here to the struciural  reasons for this state of afiairs, which have
zrlready  been exa]mined in Chaptet 2, an attempt is made below to identify the
other ?actors which curb institutional  investment in bonds.
it) Th. *t"trg..ents governing the operation  and superrrision of institutional  investors are
cllalt with iriChapter-l2; in the preient chaptet, therefore, only those problems arising in
connection with thiir investment in bonds are discussed.
180/)  INSURANCE  COMPANIES  AND PROVIDENT  SOCIETIES
5.  The variety of insurance  and provident  organizations in the member countries
and the diversity of the legislation applicable to them make it difficult to assess
the conribution which these institutions make, or could make. to the fixed-
interest-securities markets. Besides the Iife-assurance  and liability and accident
insurance companies,  there are a gteat many specialized  insurance or provident
institutions, of a national or occupational  character,  and also the pension funds of
private firms, administered either by the firm itself or by a financial  institution.
The opportunities available to these various organizations to invest in bonds  are
governed either by law, by officially prescribed statutory provisions, or by con-
tractual  investment rules.
Though it is impossible to deal with all the problems  raised by the investment
activity of these otganizations,  a close look does at least need to be taken at the
life-asiurance  companies,  because of the importance  an increased  and more diversified
contribution of capital from this source could have for the fixed-interest-securities
market.
The support that life-assurance  companies bring to
more important  because of its regularity,  thanks to
the resources at their disposal.
the bond market is all the
the constant progression of
For the EEC countries as a whole, the life-assurance companies'  investments
between 1960 and 1964 averaged about $1 400 million annually, i.e. approximately
2.57o of. gross capital formation during this period. Depending on the countries
considered, however, the percentage  ranges ftom t.27o to 7.47o - 
difierences
which reflect the very unequal role of the life-assurance  companies  as sources of
investment finance  (see Table 27).
The variations in the life-assurance  companies' total annual contribution to the
fixed-interest-securities markets, however, are less great than the difierences in
their contribution to the capital market as a whole. In the Netherlands and
Germany,  vrhere these institutions are the most highly developed, the bulk of
their investments consist in mortgage loans and loans against promissory  notes;
in France and Belgium, on the other hand, fixed-interest-securities  investments are
by far the most important,  and they also account for a high proportion  oJ -tlre
companies'  investments in- Italy. In Fralce, whete the total conttibution  of life-
assurance companres ro the financing of investments is among the lowest, the
proportion of iheir total investments represented by fixed-interest securities  is the
largest.
The problem in most of the countries, then, is not so much to increase the total
volume of the insurance companies' investment in fixed-interest  secutities as to
adjust the distribution of the investment  and avoid undue discrimination against
private-sector issues and issues by borrowers resident in other member counffies,
in relation to those floated by domestic public-sector borrowers.
This is, moreover,  a problem with which the provident institutions and the savings
banks also have to contend.  These institutional investors are obliged to apply a
181substantial  proportion of their reserves to purchase of government or government-
guaranteed  stock and in many cases have only limited {unds available for investment
in private or foreign bonds, which furthermore have to compete with other forms
of investment (shares, real estate, etc.).
6.  \7hile the regulations in the Netherlands  are liberal in this matter, in the
other Member  Stales restrictive management rules are imposed on the companies
and the supervisory authorities have more power to intervene. Investments in
public-sector bonds are the only outlet available to insurance companies  without
any fixed "ceilings". Some countries go so far as to fix "floors" for investment
in government  stock. Investments in private bonds, on the other hand, are subject
to various limitations. These are supplemented in the case of external investments,
vrhich in Germany, Belgium and Italy require, without exceptioll,  the approval of
tlee supervisory authority, (1) whereas in the Netherlands there are no restrictions
at all on the insurance companies in this field.
fn France, the regulations governing insurance companies are now being reviewed.
f'he efiect will be to widen the scope for the companies  to invest in industrial
and foreign bonds quoted in the oficial list of a French stock exchange  by allowing
half the value of such holdings to be treated as "first-category"  stock, in which
insurance companies are required to invest 507o of. their technical reserves. This
amendment will make for a more balanced spread of insurance companies'
investments  and open up the way for them to participate in the development of a
Iluropean capital market.
T'he long-term aim must be to ensure that each member  country  treats investments
on its own market  on an equal footing with those in the other Community countries,
vrhenever the risks incutred are identical. This principle is embodied in the dra{t
tlrird directive implementing Article 67 of. theTrcaty, which is now being examined
by the Council.
Insurance companies could be authorized at once to devote a small percentage of
their technical  teserves to foreign investments of the same type as those permitted
on the home market.  Further, foreign securities  quoted on the stock exchanges  of
the country in which the company is domiciled could without restriction  be accorded
the same status as domestic securities.
A libemlization,  even in a limited degree, of investments in foreign bonds would
undoubtedly  have the advantage of encouraging insurance managements  to take
a greatet interest in the development of the Community  markets and would open
up the way, it desired, for a subsequent extension of their investments on these
markets; mofeovef, it would not in itself be likely to pfesent any greatef risk for
life-assurance policy-holders t}an do the share investments already authorized  in
c,3rtain countries, the expansion of which is recommended  below (see Chap. L0,
sr:c. 8).
(l) Needless to say, however,  investments in foreign  securities are invariably  authorized  when
it is a question of covering  a risk in the same foreign currency. In some countries,  the com.
prrnies are obliged to maintain a strict corelation between  investment  cunencies  and commit-
m.ent cuttencies.
782B) INSTITUTIONS  COLLECTING DEPOSIT SAVING: BANKS AND SAVINGS  BANKS
7.  A similar problem arises in the case of the savings  banks and their central
otganizations,  though the investment rules relating to them are aimed not only at
protecting savers but also at ensuring that the investments of these institutions
are suff,ciently  liquid, given the nature of theit resources. In some countries,
howevef,  the rules initially designed to serve these purposes now have the efiect
mainly of channelling the liquid savings collected  by savings banks to the financing
of local authorities' capital expenditure  and housing (see Table 28).
The investments of the local savings banks in private bonds are normally subject
to more restrictive conditions than those in government  bonds. Investments  in
foreign bonds are either prohibited or subject to special authorization,  which in
practice is tantamount to placing very severe festfaints on them.
The central institutions of the savings  banks, on the othet hand, enjoy a substantial
degree of freedom in their investments, including investment  abroad. Relaxation
of the regulations  applying to the savings banks might help them to exert a
stabilizing-influence on the bond market and play a part in the integration of the
financial markets. This relaxation  should be based on the same principles  as those
suggested above for the life-assurance  companies.
The deposit banks play an active role on the bond market in Italy and Germany.
Their opetations, while admittedly helping to widen the market, render it partic-
ulatly vulnerable to restrictive  monetary policy measures. In Belgium, on -the
othei hand, the banks' investments in bonds othet than those issued by the public
sector have so far been limited by regulations adopted in the 'thirties. A bill now
tabled in Parliament, however, provides for the elimination of this resriction.
In France there are no obstacles to the acquisition of fixed-interest securities by the
banks, provided the liquidity ratio and the special minimum teserves requireme_nt
are duly observed; in point of fact, the banks do not take an active part on the
bond market, except when such securities are first issued'
On the whole, more latitude for operations in all classes of fixed-interest securities
would enable the banks to exert a stabilizing  influence both on the national bond
market and on the European capital market, where they are already very active
because of their participation  in international  underwriting syndicates. A necessary
condition for this, however, is that the monetary authorities pay paticular attention
to the efiect of their liquidity policies on the attitude of banks towards investment
in bonds.
C) INVESTMENT COMPANIES  (OPEN. AND CLOSED.END)
8.  Open- and closed-end  investment companies can vrithin limits contribute  to the
activity of the bond market, even though their original and normal line of businesslies in equity investments. (1) There are, however, i-nvestment  companies which
specialize-in the holding of fixed-interest  securities. (2)
I'hese companies have a number of advantages for the small investor. They give
him a widi spread of investments, however small his holding; they select the
securities for admission to the portfolio  after a searching comparison  of yields and
other terms, a comparison  whiih the individual investor often cannot easily make
himself; in the countries in which subscribers to substantial blocks of bonds enjoy
more favourable conditions  at the time of issue, the can pass these benefits  on
inditectly to the small investot;  finally, they considerably simplify the collection
of coupons and the various other adminisrative  formalities.
In addition, investment  companies have an especially  useful international role to
p,lay, in view of the dearth- of information  available to small investors on the
iubject of foreign bond markets. In this respect they can make a very real
contribution to the development of intra-Community investments.
It would accordingly  be desirable to remove the obstacles  which, in some countries,
still limit either the holding of securities of other member  countties by investment
companies or the circulation of their shares or certificates among the investing
p,ubfic in the other member countries; how this ptoblem can best be tackled is
examined in Chapter  L0.
I.i. TAXATION OF BOND INCOME()
9. With the gradual dismantling of exchange  controls and legislative and statutory
irnpediments  to investment in securities issued in other Member States, the
influence of taxation on international  movements of capital assumes increased
irnportance. This is particularly true as regards the acquisition  of foreign bonds,
for here the yield aspect is a more decisive factor than it is in a share investment;
and obviously it is the comparison of yields net of tax that guides the choice
b'etween various types of domestic  or foreign bonds.
fn order not to distort the yield structure for the investor, taxation  should be
neural as regards the place of investment in a European bond market; this goal
c,ould be approached by various routes.
(1) I(ays and means of developing  the activity of investment  companies in general, ,and morg
particuiarly their participation in the business of the share market, are examined in Chapter 10,
(:; Institutions  of this iype exist in France and have recently  been inuoduced in Belgium and
Clermany. In Germany,  ihe companies undertook, when they were established, !ot, to aUoxr
their ceitificates to ciriulate  abroad; even so, the fiscal considerations which dictated  this resuic-
tive attitude, i.e. the desire to prevent evasion of. the 257o Kuponsteuer,  should not in the
longer term prevent  these institutions from disseminating domestic bonds among small investots
irr the other member countries.
(') Only the fiscal problems peculiar to the fixed-interest-securities market are_ dealt with here;
a compiehensive suivey of the fiscal problems  afiecting the European  capital market is given
in Chapter 14.
|tJ4,4) ELIMINATION  OF DOUBLE  TAXATION
10. In spite of bilateral agreements intended to eliminate it, double taxation of
income from foreign bonds still survives, to a partial but by no means negligible
extent, in relations bet'uveen  certain member  countries, and is a serious disincentive
to the acquisition of foreign bonds. This tax deterrent has become the more severe
the more gross yields on the various Community markets have tended to move
into line; thus, difierences in yield, which formerly might have been an incentive to
investment in bonds issued in other member countries, are now frequently  cancelled
out by the exra tax payable compared with investment in domestic securities.
The existence of double taxation is incompatible with the development of an
integrated fixed-interest-securities  market, the more so as the majority of investors,
especially  individuals, regard tax deducted at source abroad as lost and take no
account, in their yield calculations, of any possibilities  of refund, because of the
complexity  of the formalities this would involve.
In Chapter 14, various technical  solutions to the general problem of double taxation
are suggested.
B) TFIE PROBLEM  OF "ANONYMOUS"  CAPITAL
11. Another serious tax problem  arises because the opportunities  for tax evasion
are not alike in the various member countries and certain bond markets may for
that reason be particularly attractive  to "anonymous"  capital.
The factors underlying these disparities are the difierent rates of deduction at
source and the varying  degrees of eficiency of control exercised by the fiscal
authorities.  There is a general consensus that the "coupon schedule" (bordereau
de coupons) system  used ln France - 
involving notification  of the value of coupons
paid, and the names of persons collecting them, to the tax authorities - 
is the
only foolproof arrangement.
Admittedly the deduction at source is as a rule no more than a payment on account.
It is, however, of a definitive  character for certain investors such as the superannua-
tion funds or insurance  companies in France. In this case, and every other where
there is an opportunity  for tax evasion, the deduction  at source is the only tax
paid, and its rate has a decisive influence on the attractiveness of a bond investment
in a specific country to domestic  or foreign "anonymous"  capital.
In Chapter 14, various solutions  are examined which are already being or could
conceivably be employed  in order to remedy the dislocatoty efiects of this situation
on the circulation  of capital and an attempt is made to assess the extent to which
these solutions are compatible with the prospects for the integration  of the capital
markets. Anticipating  ihe conclusions reached in that chapter, it will suffice to
remark here that the problem of. tax evasion can be solved only by harmonization
of the tax systems  and strengthening of co-operation  between the fiscal authorities
of the Member States. However, if the methods employed to identify and tax
income from bonds in the Community  were toughened,  and as a result the level of
185taxation  became higher than in certain non-member counffies, there might be a
flight of capital to tax havens outside the Community  and a coresponding  depletion
of the European bond market.
It should therefore not be overlooked that there will always be markets ofiering
fiscal refuge to "anonymous" capital. The Group accordingly considers that any
srtrengthening  of controls should be accompanied by a reduction, or even abolition,
of tax deductions  at source on bond income. If it were not, the tightening of the
crcntrol in any one country would merely force up the rates of interest which would
have to be ofiered on issues in that country to compensate for the deduction at
srf,urce and thus give subscribers  net yields comparable  with those obtainable  on
other markets. It  seems, moreover,  that the recent development  of Euto-bond
isisues (a subject dealt with further on), which ofier a regular flow of securities
having the features sought by "anonymous"  capital, has strengthened  the tendency
towards international  harmonization of vields net of tax deducted at source.
C) PREFERENTIAL  TAX TREATMENT FOR BOND  INCOME
L2. The Group considered,  however, whether new problems would not arise if
dhe tax treatment accotded to bonds were relatively  more favourable than that
applied to other forms of investment for savings. In ihis context the question arose
'urhether taxation  ought to be wholly neutral and thus make the investor's  choice
immaterial from a fiscal standpoint, or whether it ought not rather to be selective
and favour particular forms of investment along the lines considered the most
desirable by the public authorities.
Adonetary stability is, of course, the necessary precondition  {or a sound and
balanced  development of the bond market. Unfortunately,  there is no evidence
tlhat monetary  stability is being achieved nowadays any more than in the past.
I'able 19 on fixed-interest security yields shows that in real terms, i.e. after
allowing for price rises, bond yieids are substantially lower than the yields at
current prices. At the end of 1965, rcal yields varied, depending on the member
country concerned,  fuom 1.24%o to 4.827o in the case of public-sector  securities
('yields at current  prices from 5.507o to 7.707o) and from i.lTo to 4.737o in the
crase of private-sector  securities (yields at current prices from 5.957o to 7.6%io).
In some countfies, therefore, the real yield after deduction of taxes paid on
interest was clearly low - 
or even a minus quantity 
- 
in certain years. It might
be imagined that the operation of market forces would in the normal course have
tlhe efiect of restoring real yields to an atttactive  level, through an improvement
in interest rates or other advantages ofiered by borrowers, or through a fall in
bond prices; on account of institutional  factors and official action on the market,
however, this compensatory  mechanism is functioning only very imperfectly. Such
a situation cannot be maintained indefinitely without giving rise to the switching
of capital to other markets or other forms of investment. This is why it  has
s,cmetimes  been suggested that the hardships caused by erosion of the qrrrency
and the shrinkage of real bond yields should be ofiset by special advantages of a
fiscal nature. It has been argued that compensation of this kind would also be
vrarranted  by the fact that the public sector is the chief issuer of bonds in all the
1136Member States and therefore the main beneficiarv of a limitation of the yields
ofiered to investors.
There are a number of obvious political objections to this proposal. Furthermote,
any preferential  system of taxation  that might be introduced could not be confined
to bond income but rrould have to be extended  to other fixed-intetest investments,
since the problem is a similar one in their case.
On the other hand, there is a case for encouraging longer-term investment in
fixed-yield securities, for liquidity preference is already too strong in all the member
countries.
The Group accordingly takes the view that this aim, to rxthich the two above-
mentioned objections would not apply, should be pursued along other lines,
through incorporation of any tax concessions that might be allowed on bond
income in a fiscal system ofiering incentives to all long-term investments;  since to
single out bondholding as long-term and treat deposits as short-term investment
wo,rld be open to argument, these advantages  would have to apply to every fixed-
interest investment maintained over a specific period.
It is also clear that such fiscal advantages should not be accorded solely, as is
the case in some member  countries. on income from investments in domestic
bonds, as this would have the effect of introducing yet another division between
markets.
coNCrusl0Ns
13. The balance of the markets in fixed-interest-securities  could be significantly
improved by lessening the divisions within the markets. This result could be
brought about by an improvement to the conditions governing the supply of
capital through amendment  of:
i) The eligibility  rules {or institutional investors;
ii) The tax treatment of bond income.
1) In a general  context, in order to enable institutional  investors to set the pace
- 
as they should - 
in market integration, the Gtoup suggests a revision of
eligibility rules that would:
a) Cut the difierences in treatment between industrial bonds and government
stock to the minimum needed to ensure that the institutions do not incur excessive
risks;
b) Facilitate investment  in bonds issued in other member countries by treating
them in the same way as domestic securities  whenevet they have comparable
features, and in particular whenever they are quoted on a stock exchange in the
counffy of the investor.
t871!) In addition:
rr) Insurance  companies and local savings banks should be free to invest a modest
percentage of theit resources in other member countries, in any securities of the
siame type as those permitted on the domestic market, and in particular in other
member countries' bonds not quoted on a stock exchange of the countfy in which
these institutions are domiciled. Later on, the percentage could progressively be
laised.
Ivlore liberal powers in this respect could be granted forthwith to the central institu-
tions of savings  banks, savings banks with centralized  structure, and banks in
61eneral;
l)) Investment  companies should be free to invest in domestic and foreign bonds
in whatever proportions  they please and be authorized to sell their shares or units
in othet member countries.
;t) In the fiscal sphete, the Group tecommends  that:
a) Double taxation,  which is a particulady serious impediment  to the integration
of markets in fixed-interest securities  owing to the importance of yield considera-
tions in these investments, should be eliminated;
lc) Tax systems in the various member  countries should be harmonized, in partic-
ular by fixing withholding-tax rates on bond income at the same level - 
a level
rvhich should not be such as to divert capital to non-Community  markets;
c') rD7hatever fiscal advantages are granted in favour of bond income should fit
into the framework of measures for stimulating long-term saving and should be
a.pplied without discrimination  to all investments  exceeding a specified term.
II.  Issues of fixed-interest  securities
1\. PROBLEMS  RELATING TO THE STRUCTURE  OF DEMAND FOR
CAPITAL IN THE FORM OF /.'SUES  OF FIXED.INTEREST SECURITIES
In connection  with the desired integration  of the member countries'  fixed-interest-
securities matkets,  the Group considered whether difierences in the size of the
rnarkets, and in the relative importance of the various classes of issuer, were likely
to influence the development of a European bond market.
/) DIFFERENCES IN THE SIZE OF THE VARIOUS MARKETS
L4. Statistical dissimilarities make it difficult to comDare the various stock
rnarkets in terms of size; in the oficial statistics on issues o^f medium- and long-term
fixed-interest securities, definitions and methods of compilation  difier from counmy
to country. Although any attempt at reconciling such disparate data for the
188purposes of international comparison is inevitably  open to criticism,, it is never-
theless possible to indicate the main difierences that emerge (see Table 20).
It will be seen that, for the period L960-65,  the total volume of net internal
issues, expressed as a t^tio of gross domestic capital formation,  was about 227o
in Italy, fOTo in Belgium, lOTo in Germany and France and77o in the Netherlands.
It vras not possible,  ho\vevef, for want of suficient information, to take account
of privately contracted  loans against promissoty notes, wbicb were on a v,ery
large scale in Germany and the Netherlands. To do so vrould have had the eflect
of lncreasing the Dutih and German  percentages appreciably and of providing  a
more 
"..rrraie 
picture of the real difieiences in size between the various mafkets,
which are less great than the figures quoted suggest. Howevet, even if  thes_e
difierences exist at the present iime, ii  does not follovr that bond issues will
maintain the same ratio to investments in the future: the difierences reflect the
situation on rapidly expanding markets.
B) DIFFERENCES  IN THE RELATIVE  IMPORTANCE OF THE VARIOUS  CLASSES
OF ISSUER
15. On each of the Community markets the chief obstacle to an expansion of
other member countries'  issues is that the domestic market is already over-
extended by resident borrowers. The issues of public or semi-public institutions
dominate to a greater or lessef extent all the markets,; thus, in the period 1960-65'
the fixed-intereit securities issued for the financing of the central government,  local
authorities and public enterprises accounted on average 
_ for_ apptoximately 65%o
of total net domestic issues in Belgium and the Netherlands,  477o in Germany
and France and 367o in ltaly. If  account were also taken of issues placed by
semipublic credit institutions, it would be seen that private recourse to the bond
market is in general very modest in every Community counmy.
Private issuers, then, are already finding it difficult to obtain a place on the bond
markets; it may therefore be wondered urhether the opening of member  countries'
markets to issues by the partner countries would ease these difficulties or aggt^-
vate them.
On the whole, it would be easier for private enterprises  to gain access to the bond
market if they were no longer restricted in their borrowing by conditions pecul-iar
to their home market bui able instead to take advantage of any favourable
circumstances occurfing on other markets.
The large concerns, internationally  known because they enjoy wiie_ markets,  because
their sliares are quoted on more than one stocl< exchange, and for other reasons,
are pafticularly well placed to launch bonds likely to appeal stfongly to foreign
inveitors. Agiin, because of the diversified  nature of their investments and
currency 
"urni-ngt, 
issuers of this type are less reluctant  to assume exchange risks-
In preient .on*ditiont, however, ii  might well be that the large international
companies would be the only ones to avail themselves of these additional sources
of finance. Medium-sized firms are in fact aheady having difficulty in drawing on
their own market because of their inadequate financial  structure. In some cases,
this obstacle has been overcome by setting up groups to issue loans the proceeds
189of which are distributed among the members,  while in others specialized  institu-
tions have been brought in to Z.t ur borrowers  on the market. the hkelihood is
that_ the problem  as regards the necessary minimum  size and necessary standing
for launching a bond issue will be felt still more acutely when it is a question oT
resort to other Member States' markets; the extension of the group flotation
techniques and borrowilg by specialized institutions would consequently be of
undeniable  value in the framework  of a European market.
I{owever,,the cenffal governments  and other authorities might also consider  issuing
Ioans on foreign capital markets. The special problems arising from such recor-trsE
have been examined in Chapter 6, which deals with the financial policies of public
authorities and enterprises.
I\. REMOVAL OF RESTR/CTIONS ON ACCESS TO MARKETS
li 6.  fn most of the member countries, there are obstacles to the issue of foreign
loans. They derive from, on the one hand, exchange-conffol  regulations  and, on
the other, _legislative obstacles and special adminisrative  authorilation  procedures
to which foreign issues are subject over and above the formalities prescribed for
the issues of residents.
II) DISMANTLING  OF EXCHANGE.CONTROL  RESTRICTIONS
17. As has been stated in Chapter 3, issue operations have been liberalized in
accotdance  with the first directive implementins  Article 67 of the Treatv onlv in
(iermany, Belgium and Luxembourg,  the othei member countries  having 
"uril"d themselves of the tight to retain exchange-control  restrictions  for such oplrations;
despite the balance-of-payments  surpluses achieved since then by the countries
concerned,  and despite the steady growth in the volume of issues on their own
dlomestic markets, there has been no official policy change. Foreign issues have,
h.owever, been authorized  f.airly frequently. In Germany and B-lgium, on the
other hand, despite the liberalization,  various  circumstances have made it impossible
f,cr foreign issues to be placed with residents of these countries to thi extent
anticipated.
Interest rates have tended to move closer together during the past few years. In
addition, co-ordination of economic policies in the Community  framework has
lessened  the danger of the Member Siates following contradictory  policies in the
budgetary, monetary and investment-guidance  fields. The situation, which at one
ti.me might have justified a cautious attitude on the part of certain Member States,
seems therefore to have changed, with the result that these countries  could now
drop their exchange-control  restrictions more easily than at the time when the
firct directive was issued. It would, moreover, always be possible for any Member
State in dificulty as a result of the derestriction  to invoke the safeguard  clauses
and to apply the procedures of Article 73.
190Furthermore,  the desire to use domestic savings  solely to meet the requirements
of resident issuers 
-,which 
today appeart to'b. the main ;.;""i;;;il;;;i;;
these restrictions in the three m.mb.r countries refe'ed to above 
- 
doe, noi
take account of the increased  scope for issues a European mad.ei r1,""H-;{i;r: It may be expected that the creation of this market wiil Lave the efiect, "oi-.r"fy o[. aggregating the savings already available on each of the existing *urk"tr, bu't
also of increasing their total volume.
Two.finalpoints to note here arc that some degree of balance is necessary betv/een
the liberalization  commitments undertaken by ihe various Member States, and thai
lack. of progress in the abolition of exchang'e-control restrictions *""tJ in.rit"iliy
block-progress  in other respects towards ihe achievement of free movem.nt  oi
capitaT.
18.^ rn practice, the possibility might be_considered of proceeding  by stages, wirh
at first a limit on the authorization of foreign issues and then "grahuatt'v l"irirj
the limit.
The limit could be related to objective data, such as the volume of gross domestic
saving of the country  under consideration ovef a given period.
This is the solution envisaged_in  the third directive pursuant to Article 67 , the
draft of. which is now under discussion.
B) ELIIVIINATION  OF LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE RESTRICTIONS
19. Sp...y! legislative and administrative  restrictions on foreign issues still survive
in certain Member States. If, as seems to be the case, the r.-uron fo, m"intrinins
them is the same as that for maintaining exchan-ge-control  restrictions, tfr"-rtg6""l!
advanced above also hold good here. The aSofition of these res6ictionJ too is
provided  for in the draft third directive.
In this wal, t[-)q disciminatory  character  of certain provisions would be removed.
For example,.although,in Belgium..foreign  issues ar.,nb longer afiected by .".tu"!.-
control re_strictions, they a-re still -su6ject to authofizati-on by tt.  l,rinirt"r ?
Finance. In- France, apart from a few special  cases, foreign issues are prohibited
by a law dating -back- many years. Moreover,  again #ith certain &ceptions,
canvassing_on behalf of foreign securities_is  prohibited,  and this purs their pla.e-eni
at a considerable  disadvantage  compared  with French securitiei.
It has been shown in chapters 4 and 5 that the establishment  of. a.,queue" {or
issues is often used to determine market-access  priorities  and as an instiument for
regulating long-term trends of interest  rates,
It was stressed in those chapters that cetain disadvantages in the present method
of establishing national issue queues could be avoided If th.y *.r.  to be based
on clear-cut, predetermined criteria reflecting purely technical consideratioor. it"
aim of the queue- w_ould then become simply ihe pievention of temporary dist,rrf-
ances of market balance, by spreading  issues ovei a period. on ttese iin.r, G
191establishment of a queue would not be inconsistent with integration  prospects,
orovided the issues 
-of 
foteign borrowers were treated in a non-discriminatory
Ir;;;;;Ju..oun, was takei of the trend on markets in other member  countries'
il-i;-;f".t, ho*.u.t, ittui the more closely-knit markets become, the greater will
be the impoftance  assumed by these considerations, and in.consequence the less
it will be possible for the supervisory  authorities on each of the markets concerned
to establish queues seParatelY'
20. The Group accordingly  suggests that representative,s of the authorities  or
6.ai.r 
'i.rp""ti,6l. io. .rtiblishii"g the queue in each of the member  countries
should co-operare i".rt^ll;[i;;;"qr;g" iriteria which could in the future be used
as a basis for their J..iti""ll u"i thut systematic co-ordination between these
["ai.,,ir""fJ-tuUt.q"lntty  U.'.riuUtirt.d,  io as to harmonize the queues as fully
;.";;;tibl.. Conridera=fi#  .o.tld, fot example, be given t9' th: idea .of lending
"inititutional support" to such co-ordination.arrangements  by rnstructmg a com-
Detent bodv, within *hi.h ,.p..sentatives  of the 
-market supervisory  authorities
;;;il  .."i'r"g"lutly,  to monitor trends on the various Community -tlk.ltl  111
;il; ;"  the iniernaiional  market (discussed below), and publish reports.on :lt:
oDportunities for floating foreign issues and on methods ot malntalnlng tne
;#ilil;ffi.f  rf,,. ;;ffi3;;;k;";  whil. erploiting their potentialities to the full'
C.PR1BLEMSKELATINGTo/SSUEcoSTSANDPR0CEDURES
21. Even if the various restrictions  hampering free acc-ess--to all the EEC bond
*urt"t"were  lifted, ittn.tt.uo"ld make nie of 
-the new facilities available to them
;;1"^;; i1yo.onditiont--  nrt., that the cost of recourse to a foreign,market,was
;d;;*"g.;"s, and secondly, that there were ge-nuine opportunities for reachlng
i*.rro."t in other -.ab.t'.onnffies by means of attfactive terms of issue'
The rest of this chapter is therefore devoted to the following topics:
a) Issuing costs;
b) The problem of competition  with resident issuers;
c) The problem of placing loans with institutional  investors;
d) The problems set by the technical characteristics  of the securities  issued'
,4) ISSUING  COSTS
22. As interest rate difierentials  between the various markets tend to naffow' so
the flotation costs incurred increasingly  influence the choice of market for an issue'
ii it Uy no means certain that, in- fietett.conditions,-costs on the various Com-
munitv markets can be considered competitive with those ruling -on. the leading
international  capital markets, or even on the Euro-bond market, which is exposed
to keen competjdon ftom Ametican and British institutions'
In the Member States, it is the credit institutions, and not spe-cialized intermediaries
iit. inu.trrnent bankers and issuing houses, which are main\' responsible for the
192placing of loans. Despite the advantages of a very dense network of offices and
close contacts with customers, issue costs appear generally to be rather high,
although the margin betvreen the yield to the holder and the cost to the bomower
difiers appreciably from country to counffy. By way of comparison, the highest
commissions charged are in France, the lowest in the Netherlands; it is not possible
to quote figures, since the variations between difierent issues in one and the same
country falsify any comparison.
Two significant {actors  may nevertheless be noted. First, the practice of canvassing
has a considerable  incidence on costs, particularly  in France. Secondly, in other
countries, the exueme weakness  of competition between the issuing syndicates
and the lack of flexibility in the allocation of quotas among them may raise the
cost and impair the quality of the placing. As a consequence of this lack of flexibility,
issuing commissions  may not provide an accurate reflection of the costs incurred
by the syndicate and may not be commensurate  with the actual difficulties with
which the institutions have to contend and which vary according to the standing
of the borrower, the characteristics of the issue and the market situation. This
combination  of defects is mainly due to the fact that "wholesale" placing with
institutional investors is insufficiently  developed and that in consequence. the
market is still, as it were, largely a"retail market". Progress can only come.from
the gradual development - 
which is in fact already appreciable - 
of direct placing
of substantial blocks of bonds. On the other hand, selection on a competitive
basis of the syndicate to be entrusted with the placing of a given issue -may help
to stimulate iompetition where large-scale loans are concerned, as is frequently
the case in the United States.
The fact remains that the opening up of the EEC markets cannot be Properly
efiective until competitive costs and placing facilities enable Community financial
institutions to entiie customers  away from the Euro-bond market'
B) THE PROBLEM  OF COMPETITION  \OITH RESIDENT ISSUERS
23. Competing with the issues of resident borrowers involves  foreign issuers in
special problems  when the former have the opportunity to make "tap" issues-
fhese isiues assume very considerable importance in Germany as regards communal
and mortgage  bonds and in France  as regards Treasury bills (Bons- du Trtsor). In
the otheimember countries the same technique is used for the financing of local
government capital expenditure and residential constuction,  and also for the
iefinancing of brdinary credit institutions (short-term deposit certificates). Over
the period 1960-65,  tap issues averaged about 657o of the total net domestic
issuei of fixed-interest securities in Germany and 427o of the total in France  and
Belgium, as against only 237o in Italy and t67o in the Netherlands (see Table 2l).
As these issues escape the "discipline" of the queue 
- 
in the countries  where
there is one - 
the lnstitutions iJsuing them have an advantage over resident or
non-resident  borrowers, who under this system may find their issues postponed or
even prohibited altogether whem the market is over-extended.  The- special terms
o.r *hi.h these securities  are frequently ofiered help to make them first choice for
investment portfolios,  thus leaving that much less room on the market for other
IOans,
193l\ solution to this problem  might be found in standatdization of the "tap" issue
conditions in the Member States and co-ordination  of the policies of the market
authorities. This would prevent tap issues stultifying the efiects of the queue
system.
C) THE PROBLEM  OF PLACING \TITH INSTITUTiONAL INVESTORS
2,4. The inadequate  scope for institutional  investment in bonds of other member
countries  has already been analysed at length. There is nevertheless reason to
emphasize  one special aspect of the problem, 
_ namely the principle habitually
followed by these organizations  causing them to limit theit investments in a given
cunency more or less strictly to the resources they hold in this currency. -Since
the greater part of their resources is in local cumency, this principle clearly milita.tes
a.gaiist thei? subscribing  to loans issued by a foreign borrower on his own market
and consequently  expressed in a foreign currency'
llhe device of parallel loans, consisting of vafious tranches, each expressed in a
cli{Ierent cnrrency, aims not only at spreading a latge loan ovet sevefal markets,
trut also at supplying institutional  investors in the various countries with bonds
expressed in iheir own currencies.  This device has, bowever, a number of
clrawbacks, including in particular the very great technical complexity due to_the
fact that it really entails ieveral  simultaneous  loans rather than a single loa!. Not
a.re the many administrative  formalities involved and the need -to a-d,opt a
standardized fotm - 
even if the yields ofiered by the vafious tranches  difier - calculated to encourage the use of this procedure.
lf, more convenient variant of this device enables institutional investors to be ofiered
employment for their funds free of exchange risks, without necessitating  the issue
c,f a series of foreign loans. Foreign subscribers to a loan placed on the domestic
rnafket, but also designed to attract savings from other membef countfies, 
_ are
simply given the optioi of having bonds to which th_ey subscribe expressed.in  their
.,rvn.rIr"r.ies. This device haJthe very considerable  advantage  that it does not
entail any arbitrary fixing of trancbes, but allows the subscribers to determine
the volume of each fn aciordance  with what the appfopriate  market can absorb'
llhe technique  has already been used for an issue by_ al Italian government-
controlled holding company. As interest rates are gradually aligned, its use is
liikely to become mote common.
D) FEATURES OF SECURITIES ISSUED
25. The securities  ofiered in the member countries do not always have identical
fr:atures. While in some countries it is permissible practice to issue index-linked
b,onds, participating debentures and "premium bonds", these are not usual in
others, and in-some are actually illegal. The special attraction exerted by some of
tlhem can at times distort the competitive  conditions  on the issues market'
T'he practice of index-linking,  which was fairly common in the past, has been more
or less rigorously circumscribed  in all the Member States. Thus in some countries,
indexlinked  securities are found on the market but new issues are not authotized;
194in others, the only prohibition  has been on gearing to a reference index unrelated
to the activity of the issuer. In the latter case, therefore, it is permissible to issue
participating debentures  giving the holder an interest in the borrower's business
results, The participation may take the form of a revaluation  of principal or of
raising the annual interest payment in proportion to the increase in the bonower's
turnover or profits.
Convertible  bonds will be examined in Chapter 10 (equity markets),  since they
raise special problems, particularly in connection with the deferred capital increase
that they may represent. Yet, throughout the period preceding conversion  they
are in efiect a form of bond linked to the price of the share.
Finally, "premium bonds" (1). These are normally the special preserve of issuers
in the public sector and they vary considerably in importance  from counry to
country.
The problems of competition  mentioned above make it desirable  that the Member
States should so far as possible standardize  their attitude to these difierent kinds
of bond in order'that 
-issuers 
receive similar technical  facilities on the various
markets. Failing such alignment, the diversity of situations might result in an
abnormal  expansion of issues ofiering the indexing terms so popular with the
public, with the risk that these issues, made by botrowers in the counries  with
the most liberal system, would exploit this special advantage to drain ofl savings
from other member countries.
coNcrusl0Ns
26. The difierences in size or structure between the fixed-interest-securities
markets in the Member States cannot in themselves  warrant limitation of access
for foreign borrowets. Nor, as they lessen, can appreciable divergences in yield
levels on the various markets be adduced as justification for the maintenance  of
restrictions. At the very most, there will be a transitional problem which could
be overcome by opening up the market in stages and by making certain technical
adjustments.  The Group accordingly recommends:
1) Elimination of the remaining exchange-control  restictions, if necessary limiting
authorization  of the issues placed by other member countries to maxima fixed in
accordance  with objective  criteria and due to be gradually  raised;
2) Elimination of certain legislative or administrative provisions discriminating
against  issues placed by othet membet counries;
3) Introduction of anangements  for systematic  co-ordination  between the market
authorities in order to monitor trends in availability of funds on the markets and
thus prevent  even temporary ovedoading of any of them. This co-ordination
should be based on criteria determined by common agreement and should be
cartied out bv a bodv in which all these authorities  are reoresented:
(l) Unlike UK premium bonds, continental  premium bonds always bear interest as v'ell.
1954) Re-appraisal of the existing techniques for placing issues, with a view to
lurthering  those which have proved the most efficient and least costly;
Ji) Agreement  on a common attitude to devices such as tap issues, issues of index-
linked bonds or participating  debentures, "premium bonds", etc., which may favour
certain issuers and also produce not inconsiderable  distortions  of capital movements
between Membet States.
III.  The Euro-bond  issue matket
tl7. Conventional  foreign issues in local currency have, as has been shown in
Chapter 3, already attained an appreciable volume in the Community countries,
s,ince their gross value for the years 1961 to 1965 may be estimated at approxi-
rnately $550 million. This figure, however, is seen to be low when compared'with
the value of {oreign issues during the same period in the United Kingdom ($296
rnillion), Switzerlands ($704 million) and above all the United States ($1 480
rnillion). They accounted in fact for less than L.57o of the net domestic issues of
rnedium- and long-term  fixed-interest  securities in the whole of the Community,
'rvhich totalled more than $38000(1) in the period 1961,-65. These comparisons
s,uggest that foreign issues in local currency are still at an embryonic stage of
development and that a genuine European fixed-interest-securities market is still
ar long way ofi.
I{owever, since L957 - 
and at an increasing  pace since 196J - 
an international
bond market, the "Euto-bond market", has been building up. The issues placed
crn this market totalled g1 770 million in the period 1,961-65  and hence far exceed
the amount of local-currency  foreign flotations in Europe.
tlhe interest aroused by this experiment  calls for a searching  examination  of the
characteristics  of the market in question, the reasons undetlying its development
and the problems it is currently  facing.
IT. PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE EURO-BOND  ISSUE MARKET AND
}IE,ASONS  FOR lTS DEVELOPMENT
28. The Euro-bond market may be defined by reference to its principal features:
the bonds (whether conventional ot convertible)  are expressed  in foreign currencies
'orrhich play a major role in international financial transactions (dollar, Deutsche
Ilark) or in European units of account, or embody  special clauses, such as an
exchange option; they are issued by syndicates consisting of banks in the various
(1) Table 20 (domestic issues) and Table 15 (foreign issues) are not suictly comparable:  in the
case of foreign issues, only gross figures  ate available,  u'hereas for domestic  issues the figure
net of redemptions is shown. If net figures were available in each case, the percentage  would
be even smaller.
196member countries  co-operating with others in the main financial centres outside
the Community;  they are purchased by an international public extending well
beyond the confines of the country of issue and sometimes exclusively  foreign.
In-contrast  with the international markets of Zvich, New York and London as
operated before  1957 , the Euro-bond  market, physically  located in Luxembourg,
Lbndon, Frankfurt or New York, difiers in many cases from the "domestic"
markets alongside which it functions in respect of the currency of issue, the_yields
ofiered (1) anl the placing techniques  employed. Furthermore,  Euro-bonds display
common features, iirespeitive  of the place of issue or quotation, which no longer
has a great deal of significance, the actual sources of the funds being largely the same.
Due mainly to the initiative of foreign financial institutions and stimulated_ by _the
benefits -hi.h th.te securities  afiordboth  borrowets and subscribers,  the develop-
ment of Euro-bond issues has also been given a boost by fortuitous  circumstances
associated vrith tax or exchange-control measures  adopted by certain States in
implementation of their monetary or external payments  policies.
,4) DEVELOPIVIENT  OF EURO-BOND ISSUES AND THEIR ADVANTAGES  FOR
PARTICIPANTS
29. For the borrowers,  an outstandingadv^fltage  of Euro-bond issues has been to
provide them with funds to supplement those from conventional issues or, where
no conventional issue has been possible, to provide them with alternative  sources
of finance. This is to be regarded as an outcome of the public-sector dominance
of the domestic  markets and the comparatively  niggardly tfeatment of private-
sector and foreign lecourse in consequence.
In many cases, too, Euro-bonds  ofler borrowers  the advantage of a lower cost than
flotations  on the domestic markets of the EEC member  countries;  either the yield
can be reduced by reason of the other benefits accorded to the investor, or the
placing cost may 
-be 
lower on account of the competition between  international
issuing syndicates.
The lower cost may also be due to the fact that the borrovrer  agrees to accept an
exchange risk. This is the case with industrial  and commercial companies which,
because of the nature of their investments  and the diversity of their currency
earnings, can safely assume an exchange risk that is in any case low in relation to
the risks incurred in their industrial and commercial  operations. It is also the case
with the financial institutions not required to guard against the exchange  risk,
either because they pass it on to their own debtors or because the risk is assumed
by the Government. And, finally, it is the case with the public authorities.
It must be pointed out, however, that private issuers in the Community have
not availed themselves to any great extent of the facilities ofiered by this mafket,
which have been used mainly by international institutions,  next by Scandinavian,
Portuguese and Japanese bortowers, and of late especially by subsidiaries of
(t) The rates applied in the case of conventional foreign issues wete generally higher -than
ihose obtainable 
-on 
domestic issues, but their variations  always corresponded  with those of the
latter. This is no longer necessarily  the case with Euro-bond  issues.
197l\merican  companies. In the case of this last group, however, the capital obtained
c'n the Euro-bond  market has always cost more than on the US market; it has
roainly been the desire to .o-op.r"i. in the "programme of voluntary  restraint"
i.ntroduced by the Ametican  authorities  that has been responsible  for the scale of
their bomowings  on this market; even so, the cost of the funds thus obtained has
t,een less than they would have incurred for issues in local currency on the Com-
nnunity markets.
)t0. For the investors, the chief attraction of Euro-bonds  appears to lie in the
f.act that they ofier a yield free of any tax deduction.
l\s is known, Euro-bond issues are located in countries in which no deduction of
trax at source is applied to non-residents  at the present time. But in addition, most
o,f these issues, and in particular those of subsidiaries of American companies,
irrcorporate  a clause to the efiect that the interest is payable without deduction of
any tax, present or future (1), which may be imposed in the issuer's country on
interest paid to a non-resident. In the event of such a tax being introduced, the
issuers usually undertake to increase the interest so that, after deduction  of tax,
the holders continue to receive the stipulated  net amount. No doubt one of the
advantages  most appreciated by the public is that the collection of interest on these
loans, unlike that of interest on other foreign secufities, entails none of the
bothersome formalities usually required in order to obtain  a refund of tax deducted
at source abroad or to ofiset the deduction against tax due in the country of
r,esidence. The investor is thus assured of not having to sufier double taxation.
Its, moreover, such securities may be held anonymously, there are opportunities
frcr tax evasion by the holders. This is something of which the various governments
are naturally aware. It would, however, be going too far to consider it the decisive
fractor in the development of Euro-bonds.
f'he various combinations applied have moreover o{fered investors ample choice
bet'ween various  currencies  (2) and have enabled them to spread thek portfolios
both geographically  and {rom the risk point of view. Another incentive to purchase
s,uch securities may thetefore  consist in the investors'  desire to protect themselves
against the possibility of devaluation of their own currency. It cannot be ruled
out, however, that the dificulty some investors may have in assessing the exact
s,:ope of the monetary clauses  may sometimes have led them to an unduly broad
itrterpretation of the extent of the advantages  ofiered. In point of fact, the investor
iri protected against possible changes in the parity of certain currencies, but not
a,gainst erosion of the currency due to rising prices.
B) DEVELOPMENT OF EURO-BOND  ISSUES, AND GOVERNMENT POLICIES
31. Although the place of issue is only of minor importance, given the interna-
ti.onal character of the is.suing syndicates  and the purchasing public, the physical
location of the Euro-bond market in certain countries gives the financial centies of
(t) lhis is not the case with Japanese  loans, interest  on which is subject to deduction  at source
irr Japan itself.
('?).In Chapter  13 (exchange risks) the ways in which the exchange risk is split between holders
and issuers of international bonds are examined in detail.
198these countries a number of advantages. The market does in fa-ct bring local
{inancial intermediaries  a good deal of additional  business, thereby helping in
particular to improve the Jperating conditions and profitability of their "issues"
departments.
This is particulady the case in the Luxembourg  centre, as it once was in the Swiss
centres.
As reeards London and New York, where the reputation of the existing  financial
i".ri ,iiionr was a decisive Qactor in the location of the international  market,
Euro-bond issues have provided an opportunity to continue issue activity for
ior.ign account which would otherwise have been radically reduced. Considerations
;i;;;G.  ;;i  the "invisible" earnings {rom this activity have been enough by
themselvEs to vrin official favour in the countries where these markets are
established.
Another reason for the oficial blessing  is that the Euro-bond market cannot exeft
an adverse influence  on the country's 6alance of payments because of arangements
;'ilhl;-ptJi;;  Jir.o.rr"g. resiients  from pariiiipating on.the market: supply
unJ J"rurrd,  as already notId, come mainly from non-resident  issuers  and investors'
ir1f.. U"i,.d States,'rince the introduction of the interest equal,ization tax, and in
;*-t;it.i  Ktrg;;;; on account of a high dollar premium, resident investors have
no inducement to buy Euro-bonds. Tf,e appreciable influence of the American
r"ttroriii.r on the d.ir.lop-.nt of Euro-boni  issues is also attributable to the
;;;;;;;  oi uoi"nr-y_ r^estraint, more particularly .its encouragement  of United
btri!, .nt.rprises to find rnot. of their fitttn.. requirements.  abroad,  -which since
i%t; ;  ;;ntioned above, has induced American subsidiaries to rely more on
Euro-bond  issues.
In Germany, since the in6oduction of the 257o withholding  tax (Kuponsteuet)  on
ih" lnt.r.ri on their hoidingr of German bonds, non-residents-  have inclined more
i.*"rit  it-r. b.,,,tr.h. Mark" flotations of foreign borrowers  which are not subiect
i. ,irit a.J"ction. ConseC"."tty,  their investrients no longer conffibute to swell
i-oor* of capital, in " -un".t considered  undesirable on account of the already
iil;;1";."ii-plv*."tt  surpl.rr. on the other hand, German  enterprises have -f#ifr.ir 
prrt been'induced to borrow on the Euro-bond market thanks to the more
attractive'conditions  it ofiered than the domestic  market'
In Luxemboufg, there are no regulations preventing. Iuxembourg investor.s from
subscribing to Euro-bonds. But in pfactice--the problem does not arlse' tor the
L;;;;;'rg  investing p"Uti. is uaditionally veiy consetvative-with.reg.ard..to
f;iiliffir.-  ftt.r"" ale alro restrictions on the extent to which the leading
i.rriiltionul investofs, and in particular the insurance companies and the State
Savings Bank, may invest in foreign securities'
32. The attitude of the other Member States has sometimes been more cautious
esoeciallv  so in the countries which, desiring to maintain firm control over their
."ii "f}"rt 
etr, h"ve found how aimcult ii is to follow an autonomous policy
*f,." 
-,tr" g"tojbona issue market and the domestic market ate aheady so tightly
enmeshed.
r99But, in the first place, it would be diffcult for these States to preclude their
e:rterprises from placing Euro-bond issues, which are a profitable source of finance:
to do so would risk putting them at a disadvantage compared with foreign
competitors who do make use of the market. Furthermore,  these resources supple-
rnent domestic funds; if potential demand for capital on the bond market of a
i\lember State exceeds the available supply, the diversion  of some of the demand
t<l foreign markets or to the Euro-bond market improves the situation on the
internal  market by giving greater scope for other issuers to draw on it.
Secondly, investors resident in the Member States are as a rule free to participate
in the Euro-bond market, since the securities  are quoted on the Luxembourg  stock
e:<change  immediately  after issue and the total liberalization in force for quoted
securities thus becomes applicable to purchases on the Euro-bond market. Ho*ever,
certain resrictions are imposed 
- 
formallv or informallv 
- 
on Member State
b:mks participating in issuing syndicates,  pariicularly as regards the extent to which
they may advertise  such issues. The aim is obviously to prevent  Euro-bond  issues
from encroaching too deeply on the domestic  market.
B. THE EURO-BOND MARKET:  CURRENT  PROBLEMS
,4) RECENT  TRENDS  AND MARKET  BALANCE
3.3. _ Duling 1965, American companies,  among others, stepped up their recourse
to the Euro-bond market. combined with the general upward movement of
interest rates, this at times caused log-jams reflected in difficulties  in the placing of
issues and, a_t- the beginning of L966, the withdrawal of some issues previously
announced. If too many issues were again made on the market, these iifficulties
might become even more acute since the relatively limited public for them has
already acquired ,a sizeable portfolio. A saturation  problem might thus arise, at
least for a period, to point the need for timing of iniernational issues.
Tlnere can be no certainty that the financial institutions participating in the issuing
syndicates will invariably _be able to gauge the market's absoiptive capacity
accurately and avoid overloading it.  An error here could have- unfavourabll
repercussions on price movements on the secondary  markets,  which would ulti-
mately have the most regrettable  consequences  as regards the future of such issues.
The idea of establishing  a queue for Euro-bond issues has occasionally been mooted,
but it is hard to see what sort of authority could be assigned  the task in question.
However, it would be quite in order for the representatives  of market authorities,
at the periodic meetings advocated above, to extend their agenda to a study of the
trr:nd of the international market and make general recommendations  concerning
recourse to it, so as to assist in regulating the timing of Euro-bond issues.
B) LONG-TERM  BALANCE OF THE EURO-BOND  MARKET
3qt. rt is obviously very difficult to gauge the absorptive capacity of the Euro-bond
mrarlet; its limits, which were beginning to become apparent, have been extended
by the vogue for convertible bond issues.
2A)The pronounced success scored by the latter on the international market enabled
a number of concerns, and in particular  subsidiaries of American companies,  to
bonow for a time at relatively low rates of interest. None the less, these rates,
too, have risen, and the prices of several convertible bond loans are now well
below par. As this price movement is also associated with the market behaviour of
the shares of the issuing company, however, it should not be concluded that the
fall is evidence of saturation of the European market with convertible  bonds. In
general, the diversification of the securities offered - 
as shown, for instance,
in the recent appearance of relatively short-term lsans 
- 
and the higher yields may
atttact new classes of European  investor to this market - 
and also, for that matter,
new purchasers from non-Community  countries. The supply of capital available
for investment on this market may therefore  expand further.
At the same time, the increasing  cost of capital raised on the Euro-bond  market
is nullifying one of its principal attractions for certain borrovrers. It  is also
doubtfuf whether American enierprises will continue to make the considerable
financial sacrifices involved in borrowing at rates well above those ruling in their
ov/n country. It is possible that they will prefer to finance their foreign subsidiaries
by means oi issnes of shares - 
by holding companies combining all their European
interests - 
which 'would appreciably lighten the pressure on the international
bond market.
35. \While these are the prospects for the development of supply and demand on
the Euro-bond  market, it must be noted that its future will also depend on an
improvement in the markets on which securities cumently in circulation are
negotiated.  One of the main sources of anxiety concerning  this market stems from
thJ use various financial institutions participating  in the issuing syndicates may have
made of short-term  funds raised on the Euro-dollar market. The recourse itself
'would give no reason for concern provided it was only a question of purely
temporary utilization to facilitate the orderly placing of an is_sue. However,-it_is
frequently claimed that, through this expedienl,  an appreciable_ prop-ortion of the
securities-in  circulation  is in fait being financed on a permanent  basis by short-term
bopowing. If this is so, the vulnerability of this form of_financing  might in certain
circumsta-nces  give rise to sudden pressure on the secondary market and thus to a
slump in prices.
36. This source of weakness  in the Euro-bond market is not unconnected with the
failure of institutional  investofs to move onto it in strength: the latter have been
able to conuibute only a meagre amount of funds, at least during the early part
of the market's existince, an-d the quality of placings has consequently often
sufiered. A more favourable trend appears to be developing of late - 
witness the
gtowing volume of dealings and the increase in arbitrage.
\X/ithout this latest trend, it might have been feared that the combination of these
shortcomings  of the secondary Euro-bond  markets would in the long run hamper
the placing of new loans. It might also be useful to encourage  a more active
marliet in ihese securities by quoting them on a numbef of stock exchanges,  more
particularly in the bonowet's country.
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:17. \0hereas  the interpenetration  of the markets of the various member  countries
has been relatively slow, the Euro-bond issue market has developed more rapidly
arnd has been fulfilling certain functions which would properly belong to a European
rnarket in fixed-interest secutities. There are, however, a number of defects in its
functioning  that need attention.
llhe following observations and recommendations  may be made:
1, ) The Euro-bond issue market has enabled borrowers in the Community to find
siupplementary resources relatively cheaply; it is unlikely that the same volume of
capital could readily have been obtained on the Member States' markets.
ll) Euro-bond issues have led to co-operation  between the financial institutions  of
Community and non-Community  countries, and this has enabled the former to
develop certain methods of issuing and placing securities which have proved
efiective on markets outside the Community. At the same time, the usefulness
of competition  between issuing syndicates and its beneficial efiects on the cost of
loan capital have been demonstrated.
;i) It has also been seen - 
when Euro-bonds  have been issued - 
that an
international  market can adapt itself perfectly to a multiplicity of financial centres
and does not require the concentration  of all operations  in a single focal point.
,l) Various  procedures for overcoming the obstacle  inherent in the exchange risk
have been tried out on the Euro-bond market, which has also helped to popularize
the use of devices such as the convertible bond, the kind of bond likelv to atftact
,videt sections of the public to the market.
ji) It has not been possible to avoid overloading the market at certain periods, and
this - 
with interest rates generally  rising - 
has seriously  disrupted the operation
of the market.
(i) Moreover, the secondaty  Euro-bond market has in the past shown signs of
instability, due to:
i) The financing of an appreciable  proportion of the securities in circulation by
short-term borrowing on the Euro-dollar  market;
ii) The relatively small-scale  participation  of institutional  investors, who have
been able to "absorb" foreign-cunency bonds only within narrow limits;
jiii) The lack of "uansparency" of the secondary  market and the low level of
rltbitrage business. In this connection there may well be a case for allowing Euro-
bond issues to be quoted on a number of financial markets, more particularly in
the country of the borrower.
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STRUCTURE OF EQUITY MARKETS
Intoduction
L.  Equity markets  are facing similar problems  in the various Community countries.
The annual volume of equity issues in these counuies is far from negligible:  the
average figure for 1960-65  was $2 500 million, compared  'with a little more than
$1 000 million in the United States (Table 22). However, even on this impressive
scale share issues have not suficed to restore the financial structure of European
enterprises  thrown out of balance by the shortage of own capital. This fact and
its consequences,  discussed in Chapter 2 (sec. I7), are clearly reflected in Tables 10
and l"l" on sources of external finance and the financial sffucture  of enterprises.
Another point is that the trend of issues has been very inegular, with appreciablg
fluctuations from year to year prompted by varying conditions on the stock
exchanges.  The risk capital market is not, then, as reliable a source of funds as
business firms would wish; this is due in part to defects in the machinery of the
secondary  markets, to be discussed in the next chapter, but also to structural
problemi afiecting both the supply of and the demand for capital on equity
markets.
Although the Group concenuates its analysis on problems connected with the
develop=ment of a European capital market, it has had to touch on some of the
problems of the various member  countries' markets: more than in any other sector
bf th. capital market, the integration of equity markets is leavily dependent on
an improvement in the working of each of the national markets.
This chapter is therefore divided into two parts:
i) The first deals r.vith ways and means of improving the supply of capital on the
markets by an increased 
- 
contribution from institutional  investofs and by an
adjustment of tax legislation;
ii) The second discusses how the terms and techniques of issues of industrial
securities can best be adapted to the pteferences of European savers.
I. Supply of capital on equity markets
A. THE SHORTAGE OF PRIVATE CAPITAL  AND THE POSSIBLE
CONTR/BUTION  OF /NSTITUTIONAL /NYESTORS
2. Traditionally,  the share market has been considered largely the preserve -of
private investors regularly seeking investment  outlets on stock exchanges.  Under
present circumstances this is no longer valid. The reasons for this change - 
mainlythe redistribution of incomes and the public's growing interest in other, sometimes
speculative forms of investment 
- 
have often been discussed. The problems
encountered today arise because not all countries have as yet created the conditions
nLecessary  to ensure that the traditional clientele of the share market is succeeded
Lry new classes of saver and by institutional  investors.
llhe _inadequate supply of capital from private investors,  especially those in the
middle-income  brackets,  is also explained  by the fact that the finaniial institutions
they us ',ally deal with (savings and other banks) are not always capable of - 
or
perhaps have no interest in 
- 
turning their customers'  attention tovrards equities.
such use of their customers' savings would in fact compete with other forms of
investment more remunerative to the bank, as for instance  deposits,  which can be
r,ein_vested profitably, or fixed-interest  securities, which norrnally earn the inter-
mediary a higher commission.  Another factor is that in continental Europe
stockbtokers and other dealers are not organized in such a way as to facilitate
contacts_ with the public 
^t 
large. As for iivestment  consultants,"they are still far
rr3moved from the developed stage they have attained on the capital markets of
srcme non-member  countfies.
F)uropean counffies are thus at present  sufiering from a manifest dearth of financial
intermediaries with suficiently wide contacts udth the public to allow them to
provide advice and assistance'in share investments.
T'his situation alone could not account for the anaemia which aflicts the equity
markets of most member counffies, if institutional  investors, for their part, wer-e
c,lntributing handsomely to the supply of capital on these markets. It ii precisely
here, however, that a fundamental  stuctural weakness of most of the European
g,quity markets_lies:  institutional investors are still not contibuting enough capital.
It is a very difierent story in Britain and the United States, where ihese institutions
dominate the field.
I:n the Nethedands, institutional investors  purchased on average over the years
fr:om 1960 to 1965 more than 757o of newly issued equities, bur in the other
crruntries the fragmentary data available  suggest that their contribution seldom
accounts for more than 207o.
T'here is no doubt that the institutional  investors  are best suited to manage the
savings of a tarye section of the public with no practical experience of direit and
jrrdicious investment in equities.  Hence, if the slare markel is to receive any of
the savings of large segments of the population which now keep away from it,
the activities of certain intermediary  institutions which collect savings ind invest
them on the basis of sound marker analysis need to be stimulated.
Intermediaries of this kind are even more important for investments abroad, since
k.nowledge  of foreign stock-exchange  techniques and of the quality of foreign
securities is possessed by few private individuals.  The institutional  investors
tlrerefore have a key role to play in the interpenetration  of European markets.
Unfortunately2 mainly as a result of regulations  conrolling their activities,  the
institutions of this type in EEC countries  are too often reitricted both in their
ellorts to atftact fresh funds and in the investment of these funds in shares,
zct4particularly foreign shares. Thus, there is a danger that these institutions,  so lar
from promoting market integration, may in certain  cases act as a bartier between
their customers  and the markets of the other member counffies  and consequently
help to isolate the markets.
There are three groups of institution with difiering sets of problems:
i) Investment  companies (open-end  and closed-end);
ii) Insurance and provident institutions;
iii) The savings-bank  networks.
.4) INVESTIVIENT COMPANIES (')
3.  At the present time, the legal status and rules of operation of investment
companies difier substantially from one Community  country to another. The
German, Belgian, Luxembourg  and Dutch open-end  investment  funds have much
in common, but there are substantial difierences between this type of institution
(similar to the American  mutual fund and the British unit trust) and the French
soci1td d'inuestissernent i capital aariable (SICAV),  introduced at the end of.19$.
The closed-end investment  companies  are still of great importance in France and
the Nethedands, as they ate in Great Britain. In the Netherlands, moreover, the
most widely used formula is a special one, combining the status of a closed-end
company with the practical operaiions of an open-end fund. Thus one or other of
the arrangements has thrived, depending on the countfy, and in certain countfies,
like the Netherlands and France, both types of institution may even co-exist' In
Italy, on the othet hand, pending the establishment of legal arrangements- for
open-end funds, there is at ptesenr  only one investment company,  and it is of the
closed-end type.
In 1964, the assets of investment companies, expressed as a pefcentage oj market
value (2), were about 5.57o in France,  3.7%o in Germany  and 2.3%o in Belgium (').
The Netherlands is the EEC country with the highest percentage: 8.2. In the
United States, Great Britain and Japan, the percentages  afe appreciably  higher
than in the EEC counries. This slggests that these companies still have growth
prospects in most Community  countties,  although the resources attracted by them
are already  considerable.
Through the international movements of capital, they- involve, the oper-ations of
investirent companies have already forged strong links between the caojtal markets
of the Community and with those of non-member countries.  These links are of
(1) Except  where qualified as " open-end " or " closed-end ", the term " investment  companies ",
as usedin this repbrt, is to be understood  as denoting both categories'-
1r) A; thi, rutio "i* 
iakes account of the companies'-investment  abroad, it is used here solely
aj a pointer to the growth o{ the investment ,companies  and not as an indication of theit con-
tribution to domestii capital markets. (See Table 24: Assets of investment  companies 1960-64).
(3) For Belgium, it should be borne in mind that some of the funds managed by Belgian banks
are incotporated  in Luxembourg.
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securities and on the other from the distribution of their shares or certificates
among foreign savers.
Iroreign investments  account for a particulady high percentage of the net assets of
these organizations  in the countries where the range of domestic securities is too
narrow to allow of a satisfactory spread of the portfolio. This is the case in all
the Benelux counuies: in 1964 foreign investments  accounted fot 57 to 607o
of the total in the Netherlands and Belgium, and the percentage was still higher
in Luxembourg. on the other hand, it is only about 307o in France and as little
as 167o in Germany (1). These ate, of course,  averages calculated on the basis of
tlhe assets of all the open-end  and closed-end companies; some of these specialize
in foregn securities, others confine their invesiments to domestic  securities.
lJthough  the figutes for France and Germany are relatively low, it should be noted
tlhat the investments of these companies  abroad account ior a high proportion  of
overall gross investment of residents in foreign securities,  viz. about a quarter in
()ermanyand a half in France in 1962, the only year for which comparative  figures
arc available.
Flxtension of the activities of these organizations  raises various types of problem:
harmonization of investment rules, rerioval of obstacles to the saii of thiir shares
or -certificates,  alignment of their rules on management, information for the public
and supervision,  and lastly taxation problems.
4.  Although their legal status difiers appreciably  from country to country,  invest-
ment companies in Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands have
comparable  opportunities for purchasing domestic or foreign securities, since the
rtigulations  with which they must conform entail no practical restrictions in respect
of the origin of the securities which they may acquire. In France, on the other hand,
tlre rule requiring the SICAVs to hold 307o of their portfolios in bonds denominated
in francs does in practice tend to limit investment in foreign securities. In
Italy, if. the provisions  authorizing the constitution  of open-end investment funds are
arJopted in the form proposed in the bill on joint-stock companies,  they will be
er/en more restrictive  than those applied in France, for the proposal is to authorize
investments  in securities listed abroad, but not on an Italian stock exchange, only
up to a limit of I07o of the assets of the funds. Although it is planned to allow
u:nrestricted  purchase by these institutions of foreign securities quoted on Italian
stock exchanges, this proviso seems to have no practical value at the moment since
n,c foreign securities  are currently listed on Italian stock exchanges.
The sale of investment companies' certificates  or shares in member countries other
than those in which the companies  are registered is also hampered by a variety
of obstacles.
(t) The ratio quoted for the Netherlands refers to the ten main Dutch open-end  funds for
which statistics are available. The figure of )\Vo given for France is for 7963 and probably
exaggerates the position, since it concerns  only the fi{teen main closed-end  funds and loes noi
take account of France-Obligations, the_iqclusion of which would lower the percentage.  The
investments  jg f-orgign securities_  by " SICAVs " set up since then have, in most cases, not
exceeded 30Vo  of. their assets. -The ligure of 16,% for Germany refers to investments in foreign
shares in 1962, the last year for which a breakdown  of the investments of German funds -of
this type u'as published  by the Bundesbank.
206These include exchange-control  restrictions and administrative  barriers connected,
for example,  with canvassing for business. The protection of the saver's interests
invoked io justify these reitrictions, however, need not entirely preclude their
abolition. if 
-certain 
measures of harmonization  in connection vrith disclosure and
supervision are adopted. This vrill be discussed more fully below.
A case in point today arises in connection with the above-mentioned  obligation
imposed foi StCAVs to hold 307o of their assets in bonds. The authorities  rule
thii to be incompatible  with unrestricted introduction  into France of certificates
of foreign op.tt-.nd funds, which are not subject to the same obligation. .To the
extent thut ih. French authorities maintain this position, it is desirable that the
obligation  should gradually be relaxed in order to eliminate the obstacle it presents
to fiee circulation  of open-end fund certificates throughout the Community.
In other cases, the dificulties are of a more practical  nature, arising because the
scope of expansion  of open-end funds is largely determined_ by the sales network
plaied at their disposal-by financial establishments.  The fact that a number of
European open-end-funds  have been set up by international  banking consortia has
facililated dlfiusion of their units in all the Community  countries and in some non-
member countries. On the other hand, the close link in certain counffies between
the funds and the financial institutions managing them may have inhibited the
distribution in these countries of certificates of foreign funds. Stock-exchange
dealing in certificates  of open-end funds should therefore be considered  a welcome
develo"pment,  for it may help to free the funds of this dependence  on sales networks.
There 
^is 
already much business done in these certificates on the Amsterdam,
Brussels and Luxembourg  stock exchanges.
).  Expansion of the activities of investment companies throughout the Community
would be encouraged  by alignment of the rules governing their management,
information for the public and supervision.
It has been noted that, in the countries where there are both funds disffibuting
income only and funds distributing  capital gains on sales of securities  a5 rvslrl, the
latter have had more success with the prr-bli.; in the "profits" distributed,-the
public does not always seem to distinguish very clearly between the portfolio
i.rcom. and capital gain elements in the distribution. Since in certain counffies
(Belgium and Francel the distribution of these capital B_ainsis at present forbidden,
it is"likely that harmonization  of the regulationi on disffibutions by these {unds
rvill be required eventually. In any case, it is essential that the .qubli_c should
always have at its disposai the information  enabling it to make this distinction
clearly.
The obligations  of investment  companies  concerning info_rmation to be supplied
to the p"btic also vary widely in extent from one member country to another.
Improviments  here would help to inc-rease the_pyblic's _co_nfidence in this.type.of
invlstment and hence the sales of certificates  and shares. lWith a vievr to facilitating
comparison,  there is also a case for harmonizing the presentation  9f the information
alreadv available in most of the member  counties, particularly  information on
chanees in assets of the funds, analysis of their portfolios, management  charges,
and iale and repurchase prices of certificates'
2076.  Lastly, harmonization  of the supervisory  arrangements to which investment
companies are subject in the various countries is also required. At present, these
,:ontrols difier-very widely within the EEC, deriving in some case fr-om legislative
provisions  a_nd in others from administrative or purely professional  regulations.
.Fundamental  criteria for the protection  of savings shouldbe agreed  and esiablished,
though alignment on the strictest rules is not desirable. Regulation of the
r:ommissions charged by the.managers  of open-end funds is a pariicularly  delicate
point and should be approached with due regard for the problem of appiopriately
rcewarding  efforts made in promoting this form of investment.
'fhese harmonization  measures would remove all need for the resffictions  now
imposed. in certain countries on the disribution of the certificates of foreign
open-end  investment {unds. At prese-nt these restrictions are held to be justifiId
by the need to protect the interests of savers.
:7. Tax attangements for investment  companies arc a vital factor in  their
development.
r\  detailed examination of the relevant arrangements in the various member
countries will be made in Chapter 14, which deals with tax problems. It will
sruffice to note here that "transp_arency" is a basic requirement in this field, both
ert domestic and at international  level.-
On the domestic plane, the aim should be that investment income lansmitted
through these companies should enjoy the same fiscal treatment as if it had been
clirectly paid to the individual investor. Once tax transparency on these lines
r;sas assured within each member country, partial hatmonization of the fiscal
treatment of institutions  engaged  !n_ th9 colleitive management of savings in the
Community would be an accomplished  fact. Howeverf complete harm"onization
'oitould also require alignment of the systems of taxing operatioirs in securities.
Itl international level, the main problems arise in connection with the application
c'f bilateral double-taxation  agreements  to_ income received and distribut"J Uy
investment companies, in particular when the county in which the income arisei
t.he country in which the company operates and the- country in which tt " o*"..
o'f the shares or certificates resides are difierent. The principles governing the
traxation of such income vary from one country to another.  ^It 
may eveln happefr that
a tax department  takes as criterion the real origin of the iniome for'jomestic
companies,  but.only.the apparenr  orig-in, that of the country where the company
ir; domiciled, when the company is a foreign one. The diffeiences in withholdinj-
tax arrangements lie at the heart of most of the difficulties encountered.  Doubie
or even triple taxatiol mly result from the_complexity  of the situations arising
and from divergences in the interpretation of the-agreements.
Clomplete neurality-u/ould  be obtained if the real origin of the companies'  income
and the residence of the beneficiaries of distributed income were tafen as criteria.
a:nd the nationality  _of_ the companies were ignored, since all they do is transfei
income. But, as will be shown in chapter L4, there would be ierious technical
dificulties in the application of this prin-iple, and the Group feels that an adequate
208solution to the problem can only be found in the framework of a multilateral double
taxation agreement,  con;ining specific provisions  for institutions collectively ad-
ministering savings.
B) INSURANCE  AND PROVIDENT  INSTITUTIONS
8.  As in the preceding chapter, the study of these institutions  must concentfate
on life-assururi. .o.p?ni.r.' titit  is jusiified by qh. importance an increased
;;;tH;;;;i;.ti,tt;-ih.i,  putt would have for. the equitv market, qd bv *'
;,ri.l;;dirtion to which these investments are often subject. today. Obvb",:lt;
,o-. ofifr" principles laid down in the following  s.ections could equallv. be,an9{1d
to insurance and p?ovident institutions other than life-assufance companies (notably
to pension funds).
Broadly, it may be said that, while the contribution of life-assurance- companies. to
the fi*ed-i.rt.r"rt-r..rrriti., markets is appreciable in all the m-ember countries,
iir.ir-p"i.ir6.t oi .q"iries are mor. -bd"tt, either because.of the restrictions
o" ilril tind of inu"tt.n.ni or because o{ the management's cautious  -approach to it'
ifrrr'"ppfi.t.tp".idtv r",t" inu.r,-ent of techniial reserves:  for the:ryl"n::j
of their o*n ,^"rorrr.Lr, *ort companies pursue a more flexible policy with regard
to investment in equities'
InGermany,forexample,investmentinsharesmustnotexceedl0Toofthe
il:;;;''r..tt"iJ  t.i.ru.r, und it is allowed only for exchange-listed  shares,
;;;h";,  i"r,yti.tr there are regulated unoficial dealings, that.are fully paid up
;;i-h;r.ti.iJi,  ut le"rt eq,ral"to the capitalization rate applied by the companies
(the "technical  interest rate").
In France, the scope for investment in equities, still limited by. the requirement to
;i;;.;;Gr;r->Oqi of technic"l reserves  i-n "first-category  securities", has indireitly
"u*" *ri"".J[;-"-;.f;;-itrirod"."d in 1966 and-exiending th,e r.afge of first-
catesorv investments  to include,  on special  terms and conditions and within specihed
ii-i[r. ina"rrri^i d.U.nt"res, mortgaie  loans and the shares of real-estate  investment
;;;;;il-;ii;a-;tilh 
-#.. 
pi"iiously in competition with equities for the
insuiance  companies'  investible  funds'
In Belsium, investment in shares is permitted' up to I57o of actuarial  reserves'
pt"tla?Jrt;;  ;h;;.r in Belgian companies  meeting certain special  conditions.
In Italy, investment in equities was subject to special authorization hy thg
*"p.ruiJor' authorities "n,ii iSg:. At present, insurance co.mpanies  are allowed
;;;;ffi;il-;i;;;r  of Italian .ornpuni.t that have been listed for at least five
u"r'tr. itt.r. investments,  which compete with investment in industrial debentures,
il;'";;-;;;;"i  lt% of the comfany's  actuarial reserves and must allow an
adequate spread of risk'
The two extfeme cases afe Luxembourg, where the insurance  companies are
,,of uilo1y"d to invest in equities at. all, and the Nethe4ands,  where they. ate
subiect to no restrictions, though they do make a point of complying with principles
re.ommerrded  by a supervisory authority, the verzekeringskamer.
2099.  The criteria laid down in the often very restrictive  arrangements  governing
life-assurance companies'  investment in equities are open to criticism from severaf
points of view and are now being gradually revised, as examples given above
show. It now seems hardly correct to claim that the saver's intereJts can best
be protected in all circumstances by investment in fixed-interest  securities, sound
though they are. At present  there are signs of a move towards more flexible rules
for the administration  of insurance company  reserves.
The risks that share investment  necessarily entails should not be an insuperable
barrier to liberalization of the regulations  concerned. By wide diversificaiion of
share portfolios, efiecled directly by the insurance  company or indirectly through
the purclase of certificates of open-end  investment  funds, it is possibli for tLe
risks of fluctuation  of the value of these portfolios to be contained within accept-
able limits.
Moreover,  giving life-assurance  companies  more generous  powers for investment
in shares, would probably enable them to attract new liinds of customer and
would thus help to support this form of contractual saving, from which savers
s_eem to be turning away in certain countries. They could ofier policies geared to
the trend of equities, as they akeady do in the Netherlands, foi example, where
companies investing  their reserves in investment  companies' shares or certificates
can in this way ofier policies in which the assured sum is linked by an index to
the ffend of the securities managed by the investment companies.  Similar policies
can be taken out in France too. Many difierent ways could be devised of gearing
policies more or less directly to the equity investments of an insurance  company;
and they would probably attact new customers who are not interested in the
present formulas, based largely on fixed-interest investments.
The Group therefore  considers it desirable, both for the development  of contractual
saving and fot the widening of equity markets, that life-assurance companies should
be authorized to make use, alongside the present contract arrangements,  o{ new
and more flexible devices. It feels, however, that these new arrangements, and
especially  the types of investment permitted for premiums  collected in this way,
should be clearly determined in advance and made clear to policyholders  so th;t
they have full knowledge  of the special  conditions involved.
10. If the investment banks of life-assurance companies were broadened in this
way, an important contribution would be made to integration of European  share
markets.
At the present time, the restrictive regulations  applied by member countries to
investment in shares (see sec. 8) generally include additional  limitations on invest-
ment in foreign shares.
ln Germany, all- share ilvestment- is suljegt to special authorization,  though there
:is greater flexibility{or domestic  shares fulfilling certain criteria. In Francelforeign
shates can be purchased  by insuran_ce companies only if they are quoted on"a
.French stock exchangei apart from this, there are no iestrictions othei than those
applicable  to investment in French shares too. In Belgium, investments in foreign
r;ecurities 
- 
shares and bonds
J:eserves; this limitation is of course associated with the one alreadv mentioned
it10concerning  investments  in shares in general. To be eligible the fo-reign shares must
in additioi figure on a list submitted by the insurance company_and  given ministerial
approval. Ii  Italy, investments in-foreign shares are still subject. to special
auihorization, but ihis is practically automatic when foreign risks are to be covered.
The situation in the Nethedands - 
where life-assurance companies are completely
free to invest technical reserves in shares - 
and in Luxembourg - 
where they
are prohibited from doing so - 
calls for no further comment'
Two arguments have often been put forward to justify the relatively unfavourable
treatme;t of investment in foreign shares compared  with domestic shares. First,
it is argued that it is more dificult for insurance  companies to assess the quality
of forefun shares; and secondly,  such investments are held to involve an erchange
risk, uiess the company  is in-fact seeking to cover commitments expressed  in the
,u-"..r.r"rrcy. These i*o urgu."nts arJ hard to accept. In the fitst place,.the
leading foreign securities are almost certainly  sounder than some domestic  securities
the pirchase" of which is authorized vrithout any check.on qrrality; nor is. there
anything to pfevent  insurance companies from_ inve-sting_ abroad -through -specialized
institutions, like the open-end inveitment funds, which have a thorough knowledge
of the various markets.  Moreover,  once risk investments are allowed at all it is
hard to see why insurance  companies  should be forbidden to take exchange tisks
at a time when they are running quantitatively bigger risks of fluctuation in the
value of the equities they hold. This does in fact seem to have been acknowledged
in the reform made in Oee in France: commitments accepted in a specific currency
must still be covered by securities  denominated in the same currency, but {oreign
securities quoted in francs on a French stock exchange  are now recognized as
eligible cover for commitments in francs.
The Group therefore feels that the present  difierences of ffeatment between  invest-
ment, i., domestic shares and in otfrer member countries'  shares should be relaxed
so as to allow insurance companies to make their contribution to the -in-tegration
oi .q"ity markets in the Community. Two practical measures could be taken
straightaway without upsetting  established  principles:
i) Paritv of treatment could be introduced for investments in domestic shares and
it itr. i.rrificates of open-end  investment  funds whose portfolios  include foreign
securities;
ii) The distinction between domestic securities  and other member countries'  secu-
riiies could be discontinued, where the latter are quoted on a stock exchange in the
country in which the insurance  companv  is registered.
C) THE SAVINGS-BANK  NET\(ORKS
11. It may be asked whether a capital market contribution  from _the Yvings-
bank system in the form of share investments  is not a practical possibility. Savings
banks iransform their resources  into longer-term investments  in the form of claims
and bonds, and at present most of them are bound by severe festrictions  on their
capacity to hold equities,
In practice, as will be explained  in Chapter  '1.2, onTy the central giro institutions in
Germarry  and the Caisse'des Ddp6ts et Consignations  in France (in the exercise of
2tlcertain of its activities) enjoy relatively liberal powers to purchase  shares. There
rrre difierences  of degree in the limitations  impbsed on rh; savings banks in the
'vario-us countries, but the exceptions to the general ban on investing in shares
irre few. Among  these may be mentioned the power of the Dutch saiings banks
to make such investments  up to a limit of 50%o of their own resources, and a few
exceptions  in favour of the savings banks in Italy, subordinated to the same rules
as the commercial  banks, o{ which more later. These already restrictive regulations
are even more so for investments  in foreign  shares.
lfhe restrictions  are defended  by arguments  referring to the need to protect the
siavet and for special caution in the employment of funds withdrawable at short
notice by depositors. But it is undeniable that, in addition to the objective of
protecting the saver against the risk of loss or immobilization,  these regulations
often also serve to canalize the resources of the institutions  towards the financing
of housing  or inf_rastructural  investments which are considered to deserve priority.
.r\ tevision of these priorities,_ giving greater importance to the finaniing of
"productive"  investment, might lead to some relaxation of the regulations coniern-
ing the savings banks and enable them to make a significant contribution  to the
equity markets. This liberalization process - 
as indicated in Chapter 12
(secs. 24-30) - 
could well be more rapid for the central institutions and the
s.avings banks with cenualized  structure than for the local savings banks.
1i,2. In the immediate future, the savings banks could probably make a major
contribution to the develoqment of equity markets in a way othir than by direct
i:nvestment. In view of the growing resources  available to them, they should
perhaps also aim at helping to intereit the small savers who are their customers
i:n more "elaborate"  forms of investment than they normally  accept, notably invest-
rnent inequities.  In_Germany there is an investment fund--unug"d  by th6 savings
t,anks which has enabled certain resources  to be directed throueli these banks onio
the secutities market. rn France, a SICAV sponsored by the Caisse des D6p6ts et
{}onsignations has just been set up (1966). Its certificaies are distributed t'hrough
the savings banks.
hnother w-al- in which the savings  banks can stimulate security investment by their
customers is by ofiering their services as managers of portfolios and as intermediades
{rrr securities  transactions - 
as in Germany, Italy and the Nethedands.
B;. THE ROLE OF THE B,4NKS
13.. The operations  whifh banks may carry out on the equity markets are subject
to laws and regulations based, in some reipects, on radicallv divergent principles
in the various Member States. In Germany,  the Netherlands  and Luximbourg,
banks are entitled to hold shares on their own account, both as participations  ant
a; portfolio investments;  but in other respects controls over these iransaitions shovr
distinct difierences of emplasis in the three countries. fn France, a distinction
--  more important in its leg-al implications than its practical consequences  - 
is
drawn between  two types of bank: one, the banque d'affaires, is mainly concerned
u'ith ac_quiting  participations and cartying out related' transactions, #hereas the
other, the deposit bank, is not allowed to hold shares, save for as long as is s6ictly
2L2necessary from the technical point of vilw for the placing,of. n9* issues with its
;;;;;lt,;r  where ii it toiai"g or administering  a.portfolio for-a third party,
;i;-;;;ft"  oi ,h. investment oT irc o*n capital and the taking,of  particiqations
i. ;iil'fi"ancial establishments.  Rules similar to those- applied to the deposit
t-unt , i" France ulto o-.."t in Italian and Belgian legislation incorporating, the
banking reforms of the thirties and defining the limits of the operatlons ot these
institutions.
The problems raised by these diflerences of regulation,. ?ld to:t t:p":]t11l-,+^:
oroblem of their posrible incidence on competition within a. .buropean capltal
m"rket, will be examined  in Chapter I?. 9f interest here are the advantages anct
;il;;r6;r  "r 
,tt. two systems^ for the functioning of the equity markets'
14. The arguments advanced fairly frequently nowadays,in favour oi less speciali
)^id"-ii U"i[r *rirfv ,"tr "r 
the coniribution-deposit banks could make to.the
supplv of risk capitai, the widening of the often excessively narrow securltles
*i'r"f3rr"if.";kff il  ;;".i;J  as i  rer,rlt, _and finally.the need lo pre.pa,r: th?
tanks for internitionai competition. It should be added here that the activities ot
;il  b^;L; o" th. .q"i,y--'u*ets would contribgte. appteciably to the integration
"i-,fr.r" -r.t"tt "t'f,ritop.an 
level, since the banks-iould acquire the necessary
k;;kg;-;a  flrrln"t" "tti 
stock-excirange  machinery  in the partner countries more
easily than other investors.
15. However that may be, the risk of loss through falling prices and the risk of
i;-"fili;;;i.r  of capiial inherent in share investment  would prevent the banks
i;;;;;;;il  j i  tutg" proportion  of their resources to this type of investment,
;i;;;  ,il;;;'"..  J"*tiir 
^commitments  to customers.- Subject to observance  of
;d;;;;t"f.t  "f-t"rking 
,".,rrity and,control by the supervisory authorities,
honiever, it should be practical to relax the_ regulations. sufhclently to allovr'  DanKs
to increase their contribution. But the problems which would then arlse - 
ancl
*fri.lr^ *"  "fr!a' 
Jlt..rnibl. in the lountries vrhere these institutions  have
.onria.ru[f. fr".dom to invest on equity markets - 
must also be taken into
consideration.
16. These problems spring mainly from.the conflicts of interest  a b-ank may face
in .""t.iri"g'its  various fun"ctions - 
distributing credit, taking conmolling intere.sts
i" ."i"rprirEs,  r,rnnint-ashare  portfolio, particifating.in issue syndicates, managing
oo**ni investment innds and, finally, acting as adviser to its customers of as
-un.g.t of investment portfolios.
Conflicts of interest could arise between the bank and its business customers,  and
"lt;-l;,*;;" 
the bank and the owners of the portfolios it manages or advises on'
ptort"*l also arise - 
and will be examined in chapter 11 (sec. 46) - 
in
;;;;ii;"  ;ith th. activity of banks as stock-exchange operators,  when they may
at the same time hold shares.
It would almost certainly be going too far to assume that such conflicts of interest
ur. ir.rituUfe vrhen ;;;;  ;h;;;.  of these functions are per{ormed together, for
if-t. i"i.o."a"nce of investment  management departments of banks and associated
ffiidd;';;;ia  G .nr"r.d by strici rules coicerning  management,  information
for the public and suPervision.
213'Ihe fact that in some. of the more_ developed markets institutions  specialize in one
or other of the activities mentioned above does not necessarily mean th u,t tpriiutzi
tion would be the arrangement  best suited to current .oniitiottr on coirtinental
JEuropean  markets, which are manifestly-too  narrow. The situation  might be q"iie
difierent in an integrated European maiket of the future.
-[n short, the possibility. of conflict-s _of interest should be carefully weighed and
$et against the conttibution which fuller participation of the banks'on th? -urk.i could make. Some degree of harmonizatibn  of ihe rules governing tl,. op.rutiont
<lf ,banks on, equity.maikets  in the various member  countrLs r..mJ in.uitiUt.; U"t
<nly a.detaiJed study of.all the advantages  and disadvantages noted in the pasi can
,urow lts character and llmrts to be toreseen-
C. TAX INCENTIVES  TO INYESTMENT IN SH,ARES
,21) MEASURES  TO LIGHTEN TAXATION  oF DIVIDENDS
17. Considerations of yield have probably contributed to some extent to depressing
the supply of capital {or investmeni in shares. Certain fvr.mbet Siutes have tfr.r.f.tE
taken steps to make this type of investment  more attractive.
llhrougholt the period from 1960 to 1964, even when share prices had fallen
appreciably, average  share yields remained low in most of thj BgC countries.
Often-they  were lower than those on American or British securities,  to sav nothins
of yields on_ fixed-interest_  securities,  which are of course i" u ;;;;l.t.ii  jifi;;;;?
categqry. The_ fact that investors tend to be more interested in ihe ptorp..t oi
capital gains than in the dividends paid by Eurooean companies hur tg,lo.tiring io
do with-this;  none the less, low yields have probably discouiaged potential  inu"fio6
in search of regular income.
T'he tendency for- investors to look for capital gains rather than income has often
b,een strenghtened  by taxation  systems  bearing more heavily on distributed income
than on capital gains.
some.Ilember states, aware of these forces,^have  therefore sought to lighten  the
overall tax burden on the distribution of profits and thus to in.riare th. i"t,rrn o.,
the shareholder's  investment. Two systems  have been inroJu..J, in Germanv.  a
lower rate is charged  on distributed  dividends than on unditttibut"J pi"n,r-ij""ijf.-
rate 
. system), which means a tax abatement in the hands of thi compuny; in
Belgium  and France,  a fiscal claim (tax credit) proporrionare to rhe di"id.nd^r..Liu.J
is granted, representing  a tax relief in the handi of the shareholder.
r')espite technical differences, the ultimate objective  was the same in both cases, i.e' to lighten the double taxation efiect deriving from the fact ;h;;, ;h.;;p;;?;; put to reserve were subject only to corporation tax, distributed income was iauEht by that tax and also by personal income tax in'th. hu"jr-of *.-rhur"h;ldil:
Another aim, in these counries, was to lessen the difierenc.,  of fir.ul tr.ut-*i oi
share income and income from bonds.
2141g. There is some doubt as to the eflectiveness of these measures, for their tesults
do not seem to tuu..o*.,rp  io 
"*p".rations. 
Their efiect seems to depend largely
on how prices react to the measurei  at the time of their adoption or subsequently'
ii il;;r';;a;.;;h;  i;;;  il  i;;";"  which will accue to the shareholder,  the
;;"';;;;;g"  i. ."piiulir.J rokly to the .benefit of existing. shareholders, new
rfrrt+"fa-.ir't.irg- i"."J--ith thl same yield.prospects. Only, when the stock
.".t"rU. does noi."ua do., an increase ih yieli become. possible. But even this
;;;;;  that compani.t  ao 
"ot 
udl,rtt_th"'j'  disiribution policies. in a way that diverts
;;;;';i,6.  ,u* r^a""ri"e.r g;;r;d by the authorities to satisfaction of the com-
;il.;i  ;;;;;*  r.i"ir&".nrc. In such cases, which are in fact the most
'#;r;;h.;;;;i.;-;;;d;.y  .ho'.n to ease the tax burden has results that
are not very difierent from thote which would have been obtained from a sffaight-
forward reiuction of the rate of corporation tax'
Broadly speaking,  the double-rate system and the tax-credit system do not difier
much in their impact ;;il;;;.rii.  *utk.t, but this is far from being the case
i;-;;;;J;T  ,f"='i. "d."r'o"-ih.- 
t.ope for'international integration of equitv
markets.
B)DIVIDENDTAXRELIEFANDITSRELATIONToTREATMENToFFOREIGN
Si]AREHOLDERS
19. The main difierence between the two systems described above lies in their
treatment of foreign shareholders'
The double-rate  system  now operating i! Germany.benefits  all distributed  dividends'
wherever  the sharehofi* *rii."  n"? the tax-credit system' at least as-now applied,
il;i;r*;;it  if-r. t.rta*" ;i;h.  country in which it is adopted and bears solelv
on iiuid.ndi 
^.crrring 
to these residents on shates in domestic  companies.
viewed from the efficiency aspect alone, the fact- of reserving the tax reliefs for
the benefit of ,.ria.tritirurih;ie;;;  hur ,(. efiect-of limiting the flow of capital onto
the eouitv market, which the measures are in fact designid to stimulate:  foreign
:il;#ilil;;;"i;;;  *  U*.nt from the tax-credil system' but may actuallv
sufier if the compani"t'--ut r".*t lo harr. often been the iase in France - 
lsduqs
dividend distributionJ b".""* th" shareholders  are also receiving the tax ffedit.
For non-residents, thJ;;;;;  i, h.r.. liabie-to we"ken the returi on these shares
il  l;;  ,h;; u*"y fro- the market. It is, moreover, unlikely that the inducement
;;;;ia;;;t^..ltoU.trior"tt  tot.ig" securities and switch into domestic  securities
;,h 
-iri;h.; 
ui"ld, drr. to this tax concession can sufice to ofiset the injurious
efiect nientioned  above.
20. The efiect both types of measure can have in isolating  markets is more
serious in the.rr. o?,#;;" credit, since it discourages.foreign shareholders  and
at the same time onor-t"Ut,t"rial'inducements to iesidentlnvestors  to.pre{er
atnl..,i. i" fot"ign-rhur"r. The double-rate  system.also  lessens communication
b;;;;  markets,"bu;;;;  tt" .fi..t is limitei to the encouragement it afiords
to inuertors to prefer investment  in domestic  securities.
21521.. Although.there are times when tax measures  may enable company dividends
to be increased, the best way of making share invesiment more attractive is to
improve the general_ conditions  governing the profitability of firms. Moreover, if
a tax benefit granted to shareholders is to be appreciated, it must be understood,
and from this angle the simplest measures  are probably the most efiective: in the
past' measures to increase the return on equities have sometimes  been much too
indirect.
To _prevent the measures  adopted tending to divide rather than unite equity
markets, action should be taken - 
pending harmonization of the various tur-..li.f
systems - 
to organize without delay an arrangement under which the two systems,
the tax-credit and the double-rate system, may coexist. For example, shareLolders
il, domestic  companies who are resident in aiother Community iountry could be
allowed a refund equivalent to the tax credit enjoyed by residlnts.
CONCTUSIONS
22. Action to expand the supply-of  capital on equity markets must principally
focus on raising the conffibution of institutional  investors.
1) The Group therefore recommends:
a) 'With regard to investment companies:
i) T}tat not.only the few surviving limitations on purchases  of {oreign shares should
be abolished, but also restrictions hampering  the distribution of sharis or certificates
.issued by these companies among savers in other member countries;
:ii) That rules concerning.  management, information for the public and supervision
of these companies-should be alig-ned,_with the special  aim of efiminating airy do"bi
as to the nature of the income disributed and bf the conditions undei .hi.h th.
shares or certificates  can be bought and soid;
iii) The achievement of .complete tax transparency, both at domestic and at
international level, in order to prevent income pasiing through these companies
rrom Derng penallzed.
li) tUfiitl regard to insurance  and provident institutions, particularly life-assurance
comparues:
i) That the authodties should reconsider  the rules which - 
for reasons associated
rvith- protection  of the interests of savers - 
have so far hampered  broader action
by these institutions on equity markets;
i:i) That the life-assurance companies should be authorized to ofier policies linked
urith. equity investments or investments in open-end investment  frrndt, alongside
existing types of contract based mainly on invEstments  at fixed interest;
ii.i) That, as an immediate  measure, the distinction between  investment in domestic
s,ecurities  and investment  in- foreign securities listed on a stock exchange of the
crcutttrY in which the institution in question  is registered  should no longe."b. -uJ..
2'.16c) \7ith regard to the savings-bank networks:
i) That, as recommended  in Chapter 9,.local savings banks be allowed to use
;#;iib;.;-,"r-;-iihe-ii;;;;A  ;  ,r'uk" in,'.'t-eits in other rnember counffies
similar to those p.rtniti.Jon-ih. do-"rric market. Investment in shares would
thus also benefit rt.*-it.  r"L""ti*. The central institutions  and savings banks
*i,f, *rr*fir.d ,tr,r.trrr.r l."ta aheady be allovred greater latitude;
ii) That the savings banks be allowed to invest part of their own funds in domestic
or other member .o"n,ri.j-tn*;;;;t""C  the iines followed in the Netherlands;
iii) That savings banks throughout.the community  be author?ed to set up open-
;a il;;t;;.;;f"nar'rnJ-f'uiJie  .har. investments on behalf of their customers
-1t 
th.V do already in some member  countries'
2) The activities that can be carried on by banks on the equity market are subiect
in the vario.r, -.-b.,  -,-r"tri"r to laws 'uJ- t.!"htions often based on radically
divergent principles. th" 6r;"p.i; frliy "*;" 
o't ,f," contribution that the banks
can make to the b;"d."id-if-i"pii'"t  -arkets and the supplvinu of private
enterprise  with risk capital, particularly it tft...tl*  of u f*ut6'E"o"ptutt  market'
;l:;5# ;#'#iltrff;#il;ru'i"' i";i;n;ld ;ight lead to connicts or
interest has to b. .";r;i.;;:  I,-i; ir't.."r.t. not possible"titho"t detailed  studv
to draw conctusions #;;;'dr;;;iit  -J F."ai"g,-  or reducing - 
the rights
ri Urtlt ," take participations  and hold share portfolios'
3) The low yield on -equities  may. have, turned potential investors away from
Community  markets: the tax inceniives adopted-intthree.of the member  countries
in order to give ,r,^r.hoii#;^i;;;!;; yt"td oiuy th"t.fore-increase  the flow of funds
to the markets. Howevef, the rule ,"r._ruini'th.  tax. relief to resident holders of
domestic shares is "'f*;; 
";;;it"; to [..f  th" markets apart and ultimatelv to
,.i"i."il'.'.m]u; ;f^;il-;;r#  t"k.n. ih.  9t-oyp theie{ore  hooes that these
drawbacks  will be eliminated by allowing t;;-illd;t  resident. in bther member
;;;ri.;  advantages.ffi,i"ttit  the taicredit enjoyed by residents'
II. Issues of equities
23.Theproblemsbesettingtheequitymarketsofthemembercountriesarise
;;;  J;  f;-  th. ,t,or,"g. 
"? ."pr,riioi ritk invesrment. The supolv of securities
bv enterprises  does '";1;;;.:J;;^;t;';"il; 
*iil, '"f  i'nt'fl'*ibilitv to the
o^tt.tn of savers' demand either'
In spite of the relative inadequacy of their own resources' Community  enterptises
h;r"";;r;;;i;;t  il;;;;  to place new issues of shares_on  the market to
the extent required ,.;;;;;itth  u tlo"nd n;;*i"i  structure (Chapter 2' II  and
Table 11).
The absence  from stock-exchange lists of the secutities of companies  which, in
view of their size,;;;lJ^;;;.b  h"rr.,gon. public'in other,coun6ies  deprives
ff;;;;;rr..rr'.r  a certain means of .upt"ring the public's interest. The
217:r1,::.'^j"11Ts 
situation are complex  and onry the chief among them can be briefly lndtcatecl hete.
Firms where control is in the hands of a tamily group are often unwilling to have their securities  quoted on the srock exchang= iyl 6p;bri.'-L;*"r" ,t"--u;oriiy
shareholders do not care to run the rirk of-ioring :;";;';rjL"nrg...nts  wish to ensure stable operation.
'A completely  difierent question  is-that of the reluctance of companies alreadv listed to,increase,their  capital when unfavourable marker -raiii"r,'*."iJ .;;;ii'";;r:
'valuation of new shares  oflered to the public and therefore "dilutioni' ,f *.l"ia-G of existing shareholders - 
a situation arisinj rr.q"."ity i" i.i.ir  y.urr.
t{ngthe| reason why companies  seeking  finance prefer loan capital to share issue
IS tnat borrowlng  may well appea! the cheaper alternative becaule of the wav taxes
;11.^-11_.T:g 
u?d pl.rr,.rperience of the tendency for money gradually t. a.pi..i"i.. l-astly, tt is doubtful, given the c_ompetition  which must be-maintained wiifr ottrer j:Ttl1t* fis9a.llr 
.aided, types of investment, whether th. t..h"iq"es used in the rnember countries for the.placing of securities are adap_ted to preserit circumstances,
rvhich call for growing efibrts t5 attract tlr. ,ruio!, o'f ;h.;,iblt onro the marker. '-Lhe Group suggests four difierenr ways of dealirig with thise problems:
i)  The use of preference shares, shares with limited voting rights, and shares with plural voting rights;
i.i) The issue of convertible  debenrures;
ilii) The adjustment of issue controls and of taxation of distributed profits;
i',r) The improvement of the nerworks for distributing  new issues.
4.. PREFERENCE  SHAKES AND SHARES WITH PLURALVOTING RIGHT.S
24. The reluctance of managements  to increase their capital for fear of losing c'ntrol and being unable to lnsure continuity of managem.r, ,nig-fi ;;  ffii; o'ercome by,widening.the  rang.e of securities to'include, ";il?;;; 
or?inury ,i;;;; preference shares urith limited voting rights and ,hr;.;-;;;;i;;  more than one vrrte. Resort to the capi.tal market 5y tfie irr". oi ,".i ;;;ir?.,  would enable large concerns of a family character ,; h;;. trr.ir-,,o.r., j!;h ;;  on rhe market. This could be a welcome development provided 
" f"f;.hri;"rnrp i, maintained br:tween the.rights and. obligations  of ihe various ;.t;;i;;;f  shareholder and more especiallv provided  the -limitation 
of voting^righ;-i:-;;;p*rut.d  bf ;dJ;; hr:lders bf these-shares  genuine rdu"ntuj.,'of u'frnTiiiuf;;;r.;. "
2-r. Preference  shares,,enjoying  priority in the distribution of profits and in the e'ent of the companv's liquidati6n, but conferring  no or only limited voting rights, are known in moit membir "rJ;;r-;;;;;;  .o;,ri.r,}ii,i"er',ire rules apprying tc'them varv fairlv widely. preference rhares are, ot course, i"*ri.j'r",i:ii'iirE
needs o-f.managing gro.'p' r.i..;;  ;;;;;;;.  B";rh;y;;;;i;o"f" or inreresr to shareholders .hos. influince on G -.nr!LL."t,rdl;dp..ri  "r 
rhe companv
2113is in any case negligible and who may attach greater value to the stability of
in.o.. u'tro.iated ivlih this type of shari than to ihe right to vote. Shareholders of
this category include institutional investofs whose participation. in a given company
i, i, .rv ."ent limited to a small percentage of the company's  capital.
In the context of the development of a European  capital market, cer-tain problem.s
;*il;;.  a".ause the official attitude to shaies of this type is not the same in all
;h."-M;il  i,ui.t. Thus, development of their use was tecommended by. the
i;;;  d;mittee in France, and more recently, in an Italian draft for the reform
J-loinrr,o.k-.ompuny-i.gitiution,  which speiifically  provides for a-category of
;ruuing, share" *;oyi"g"preciseiy defined-_privileges,..whereas  in- Belgium.the
il;;;?;"t;;tttotiiio  i.'uppu..ntly hostile to any limitation of shareholders'
voting rights.
These attitudes should be reconciled  so as to preclude disparities in.the opportunities
available to Community firms to draw on th. savings of the public on attractive
;;;;.  A ."mmon b*ir *ight be found by defining the privileges.which future
irr*t 
"f 
iftir ;yd "f 
share sf,ould be awarded to compensate for the loss of voting
;i;h;; -  ; loss that -igtrt p.thups be confined solely to decisions concerning the
da'y-to-day administration of the firm'
26. The question of the granting of plural voting rights is more arguabl.l flT-.
too the r.srrlt is to introduce a distinction between two categones ot shareholder'
*iitr""1 
-,h" 
difi.t.nce of rights necessarily  being accompanied by compensatory
advantages.
\X/ithout  going into the many facets of this.problem,,it  1ay,.be 
suggested h:l: lil:
shares coiferr:ing more than one voting right may also tacilitate resort to the rlsK
.r"i*f -"rket 6v ..tiuin fompani.s,  u'r t[" g.o,rpt already. in conmol would not
;;5i';h#-;;:iti.r1t  iir."r"r,ed.^However, to avoid abuse, the utilization of plu.ral
;;ilLffi';i-,;td 
-;; 
;ilioty li-it.d. If the Member States were to incline
to",uid, r"ecognition oiit-rir lini of share -  ?!d the.legislqtign  o{ some of them is
;;;;;;-r,"tll  ait,in.ri/-r'oriii" - 
the model,mishl well be the rules currentlv
in force in France, .u1t."" ,tr" voting right is dependent 91 th.. length of time a
;i";; ri;;; is heli in one portfoliol  The plural voting right is thus seen not as
l',' ,rUiir*v frivilege but ai a reward for the investor's "loyalty" to a company'
B. CONVERTIBLE  DEBENTURES  (r)
27. The convertible bond or debenture gives the holder the right to convert into
a soecified number of ,"Cui"r uf1e. u fi*eiperiod of time;.^this iight is exercisable
within a given timeJimit  and on terms and conditions specrhed at the tlme ot lssue'
The issue of convertible  debentures has the advantage ovef a.straightforward share
ir*" oi.nuUling a company to raise funds even when stock-exchange prices are
(t) I, h*-.,  b.en thought necess,afy-to  discuss  here -the pos.sible variants of the convertible
i.jfr.",".. [;;G;r;..;  w-ith detachatle  warrants, ..exchangealle  debentures, .etc')'. These all
;;;;;;;";h  lh. ,o-" pt"tt"-t as regards suitability foi a European  capital market.
219relatively low, ro deduct frcm taxable income the interest paid until the time of
conversion  and to defer an increase in capital until a time when it will rro long.t
depress.prices.  In particular, it,allows a cornpany, by means of the conversion  terfis,
to fix -the 
is_sue premium  on the shares at a highei level than would nor-rllv t.
possible with an ordinary  capital increase. compared  with the traditional ,up. oi
bond, the convertible  -variety  has the advantage tirat it usually enables the corripany
to pay a lower rate of interest.
The formula is attractive  to. the type- of investor  who desires a satisfactory return
on- capital  and at the same time a siake in the success of the firm, for it ullo*r lh.
hgldet, during the time between issue of the debenture  and expiry'of the .onu"rtio"
fisht,-t-o benefit from any apprecia4on  of the shares that may o..rrt urrd 6 p;;A;
himself..against the possibillty of depreciation, since in'the latter-.;.;t-rh;
convertible debenture for practical purpbses becomes- an ordinary bo"d *hor. pri..
is related solgly to its yield. Suclr ar investment  therefore  involves  limited risks
and seems ltkeLy to atftact investors most vrhen there is uncertainty as to the
movement of share prices; for similar reasons, the convertible  debenture is also-a
usetul instrument tor interesting savers in 
. foreig-n markets of which they might
otherwise fight shy for lack of knowledge of the shares availabre.
Another important point to stress in the context of market integration is that, as the rules on institutional investment abroad are generally moi. restrictive for
shares than for bonds and as convertible debent,rres"com.-iirto-iL  htt., .ut*oru.
they can be placed with foreign institutional investors *"i.  .mifv 
-;il-;irill:
Consequently,  both among individuals  and institutions, there is a wider market for
these securities than for shates. This fact is r,tpporteJ bt til  success of recenr
convertible  debenture issues in the Member Staies and ih. irr,r., of American
companies on the Euro-bond market.
The Group considers that increased use of this formula, cunently still hampered
:ll ::Tl]l::,y,r-r:ies  by legal ol"tacles-(timeJimit  oJ conversion  ,igtt, no porribiliiy
lft $rstrnguishing  between. "authorized  capital" and "issued .capital";, .o"ld f";;;;
Dorh the wrdenmg and the integration of European markets. As in the case of 'preterence  shares and sh.ares with plural voting rights, harmonization of legal
regulations  on this lvne of security and-of official"attit-ud;;;i;l;"eeded,  i, ";$; to pr-eve_nt  its use bec-oming  particularly widespread in some M.o,b;;-Si;;;, ;;;
l-h."l.l.uiing^.o 
unequal co-petitive .oniition, and distortio"r-o? .upitul ;;;;;; 'ivrthrn the uommunttv.
C. JUPERY/SION  OF /JSUES AND TAXATION OF DIJTRIBT]TED PROFITS
tl8. Although issues-of shares, like those of bonds are subiect in most cases to
control. or p_rior .Suthorization, unlike the latter ,1,.v J"'llt  encounter real
restrictions. It will sufEce to note here that, in Belgiuin and Luxembtu;g;  p;i",
i*,h:ii:lii:r is required for all equity issues,. in 
"France for issues .*L""di'g rr l  mlrlron, rn rtaly. tor operations in excess of Lit. 500 million, in the Netherr
lands tor those exceeding Fl. 10 million and in Germany for issues of convertible
clebentutes and shares with plural voting rights. rh. ii.iihri-ifr.r"  ceilings anJ
220the authorities  responsible  for applying them difier from countfy.to country does
,ot seem likely to .;;.-;t;;;llr  io the integration of matkets within the
Community.
The problem should, however, be considered from anothet' no less impoftant
;i;,';i";;:  r; l#;i;;-t;  "'e".a 
that,_ by granting. interest subsidies,
"*""ih-'n"r# ,*iifif.-^,-J"rrorrrublJrates  and placing vaiious forms of loan
:;il;i#il"irrp*ri  "i.r,t.rprir.r, 
the authoriti.iin to-e coungies had encour-
ased them to run ,rp .rl.*iu. i;il;'  ii-it th.r.fore appropriate to inq'ire. whether
;f;:"rr','.'n"bil'^lirh-*iti;r .o"ta not use the ofte! u.ry tttong hold thev have
ou., tt. financing of ."t.rprit.s  thr_ough loan capital to work for an improvement
of their financial *r.r.r,r"r".I^At"it-"ft"iav  practised noy -and again, patticltTtll:
ii"ivlifr. 
""thorities 
lould stipulate as a condition of their agreement  to a loan
that the enterprise #r;;  i;;';;i;"f;"ffi.i.nrtv to maintain I _!4ll..d 
financial
tlrn.,,rt.,  whi^ch otherwise might be distorted by excessrve  borrowlng'
2g. Equity issues could be efiectively.stimulated- by taxation.measures; at present
,ti  ,^"it*l, of irrrr.Jli "q"iry 
,t*kr, and of dividend distributions  on new
;'hil;;'t";;;;  ,h.-.;J.f11.",1t* ,o the market to a point where it deters some
.ni".ptit.t from increasing their capital'
The problem of indirect taxes will be dealt with in-chapter 14 (sec. 46); that of
direci taxes on distribl,itea p..nir-tt^ th:tat been discuised in secs' 17-21 above'
where certain reservations  wefe expressed ,rr'..rp.., of the advantases accorded to
shareholders in th" ro.io;i;;; i.ii.i, i"t iittri["tli profits. Non6 the less, such
advantaqes are likely"io ;;.iiii;";;-^iliir...tv the issue of new shares, since the
aitia."3-.tt"rg. to th" company is rcduced by these tax reliets'
certain more direct and probably mo_re efiective measures of encouragement  to
irt""t "f t.*  shares could, however, also be considered'
30.Itisknownthat,whencompaniesraisecapitalby.shareissues'theofier
of a net vield often lo,t, tf't- twiie as -"lh ut^it would to resort to credit or
i;;'il',il*il;;a;;u'r'i.v  ,t."ra u uito.u.a, for a given period, to deduct
dividends paid on r.#"r'#;  f"t#^L.it p.ofit 1i^b1. to"corporation  tax; these
dividends would then-b. il;A  on the.same'footing as interest paid to bondholders'
Measures of this kird;;;;i"tt;J";;  i;. a [mitid number of vears in France in
i;;,;i;"t'r1..i-it  i"t.. ""tir th"ni & pes' The Group :::il*t:..1y:
similar temporary -#*.r-.o"ta  U. adopted in other member countries,  where
they might make a -.rr-.r"r .o"tritution to iestoring the balance  between the various
methods of raising ;;;a;-;pioyed  by compuni.r, which for tax reasons too
{requently oPt for loan caPital'
31. It  has also been suggested that .the practice of .distributins bonus shares
instead of - 
or, .u.ii'u.ir".t ii " ti,ip1*i"ff;-  Ji',idendt  in cish provides an
acceptable .orpro*ir."L;rr.;;  the'need for companies. to in*ease their own
caoiial and the d.rir."of" riru."i"fJ".t it t.  ,.-rrrr.tated in a tangible and easily
i.iur?tr.'i";;. ihilp;;.;i;;i;;iiespread among Dutch and American,companies
in oarticular. So-. ii-i"fr.- 
-a..1ur" 
"rto.k diiidends" regularly, others inter-
mitiently.This method has indisputable  advantages, larticularly  _in present circumstances,
when profit,.margins  are narrow and it"is'diffi."ii i" pr".";;;  issues of shares. flowever, diflerences in the fiscal treatment of rto.k diuid.nds raise ..r,uin problems. They are sometimes treared 
"r.ordi*ry 
ji"ia."a airlru"ri""r,^"rl
sometimes as actual capital inueases  nor subject to income ioln tn. rr"rj, lf i-f..
if:-.^fi:,t-|r]1-,1111 
sgmftimes  results in doubre tr"rti"r ,i int.in"tion"t level, but there would seem to be no major obstacre to solving this problem uv lr^r111.i"irl- tion measures.
D. THE DISTRIBUTIVE  NET\Y/ORKS FOR NEW /SJUES (\  AND THE SUPPLYING OF MEDIUM-SIZED  FIRMS WITH'ruSi-CtrbruET
1?^-^li::,191  imrysstble that the difficulties and cost of placing new issues of
::1::"ylrlrrl:f"Ilr: 
may have contributed i! some .ur", to^ti.itifig-ih; f;-.-q*r;; and scale ot such operations; the techniques for disributing  new isiues are ind..i less well developedbn EEC marketr tt"tior rh";;f;;,#r,i',i--".u.,  countries, where institutions  specializing  in ttr" 
"nJ.t*riting 
and placing ot securities ofier companies a wr.de rang-e of sirvices adapted to tfre -;r; ;-ir.';  situations. The
::*:y:,-,-rl+ of capital- increases is a tichnique that ir .ariirr.ry ]ittre used in contrnental -burope, perhaps Secau_se of the nirro*nes, of European markets  and their poor capacity fbr absorbing,  hrg. quantities of ,to.k ;i,hJr, generating ex- cessive price fluctuations. In ruJh circ,rmstances an "nd.;;;i;G 
opEration eitails
l:*1":l:,l1qhrt^:r}r 
which financiar  institutions mav hesitate ." ,-r'r..,-p"iit;;'r".ry If their articles forbid them- to incorporate  the unplaced ,..rrriii., temporarilv in their own. portfolio^s for subsequent  ^sare on the ;;tk.t. 
--H.;.;, 
#;il#l'"#
basrs the Member  states choose to give their all-purpose orup..ialir.J-b"rr.r,-ii is desirable that the regulations on lh.ir security^invlestments ihould allow them suficient flexibility to ait in the placing of share'issues-
The existence of intermediaries  specializing in the underwriting of new issues of shares and in the redistribution of ,;;;;-iri:, pr.rrrppor., u ffi'uolrrme  of issues and above all a substantial contribution t.o-  institutional investors. These conditions are fulfilled in practically none of th. M.-b.i-s.,;;;;;rk.ir, ."*ii.rJ in isolation, and consequently  issuing still has , ,"["Jir",.-pr"* in the activities of credit institutions.  international  -bank 
ltrrrortiu ur. ,rou, L.in! ,., up to pray on the Egrgge.an  market the rote pra_yed by ;;t;-h;r;-ilffi ui] ilu.rr-enr banks rcn the British and Americ"r, .rt(.tr. 'Here is f"rtFr.i *ii"n..  that many ,cf the,operating defects and institutional deficiencies 
""^,r-,.' 
n"ropean markets ,can only be removed by progressive  integration.
'73' The.problem  of supplying risk capital to medium-sized  enterprises  is in some .vavs similar to the above,. though a sorution -iil h;;.1; il^;;;'gil ;;,,g^,ui11., difierent lines. The difficutty is"not, 
"r 
in-irr. r"rt-.rr.,'i"l"oi"Jiu.ing  large new issues on the market without distuibing it and "t ,h;l;;;,"po'.riut. .orr. It is rather one of supplying  enterprises 
"oi y.i uut.-t"'-r*"" ii..:;i;  .  the market
(t) The aspects of this nroblem,concetning disribution through  stock-exchange  machinery  are clealt wirh-in Chapter li  1r..r. 44 and 4gi.
222with the risk capital  needed to balance their financial structure and expand their
business, until such time as they are able to make a more direct approach  to the
market. This need is particularly obvious in those countries  where the business
traditionally  handled by banques d'affaires has, for one leason or another, failed
to develop  normally.
In their attempt to solve this long-standing problem, it is only quite recently that
Community  counries  have done much to create the institutional  background. In
some casei the task has been put in the hands of specially formed institutions
under public ownership, while in others private banks have taken action on their
own initiative.
It has also been suggested that a "European development company"  might help
to solve the problem, especially those aspects more directly  concerned  with European
integration, ty acquiring participations,  stimulating  growth and reorganization, and
unloading its-participations on the market as soon as possible, thus ensuring  thaL
its funds are deployed to maximum  efiect.
Experience gained in this field is of too fecent date for the Group to be. able to
express an oprnlon on the conffibution that such ideas might make to the balanced
development of the European capital market'
CONCLUSIONS
34. Enterprises issuing securities do not always seem to have selected  the typ-e
of security-and  placing technique best adapted to the pattefn of. savers' demand.
Several factors explain the preference  given to borrowing  rathet than capital
increases,  and possible  remedies are therefore to be found in difierent fields.
1 ) The widening of the range of securities offered, by greater recourse, to preference
shares with limited voting rights and, under certain conditions,  to shares  carrying
more than one vote, would enable the difidence of managements anxious to retain
control to be overcome. Use of these types of security requires, however, the
strict maintenance of equilibrium between the changes  introduced in voting rights
and the benefits or restrictions invoh'ed for the shareholder. Harmonization at
Community  level would also be desirable.
2) Convertible debentures enable firms to resort to the market on better terms
than by issuing ordinary shares, especially when market pri,ces are depresse4.  Th,.V
also give holders the chance to benefit from appreciation of the shares while at the
same time protecting  them against the possibility of deprec?tion  and assuring them
a satisfactory yield.- They aie the ideal instrument for a first apqroach  to foreign
markets and-aie also a means of attracting institutional investors, for whom invest-
ment in foreign shares is forbidden.
l)  In the interests of protecting savings and by reference to objective criteria the
authorities should see to it that business  concerns do not incur excessive loan
commitments when their financial structure calls for an increase in ovrn capital.
2234) If, for a given period, firms were allowed to deduct dividends on newly issued
shares from profits liable to corporation tax, these dividends would then enjoy
comparable treatment with the interest paid on bonds, and recourse to risk capital
would entail fewer disadvantages  than at present. The drstribution of bonus
shares (stock divided) in addition to dividends in cash would constitute an accept-
able compromise between the need fot companies  to increase their own capital
and the desire of shareholders to be remunerated  in a tangible and easily rcalizable
form. The tax arrangements  concerning these distibutions should, however, be
hatmonized so as to avoid any double taxation.
5) An improvement in the channels through which new issues are distributed
could play an important role in reducing the difficulties  and cost attendant on such
operations.  Howevet, intermediaries could specialize only if the market were large
enough and they could rely on a substantial  conmibution from institutional investors.
These conditions could be mote easily attained in the framework of an integrated
capital market.
224CHAPTER 11
OPERATION  OF A EUROPEAN SECURITIES  MARKET: INFORMATION
FOR THE PUBLIC, DEALING IN AND MOVEMENT OF SECURITIES
Introduction
1.  The two preceding  chapters dealt with certain structural problems of national
security markets, and a number of arrangements were suggested which would
remove the major obstacles to market integration.  Measures of this kind are
necessary, but by themselves not sufficient  to ensure the development  of a genuinely
European market. To this end two sets of additional conditions need to be fulfilled.
First, the horizon of transactors on each existing national market needs to be
widened and they must have at their disposal sufficient and reasonably homogeneous
information on securities dealt in on other markets.
Secondly, movement  and dealing conditions for all European  securities need to
be such that investors can interest themselves in the securities of other Member
States as readily as in their own countfy's, without such transactions being penalized
by higher costs. These two sets of problems are discussed below under Heads I
and II, respectively.
I. Information
A. THE ROLE OF /NFORMATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT  OF
SECURITIES  MARKETS
2.  In all Member States an essential factor in the expansion of the capital market
is that the public be given better information on securities and familiatized  with
the machinery of the stock exchange. Looked at from the point or view of the
development of a European capital market, these problems  assume a new aspect
and added urgency.
,4) IMPROVEMENT OF INFORMATION  AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL
MARKETS
3.  In most cases, the problem of making information  on securities available to
the public has been approached  in Member States from the angle of protecting
savers. But publicity is important also for an expansion  of capital supply on the
security market, and this aspect seems to have been neglected.
In the first place, for lack of suficient information on the operations and prospects
of companies  some investors  are inclined to tread warily on equity matkets. By
contrast, it is the wide range of information  available - 
among other things 
- that explains  r.vhy the leading international  securities  ate so popular with investors..Arnother  consequence of deficient  information is that the public tends to attach more
importance to political of tax aspects than to the basic facts showing a.company's
deielopment  ,trd itt prospects;  this explains  the often speculative bent of European
stock markets and the public's lack of selectivity as between difierent securities.
4. These defects are apt to discourage  many classes of potential investor from
p,lacing their money in equities. Another point is that changes- in the disffibution
cf natlional income to tlie benefit of wage-earners  have diminished the_ savings
capacity of social groups used to equif investment  and increased that of groups
wilh little experience of the stock exchange.
It is true that, thanks mainly to the eflorts of financial institutions, there has been
some growth of publicity  in-recent  years .for the various forms of investment;  but
ir is a"striking fict thaf most of this publicity has been directed towards savings
deposits  and time deposits,  life-assurance policies, building-society  savings schemes
ani the purchase of fixed-interest securities,  while publicity for equity investment
i,s rehtGly undeveloped  and, in some countfies at least, appears to be_ hampered
t,y legislative or adminisrative regulations  even stricter than those actually rgguired
for piotecting the saver. Publicity in favour of certain institutions no doubt does
^1trirt 
fundslo the equity market;  nevertheless, there remains  scope fot educational
rrublicity campaigns whiih, free from certain excesses of canvassing, could help to
l,roaden  the rang! of equity investors,  who in the Member States still account for a
clistinctly  smallei proportion of the population than they do, for example, in the
IJnited States and in Great Britain.
:;. Lack of information by which the comparative merits of difierent types of
investment can be assessed,  especially from the point of view of their yield and
soundness,  induces savefs to tii.k to the simpleit forms, like sight deposits and
savings deposits, because they are not in a position to assess  the advantages  of other
forms of investment, such as securities'
l\ll this means that the economic  and financial objectives of fostering the supply
of entrepreneurial capital, combined with the need to-protect the savings. of the
frublic, iogether creale a strong case - 
despite diflerences  between the two
i.qrrir.*e;6 - 
for the provision of fuller information  for the public. Several
c,fficial studies on the problem of financing investment do indeed suggest that
fuller information for t6e public is of paramount importance for an improvement
in the supply of risk capital. Examples afe the fepoft of the Lorain Committee
lttlay t96i)'appointed by the Frencl Government  to investigate  the_problem  of
iou.rt-.nt finince, and the feport of the govefnment commission  in Belgium  (De
\/oghel Commission, March tggZ) whi.h was set up to study the problem  of
financing economic growth.
I}) FULLER  INFORMATION  AND MARKET INTEGRATION
(;. \fhen it  comes to security investments on foreign markets the above-
rnentioned problems  are multiplied. There is, at the outset, the by no- means
legligible dificulty of assessing another country's  political,  economic and financial
226situation  anci prospects,  the structural aspects and short-term outlook of particular
industries,  and finally the likely trend on a stock market operated by techniques
and reacting to forces unfamiliar to the investor.
As regatds  foreign shares, the investor has the additional problem of interpreting
the facts and figures published by companies.  Comparison is dificult, firsf of all
because the material  varies in quality as between countries, and secondly  because
of difierences in laws and in fiscal and administrative  regulations and practices.  As
things are at present,  these difficulties cannot be overcome completely.
As regards foreign bonds, the main deterrent  to the non-professional  investor lies
in the diversity of the terms and conditions on which the securities are issued and,
as will be seen presently, in the dificulty of comparing  real bond yields as between
difierent countries. The lack of information is surelv one of the reasons whv
investment in foreign bonds has not progressed more significantly in spite of th!
appreciable  yield difierentials which in some circumstances  develop between  one
market and another.
Though institutional investors, of course, have more knowledge of foreign markets,
their investment  potential is often restricted by regulations  intended to protect
savefs. It would doubtless  become easier to relax these regulations if there were
fewer gaps in information  about the provisions and practices ruling on difierent
markets.
7.  One way of giving both individuals  and institutional investors fuller infor-
mation might be for banks, stockbrokers  and investment consultants  to work on the
basic information available and then present it to investors  in a clear and easily acces-
sible form. Some moves in this direction  have already been made; certain groups of
financial institution have set up joint research units to guide their own and their
associated  investment  houses' investment  policy, and have placed the information
so collected at the disposal of their clients. Similarly, financial analysis companies
have been formed, precisely for the purpose of circulating to their subscribers
comparative information on securities in various countries. But in spite of these
praiseworthy initiatives, the quality of published information  unfortunately  still
suffers only too often from the inadequacy of the basic data disclosed by cornpanies.
Contrary to the practices of other countries,  and more especially of the United
States, information  available on most companies  in Member States is still embryonic;
but srangely enough, the regular publication of material normally withheld from
European  shareholders  has been readily undertaken  by certain companies when
they wanted to raise funds on the American  or British capital markets. On the
other hand, the fact that information  on US companies  has been made widely
available in Europe by brokers and investment  consultants  has had the result that
the public can often get to know more about American companies than about those
of its ovrn countty,  and this in tutn has induced domestic companies to display
somewhat  less reticence in publishing  facts about their own aflairs.
In conclusion,  the first prerequisite for any satisfactory  development  of information
is recognition of the need for it by the issuers of securities,  supported to this end
by action on the part of the authorities responsible for capital markets. The
Group has tied to define in more detail the nature and limits of what can be done
in this matter.
227(]) THE TASKS AND THEIR LIMITS
,8. In view of other studies now in progress under the auspices of the EEC
tCommission,  and more especially the work on the harmonization of company law in
.Member States [Article 54(39) o{ the Treaty of Rome], the following  analysis
will not covet:
;i) Rules on the drawing-up of balance sheets and profit-andJoss accounts, auditing
and repofts of directors or managers and auditors;
:ii) Rules governing the issue of securities, definition of the rights attaching thereto,
,dealings in such securities, etc. Apatt from publicity in connection with the
rendering  of annual accounts, the problem of information for savers and investots,
as here discussed, embtaces two distinct features that arise, however, only where
a call is being made on public saving:
,i) Information for subscribers on the occasion of a public oflering of securities;
:ii) In addition to the annual publication of accounts, a continuous flow of
information for shareholders and the public at large, ptoviding  accurate facts and
:6gures on company operations.
Though the laws of more than one member country prescribe  special disclosure
:rules in the case of public issues, France seems at present  to be alone in legislating,
at least as far as the bigger companies  (1) are concefned,  for a continuous flow of
information for shareholders and others.
Yet, though information is cleady of particular value when an appeal is made for
the public's savings and, even more so, when shares are ofiered for public sub-
scription  and listed on the stock exchange, it is no less necessary in other circum-
stances;  a steady flow of intelligence to shareholders and the public, not limited to
the publication of annual accounts, seems indispensable if  investors and their
advisers  are to be enabled to take fully informed investment decisions.
'The Group is, of course, av/are that the development  of such permanent and
more detailed information may raise certain problems for companies in relation to
shareholders,  employees,  competitors and the tax authorities, given current European
practices in this respect. It will therefore be necessary to proceed with some
,caution, and it will no doubt be indispensable  to harmonize legal requirements so
that all European firms are placed on an equal footing. However,  experience in the
United States testifies to the f.act that fuller publicity requirements have done no
harm to companies but have in fact redounded to their benefit as regards both
sources of finance and relations with the public in general.
Although the practice of providing a continuous  flow of information has been
spreading in recent years, it is doubtful whether it will do so sufficiently  unless
it is made compulsory. This suggests,  and the Frcnch example confirms, that the
lavr will have to step in if current  customs and usages are to be radically altered.
(1) Ordinance No. 59-247, of 4 February 1959, on the capital market, supplemented by decee
No.65999, of 29 November  1965, on information {or shareholders  and the public.
228Given the fears of business firms that mote exhaustive disclosure of their afiairs
would weaken their competitive position unless their rivals were obliged to be
equally forthcoming, the pertinent requirements need to be equivalent in all the
countries of the Community  and there must be no discrimination on grounds
of nationality.
As regards the content of information regularly published, the following  principles
may be suggested.
a) The Board of Directors should periodically,  that is at quarterly or six-monthly
intervals,  publish a statement indicating at least sales and gross profits, together
with the figures fot the corresponding  period of the preceding year;
b) Any new factor which might have a major beating on the firm's situation or
profit expectations  (for instance  investment  programmes,  important  agreements of
contracts) should be brought to the public's notice almost at once;
c) When the annual accounts are published, the report of the Board of Directors
should restate or bring up to date some of the information on the company
published when the shares were first issued.
If current discussions within the Community lead to the establishment of a new
type of European incorporated  company, this should provide an opportunity  for
progress in the matter of company  disclosures.
9.  In the present report, however, the Group has been unable to define in detail
any rules on infotmation to be supplied regularly, which also entail some har-
monization of the rules concerning  annual accounts.  (1)
The Group examined only the rules which should govern information for investors
in cases of public issues or of admission to stock-exchange  listing.
Since it is on these occasions that information needs to be most comprehensive, part
of these rules might serve as a basis for the later definition of rules on continuing
publicity.
The Group presents in an annex its detailed ptoposals for a model prospectus  for
public issues or admission to stock-exchange listing. This model prospectus  should
be regarded as a coherent set of suggestions  illustrating the principles of an
information  policy to be discussed below. Other solutions would no doubt be
feasible and acceptable to the extent that they provided investors with equivalent
information.
D) PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION  IqITH THE ESTABLISHMENT  OF COMMON RULES
10. The preparation  of proposals on the provision of information for investors
entails harmonization of existing or planned legislation in the Member  States, and
manv obstacles have to be overcome.
(l) For fuller information  the reader is refetred to the Report of the Permanent  Commission
on Standardization (Project 1966/3),  approved at the 1966 Noordwijk Congress of the Eutopean
Federation of Financial  Analvsts  Societies.
229lPlanned legislation in the member countries is by no means following a uniform
t.rend. In some countries of the Community,  the relevant legal provisions are now
r:nder revision; in others, it is not yet known how recently adopted regulations
are going to be applied. Thus the new French bill for the reform of company
l.aw makes the Government  responsible for laying down by decree the rules of
jnformation  to the public and disclosure to shareholders;  the Belgian bill for reform
of the lavr on limited companies  proposes  abandonment of the "statutory disclosure"
system (notice l6gale) and bdnging the whole field of public security issues under
the separate legislation of Royal Dectee No. 185, of 9 July 1,935. In Luxembourg,
a new system of information control and capital market supervision on the Belgian
model was recentlv inroduced. but it is not as vet clear how the administration
.rill apply it.
ilhe scope of legal ptovisions on information for investors varies considerably  {rom
one country to another. In some cases, they apply only to company issues - 
or
indeed issues of certain types of company,  such as limited companies - 
involving
an appeal to public savings; they may also apply to issues made in the countty
by foreign companies. In other cases these legal provisions are applicable  regardless
of the status and nationality of the issuer, subject to certain specified  exceptions.
.[n Belgium, for instance,  information controls under the Royal Decree  mentioned
above apply not only to the issu.es of Belgian and foreign companies,  but also
to those of foreign governments and international institutions.
lleveral entirely difierent  approaches to the information  problem find expression
in the law of the various Member States. Some countries have no special publicity
lequirements at all in the case of public issues. In other countries, the particulars
to be furnished by companies in the case of a public issue are laid down by law
i.n uniform manner  and are hence necessadly defined in formal terms. In Belgium
and Luxembourg  publicity obligations of this formal type are in some respects
supplemented by the control exercised by an administrative body; and this arrange-
ment, backed by the constant build-up of case law on the subject, is producing
a system in which the nature and quantity of information made available depends
closely on the status of the issuing company or institution. The borrower  must,
in each case, publish whatever is "necessary for the correct appraisal  of the nature
of the business  and of the rights attaching  to the securities".
Jiinally, practices not resting on the law itself, but enforced by banking houses
acting as intermediaries in security issues, are extremely  impottant in setting the
publicity pattern with which issuers must con{orm.
]}. THE CONTENT OF ,4N INFORMATION  POLICY
,4) BASIC PRINCIPLES
"t1. In view of the legislative and conceptual  diflerences  between the EEC
countries with respect to infotmation for subscribers to new issues, it would seem
impracticable to work out uniform legislation in this matter. A more promising
approach would be to formulate rules the scope and content of which would be
2B0bindingly accepted as a minimum by Membef States, 1eavi98 each cotntry {ree,
within"tire limits discussed below, to broaden  the field of application and to enforce
additional  regulations and formalities in the case of issues oflered wholly or
conjointly on its territory.
Legislation governing the provision of information for subscribers is essentially
p,r6[. prot.-.tion lair (t|eistation de police), w-hi9h is traditionally a matte.f of
ierritorial rather than national jurisdiclion. It follows that the law_ ap-plicable.is
that of the counry in rvhich the security issue takes place,_  and not the law of the
country to which the issuing institution or company is subject-. \Thatever merits
adoption of the nationalit/ principle might have for the freedo-m of 
. capital
mo'iements, it would in piaciice lead in each Member State to discrimination,
sometimes io a foreign issrier's advantage,  sometimes against him. In any event, the
territoriality  principl"e will need to be applied,to  issues by institutions and companies
from non-io-*rrnity  countries and a6ove all from countries where the provision
of information for subscribers is subject to no special rules.
However, the territoriality  principle in no way precludes a country-'s  legislature
from applying  one set of pubticity principles for domestic issues and another for
foreign issuei provided  s,rih difi.r.ntiation does not disciminate  against residents
of another EEC county.
For the rest, the principle of non-discrimination  laid down by th._ Treaty of Rome,
together rvith the requirement  that a company must accord equal_ treatment to all
its- sharehold.rs, -."nt  that any company or institution raising funds on foreign
capital markets vrhere information  is subject to less severe rules than at home
must provide the same information for foreign as for domestic subscribers.
B) THE SCOPE  OF COMMON RULES ON DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
12. Clear lines need to be drawn to delimit the scope of any information rules
to be worked out at Community  level in the light of these principles.
As regards the nature of the securities ofiered, only resort to the capital matket
by issues of securities  is considered,  viz':
i) Negotiable, transferable and redeemable  securities, vrhethet they be registered,
to order or to bearer;
ii) Securities forming part of a collective issue and conferring rights cortesponding
to their proportion in the collective total.
Thus, the raising of funds by credit entfy in account or passbook,  or by other
means not having the above "collective" characteristic,  is excluded.
The securities concerned  must represent:
i) Either members' title to shares in firms or companies under private ot public
law, shares in a limited company to be understood  as including also securities
indirectly  fepresentative of such ihares or entitling the holder to subscribe, e.g.
subscription rights and warrants,  or
231ii.) Creditors'  claims on such firms or companies, or on public authodties  or
irrternational institutions.
llt Community  level, the scope of the disclosure rules might possibly be limited
t,o issues of shares in joint-stock  companies and to issues of bonded loans by such
companies  and by public authorities, enterprises or agencies [Articles 5a0 d and 58,
second parugraph, of the Treaty of Romel. For other security issues the publicity
requirements would then be the sole prerogative of the national legislatute.
flowever, the information rules need not necessarily apply to issues made or
guaranteed within the country by central government or local authorities.
13. The rules would apply only when an appeal is made for the public's savings.
Subscribers to a private placing may be presumed to be in a position to obtain the
necessary information from the borrower and to be able to appraise it correctly.
T'he concept of public appeal for savings in an empirical one which needs objective
definition. The term "public issue" in a market may be taken to denote that the
s3curities  created or to be ueated arc, by the efiorts of the issuing institution or
company or a third party, distributed among the public of the country concetned,
or that, by virtue of their admission to oficial or unoficial quotation in that
c,ountry, they are liable to be so distributed.
For citeria by which to define a call on the savings of the public, those adopted
in the new French company law might serve as a starting point, viz.:
i)  The employment of banks, financial enterprises  or stockbrokers with a view to
placing the securities;
ii) The use of any method of publicity to the same end;
iii) Inclusion in the official list of a stock exchange,  from the date of listing.
T'his last critedon seems to be worded too resffictively, given that in some countries
periodical lists or unofficial lists include unquoted securities traded on a large scale.
Further research on these markets would be tequired prior to a decision on
this point.
A.s regards the form or legal designation  of the issuing operation, the term public
is,sue should be understood to include display for sale, ofier for sale, publi- sale,
o:fiering for public subsuiption, public exchange and public ofier of exchange, and
stock-exchange  listing.
C) TTfr CONTENT OF COMMON RULES ON DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
1, .  It is implicit in the objective of the publicity requirement that it should bear
o:n the main features of the situation of the institution  or company whose securities
are to be issued, and on the rights attaching to these securities. These essential
el.ements. which determine the value of the securities  for which subscriotions are
invited, are necessarily of an individual character  and cannot be accuratdly  defined
22,2by general rules. Moreover, subscription to securities, in the nature of things,
largely hinges on the issuing company's  growth prospects  and the likely trend of
its profitability.  Neither the future outlook nor the policies which condition it can
generally be discerned  clearly in the accounts relating to past years.
This necessarily individual character of company  information is particulady in
evidence where it is a question of an issue of securities directly or indirectly
representing  title to shares-, the value of which depends closely upon the .o-prny;,
situation and profitability. In these circumstances  there seems little point in any
disclosure  arrangement which goes no further than to require the obligatory
publication of cettain particulars, such as balance sheets, extracts from articles,
bonded debt outstanding and composition of management and supervisory boards.
!7hile such a system would no doubt be better than none at a7l, it would be a bad
one in so far as it might lead to incomplete and therefore misleading information,
r.vhile allowing the issuing company to claim it had properly complied  with the
legal formalities. It is this shortcoming of the "statutory disclosure" system which
led to its replacement by administrative information controls in Belgium  and
Luxembourg.
There is thetefore  one general principle the information rules should provide for,
and that is that the issue prospectus  must correctly describe the rights attaching
to the securities ofiered and must give a full, frank and unambiguous  picture of the
issuing  company's  or institution's  situation.
This general principle transposes to the field of calls on public saving the require-
ment 
- 
embodied  in statute lav,' in several Member States and in doctrine or case
law in others - 
that the balance sheet, profit-and-loss  account and directors' report
to the general  meeting of shareholders  must give a full, frank and unambiguous
picture of the company's  assets and profit-earning  capacity.
In spite of its, for practical purposes, somewhat imprecise legal language, this
general principle does need to be explicitly stated as an essential  element of the
publicity  requirement, because it provides the basis for assessing:
i) The responsibility  of the signatories  of the prospectus in the event of its being
incomplete or inaccurate or of its misleading subscribers  (criminal responsibility,
liability for damages under civil law, possibility of subscribers claiming  annulment
of the subscription);
ii) The actions of all the parties to an issue operation - 
banks, firm takers,
underwriters and sub-underwriters - 
or of the bodies exercising a legal function
in the protection  of savings (stock-exchange authorities,  government agencies).
15. In addition to this general principle, there will need to be a list of the
particulars  which, whatever the type of issue, must in all cases be furnished to
potential investors.
This list will necessarily difier according to categories of issue. It should include
the following considetations:
i) The nature of the securities concerned: information  on the issuing company's
situation needs to be more exhaustive in the case of securities  representing either
title to shares or entitlement  to subscribe thereto (e.g. warrants, subscriptioi rights
233or convertible  debentures) than in the case o{ securities representing  creditors'
claims. On the other hand, there are certain types of infotmation on rights attaching
to securities that are specifically required for bond issues (redemption table, advance
r€:payment,  index clauses, currency-option clauses, etc.);
ii) The status and nature of the issuer: information to be furnished will necessarily
not be the same for a loan issued by a business company  as for a loan issued by a
prrblic authority;
ii:i) The nationality of the bortower may need to be indicated, in so far as it may
h,tse a bearing on the rights attaching to the securities  and on the fiscal treatment
ol interest or dividends accruing  and sales proceeds.
C. INST/TUTIONAL ASPECTS  OF INFORMATION CONTROL
,4) EXTERNAL  CONTROLS
1'5. The problem of information  for investors cannot be dissociated from the
question of external control of information  furnished on the occasion of a se-
curity issue.
A.n initial external conrol should be exercised by the banks participating  in the sale
of an issue and staking theit rcputation on the quality of the securities  concerned
and the terms on which they are placed.
That the banks can have fat-reaching influence in this matter is borne out by the
comprehensive  information  provided, mainly at their instance, on the occasion
o:[ most of the recent issues of Euro-bonds.
Elowever, the efiectiveness of bank action depends largely upon the participating
bank's reputation  and upon usage in difierent countries. It depends, further, upon
the capacity in which the banks act and the extent to which their own credit is
committed. This degree of commitment difiers according  to whether the bank acts
urerely as an intermediary,  assumes responsibility  for the financial servicing of the
issue, or purchases it outright or underwrites it. However, this conffol by the
banks may prove insufficient where their interests  diverge from those of subscribers.
17. Another type of control in exercised in most Member States by the stock-
exchange supervisory authorities in all cases where an application is made for
a,imission  of securities  to quotation.
T'he action of these supervisory  authorities, which is not confined to the supply of
irrformation,  varies as between difierent counffies, both de jure and de facto, and
isr strongly influenced by prevailing usage.
T'he efficiency of this contol is limited by the fact that it becomes operative only
on the occasion of an application for stock-exchange  quotation.  The procedute may
be efiective enough in the case of security  sales through the stock exchange, but
it generally becomes applicable only after a sale by public issue. It is thus more
234in the nature of. a posteriori control of the information furnished. The refusal of
stock-exchange  quotation on these grounds in generally  an inadequate  and avrkward
sanction, for it hurts the holders of the securities  more than the issuing company
or institution.
Nevertheless, this does not prevent scrutiny by the stock-exchange  supervisory
authorities from having appreciable influence, in so far as borrowers proceeding
to a public issue will be led to adhere to the principles laid down by these
authorities  for admission to quotation.
18. A third type of information control is prior conuol. Such a system exists at
pfesent in Belgium and Luxembourg, where prior control is exercised by an
independent administrative agency in some ways akin to the US Securities and
Exchange Commission.
19. The principle of external information control prior to any public issue must
be sharply distinguished from the question of the nature and quality of the
institution or agency responsible  for such control.
There can be no doubt that external information control prior to any public issue
is in general the right way to ensure that subscribers are fully informed and supplied
with data best adapted to the specific characteristics  of each issue and the situation
of the issuing company or institution. This method, furthermore, makes room for
the disclosure requitements  to take account of questions of business  ethics not
always spelled out in law, as urell as protection  of the interests and rights of share-
holders and creditors. Experience  in countries where such prior control exists  goes
to show that its efiectiveness is widely recognized  even by the institutions
controlled.
B) POSSIBLE METHODS OF CONTROL ON A EUROPEAN  CAPITAL MARKET
20. If it is considered desirable to establish or organize extetnal information
control in the setting of a European  capital market, the next question to examine
is how and by whom this control might be exercised.
A first solution that comes to mind is the establishment  of an agency at Community
level, to be competent for issues floated within the tenitory of the Community
and to be endowed with powers similar to those of the Securities and Exchange
Commission in the Unitei States, the Banking Commission in Belgium or tf,e
Bank Control Commissariat in Luxembourg.  But this solution does not appear
practicable  as soon as would be necessary. Although the setting of a larger market
would make such a solution appear more logical, the establishment  of such agencies
in the countries which still lack them could also be envisaged: this might indeed
be the most appropriate way of "moralizing" the stock exchange - 
a topical
problem in several countries - 
and at the same time of making investment  in
securities a sounder proposition than it all too often is at the present time.
21. Another method, also at Community  level, might be to set up a Co-ordinating
Committee composed of representatives  of the supervisory  agencies aheady
mentioned or, pending the establishment of these agencies, representatives  dravrn
z3afrgm the professions  concerned,  from banking circles, the authorities responsible
for admission  to stock-exchange quotation, and from such national governmental
authorities as have a supervisory  function in respect of information.
This Co-ordinating  Committee would by definition have no oficial status and
therefore no smt;tory powers. It  would limit itself to formulating opinions
relgarding the adequacy  of in{ormation furnished  to the- public. Possible sanctions
wil"ld 6e of two kinds: first, the Committee could communicate  an adverse
or,inion to the firm concerned and to the competent national authorities,  and
s6,:ondly it could advise to the bank or issuing house  heading_ the issuing consortium
ocrt to collaborate in an issue where the conditions  were found to be misleading
for subscibers. At a later stage the Committee  might be empowered to publish
any adverse opinion ignored, uid authorized to mak-e public the fact that a proposed
issue had nof b..n zubmitted  to the Committee  for an opinion' But this would
in.volve confening an official character  upon the Committee  and attributing to it
quasijudicial powets.
H,owever informal and unofficial  such a system might be, a necessafy  precondition
for its inloduction is that the professional circles concerned  support it and that
the competent national authoritiei have a real desire to collaborate. It alsl requires
that the bankers handling the issue or the national authority respon_sible_for the
sc:rutiny of the records  beieleased  by the issuer from the requirement of professional
secrecy vis-)-vis  this Committee.
If all these conditions were fulfilled, the Committee could, as and when operations
w,:re submitted to it for its opinion, gradually work out information des, taking
full account of past experience on the major capital markets of non-member
countries; it could also base its opinions on compliance with a jointly defined
m,cdel prospectus, such as is annexed to this report. Initially, the Committee could
concentrate  on international operations.
T|is system, testing entitely on voluntary suppoft, would certainly contribute  to
the improvem"nt oT information  and to'the^development  of a European capital
market. But it depends upon this support being forthcoming, and, also upon tbe
smooth functioning of a iommittee with, if it were to work eficiently, would
de,finitely  need some modicum of administtative organization and services.
2il. A third approach might be to issue a directive  under the Rome Treaty,
envisaging harrnonization of information for subscribers  and the establishment of
sirnilar systems of prior information control by each Member State., The next step
w,culd be to get ihe various institutions to co-ordinate  the application of the
regulations in 
-force in Member  States with respect to information in the case of
"cibmestic" issues, and to define a common attitude to "international" issues'
Surch a directive would need to specify and rule on the opetations to be subject to
control, the methods of control and the po\vers of the responsible  authority.  C)n
the other hand, the choice of the institution or agency to be responsible for
information control in each Member State can safely be left to each countty's
orvn legislation. Under this proposal the relevant  pov/ers could be vested either
with the stock-exchange authorities, with appropriate modification  of their sphere
of competence, or with an administrative  body.
236To be meaningful, such prior conrol must be more than a mere check on legality
showing whether the minimum publicity requirements  specified in the directive
have been fulfilled. The chief purpose of the work of these authorities should
in fact be to ascertain that the prospectus  ptovides an accurate and frank picture
of the issuing company's  or institution's situation as well as a full description of
the rights attaching to the secutities. On the other hand, the control will only be
efiective if the sanctions  imposed for non-compliance are clearly stated. In this
field, too, co-ordination among the authorities could be most valuable.
23. It is also important to ensure that the information needed for an investor's
enlightenment is available to him at the moment when he is called upon to make
his investment. In this connection a distinction  has to be made between public
sales and subscriptions on the one hand, and admission to official quotation and
introduction on the stock exchange on the other.
Under the law of most Member States, the public sale or subscription of company
shares and debentures is already subject to the requirement that the subscription or
sale must be recorded in an application form made out in duplicate, one copy
to be retained by the subscriber.
There is a case for confirming this rule at Community level by prescribing  that
the application  form must be part of the prospectus  itself and that the complete
document must be placed at the disposal of the subscriber.
It might perhaps be expedient to prescribe also that brokers in the official and
unoficial  markets (courtiers, agents  de change,  banquiers,  etc.) should be authorized
to subscribe  as agents ot proxies only if they were in possession  of an application
form signed by the client, and to sell to a client such securities  as they may have
subscribed or acquired on the occasion of an issue only against the client's signature
on an application form. An exception might be allowed on orders teceived from
other brokbrs.
Non-compliance  with these provisions  could probably attract only civil sanctions;
for instance, a broker vrould have no grounds for action at law against a client who
declined to honour a commitment  resulting from a subscription  at variance with
the prescribed procedutes.
It should also be laid dorvn that announcements concerning  the issue 
- 
v/ha1svs1
their form - 
must indicate where and how the prospectus  may be obtained.
In the cases of admission  to stock-exchange quotation or of issues through stock-
exchange channels, provision should be made for the public to be informed
adequately according to unambiguous rules, especially through press advertising;
here again the announcement should indicate  where and how the complete document
(the prospectus) may be obtained.
CONCLUSlONS
24. The problem of proper provision of information for the public is in the
forefront among those which take on a new aspect and added urgency in the light
of the development  of a European  capital market. The difficulty of getting  genuine
zJ/participation  from savers even in the relatively  homogeneous context of the present
national  markets is multiplied in the setting of the developing European market.
L) An information policy should involve:
a) Campaigns  to familiarize the public with security  investment and stock-exchange
machinery;
b) A permanent flow of information on the operations of companies, in addition
to the annual publication  of their accounts;
c) Especially  comprehensive information whenever an appeal is made for the
public's savings - 
that is, on the occasion of a security issue or the introduction
of securities on a stock exchange.
2) The Group gave particular attention to this last problem vrith a view to the
fo:rmulation  of disclosute  rules the scope and content of which would be acceptable
to Member States as a common base. This common  base might consist of a model
prospectus - 
such as that which is annexed to this report - 
adapted to the
specific  circumstances  of difierent categories of securities and issuers.
3) External conffols appear  necessary in order to enforce observation of certain
mi.nimum requirementJ  concerning the scope and quality of information. Such
controls  are in fact exercised in all Member States by banks and stock-exchange
authorities, and in some of them by an independent administrative  agency endowed
with quasijudicial powers.
In the setting of a European matket, the Group feels that external control
procedures should be extended and harmonized; so far as "International  operations"
are concerned, the control could be exercised  by a Co-ordinating Committee manned
by representatives  of the professions concerned and of the existing supervisoty
authorities. It would work on the basis of voluntary support.
A harmonization  directive aiming at alignment, in substance  and form, of the
M,ember States' practices in this respect would give a better structural  base to the
co-operation  and allow it to be widened in scope.
There is also a case for considering the establishment at Community level of an
agency similar to the Belgian Banking Commission  or the US Securities and
Exchange Commission.
II. Operation of the stock exchanges and movement of securities
25. Improving  the structure of supply of and demand for securities and broadening
thrl investing public's horizon would not be enough to satisfy all the conditions for
the development of a capital market integrated at European level, unless it was
ac,:ompanied  by action to adapt security dealing techniques on official and unofficial
markets and to create the conditions for securities to circulate as freely throughout
th,e Community  as within a domestic market.
231\Dealings in secutities listed on foreign bourses by residents  of Member  States are
no longer hindered by exchange controls, but they may be handicapped  by cost
difierentials  and by technical problems.
In more general terms it may be said that, while the security markets of the EEC
countries have a broad range of facilities and long experience to ofier, they
nevertheless show working defects which everybody agrees are mainly due to their
narroril/ness and division into separate  compartments.
The Group has there{ore first tied to isolate and summarize the various factors
responsible for this state of afiairs.
It then examines ways of amplifying the list of officially quoted securities 
- 
espe-
cially by introducing  more foreign securities - 
and increasing  stock-exchange
turnover.
Lastly, it considers a number of special problems in connection with international
security dealings and movements.
A. THE N,4RROWNESS OF EUROPEAN  SECURITY MARKETS
26. The principal problem afiecting the working of security markets in most
Member States is the dificulty of buying or selling a large amount of any one
security without causing considerable  price fluctuations.  Although  the seriousness
of the problem  is plain enough,  especially  on the equity market, it is much more
difficult to measure it statistically  and to compare its extent on difierent markets.
The volume of business ffansacted is often regarded  as the most meaningful
indicator. The number of securities listed, which is a measure of the range of
securities  available  for stock-exchange investment, is not without significance from
the point of view of expanding arbitrage operations. The market value of
outstanding securities, finally, may be taken as a measure of the volume of savings
invested in listed securities.
/)  QUANTITATIVE  INDICATORS
27. The statistics available in the difierent Member  States on stock-exchange
transactions cover either the bulk or only a fraction of all security  dealing"s,
depending on whether there is a "bourse monopoly", as in France and Belgium,
or a large part of the business is done outside the exchange within and between
financial enterprises.  Furthermore,  in Germany  and the Netherlands bargains are
recorded in terms of nominal instead of market value. and in all the counries
only transactions on the oficial matket are reflected in the statistics,  whereas a
great deal of business in unlisted stocks is done on special markets and even
outside the exchange altogether; no full information  is available on these trans-
actions.
23928. Subject to these reservations, the volume of annual ransactions in listed
variable-yield  securities in the EEC countries as a whole may be estimated at
$9 000 million on average during the years 1960 to 1965; this figure is calculated
frrom oficial statistics in Belgium,  France and Italy, and extrapolations  from the
()erman and Dutch statistics of the nominal value of bargains.  Over the same
period, the value of share transactions averaged about $65 000 million a year in
tlre United States, and in 1965 
- 
the only year for which figures are available - the total was close to $10 000 million on the London  Stock Exchange alone. Even
if, for the reasons mentioned, the EEC figures understate the volume of business
in listed shares, the comparison  clearly brings out its relatively modest size.
29. The number of shares listed is also relatively low in certain EEC countries.
l.t  the end of 1965, domestic  shares (1) numbered  590 in Amsterdam, 496 in
Eirussels, 618 in Disseldorf,  187 in Milan and 97L n Paris, compared  vdth 3 630
in London and 1 601 at the New York Stock Exchange.
30. Finally, the market value of outstanding variable-yield securities listed in
Il[ember States during the period L960-65 was roughly $64 000 million (end-of-year
average), made up, in round figures, of $zz 000 million in Germany, $20 000
million in France,  $9 000 million in the Netherlands,  $8 500 million in Italy and
$4 500 million in Belgium.  Available statistics for the United Kingdom and the
Llnited States show corresponding  values of about $120 000 million and $410 000
million, respectively,  for the same period. However,  the disproportion  is somewhat
overstated as the last tvro figures are for domestic  and foreign shares, whereas
those given for the EEC refer to domestic  shares only.
E,ven such hazardous  comparisons as have here been made for shares are impossible
on any kind of satisfactory  basis for the bond markets. Fot reasons explained in
Clhapter  9, very few company debentures are listed in Belgium, Germany and ltaly.
B) PROBLEMS CONNECTED  \(ITH THE NARRO\NNESS OF MARKETS
31. No detailed analysis can be undertaken here of what keeps equity markets
srr narrow. The main reasons  are:
i) That savers are often reluctant to invest in securities;
ii) That only a small proportion of a company's shares are actually accessible to
tlre public: the rest is either in the hands of. a family group which refuses to put
tlrem on the market or else "trozen" in the portfolios of finance companiesl
iii) That institutional  investors do not entef the market on a large enough scale;
irr) That a latge volume of business is transacted outside the exchange.
fn short, the factors discussed in the preceding chapter in connection with the
structure of equity markets operate here too.
1t; The foreign shares listed are examined in sub-section  B and in Table  26.
2zl0The consequences of this narrowness  are serious. It partly explains the rcluctance
of institutional  and other big investors to acquire European stocks for feat of not
being able, later, to adjust the composition of their portfolios without provoking
adverse price movements.  This lack of "liquidity" and the consequent possibility
of fluctuations in certain stocks is also liable to discourage individual investors,  who
are most likely to need to rcalize their investments at short notice.
The fact that the range of quoted shares is so restricted  certainly  does nothing to
increase the volume of transactions in any of them; on the contrary, it weakens
the market by depriving it of the support of investors rvho wish to diversify their
holdings and have no choice other than to turn to the markets of non-member
countries. This argument applies to institutional  investors in particular.
There is thus a vicious circle, from which the only escape is through:
a) Giving certain institutional  investors increased scope for dealing on the equity
market;
b) Attracting  back to the stock exchanges  business that is now transacted outside
it (this can 6e done by altering the regulations concetning intetmediaries);
c) Establishing links between the various stock exchanges, by way of international
uansactions  and inroduction of foreign shares to oficial quotations.
32. The markets in fixed-interest  securities have difierent problems.  The range
of available  securities is narrow only in the case of company debentures, while the
volume of transactions in public-sector bonds is relatively large.
The fundamental problem here is no doubt that of the relationship between the
flotation of new issues and their subsequent behaviour  on the secondary  market.
A steady flow of debenture  issues is possible only in countries where this secondary
market works satisfactorily; othetwise, there will be sharp sputts of new issues
from time to time when the situation is temporarily propitious, but no ordedy
continuity of issues such as is necessary and attainable in an eficient market.  Even
more than in the case of the equity market, where the tisk of price fluctuations
is accepted, investors will fight increasingly shy of fixed-interest  securities if they
are virtually unable to realize sizeable bondholdings without causing  price move-
ments quite unrelated either to the market trend or to the credit standing of the
issuer. Even for institutional  investors direct lending or other forms of investment
become more attractive than bonds, since the lower yield of these is not com-
pensated by any real liquidity. \7here there are large yield gaps between comparable
bonds and these difierences are not automatically evened  out by arbitrage  operations,
the market is clearly not working satisfactorily.
This situation is largely due to the fact that in several Member States the bond
market is still essentially a "retail" rather than a "wholesale"  market and that
placing with a firm holder cannot always be arranged.  When financial institutions
Iorming part of an issuing syndicate sell patcels of a loan stock below the issue
price biCause not all of it could be placed, the secondary market trend is bound
to be afiected. Sometimes  the issuing syndicate agrees to a price support clause
making the underwriter's commission refundable if the securities reappear on the
market within a certain time limit; but this does not seem to be enough to solve
the problem.
241In Germany, the cenmal bank has at times intervened  with_ appropriate  action_ to
sready the prices of public bonds. Somewhat  difierent in character are th€ price-
tnpport operations undertaken in Italy by _semi-pullic institutions  at the instance
c,f-ihe *dn.tu.y authotities. In Belgium, the Fonds des Rentes intervenes on the
noarket for government  bonds to smooth out fluctuations without trying to sgbilize
prices, but its pov/ers are fathef limited. In France, finally, the Caisse des Ddp6ts
i't Co:nsignatiois  takes action to regulate quotations in all sections of the bond
rnarket, partly with the help of associates  like the investment company France-
Obligations and the National  Social Security  Fund.
l\s urged in Chaptet 4 (sec. 25), eflorts should be made to hatmonize the methods
t,v wliich the Member States try to influence the short-term rend of interest rates
c,n the markets. I{ the method chosen were that of enttusting a particular agency
ryith the task of direct market intervention,  the Group feels that the implementation
c,f its measures would have to be closely concerted.
Oficial price-steadying  intervention does a great-deal to give the secondaty market
a. firm tbne, but - 
partly because it is sporadic and partly because its range is
limited - 
there is no prospect of its having the same efiects  , as active arbitrage
clealing specialized intermediaries and investors familiar with the potentialities of
the domestic  market and foreign markets.
Once more, one is led to the conclusion that two things are needed for the good
functioning of the secondary markets, namely:
a:) Active participation of professional investors able to deal in a broad range of
securities;
l') Qrowing interconnection  between markets,  such as is already evident in the
alignment of bond yields in the various Member  States but could be furthet
enf,anced by the introduction of foreign fixed-interest securities into stock-exchange
lists in each Member State.
B. PROBLET4S  CONNECTED  WLTH STOCK-EXCHANGE  QUOTATION
3:3. \What has been said earlier on the inadequacy  of information for investors,
c,n the dificulties of placing securities and on the division of markets into separate
compartments makes it clear that it is necessary:
i) To lengthen official stock-exchange  lists in member countries, especially  by
irntroducing  foreign securities;
iji) To foster also dealings in foreign securities outside the oficial market (on
uLnoficial markets, by supplementary  public sales, etc.);
iii) To simplify and harmonize  price quotation  techniques.
Ii) LENGTHENING  OFFICIAL  STOCK-ECHANGE  LISTS
34. Listing of foreign securities  on the stock exchanges of Member States is at
p,resent ong of the principal means which could quickly bring about some measure
of matket interpenetration.
zaHowever, in some member countries listing of foreign securities is hampered  by
sfficter requirements and formalities than apply to the introduction  of domestic
securities.  To justify this unequal teatment, it is argued that inmoduction on the
stock exchange is in practice tantamount  to the placing of an issue in the country
by the foreign institution or company and that the ionditions  required for thl
protection of savers when new issues are floated still vary considerablv from one
country to another;  hence, controls need to be stricter when foreien securities  are
to be introduced.
Admittedly, protection of the interests of savers when foreign securities are
introduced on a stock,exchange does raise special problems, but they could be
solved by harmonizing the conditions required {or admission to quotation,  especially
as regards publicity requirements.  In point of fact, the argument that saveis musi
be protected often masks a desire to reserve the market'J  resources for domestic
enterprises.
Such an attitude fails to consider all aspects of the problem, for it ignores the
invigorationg efi-ect the widening of quotations and volume of businels by the
introduction of foreign_ securities  may have on the market. A second point ii that
admission  to stock-exchange quotation is not necessarily synonymous with placing
a new is-su9, f9q it is not always  accompanied by a block iale of foreign seiuritiei
previously held by lon-residents. It may be no more than recognition Jf a de facto
situation, namely that residents already have an appreciable holding of a given
foreign security; in that event quotation of the security is justifieJ in ord6r to
make dealings easier and less costly for holders and to- give- local intermediaries
the benefit of additional  business which otherwise would be transacted on a
foreign market.
35. It should be stressed that introduction o{ alatger number of securities from
other Member States to stock-exchange  dealing would lower the cost of transactions
in these securities, which is now distinctly higher than for comparable  dealings in
domestic securities.
A transaction on a foreign bourse in fact involves not only bank charees  and
brokerage  in the operator's own cgunJry, but also the expensis of corresp"ondents
abroad,  an -ex^chalge commission  which is faitly high in relation to stock-ixchange
charges  and, finally, indirect taxes which may mean double taxation. And to theie
higher costs- of the transaction itself must be added the heavier charges 
- 
for
coll:ction of coupons, safe crlstody, etc._ attracted by foreign securities, compared
with domestic, during the whole period of the investmeni.
3,6. An appreciable number of foreign secutities are already listed in all the
Community countries except Italy, and more especially in Amsterdam,  Paris and
Brussels.
Indeed, the number of foreign equities listed on the stock exchanses  of these five
]Mem.b9r  States is larger than on rhe New York Stock lxchange ( Tible 26). rt may
be of interest to note that the proportion of foreign shares in the total of'domestic
and foreign equities  listed is approximately 33%o on the Amsterdam stock exchanse,
20%o in Brussels,  l8%o in Paris, and 4%o in Frankfurt and Diisseldorf, as agaiist
427o in Zurich, 97o in London and 1.57o in New York.
243But among these foreign equities, those of EEC origin still _occupy a relatively
nrinor plaje. Of 292 foreign shares quoted in Amsterdam,  195 are American  and
no more than 30 from EEe countrieJ, and only 40 and 44, respectively, are EEC
sl:ares out of a total of.213 foreign shares dealt in Paris and 118 in Brussels.
lJthough EEC bourses have been introducing- more shares from other member
c,cuntriEs  in the course of the last few years, ihe Group considers  that this trend
slhould be accelerated  in the future in order to promote  the creation of a genuine
Eluropean market in equities.
llence the obstacles to the quotation  of shares of other member countries  should
be removed without delay, especially in Italy and Germany.
32. As regards fixed-interest securities,,the number of foreign loans listed in each
Adember St]ate is strikinely  small and often includes only tlose actually issued in
tlhe counffy where they"are listed. The admission of loan stocks issued in other
member countries to stock-exchange  dealing might create interest in foreigq bonds,
even if the market were initially-narrow.-Issuers  whose bonds were dealt in on
dhe stock exchange of another. member counmy might find it easier to place
subsequent  issues in that country.
35. All in all, the introduction of foreign securities t9 quotation on the stock
e*changes of member countries should bJencoutaged, if need.be by.a reform of
admission procedures. The following  steps might be considered to this end:
i) Elimination of all discriminatory  measures  of administrative  origin,.as has. been
p,rovided for in the proposed third directive for the implementation  of Article 67;
iii) Harmonization of. the publicity requirements  and^procedutal  ru'les.applied  by
['6*r. urthorities. The International Federation of Siock Exchanges  has already
r,ut forward Droposals  for co-operation  by bourse authorities,  for example through
''ouotation cirtihcates" which- would make it unnecessafy  for an issuer to go
.ei'eral times through formalities he had already complild with; these-proposals
could do much to sfeed up and simplify the admission of foreign securities.
II) DEVETOPMENT OF DEALINGS IN FOREIGN SECURITIES  OUTSIDE  THE
OFFICIAL MARKETS
)t9. Securities not listed on the "oficial mafket" may, in EEC countries, be traded
e,ither on special markets within the stock exchange, on the basis of simplified
procedures, or outside the exchange'
On the unoficial  market (rnarcb6  bors cote) in Ftance, for instance, the securities
of 718 issuers were quoted at the end of t965, of. which 117 were foreign,
including those of the franc area. In Belgium,  "supplementary public -sales"
{aentes publiques suppl1mentaires)  arc organized,periodically  at the Brussels and
i\tt..rp stock exchanges (at least once a month for all securities  _not officillly
listed 
"ttd *or. often-for certain specially authorized securities),  thus enabling
securities that do not satisfy the Listing Committee's conditions fot official
244admission to be traded on the bourse none the less. In Luxembourg,  monthly
public sales take place on the same system. In Germany, there is alongside  the
offi.i"l market (amtlicher  Markt) a syitem of "regulated free trading" (geregelt-er
Freiuerkehr) for bourse dealings in securities which have_qualified {or admis-sion by
simplified  and less costly proc;dures.  In addition, outside the-,exchange,  telephone
a.riingt in unlisted secrrriii.s (Telelonhandel in unnotierten'Verten)  are organized
fy thJ banks for shares of companies which have app_lied {or admission  to neither
oi the two markets (amtlicber Markt and geregelter  Freiaerke,6r)  described  above;
many foreign securities are ffaded in this way.
In the Netherlands, thete is an unofficial  telephone  market, on which brokers deal
i" ""tirt.a 
securities;  but it is relatively small, and foreign securities-nee-d  a-special
p"r*i, from the Nederlandsche  Bank-to be traded on it. In Italy, finally.,  the
ivlilrn bourre has a "restricted  market" (mercato ristretto),  where the stocks of
about 160 companies not officially listed can be traded once a week'
40. The Group considers that these markets fulfil a very useful function in
,..lin"iiritg securities until they arc teady for admission to the official market,
and this .pili.r more especially'to foreign'securities.  It would like to see more
;i1he rJ;rities of ottrer Member Staies admitted to these parallel markets'
Si-pUn.a admission procedures are particulady  appropriate  when the securities
;g-|i.;;;e liuu. ul..rdi' satisfied listing requiremintJ on iheir own domestic market'
Or" .iglrr.u.r go ,o f"t ut to allo'i any sgcurity officially listed in- any Member
Stat. to" be autoiratically  eligible for unofficial trading in other Member States
without further formalities.
C) HARMONIZING AND SIMPLIFYING PRICE QUOTATION  TECHNIQUES
4L. Difierent systems of price quotation  are employed- at present in Member
Siates. Shares are qrroted in to*  countries in termi of perientage  of nominal
value, in others in terms of money units, and in some countries both systems  exist
ria. fv side. Fixed-interest r.cnrity quotations take account of accrued interest in
certain countries and ignore it in others'
The form in which the prices of oficially listed securities are _published  varies
considerably from one .orrntty to another, even in the case of dealings.for cash,
to say nothing of those for forward settlement- and in options, in countries where
these'are poriibl.. Prices marked on unofficial markets are often published  sepa-
ntely, and the way they are presented  varies even more widely.
There can be no doubt that even an investor familiar with the machinery of his
own domestic market often finds it dificult to read and interpret foreign quotations'
This situation is hardly a propitious  one for security arbitrage, since,- given the
trryi"g characteristics of se.uiitigs anf quotation  systems,  actual yields can.be
;;i11ge out only by calculations  which few-investors are in a position  to undertake,
Si-ptih."iio., 
"nd'rottt. 
harmonization in the presentation of price lists would be
very helpful in this respect.
245C, PROBLEMS  CONNECTED \VITH MOVEMENT AND NEGOTIATION
OF SECURITIES
4t2. Difierences in stock-exchange technique do not normally set insoluble prob-
l:ms for the carrying-out of internationaf transactions, which can perfectly^well
take place.in spite of some degree of variety in the way stock 6*changes are
c,rganized (1).
Irtrevertheless, there may well be a case for equipping the various markets with
equivalent technical facilities in order to give tlem equal opportunities for devel-
opment and to improve market linkages  by certain refbrms.- 
-
A- simple but helpful  suggestion might be to lengthen and synchronize the hours
of business on stock exchanges  and thus f.acilitate arbitrage operations.
A fiore radical reform would be to inroduce a market in dealings for forward
sr:ttlement  in centres where they do not exist as yet. A proiect of this kind is at
present under discussion in Germany. The high iost of u .rlait system for stock-
exchange ffansactions, such as exists in the Ulited States, t.tgg.tir that generally
slreaking the organization of a forward market would, in European  conditionj,
probably be the best arrangement for sustaining  and increasing the volume of
business.
Ibe -Grogp feels that the movement and negotiation of securities among the
Ivlember States might be improved by:
i) The establishment of. a European clearing for security  tansactions;
ii) Fiscal measures to encourage circulation  of securities;
iii) Harmonization of the rules applied to stock-exchange  intermediaries  and to
the transactions of certain categories of operaror;
ir) The development of block uading techniques.
/,) ESTABLISHMENT  OF A EUROPEAN  SECURITY  CLEARING
4-7. I-t has-al-repdy_been  noted that the physical handling of securities occasions
a number of dificulties, including in particular the problJm of accidental loss of
bearer securities. In this connection lhe Group wiJhes to draw attention to an
a€ireement, now under study, designed to provide, among other things, for securities
on which a stop has been placed to be widely publicized  ihroughout ihe Community.
H.ovever, the cr-ucial problem  is that of the cost and complexity  of dealings; this
is largely rolt-"d in France-  and- Germany by _the existence of security l[aring
associations of bankers and brokers. The establishment of such instiiutions ii
other Member States might help later to set up a European security clearing
(1) For a detailed  account of how the stock exchanges work in the member countries,  see les
bourse,s europdennes-  (seco_nd  edi_tion) published in Lt65 by the " Groupemenr europ6en'd'6tudes
financibres ", formed  by financial instiiutions  of several  countries.
24'5system on the pattern, for instance,-of-_the  French SICOVAM  (Soci6t6 lnter'
prolessionnette iour la Compensation  des Valeurs Mobilibres)_.  Voluntary participa-
iion of the national giros, br even direct participation of financial  intermediaries
in -".t.t  and non-irember countries, in this European  cleating sy-stem would
enable it to accept bearer securities, open current security  accounts for members
iii 
^rt 
as nomiriee for foreign registerid  secutities, thus facilitating  the handling
of international transactions 
"and ieducing  commissions and brokerage, which at
present are well above those charged for operations of a domestic nature'
The International Federation of Stock Exchanges has akeady devoted much
^t*.nti"" .  the study of all these problems  and to ihe_ possil'ility of harmonizing the
phyti."l presentatio;  of securitiesl Its-important work in this direction  should now
i*'foUo"i"a up by concrete action on the palt of. government  and.boutse  authorities
in Member States to implement the technical piogress achieved. What is chiefly
needed is amendment  of^the legal provisions  applied in certain member countries,
;;.h ;t Italy, Belgium and Lu*e-mbourg,  requiring  securities  to be "individualized".
S".[ p."ritions iirpede the establishmEtrt of security clearing systems, since stocks
deposited with a cerrtral giro necessarily  lose the individuality conferted upon
them bv an identification number or registfation in the ownef's name.
B) FISCAL MEASURES TO ENCOURAGE  SECURITY  TRANSACTIONS
44. The circulation  of securities  could be encouraged by measures  in the field of
direct taxation.
Tax considerations  are at times the root cause of the rigidity in the portfolios of
certain companies, whose managels might otherwise wish to realize some of their
in".ri*.",r'o,  ,it.,  the comp"osition  of their holdings. - This is the case, fof
i;;t;;;;,  *h.t.  heavy direct tixes are levied on capitaf gains. realized on the sale
of secur'ities - 
gaini that are sometimes  paper profits only if, allowance is made
ior ,fr. g.".ral riie in prices after an invesfment ii first shown in the balance sheet
at cost i'nd if subsequent balance sheets have not been adjusted'
Appropriate  fiscal treatment of the_se capital gains would help to "thaw" the
porifoiior of these companies, and the seCuritieJ concerned could thus be brought
Lack into circulation. For instance, ceftain tax reliefs granted to companies  "on
condition of reinvestment" in fespect of sales of other types of asset might be
allorved also on security investments.  In particular, provisions are needed to
iacilitate the dissolution-  of companies  which no longer do any business but are
reluctant for fiscal reasons to liquidate their portfolios'
Another difficulty stems from the fact that in most member  countries the tax
privilege conceded  to parent companies,in  respect of income transferred_to  them by
ih.it ti,btidiafies  is conditional  upon the parint company  having a high minimu-m
holding in these subsidiaries; as 
-a 
result,-certain Pfent- companies have to hold
far mo"re of their subsidiaries' equity than they would otherwise wish to do. This
rule may have the efiect of inhibiting  direci recourse of subsidiaries to public
saving. Some w"y should be found to altet these fiscal regulations'
247l\loteover, where there are provisions  allowing tax privileges  or bonuses to indi-
viduals to encourage them to hold securities,  for instance under investment  plans,
the Group feels that these provisions should apply, without discrimination, to the
securities of all member countries.
4t.  Alleviation  and harmonization of indirect taxes aflecting the introduction  of
strurities to dealing  and transactions  on the stock exchanges would also be a f.actot
o:[ considerable expansionary  force.
A.s regards  stamp duty on the issue and introduction of securities, the directive
crrncerning the harmonization of taxes on capital contdbutions,  now under consid-
e:ration by the EEC Council, should, once it is adopted, create comparable
conditions on the various markets. The content  and implications  of this directive
a:ce discussed in Chapter 14 (fiscal problems),  as are the associated problems o{
taxes on stock-exchange mansactions;  the proposal is that these taxes, too, should
be abolished  or harmonized.
C) HARMONIZATION OF RULES GOVERNING INTERMEDIARY ACTiVITIES ON
S:IOCK EXCHANGES  AND TRANSACTIONS  BY CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF
OPERATOR
4'5. \Thereas in France- and Belgium ,security transactions are a stock-exchange
rrronopoly,  in other member cogntries they may be efiected by settlement  amoig
the customers of financial establishments,  which if necessary  themselves run stocf,
on behalf of customers.  In addition, certain credit instituiions are authorized  to
dr:al on the stock exchange in Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg,  while
irr Italy they are mere observers on the market.
A 9ls-tem-of bourse monopoly  is the best guarantee  of genuine price quotations
and thetefore  desetves,supqort, provided it involves no disadvaniages  for certain
types of transaction  such as block rading of shares (to be discussed  6elow).
F:rom the point of view of credit institutions, the problem  may be considered from
three difierent aspects:
a)t The right to act on the stock exchange as an intermediary;
b.) The right to hold securities on own account;
c) The right to effect ffansactions outside the exchange, by matching customers'
prrrchase  and sale orders with stock held for their own account.
Tlhe combination of these three functions is obviously apt to be detrimental to the
good functio-ning-of the mqrkgt, because of the conflicts bf interest that may result,
and is thetefore best avoided. It will be recalled that for this very reason a plan
now under discussion in Germany proposes the banning of the making-up of
barrgains outside the exchange, except foi transactions  between credit instiiutions.
On the other hand, there is no reason why credit institutions should not act as
intermediaries  in stock-exchange business; 
-nor 
should they be prevented from
fulfilling their functions in block trading, which indeed they can lacilitate thanks
to their close contacts with customers.
24147. The same general principles should be borne in mind in drawing up rules
governing the operations of company  directors and executives in securities of their
own company.
The objective is to make sure that all persons canying out a stock-exchange  opera-
tion are on an equal footing and to prevent  those who, by virtue of their office in
a company, have access to information  which might influence  the market from
using their knorvledge to secure a personal advantage  denied to other investors.
This problem has been solved in the United States by very far-reaching  disclosure
requirements with respect to ffansactions by executives and directors, and also
bylhe policing functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission. In the United
Kingdom, a similar arrangement has just been adopted, though the disclosure
obligations are less stringent.
In EEC countries there are at present no regulations of this kind, even though
misgivings on this point have been expressed, especially in France.
There are obvious dificulties in establishing rules for so complex a matter, and
no precise suggestions can be put forward at this stage. The most that can be
done is to outline the underlying principles:
i) As regards the scope of the rules, they should bear on every sale or purchase of
shares or other partnership  rights in a company or its subsidiaries,  made directly
or indirectly by an executive  or director of the company  concerned;
ii) As regards the restrictions to be placed upon the executives'  or directors'
freedom of action, these should essentially  aim at preventing them from using
information acquired by virtue of their office to tade in the company's  securities
to their own advantage, before such information  has become public knowledge;
iii) As regards  methods of application, a system of absolute prohibition of such
transactions would hardly be realistic: a better arrangement would be that of
empowering stock-exchange authorities or some administrative  agency to undertake
investigations whenever price fluctuations  occur that suggest company  managers  or
directors may have put through deals at variance with these principles.
D) BLOCK SALES  AND PURCHASES  OF SHARES
48. \7hen a whole block of shares is ofiered to the public or a bid is made for
buying in all or part of a company's  shares, this is one of the ways by which, on
the most developed  capital markets,  large-scale transactions can be put through
in conditions which arc fiair to all panies concerned and entail a minimum  of
disturbance to the market. The possibility of such transactions being carried out
would prevent the persistent  underpricing of certain shares and, where foreign
shares *ere introduced in any given country, would enable them to be placed with
e wide range of investors.
The various techniques  normally  employed in London and New York 
- 
specialist
purchase,  exchange distribution, special offering, secondary  oflering or tender -
249are by no means unknown on the markets of Member  States. Nevertheless,  their
institutional structure may not always lend itself to this type of opefation,  notably
because of the absence of the appropriate intetmediaries.
Iiecondly, where there is a bourse monopoly,  these operations must be reconciled
.with it, but no major difficulties  seem likely on this scote; takeovet bids and
secondary  oflerings are in fact subject to special rules in France, and also in
I3elgium.
llhird and last, there is the problem of checking the genuineness of the ofier to
buy or sell, in order to prevent fraudulent manoeuvres  serving no other purpose
than to create price movements  on the stock exchange.
,{.s in the case mentioned in sec. 47, no detailed  recommendations  can be made
here. The Group can only stress the value of creating conditions undet which
block trading in shares can take place on a comparable  basis in all the Member
ljtates. Vithout such harmonization it might obviously happen that these trans-
actions would concentrate on the markets with the most liberal svstem and so
circumvent  the unduly resffictive rules of others.
(loNctusIoNs
,19. 1) The stock markets of EEC countries have a common working problem,
''vhich is the narrowness  of the market evident in the difficulty of dealing in any
one security without causing undue price movements.  This state of afiairs can be
remedied  only by:
u) Giving institutional  investors increased opportunities to enter the market;
l:t) Attracting back to the bourse business now conducted  outside itl
c) Establishing  closer communication  between  markets both by inroducing  foreign
securities, thereby enriching stock-exchange  lists, and by international arbitage.
21) The admission of securities of other member  countries to dealing on the various
clomestic markets would make negotiation of these securities easier and less costly.
ilo this end the Group recommends:
ar) Any discriminatory  provisions which may make the admission of foreign
s,ecurities  to quotation more dificult or more expensive should be removed, and
disclosure  requirements and the procedures  for admission to quotation should be
harmonized.
li) Steps should be taken to facilitate the introduction of a larger number of
foreign securities to dealing on markets  which have simplified admission  procedures
(the French marchl hors cote, supplementary public sales as in Belgium and
Luxembourg, the German Freiuerkehr,  the Milan "resmicted market"). Their
a.dmission to these markets should be allowed without formality if thev are already
listed in their county of origin;
250c) Price quotation techniques and the presentation  of price lists should be simplified
and harmonized, in order to promote better knowledge  of foreign markets and
stimulate  arbinage.
3) Certain technical improvements might be introduced to facilitate the movement
and negotiation of securities.  The following  may be mentioned:
a) The establishment  of a European security clearing;
b) The adoption of fiscal measures  designed to bring back into circulation shares
now immobilized  in company portfolios and also to reduce the cost of uansactionsl
c) Harmonization of. the rules applied to stock-exchange intermediaries, and more
particulady restriction of ofiset operations  efiected by credit institutions outside
the exchange, as well as an eflort to find a solution to the problems raised by the
ransactions  of managers and ditectors in their own companies'  securities;
d) An adjustment of current provisions with a view to enabling blocks of shares
to be negotiated in comparable conditions of freedom  and safety in all Member
States.
251ANNEX TO CHAPTER  11
Model prospectus  for public secutity issues of admission
to stock exchange listing (t) (t)
(). Every prospectus  shall name the persons who assume responsibility for it, or
{or parts thereof, and shall state in what capacity  these petsons  act.
1. ISSUE BY PUBLIC OFFER  OF SHARES OR DEBENTURES OF COMPANIES FOR
SALE OR SUBSCRIPTION  (3) (FIRST  OFFERING)
li.L Debentures: The prospectus  shall indicate
i!.L.1. As regards the  securities  to  be issued and the
rights  attaching  thereto
1i.1.1.1- i)  The nominal  amount of the loan;
ii) The number and characteristics  of the securities representing  the
loan;
iii) The resolution  of the body which took the decision to make the
loan issue;
li.L.L.2 i)  The date from which interest runs;
ii) The rate and due-dates of interest;
iii) The redemption yield, calculated  according to the difierent redemp-
tion alternatives;
iv) The calculation  base and terms of attribution of othet benefits,
iI any;
1i,.1.1.3 The fiscal provisions applying to the securities issued, especially whether
interest is payable net of withholding tax or not;
Ji,.1.1.4 i)  The life of the loan; where applicable,  dates for premature calling;
ii) The redemption  table and methods of redemption (by drawings,
repurchase on the stock exchange, etc.);
iii) Any pourer to efiect advance repayments and the manner of imputing
these in the redemption  table;
(l) For the content and significance  of the prospectus, see Chaptet 11.
(:2) Vithout prejudice to existing  national  legislation in this field, exemption  from the obligation
to publish a prospectus  might be permitted or less detailed patticulars required when the value
c,f the securities to be issued or admitted to stock exchange listing does not exceed (100000)
uLnits of account.
(3) For a definition of the concept of company, see Article 58, para, 2 of the Tteaty of Rome.
2521.1.1.5
L.1.1.6
1.1.1.7
1.1.1.8
1.1.2
1.1.2.1
1. .L .2.2
1.1.2.3
1.1..2.4
Any guarantees attaching to the loan (description
indication and extent of any guarantees granted
or other companies - 
see also 9);
Special rights of debenture holders, including in. particular a com-
mitment, if. any, to extend to the debentures of this loan any guafantees
or benefits attaching to a subsequent loan issue, or a commitment  not
to furnish a subsequent loan with special guarantees without applying
them also to the debentures of the present  loan;
The establishments handling the capital and interest service of the loan;
The decision whether to apply for stock exchange listing of the
debentures of the loan or not; if so, the stock exchanges to which
admission will be sought.
As regards the issue procedure
Subscription rights, if any (if applicable, quotation or other procedure
for negotiation of the rights);
i)  The purchase or subscription price;
ii) Arangements  fot payment of the purchase or subscription price;
iii) The period during which lists are open;
iv) The amount and composition of the issuing expenses (as a whole
and per debenture) and how they are to be charged;
v) Amangements  and timelimits  {or issue of the certificates;
If the issue is taken firm or underwritten, the name of the firm buyer
or underwriter,  the composition of the undetwriting group and the
terms of the firm purchase or undetwriting;
The establishments authorized  to accept subscriptions.
of tangible  security,
by public authorities
L.1.3 As tegards the company whose securities  are
being of f ered
1.1.3.L The company's  name, date of incorporation,  duration, re-gistered gfi.",
capital ,nd ihe number of shares, ihe amount of capital not paid up,
ani reference to the published articles and memorandum  of association
and any amendments thereto;
1.1.3.2 Description of the company's objects and activities;1i.1.3.3 i)  Comparative accounts for the last three financial years (including
contingency  accounts and profit appropriation  accounts) or, if  the
company is less than three years old, its accounts  since incorporation;
ii) A recent statement of position if the last balance sheet is more
than nine months old;
iii) The proposed  employment of the proceeds of the issue;
1i,.L.3.4 Other loan stocks issued by the company  and any guarantees attaching
thereto;
1.1.3.5 Composition of the company's  boards;
1.L.3.6 Certification by the company's auditing board (if any) that the particulars
contained in the prospectus are - 
at least in substance - 
accurate
1.1.4 As regatds debentures of foreign  companies
The prospectus  shall indicate in addition
i)  Under 1.1.1.1-: The legislative provisions applicable to the de-
bentures issued and the courts competent in the
event of disputes;
ii)  Und.er 1.L.1.3: \Tithholding taxes, if  any, levied on interesr
received by non-resident  individuals in the country
of origin or the country of issue;
iii) Und,er 1.1.1.7: Foreign exchange transfer permits, if any, ob-
tained by the issuing company to enable it to
pay interest  and repay principal abroad.
1.1.5 As regards debentures expressed in  foreign
currency
The prospectus  shall indicate in addition
Under 1.L.7.2: Foreign exchange permits, if any, obtained for the
payment of interest and repayment of principal.
1.1.6 As regards debentures expressed in  units  of
account
The prospectus shall indicate in addition
Under  1.1 .1.2: The conffactual status of the unit of account stipulated.
tt41.2 Shares
1.2.1 Shares issued on the occasion ol a capital inuease for casb
The prospectus shall indicate:
L.2.L.L As regards the  securities  to  be issued and the
rights  attaching thereto
1.2.L.1".1 The resolution of the bodv which took the decision to issue the
securities;
1.2.1.1..2 The amount of the capital  increase, the number and characteristics  of
the securities  representing this increase;
1.2.1.1.3 i) The rights attaching to the new securities  (voting rights, profit
share, etc.);
ii) The date from which they rank for dividend;
1.2.1.1.4 The decision whether or not to apply for stock exchange listing of all
or part of the securities floated by public issue; if applicable, the stock
exchanges  to which admission  is being sought;
1..2.1.1.5 The establishments  acting as financial  agents to the company.
1.2.1.2 As regards the issue procedure
1.2.1.2.1 i)  Subscription rights, if any (quotation of the rights);
ii) The treatment of subscription rights not exercised;
1.2.1..2.2 i)  The purchase or subscription price;
ii) Arrangements for payment of the purchase or subscription  price;
iii) Arrangements  for subsequent payments for securities not fully paid;
iv) The period during which lists are open;
v) The number of securities being issued;
vi) The amount and composition of the issue costs;
vii) Arrangements and timeJimits for issue of the certificates;
1.2.1.2.3 If the issue is taken firm or underwritten, the name of the firm buyer
or underwriter,  the composition of the underwriting group and the
terms of the firm purchase or underwriting;
1.2.1.2.4 The establishments authorized to accept subscriptions.
2551.2.1..3 As  regards the  company whose securities  are
being of f ered
L.2.1.J.1 i) The company's name, date of inc,orporation,  duration, registered
office, capital (where necessary,  authorized and issued), the number of
shares, the number of securities not representing  capital, the rights
attaching to the securities of various categories, in particular  voting
rights and rights to a share in the ptofits and the liquidation surplus,
the amount of capital not paid up, and reference to the published
articles and memoiandum of association and any amendments  theteto;
ii) The history of the capital and the securities representing  it as well as
of the securities not representing  capital;
1..2.1.3.2 Description of the company's  objects and activities;
1.2.1.3.3 i) Comparative  accounts for the last three financial years (including
contingency  accounts and profit appropriation  accounts) or, if  the
company is less than three years old, its accounts  since incorporation;
ii) Possibly a recent statement of position if the last balance  sheet is
more than nine months old;
1.2.1..3.4 i) Methods used for valuation of fixed assets,  stocks, claims, the security
portfolio and other current assets; depreciation rates applied to fixed
assets;
ii) Any changes in valtration  methods or depreciation rates during the
last thtee years and the incidence thereof;
1.2.1.3.5 i) Composition  of the security portfolio (other than government or
government-guaranteeed  loan stock) and changes therein during the
last three years; for each item, an indication of what proportion the
holding represents in the total securities of the same category issued
by the company whose securities are held, if this proportion is (5)
per cent or more;
ii) The balance sheet and the profit and loss account of subsidiary
companies (1) together with a description of their activities and, if
necessary, prospects, except if a statement of position in tespect of these
subsidiaries  is incorporated in a consolidated balance sheet published
in the issue prospectus;
iii) The consolidated  balance sheet of the company  and its subsidiaries
together with a statement on the principles and methods of consoli-
dation, if such integrated accounts appear warranted and desirable;
(") For the concepts of subsidiary company and "dominant"  company, c{. the studies on harmo-
nization of safeguards to protect the interests of members  and third parties [Article 54 (3 d of
the Treaty of Romel.
2561.2.1-.3.6 i) Indusmial and commercial  agreements,  licensing contracts, etc., having
a major bearing on the company's  business;  description of these agree-
ments and contracts;
ii)  Output and sales figures (1);
iii) The investment programme  and hovr it is financed;
iv) The proposed employment of the proceeds of the issue;
1.2.1.3.7  Income tax paid or provided  for by the company  during the last three
financial years;
1.2.1.3.8 i)  Composition  of the company's boards;
ii) The overall amount of remuneration paid under whatever heading,
charged to general expenses or the profit appropriation  account, to the
members of the board of directors during the last ptoceding or the
cuffent financial year;
1.2.L.3.9 Any other disclosure required by domestic  legislation in connection
vrith the annual accounts or legal information  obligations;
L.2.1.3.1.0  Cenification by the company's auditing board (if  any) that the
particulars  contained in the prospectus  are - 
at least in substance - accurate.
1-.2.2 Sbares issued lor cash on the occasion of a company's  establishment
The issue prospectus  shall contain the particulars required unde-r 1.2.1',
except foi those relating to the history of the capital and the com-
pany's past.
1.2.3 lssue by public offer ol a loreign company's  shares lor sale or subscription
The issue prospectus  shall contain the particulars  required under 1.2.1
and shall indicate in addition
i)  Under 1.2.1.1.2:  The legislative provisions applicable to the secu-
curities issued and the courts comDetent  in the
event of disputes;
ii) Ilnder 1-.2.1.1.3: Withholding taxes levied on dividends paid to
non-resident  individuals  in the country of origin,
and foreign exchange  ransfer permits, if  any,
obtained by the issuing company to enable it to
pay dividends abtoad.
(t) Not applicable  to financial establishments  (banks, savings banks, finance companies, etc.).
2572. ADMISSION TO STOCK  EXCHANGE LISTING
2.L Adnission to stock exchange listing ol securities  floated during the year
preceding the listing by public issue, in connection with wbicb a prcspectus
cornplying with the reqairements  under t  bas been publisbed.
In this case disclosure  of infotmation  may be limited to a supplement
to the original prospectus, bringing  this up to date.
2.2 Adnission to stock exchange listing of shares created subsequent to capi-
talization of reserues  or profits, or ol debentures  allotted by way ol interest
or dioidend
No prospectus required.
2.3 Adnission to stock exchange listing ol securities  representing  tbe capital
increase of a company whose stock is listed, subsequent to tbis cornpany's
take-oaer ol anotber coffipan! uhose stock was listed in the same country,
or ol the securities  of a company formed by the rnerger ol companies  wbose
stock was listed
The admission prospectus  shall indicate in particular:
i)  The reports presented to the two companies' general meetings of
shareholders to justify the merger proposal;
ii) Justification  of the basis of the merger;
iii) The last balance sheet and profit and loss account of each of the
merged companies;
iv) An initial statement of position subsequent to the merger;
v) A statement on future outlook and especially on the prospective
yield of the securities.
.2.4 Otber cases ol adnission  to stock exchange  listing
The admission prospectus shall contain the particulars required under 1.
and 2.3
.,. PUBLIC OFFER FOR SALE OF A COMPANY'S  SECURITIES BY AN ISSUER
BEING  A THIRD PARTY \TITH RESPECT TO TI{E COMPANY  \THOSE SECURITIES
ARE OFFERED AND NOT ACTING IN THE CAPACITY OF FIRM BUYER
(SECONDARY OFFERING)
The issue prospectus  shall contain the particulars  required under 1., provided
the issuer has access to them. If this is not so, it shall be explicitly  stated that
the prospectus has been prepared only on the basis of information available to
the issuer.
i58The prospectus  shall, in addition, state why the public ofier for sale is made.
The prospectus shall, finally, contain the following particulars on the issuer
making the public o{Ier fot sale, if the issuer is a company:
i)  Full name and identity of the issuing company (cf . 1.2.L.3.L);
ii)  Its latest balance sheet, profit and loss account and profit appropriation
account:
iii) The composition of its security portfolio.
4. ISSUE OF (BEARER) CERTIFICATES REPRESENTING (REGISTERED) SHARES;
ISSUE OF STOCK BY "ADMINISTRATIEKANTOREN"  (TRUSTEE OFFICES)
The issue prospectus  shall indicate:
4.1  As regards the issuer of the certificates  or stock
i)  Full name and identity of the issuing company  (cf . L.2.L.3.1);
ii)  Description  of the issuer's or issuing office's objects and activities;
iii) Comparative  accounts for the last three financial years, including
contingency accounts and profit appropriation  accounts;
iv) Composition of boards;
v)  The composition  and amount or rate of commission and expenses
in connection with the issue of the certificates or stock, with coupon
payment and with the creation of additional certificates or stock, as
well as with the exchange of the certificates for the original shares.
As regards the certificates themselves
i) Their legal status in detail, especially with teference  to the exercise
of voting rights and the possibility of converting the certificates into
the original shares they represent;
ii) Their stock exchange quotation, if. any.
As regards the company whose  shares are represented by the certificates
The particulars rcquired under 7.2.
5. ISSUE OF DEBENTURES CONVERTIBLE INTO SHARES
The prospectus  prepared on the occasion of the issue of these convert-
ible debentures shall, in addition to the particulars required under 1.1.1,
7.1..2 and 1.2.1.3. indicate:
i)  The conversion  dates, terms and arrangements;
ii)  Guarantees  designed to safeguard the rights of the holders of the
convertible  debentures:
4.2
),r
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iii) A list of outstanding  convertible loan issues together with their
terms;
iv) The stock exchange quotation,i{. any, of the securities  into which
the debentures are convertible.
The prospectus prepared on the occasion of a conversion  ofler for these
debentures shall consist of the issue prospectus brought up to date.
However, if the conversion ofier is made less than ^ 
yeat after the
issue, the prospectus for it may consist simply of a supplement  bringing
the original prospectus up to date. If the conversion period extends
over several years, the particulars of the prospectus shall be brought
up to date annually.
ISSUE OF DEBENTURES \flITH STOCK-PURCHASE  \TARRANTS
The same principles  shall apply as in the case of convetible debenture issues
as under )., except that the prospectus  shall, in addition, contain the following
particulars:
i)  A detailed description of the characteristics  of the warrants and the rights
attaching thereto;
ii) The guarantees designed to safeguard the dghts of warrant holders.
ISSUE  OF DEBENTURES EXCHANGEABLE  AGAINST  SHARES
The same principles  shall apply as in the case of an issue of debentures con-
vertible into shares or patnership  stock.
8. SUBSCRIPTION \TARRANTS
6'.1  Free allotment of subscription warrants:
No prospectus need be prepared in this case.
3'.2  Issue of subscription  warrants by public ofier {or sale or their admission
to stock exchange  listing:
The ptospectus  prepared on the occasion of the issue or listing shall
contain the particulars required under 1.2, and in addition:
i)  A detailed description of the characteristics of the subsciption
warrants and the rights attaching thereto;
ii) The guarantees  designed to safeguard the rights of subscription
wafrant holders.
St.3  At the opening of the subsciption  lists for the shares to which the
subscription $/arrants give a right, a prospectus  shall be prepared and
contain the particulars required  under 1..2.
6t,
a10.
ISSUE OF A COMPANY'S SHARES OR DEBENTURES GUARANTEED  BY ANOTHER
COMPANY
In addition to the particulars  required under 1. as regards the securities  to be
issued, the issue terms and arrangements and the company whose securities  are
being issued, the issue prospectus shall indicate, as regards the guaranteeing
company,  the particulars required under 1.1.-3 or 1.2.7.3, according to whether
the securities  are debentures  or shares.
ISSUE OF DEBENTURES  BY COMPANIES  FORMING A GROUP FOR THIS
PURPOSE
Joint issue by a group having legal personality:
The issue prospectus  shall be so prepated as to state clearly- the
guarantees  ofi.t.a by the companies iorming part of the group and the
terms of their relationship with it.
Joint issue by a group having no distinct legal personality:
The prospectus shall indicate;
i)  The patticulars required under -1. as tegards the securities to be
issued, the issue termJ and arrangements  and each of the companies
on behalf of which the group is acting;
ii) A description of the group contract;
iii) The holders' rights of recourse against each of the companies  in
the group.
PUBLIC OFFER OF EXCHANGE  OF SHARES
The prospectus prepared on this occasion shall, as, regards the company making
the public ofier, contain the particulars required under 1.2. In addition, it
shall indicate:
i)  The purpose of the operation;
ii) The particulars  required under 1.2.I.3 as regards- the company to. who.se
securities* the exchange ofier applies, provided that the company making the
public ofiet has access to this information;
iii) Reasons for the exchange  ratio chosen.
11.
10.1
10.2
12, TAKE.OVER BIDS (FOR CASH)
The prospectus  shall indicate:
i)  Full name and identity of
(cf. L.2.1.3.1);
ii) The statement  of the ofier;
the company making the public ofier
261iii) The terms, arrangements and time-limit of the ofier;
iv) The purpose of the operation;
v) The justification of the price ofiered;
vi) The particulars required under 1.2.1.3. as rcgards rhe company for whose
shares or stock a bid is made, provided the company  making the public ofier
has access to this information. \7here this is not so, it shall be explicitly
stated that the prospectus has been prepared only on the basis of information
available to the company making the ofier;
vii) The establishments  authodzed to handle the transaction.
1.3. DEBENTURE ISSUES BY DOMESTIC, FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL
AUTHORITIES
The prospectus shall furnish the particulars required under 1.1.1 and L.1.2.
14. PUBLIC  ISSUE OR ADMISSION  TO STOCK EXCTIANGE  LISTING  OF SHARES
AND CERTIFICATES  OF OPEN-END  INVESTMENT FI.]NDS
14.1 Open-end inuestment  fund.s with undiaided ownersbip of und.erlying
secarities
The prospectus  shall indicate:
14.1.1 As regards the fund
L4.1.1.1 The fund's name, legal status, date of establishment  and the period for
which it has been set up; the registered oftce of the managers; the
legislation under which the fund has been set up and conducts  its
business. Unless the trust deed and the regulations governing the
conduct of the fund are reproduced in full in the prospectus,  an
indication of what information has been made public and an indication
of the address or the publication where the teits can be consulted by
anyone who may wish to do so;
L4.1.1.2 Under whose authority and by what procedures  the trust deed or the
tegulations governing the management of the fund may be altered;
14.1-.L.3 The general objectives  of the fund (e.g. whether universal, or specializ-
ing in paticular  securities,  etc.);
14.L.1.4 The rules adopted regarding the placing, acquisition and sale of
securities by the fund;
L4.L.L.5 The fund's investment policy; on a fund's foundation, the prospectus
shall instead indicate the proposed investment  poliry;
2t;214.1.L.6
14.1.1.7
14.1 .L .8
L4.L.1..9
14.1 .1 .10
14 .L .L .11
14.L.1.12
Name and identity of:
i) The institution or institutions  responsible for the holding and
custody of the fund's securities  and for the implementation of manage-
ment decisions;
ii) The agency or agencies responsible for financial servicing on
UenaU of 
"the fund (alceptanc. oT applications to join or discontinue
membership;  payment of income, etc.);
iii) The obligations assumed by these institutions and agencies and
the guarantees, if any, attaching to these obligations;
The intervals at which a statement of assets and an income  and
expense  account  are prepared,  together with auditing  arrangements and
publication arrangemenis  for these accounts  and the auditors' report;
i) The appropriation of the balance on income and expense  account
(distribution, reinvestment);
ii) The authorization,  if  any, to distribute capital- gains,
appropriate, the methods of 
-determining 
distributable  gains
distri6uting them (in cash or certificates);
and, if
and of
The latest statement of assets:
i)  An itemized list of the fund's holdings, indicating  for each holding
its proportion in the fund's total assets;
ii) The various valuation methods applied, by categories;
iii) An indication of the proportion of the fund's holding. of any
,ecrrrity in the total of secitiiies of the same category. issued by the
same company or rnstitution, if this proportion exceeds 1 per cent;
iv) The number of certificates outstanding;
v) The inventory value per certificate;
The latest income  and expense  account;
If applicable, the amount of distributable and distributed capital gains;
The last five years' figures (or the figures since the establishment of
the fund if it is less than five years old), for
i)  The net assets of the fund;
ii) The inventory value per certificate;
iii) The balance on income and expense account;
iv) Distributed ot capitalized  income;
v) Capital gains distributable  and dis6ibuted in cash or securities;
vi) Any changes introduced  in valuation  methods and the incidence of
these changes on the accounts;
Securities acquired and sold during the last tvrelve months. 14.1.1.13
263"14.1.2 As  regards
certificates
certificates
subscription  and
and  the  rights
repayment  of
attaching  to
14.1..2.1
14.1.2.2
:14.1.2.3
,!,4.1.2.4
:t4.1.2.5
:t4.1..2.6
i!.4.1.2.7
1i,4.1.2.8
L4.1.2.9
L4.L.2.10
The method of determining the inventory value of certificates;
The method of determining the subscription price and repayment
price and the composition, by categories of expenses and charges, of
the diflerence between the inventorv  value of the certificate and its
subscription and repayment price;
The dates, days or periods when subscriptions or applications for
repaymelt are accepted; a full list of the conditions on which appli
cations for repayment may, in accordance with the memorandum  or
articles of association, be refused, or repayment may be made in
instalments or deferred;
Voting rights, if. any, attaching to the certificates;
If the certificates are listed on the stock exchange,  the criteria and
terms of possible stock exchange issue or repurchaie of cenificates on
behalf of the fund;
If the fund oflers certificates under a systematic  saving or investment
plan, a list of the subscriber's rights and obligations, and explicit
mention of any clauses barring an interruption in the subscriber's
payments, or, an immediate repayment  of the certificates  he already
holds, and of. any indemnities which may be payable;
If this systematic  subscription plan is associated with a life assurance
contract, the respective rights and obligations of the insured person
and the insurer, the name of the insuring institution,  the mortality
tables and the capitalization rates on which the insurance  premium ii
calculated;
The amount and method of calculation  of commissions, charges and
expenses payable to the management,  the custodian or a third party
in respect of the management  of the fund and the distribution of income
and capital gains, as well as the method of charging these commissions,
and costs (whether to capital or to income);
The establishments  acting as financial agents to the fund;
Vithholding taxes levied in the country of origin on distributions  of
income and capital  gains.
14.1.3 As  regards  the  fund's  management company
14.1.3.L The company's name, date of incorpoartion,  nationality, registered  ofice
and objects;  reference to the published memorandum and articles of
association and anv amendments thereto:
215414.1.3.2 The amount of the company's capital and the securities which repre-
sent it;
14.1.3.3 The amount of capital not paid up; identification  of the owners of nor
fully paid-up shares and indication of their call liability;
14.1.3.4 The company's activities;
14.1 .3.5  The composition of the company's boards and of its investment
committee,  if. any;
14.1.3.6 The company's latest balance sheet and profit and loss account.
14.2 Open-end  inuestrnent funds constitated  in corupany t'orrn
The prospectus  shall indicate:
14.2.L As  regards  the  company
14.2.L.1 The company's name, date of incorporation,  duration, nationality,
registered office and objects,  and references  to the published memo-
randum and articles of association and amendments thereto;
14.2.1.2 As applicable in specific  cases:
i)  The amount of authorized and issued capital;
ii)  Powers and procedures  for changing authorized  capital;
iii) The amount of fixed capital and the powers and ptocedures for
changing it;
L4.2,1.3 The latest balance  sheet, profit and loss account and profit appropria-
tion account;
1"4.2.1..4  The particulars required under 74.7.1.3 to  74.1.1.9, 14.1.1. 17 and
14.1.1-.13;
14.2.1.5 For the last three years (or since the establishment  of the company if
it is less than three years old):
i)  The balance sheets and profit and loss accounts;
ii)  The number of securities  in circulation;
iii) Income distibuted,  allocated to reserves or capitalized;
iv) Capital gains distributable  and distributed in cash or securitiesl
v) Any changes introduced in valuation methods  and the incidence
of these changes on the accounts;
14.2.L.6 The particulars required snder 7.2.7.3.7 to 1.2.1.3.9.
265l+t.2.2
ltt.2.2,L
1'1.2.2.2
L'1.2.2.3
1..4.2.2.11
As
of
tegards the issue of  nev/ shares, repurchase
shares and the rights  attaching thereto
Powers and procedures for issuing new shares;
If nevr participation  certificates are issued through the stock exchange,
the criteria and conditions  applied to the issue of new certificates in
the light of the inventory value per share;
If new certificates are issued otherwise than through the stock exchange,
the method of determining the issue price and the composition, by
categories of expenses and charges, of the difierence between  the
inventory value per share and the issue price;
The dates, days or periods when subscriptions are accepted;
Preemptive subscription rights, if any;
The rights attaching to the shares; when there are several categories
of shares or securities,  the rights attaching to each category;
The particulars required under L4.1. .2 .6 ,  14 .7 .2 .7 , 74 .1 .2 .9 , and
14.1".2.10;
The holders' right, iI any, to apply for repayment of their sharesl
limitations and conditions to which this right may be subject;
The company's right, if. any, to buy its own shares on the stock exchange
or otherwise;
In the event of the company's repurchase of its own shares, the method
of determining the price for purchases  otherwise than on the stock
exchange, and the criteria and conditions  applied to repurchase on the
stock exchange, in the light of the inventory value per share;
The company's  right, if. any, to hold in its potfolio  such if its own
securities  as it may have acquited; conditions  and limits to which this
holding may be subject; the exercise of the rights attaching to the
company's  own shares in its portfolio.
1,t.2.2.4
1,l.2.2.5
1'1.2.2.6
1,l.2.2.7
1'1.2.2.8
1.,1.2.2.9
1,4.2.2.10
266PART FIVE
REMOVAL OF OBSTACLES  PREVENTING EQUAL ACCESS
TO THE EUROPEAN CAPITAL MARKET
Many of the obstacles to international financial operations  afiect more than one
sector of the capital market. In confining the analysis solely to individual  sectors
there is a danger that the wood may not be seen for the trees. That is why the
Group has thought it fitting to devote the three chapters of this Patt, to a systematic
examination of specific problems bearing on the market as a rvhole.
To lessen the inequalities of access to the European capital market, the financial
institutions need, above all, to be given a role in the European market comparable
udth the one they play on the domestic markets, in competitive  conditions  which
are not affected by excessive  divergences between operation rules and control
systems.
The exchange  risk which may be involved in international  financial operations will
not completely disappear until a monetary union is established in the Community.
Meanwhile it continues to set problems, the natute and gravity of which may
difier according to the type of borrowet and lender. In its search for possible ways
of eliminating the exchange risk, the Group looked for solutions that might make
a positive contribution  to the development of international financial mansactions
without, in so doing, inmoducing  new elements likely to disturb the domestic
capital markets.
The difierences between the fiscal systems applicable to loan, investment and issue
operations, and the frequent cases of international double taxation due to these
difierences, are perhaps the commonest cause of distottion in the movement of
capital. After making a comparative  study of the incidence of taxation on the
iniernational  financial operations of most importance to the development  of a
European  capital market, the Group has attempted to identify the measures  needed
to give praciical  efiect to the principle of neutrality of, fiscal systems and prevent
theie syitems influencing the international  movement of capital.
26?(tbtrIntroduction
1.  Integration of the European capital markets entails the active participation of
financial otganizations in capital movements between the difierent  Community
counffies. In each of the domestic markets the operations  of financial intermediaries
play a predominant  role; and this is how it should be in an integrated  European
market.
It is, therefore, not enough for individuals  to be free to carry out all the operations
necessitating  capital movements from one country to another. If  a broad and
eficient European  market is to be formed, the financial  organizations must be
able to play in it the same role as in each of the domestic matkets, both in the
collecting and distribution  of funds.
2.  There are many obstacles preventing financial intermediaries ftom participating
in the creation of a European  capital market.  Those arising from exchange  conuol,
fiscal laws and the exchange risk are dealt with in other chapters, since they also
concern capital movements  efiected by individuals. Financial institutions, for their
part, find iheir active contribution to the creation of a European.matket  impeded
by other restrictions  as well, deriving from the operating rules and conrols
imposed on them by law or by adminisrative regulations.
3.  The object of this chapter is to describe the main characteristics  of these rules
and controls and to examine to what degree they are liable to distort competition
between institutions  and, thereby, slow down the creation of a European capital
market.
This part of the fepoft, preceded by a few remarks to clarify the nature of the
problem and of the solutions  ptoposed, deals in turn with the regulations  applied to:
i) Banks:
ii) Institutions specializing in medium- and long-term  credit;
iii) Savings banks and their central organizations;
iv) Life assurance  companies.
CHAPTER 12
DISPARITIES  IN THE WORKING AND SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS
I. Requited adjustments: principles  and methods
A. ORIG/N AND NATURE OF THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED  ON
F IN ANCI AL INST/TUTIONS
4.  In most member counffies the present arrangements  concerning the working
and supervision of banks date from measutes.taken to palliate the efiects of the
great economic crisis o{ the inter-war period. The regulations  have been pro-
lressively refined as the role of the state in economic life has grov/n.).  Money-creating  institutions like deposit banks must comply with certain rules
and conrols dictated by oficial economic policy; these are imposed  either for
reasons of monetary policy (limitation of money creation and control of credit
expansion  by the central bank, external equilibrium and exchange  stability, and
stability of domestic  prices), or in order to protect depositors (proper management
of banks from the angle of security  and liquidity), or again in order to achieve
certain policy objectives in the broad sense (e.g. separation of the lending  and
participations business  of all-purpose  banks, in order to avoid excessive  risks being
taken and prevent financial groups from acquiring excessive influence over the
e,conomy; measures preventing bank concentration; nationalization of the big deposit
banks). Rules aiming at the automatic supply of the Treasury's cash requirements
may be regarded  as stemming from the same considerations.
6.  Non-money-creating  financial  intermediades  (savings banks, insurance companies
and specialized institutions) are governed by rules which are designed  mote
specifically  to protect savings and which consequently seem to detive from social
r:rther than economic considerations, although nowadays behind this justification
there often lies the desire of the authorities to direct a substantial part of the
resources at the disposal of these institutions to the financing of priority objectives.
T'his is particularly true of the public-sector financial organizations  set up in order
to meet specific  social needs (e.g. to encourage the small saver and protect him
algainst all risks, to facilitate home-ownership, to finance small firms, etc.). Save
u'here these organizations  have gone beyond their original objectives, their lending
business is necessarily restricted  and this limits the scope for fitting them into a
European  market except as regards their refinance requirements.
In other cases, the rules are also often tinged by considerations  of economic policy.
These institutions may, for example,  be required to specialize in order to prevent
their acquiring  an influence in the monetary field that might undermine 
-central
bank policy; another aim can be to associate these important  fund-raising  bodies
vith the financing of objectives laid down as part of investment  policy.
B. THE GENERAL APPROACH  TO THE PROBLEMS DISCUSSED  IN
THIS CHAPTER
7.  Even if the distortions arising from taxation  and exchange control were elimi-
nated, competition  among similar institutions in the various EEC countries would
remain unequal  because of disparities in the rules under which they operate.
This inequality,  of course, does not necessarily mean that the idea oi competition
has to be discarded altogether and that a European  capital market cannot be
brought into being. It is in fact conceivable  for the competition to be between
difierent types of institution in the various sectors.  Finance for building and
construction could, for instance, be the province of savings banks in one country,
of commercial  banks in another, and of a specialized public institution in a third.
The markets could be integrated on condition that there was competition  between
institutions belonging to difierent countries, even if these institutions  .were not of
thre same nature.
2708.  There are, nevertheless, numerous  practical dificulties in the way of this
approach. In each of the EEC countries there is a growing tendency for each type
of financial intermediary to enlarge its range of activity, both in the collection
and in the employment of funds. This trend seems to be a fundamental one and
is accepted  by the national  authorities.  It arises from the inner forces making for
the develooment of institutions anxious to cater for the needs of an industrial and
commercial world undergoing radical changes. This development could hardly be
arrested on the international  plane when it is so powerful in the domestic  markets.
As the capital markets becoml wider and freer, each institution will try to develop
its competitive  capacity in all the fields already covered by similar institutions in
the other Community countries. Consequently,  there will be an inevitable tendency,
both under political pressure and under pressure from the internal development
of the firms, towards some harmonization of the operating rules and control
systems for each class of financial intermediary.
9.  The Group feels that such harmonization should be embarked upon systematic-
ally rather than be left to develop as and when local pressures make themselves
felt. \7hile the Group does not recommend  complete harmonization of operating
rules throughout the Community, it does consider that the elimination of funda-
mental divergences is an essential condition for the integration  of European capital
markets.
II.  Banks
10. The main operating rules imposed on banks and liable to afiect international
competition  concern the way they obtain and employ funds. In this section these
rules are first of all classified according  to the purposes they serve, and the extent
to rvhich they can be maintained in an integrated market and the conditions under
which this can be done are then discussed (t).
A. RULES CONCERNING  THE COLLECTION  OF FUNDS
11. There are no important  divergences  concerning the range of the operations
that the banks may use to raise funds; in practice, however, certain operations  may
be considerably  limited by the advantages attaching to similar operations of other
institutions (state guarantees, more favourable fiscal arrangements).
12. However,  a problem does arise in the matter of interest rates. Except in the
Netherlands,  and in Germany in the case of very large sums, the interest rates
which banks may pay on deposits  are laid down by the authorities or in inter-bank
agreements, which are also generally supervised by the authorities. The reasons
underlying  the control of deposit tates are many and vary according to the rate in
question.
1t) Table 29 shows how the different national rules in Community counuies have led to very
difierent utilization o{ bank resources.
271Irnposed  or agreed rates are generally the maximum  legal rates, but they are also
normally  the actual rates applied. The limits they set to the extent to which the
banks may bid against each othet for deposits arose originally from the desire to
prevent competition  liable to endanger the security of deposits. A second reason
was to allow the banks to lend at teasonable rates.
The aim of some restrictions  may also be to curtail the operations of the banks
on markets where the State wishes to give priority to the raising of funds by the
authorities or by other financial institutions whose investments futhet certain
objectives  of economic or social policy; this type of motivation underlies the limits
imposed on the interest rates at which the banks may issue bonds or deposit
receipts (bons de caisse) and remunerate savings deposits. Rules concerning
thLe interest on savings deposits  are often combined with others specifying ceilings
beyond which the interest paid is lower than the basic rates.
Lastly, certain rules on deposit rates - 
like those forbidding the remuneration of
the current accounts or short-term deposits of non-residents and those linking
deposit rates to Bank rate  applied for monetary policy reasons.
A,s and when the obstacles to international transactions disappear, the obligation
to apply lower interest rates than those ofiered by competing institutions abroad
may prevent the banks from undertaking certain operations, especially  those which
involve relatively large sums and which normally cost the banks least to handle.
Where maximum rates have been fixed in order to facilitate the collection of funds
b1' other institutions or by the public authorities,  the efiect of foreign competition
would likewise be {elt and this would limit the value of maintaining  interest  rates
below those obtaining in other countries.
B. RULES CONCERN/NG  EMPLOY]VIENT OF FUNDS
1:t. The employment of funds, like the collection of funds, may be subjected to
la'ws or regulations fixing interest rates. In Italy there are minimum fates fof
loans granted  by banks. This type of rule is intended mainly to prevent cutthroat
competition, which might undermine the security of the banking system. The
pc,sition of Italian banks in international competition is afiected only if the minimum
rates are higher than those ofiered for the same operations by foreign competitors.
In Germany and Luxembourg, on the other hand, there ate maximum  rates, and
in Belgium the possibility of introducing  maximum rates is expressly provided for.
The main object of these ceilings is to prevent the operations financed by such
loans from costing too much. Normally the maximum rates apply only when
demand is heavy. Their existence  then forces the banks to "ration" their loans.
14. But the employment of bank funds is limited not so much by the rules
governing  intererf r"ier as by those directly specifying  the minimum ani maximum
luotas for certain types of asset.
27tZ15. Certain stipulated ratios with which the banks must comply - 
varying in
number from counuy to country - 
also vary gteady in impact in the several
counries, though their objectives are much the same:
i) Minimum reserve tatio "tteezing" a proportion of funds collected (with or
without interest);
ii) Special system of minimum  reserves  (coefficient de trtsorerie) establishing  a
minimum relation between liquid or immediately mobilizable  assets and liabilities;
iii) Cover ratio requiring banks to hold a certain quantity of Government stock
or paper;
iv) Transformation  coeficient establishing a maximum relation  between  fixed
investments and participations on the one hand and the bank's own capital and
long-, medium- and short-term  resources on the other;
v) Solvency ratio establishing  a maximum relation between the amount of liabilities
towards third parties, whether included in the balance sheet or not, and the bank's
own capital;
vi) "spread of risks" ratio limiting the loans a bank may gtant to one firm;
vii) Limitation  of the participations  held by banks to a specified percentage of the
capital of non-financial institutions (or an outright  ban on such participations).
16. Other rules may have indirect efiects on the composition of assets. They are
those that lay down which categories of securities can be rediscounted  or mobilized
at the cental bank and, where applicable, the limits within which rediscounting
is authorized (ceilings). Similar effects may result ftom rigles d'encadrement,
that is rules which limit the expansion of certain types of credit.
17. Cases of unequal competition  arise not only in connection with medium- and
long-term credit which, as has been seen in Chapter 7, remains qulject to limitations
in certain countfies, but also, in particular,  with regard to the holding of industrial
and commercial shares and debentures.
In France, Italy and Belgium a major distinction is made between deposit banks
and banques d'affaires (similar to investment  banks) and this can cause certain
handicapi, particularly in the fields of risk capital for indusuy, transactions in
securities, and even the efficient participation of banks as intermediaries in the
issue of securities.
trn Belgium,  a fecent bill proposes considerable  changes as a result of which the
distinciion between  deposil 6anks and banques d'affaires  would be applied less
rigidly. It is proposed-that  deposit banks should be allowed to hold bonds, with
nJ timeJimit, and should be able to hold shares for a year from the time of issue,
or possibly longer with the authorization of the Contrnission  Bancaire. The
erplrnutory membrandum  accompanying the bill brings out cleartry the Government's
iniention to encourage  the banks to play a more active role as intermediaries in the
security market.
In France deposit banks may not use more than 757o of. their own resources for
participations  of firm subscriptions to shares or parts issued by enterprises.  They
*uy not hold more than 1.0%io of the capital of enterprises  other than enterprises,
273real estate companies or services  enterprises necessary to the bank's operation.
On the other hand, the banques d'afaires were recently  authorized to accept deposits
o{' all kinds from the public and have no limit, within that set by the total of
thLeir own capital, on the amount of these securities they may hold. They may
even hold more than the sum of their own resources when these reach a specified
standard of stability. It must not be forgotten, however, that in the collecting of
deposits the banques  d'affaires 
^re 
at a disadvantage vis-i-vis the big banks, which
have a wide network of branches and sub-branches.
Irr Italy the banks'legal status does not forbid them to hold bonds or shares listed
on an Italian hourse, but the latter they may hold only "so far as necessitated by
th,eir relations with their customers".
Irr the Netherlands  the commercial  banks are completely free to invest in shares or
bonds as long, of course, as the des regarding  solvency and liquidity are respected.
Banks may not, however, take participations  in credit institutions, except with the
approval of the central bank. On the occasion of recent mergers the central bank
airanged with the banks concerned that its prior authorization  should be the rule
for any direct or indirect participation  exceeding 57o of. the capital of an enterprise.
Germany and Luxembourg  are the countries  where the banks have the greatest
freedom to hold shares and bonds.
CONCTUS/ONS
lil.  1) The need to achieve  a certain balance between  the rules on the management
of a bank's liabilities and those dealing with the assets it may hold makes
harmonization  even more necessary. If the diversity of the present pattern is
maintained, competition  problems will be created  between the banks of difierent
countfies, in the same way as such problems - 
ssrnslirnes acute - 
hzvs allsgn
br:tween diflerent institutions in the same countfy.
2 ) The Group recommends,  therefore, that a study should be made of the pro-
gressive harmonization  of the operating des and conrol systems applicable  to
banks conducting  business  in the EEC. Harmonization  should be concentrated  on:
i) The establishment  of common rules on interest rates, notably in connection with
ttre collecting of deposits;
ii) The gradual alignment of laws prescribing rules for balancing the composition
oli the banks'liabilities and assets:
iiii) The alignment of rules concerning the right of banks to hold industrial and
cclmmercial securities in their portfolios.
3.) Lastly, the Group recalls that some of its recommendations,  in particular those
re,lating to the unification of policy on deposit interest rates, can be put into practice
only if monetary policies  are efiectively harmonized,  as has been stated in Chapter 4.
Hi"armonization would remove  the handicap  of unequal competition  caused directly
or indirectly by divergences in the employment of the insuuments of monetary
policy.
2i'4III. Institutions specializing in medium- and long-term credit
19. Institutions with a special status and having a particular role in the medium-
and long-term_ financing of industrial capital expenditure, housing, local authorities'
capital expenditure, or of particular  sectors of the economy, exisiin all the Member
S-tates_ (see Table 30). However, they difier in their modes of operation and in
the advantages  or restrictions  relating to their activities.  The problems concerning
the role that these institutions might play in a European  capital market have already
been dealt with in Chapters  7 and 8, particularly in relation to credit for industry,
housing and local authorities'capital  expenditure;  this leaves for consideration the
problems affecting competition  that may arise from the advantages  and restrictions
referred to.
20. unlike_banks, savings banks and similar bodies, the specialized financial
institutions do not normally  accept deposits from the public but are financed rather
by the issue of bonded loans and by private loans from other financial bodies or
the public authorities.
lWhere these institutions do not receive direct financial aid from the State, the cost
of_ their_ methods of procuring  finance could sometimes put them at a disadvantage
when their lending ar:,rd investment  operations bring them into competition v/iih
bodie; enjoying wide facilities for transforming  short-term into long-term resources.
on the other hand the fact that they specialize is of some advantage in types of
operation  where administration presents special problems:  mortgage loani,- loans
to consumers, leasing business, etc.: it is not unusual to find finaniial bodies vrhose
memoranda  or articles of association  do not preclude  such operations preferring
to leave them to subsidiaries and sometimes  even, when the-size of the markei
so demands, to subsidiaries which are common to several of these bodies but
competitive  so far as other operations are concerned.
21. Besides the institutions  which specialize  solely for economic reasons,  there
are others which do so mainly for the political purpose of promoting  or controlling
certain classes of operation more strictly. Generally some instiiutions in the
private sector are allowed to finance such operations, but the public institutions
have the advantage of being able to obtain finance more easily and on better terms;
State, guarantees for loans they float, the right to attract savings by ofiering fiscal
privileges or higher interest  rates than those officially fixed for the other financial
bodies, exemption  from taxes, direct State subsidies.
22. The problem is not so much whether the present special characteristics of
these bodies would make it difficult for them to be fitted into a system of interna-
tional competition, but rather whether their position 
- 
which is often a privileged
9ne - 
does not prevent other institutioni from conducting the saml fine"of
business. This _probably does not arise so much with institutions  specializing for
purely technical reasons, as with those serving the purpose of instrumenis of
economic  policy.
It is not.for the Group to pronounce  on the wisdom of pursuing particular economic
policy objectives. Events have shown, however,  that bodies orlginally  set up for
a specific purpose  that justified privileges sometimes tend to e*tend their activities
z/J:into new fields while preserving their privileges, which afe then no longer justified
iand consequently  give rise to distortions of competition.
If institutions  enjoying pdvileges  on the domestic market preserved their advantages,
,Cirectly or indirectly, in new functions  they might be given in a European market,
such distortions of competition  could have repetcussions on that market.
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.23. 1) Recommendations  on the activity of specialized credit institutions  should
'be made case by case and country by country, paying due heed to the particular
,economic and social function of the specialized institutions and after weighing  the
advantages  to be expected from any measure from the angle of Eutopea!  integra-
tion against  the disadvantages  the same measure might have for the internal wotking
,of the markets.
2) In general  terms, it must, however, be repeated that the advaltages  enjoyed
by theie institutions are justified in so fat as they ofiset specific burdens or
,o6ligations imposed upon them. These advantages  should therefore be extended to
all institutionJ  subjeci to the same restrictions and obligations, and care should
be taken that the balance once established is not subsequently  disturbed.
IV. Savings banks and theit cen*al organizations
.24. Originally savings banks were not commercial  credit institutions, but institu-
tions with social aims to which certain privileges were granted and whose activities,
:furthermote, were subject to certain restrictions.  Today this initial stage is now
,over in all the member  countries, though the field of activity of the savings banks
.has developed difierently from country to country. In Germany, Italy and T,uxem-
'bourg 
especially, savings banks have scope for action very similar to that of
,commercial banks and similar credit institutions.
In all the Member States they are of particular importance. The netvrotk of points
'of contact with the public for the otdinary savings banks is, in some countries,
wider than that of all the other credit institutions put together. This is ttue even
if the branches  of the post office savings banks are not counted. The volume of the
funds handled by the iavings banks is particularly large in Germany, Luxembourg
and Italy (Table 28).
.A. THE S.AYINGS B,4NK SYSTEMS IN THE MEMBER  STATES
25. The organization  of savings banks and their central organizations  varies
'widely from one country to another. In France the funds collected by the network
of savings  banks are all managed by a centtal organization,  the Caisse  des Dtp6ts
et Consignations.  In Luxembourg  there is only one cenral savings bank.
:276In the Netherlands,  the central organization's  function is virtually confined to
assisting the savings banks in the employment of liquid funds, while medium- and
long-term investments are handled direct by the savings banks themselves.
In Germany  and Italy there is a balanced division of labour between the local
savings banks and their central organizations. The local savings banks are not
obliged to transfer to the cenual organization  more than a relatively small part of
their funds; they may also use the central otganization's services when they do
not find suitable investment  openings in their regional fields o{ activity. One of
the main functions of the central otganizations is therefore to ensure regional
equilibrium between the collection of savings and investment  opportunities.  The
consequence  is that in Germany and Italy the central organizations  are tending to
acquire growing importance in the field of loans and other medium- and long-tetm
investments.
In Belgium  there is one large public organization,  the Caisse G1ntrale d'Epargne
et de Retraite, which for the most part uses the post office branches, and a number
of private savings banks, which are credit institutions  having the right to accept
savings deposits and which are subject, in respect of these operations, to special
legislation.  The savings  deposits held at these institutions equal about half the
deposits at the Caisse G6n6rale d'Epargne et de Retraite.
In Germany, France, Italy and the Nethedands there are post ofice savings banks,
but only in the last two countries do they operate on a scale comparable with that
of the ordinary  savings banks.
B. PROBLEMS RAISED BY DIFFERENCES IN OPERATING  SYSTEMS
26. This section is split up under three headings:
a) Collection of savings;
6) Investment abroad;
c) Financial services ofiered to customers.
4) COLLECTION OF SAVINGS
27. In certain member countries the regulations on savings deposits and interest
rates give the savings banks some advantages  over other credit institutions.  Mention
must also be made of the rules on minimum reserves and of the fiscal advantages
accruing to income from savings deposits.
Except in frontier areas, the collection  of saving deposits is unlikely to engendet
serious problems of competition among the savings banks in the various member
counffies. Some measure of competition between them in respect of refinance
resources  other than deposits  (e.g. bonds issued by some savings banks and central
277organizations) is inevitable. The indirect eflects of competition between savings
banks and other cedit institutions in the same country might also influence  the
development  of a European capital market.
B) INVESTMENT  ABROAD
28. At present  savings banks and their central organizations have few oppor-
tunities of participating  in international  financial operations.
In Germany and France the local savings banks are not allowed to invest abroad.
In Belgium  private savings banks have the right to make certain investments  abroad
without authorization from the supervisory  body, but it is in fact a long time since
they have done so. In Italy the local savings banks are allowed to purchase bonds
issued by international  organizations of which Italy is a member. In the Netherlands
local savings banks are allowed to invest in foreign bonds or shares (the latter only
when they are quoted on the Amsterdam  Exchange) to the limit of their own
,capital.
Among t}e central organizations or cenralized savings banks only the Caisse
Gdndrale d'Epargne et de Renaile (Belgium)  may not invest savings-deposit  funds
abroad. In Italy the rule referted to for local savings banks also applies to their
,c€ntral organization. In France, the Caisse des Dip6ts et Consignations  and in
.Luxembourg  the Caisse d'Epargne de I'Etat may invest in foreign securities. In
.France, a list of authorized security investments is established  by the Minister of
.Finance and Economic Afiairs. In Luxembourg the Caisse d'Epargne de I'Etat
lhas on several occasions bought Belgian government  stock with ministerial authoriza-
tion. In Getmany  the Girozentralen  may efiect all transactions  abroad  {reely.
13) FINANCIAL  SERVICES OFFERED  TO CUSTOMERS
.29. In Getmany , Italy and Luxembourg the range of financial services oflered by
the savings  banks or their central otganizations  is wider than in the other member
counffies. In particular, the savings banks may act as intermediaries in the putchase
of securities  and accept current accounts. In the Netherlands  the savings  banks
act as intermediaries  in security transactions but they do not accept current accounts.
iio far in France and Belgium these financial services hardly exist at all. In Belgium,
lhowever, the Caisse G1n1rale d'Epargne  et de Retraite is preparing the ground
1cy extending its own network of branches. In France it is already possible to
subscribe to public issues at the savings banks (though they cannot be negotiated
rthrough these outlets thereafter). The Caisse des Ddp6ts et Consignations is to
llaunch a Soci1ti d'lnuestissenents  h Capital Variable (SICAV), whose certificates
'will be sold by the savings banks.
'Ihe ability to provide such financial services may confer an important competitive
rrdvantage.  For example,  institutions which can open current accounts into which
'wages are regularly paid will probably have the benefit of a regular flow of funds
ljrom these accounts  to savings deposits or other investments  in the same institution.
278Savings banks which act as intermediaries for the purchase  and sale of securities
may reach sections of the population which otherwise would not invest in securities.
They may also participate in the management of open-end  investment  funds and
join issuing syndicates for national or international  loans.
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30. In all the Member States the networks of savings  banks have become an
important  reservoir of capital. The Group would therefote like to see the following
changes made in the regulations concerning savings banks in order to enable them
to play their full part in a European market:
1) As has already been suggested for the lending and deposit-collecting activities
of other financial institutions and operators, the fiscal and other advantages  granted
to savings banks in respect of the collection of funds should oflset - 
no more
and no less - 
such restrictions or limitations as may be imposed on these
institutions.
2) In accordance with the conclusions  already presented in Chapter 8, sec. 18, it is
suggested  that the central organizations and centralized savings banks should
progressively  be allowed wider freedom to effect operations abroad and in addition
ihai the local savings  banks should be allowed to employ abroad a small percentage
of their deposits - 
for example l7o as a first step 
- 
for the same types of invest-
ment as are open to them on the domestic market.
3) There is a case for allowing the savings banks to purchase any foreign security
listed on a bourse in the country in which the bank is established. This would be
in addition to the present arrangament under which they are generally free to
purchase bonds issued or guaranteed by international  financial institutions of which
the State in question is a member.
4) In vievr of their extensive network, savings banks are in a position to conffibute
efiectively to the distribution of securities, especially the certificates of open-end
investment funds. Therefore  the right of savings banks to serve their customers
in this field - 
akeady granted in some of the countries - 
should be recognized
in the others  as well. These institutions vrould thus be enabled to contribute  to the
integration of the securities markets at European  level.
5) Particular  attention should be given to the question of establishing  facilities for
transfers  between the various savings bank systems. A service could be organized
in agreement with the savings banks of the various member countries. For instance,
as is now the practice for French residents travelling in France, the holders of
savings bank accounts could be authorized to withdraw,  when travelling  abroad, a
sum up to a specified  maximum  from any savings bank in the Community.  This
service might in fact involve quite small sums but would be of great psychological
value.
279V. Life assurance companies
31. The operating rules discussed here concern, lif. ,rr,rrun.e  c-ompanies, exclusive
of other insurance"firms.  The reason is that life assurance,  unlike other forms of
insurance, is based mainly on capitalization  and therefore gives rise to a considetable
ac,cumulation of financial asseti. France is the only member country in which
assurance of death risk policies concluded for a limited number of years are still
faiirly widespread. Theie are essentially  risk-insurance contracts involving only
lo.w capitalization.
32'. The volume of life assurance is particularly large in the Netherlands: In the
last few yeafs the growth of the reserves of these compalies has accounted for
over 77o 
-of 
gross domestic capital formation (Table 27). Although the percentage
is smaller in-the other member countries - 
in Italy and in France between I%o
and 27o only - 
these data show the importance of the role which may be played
by life-assurance companies in a Eutopean capital  market.
H,eadings A and B below are devoted to the qu€stions of inve,stment  abroad and
of the direct conclusion - 
without use of subsidiaries or bmnches - 
sf sen112s15
with non-residents.
A. INYESTMENT  ABROAD
33. The legal resrictions on investment abroad by life assurance companies have
aheady been referted to on several occasions  in this report. In Luxembourg_ such
in'i/estments are in fact prohibited. In Italy they ate petmitted within the limits
of contracts denominated in foteign currencies. In Germany the control bodies
must grant what is known as Deckungsstockf?ihigkeit  (t) for investments in foreign
shares (this, however, also applies in respect of the purchase of securities  of
German  industrial enterprises). In France there are no specific restrictions  on
ini,restments in foreign secudties quoted on a French bourse. In Belgium life
assurance companies may invest a maximum  of. t07o of their technical teserves in
bonds denominated  in Belgian  francs issued by international organizations of which
Be,lgium is a member; purchases of other foreign securities may not exceed 207o
of reserves and are limited to securities apptoved by ministerial  decision. The
N:thedands is the only member country where the freedom of domestic life
assurance companies to invest abroad is virtually unrestticted; there are still
restrictions,  however, on the subsidiaties and branches of foreign life assurance
companies.
34. Because of their knowledge  of other markets, including  those in their country
of origin, the subsidiaries and branches of foreign life assurance companies are
patticularly well placed to invest abtoad. Consequently, it is also very important
that all obstacles to the establishment  of subsidiaries  or branches of life assurance
1t) rifhich makes the secutities acceptable  as cove! for liabilities to policy-holders.
2130companies in the other member countries should be abolished. There are practically
no obstacles preventing the establishment  of subsidiaries, but there are still certain
dificulties where branches are concerned (discriminatory guarantee requirements,
discretionary granting of authoization to conduct business, and in certain countries
the need to establish  a distinct legal personality etc.). A directive to remove  these
obstacles is being prepared by the Commission.
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35. In view of the voiume of funds administered  by the life assurance companies,
gradual removal of limitations on investment  would promote further integration
of the capital markets.
1) Life assurance  companies should therefore have the right to eflect in other
member countries, up to a certain percentage  of their reserves, any investment
permitted in their own country. Initially, this percentage might be Llo , but should
be increased as the companies'  experience  develops'
2) Life assurance  companies  should be able to buy freely any foreign securities
quoted on a stock exchange  in the country in which they are established.
3) They should be allowed to acquire investments guaranteed by the govelnment
of anotirer Member State or a Community body in the same way as those guaranteed
by a legal entity under public law in the same country.
4) The subsidiaries or branches of life assurance companies in other member
countries should have the right to transfer all or part of their technical reserves to
the parent company. This possibility could be limited, fot an -initial period, to a
given percentage of those reserves, but the percentage  should be increased  pro-
gressively.
B. WRITING OF LIFE ASSUR,ANCE CONTRACTS  WITH NON-RE.'/DENTS
36. One way of promoting  the integration of European  capital markets is-by
giving life ariurance  companies  the right to collect funds in the other member
iountries, that is by permitting them, as is not the case at present, to advertise
and canvass direcdy by means of a network of representatives, in a country in
which they are not established,  and to write life assurance contracts directly with
that country's  residents  without going through a branch or subsidiary.
37. This would lead to certain problems  in connection  with:
i) The fiscal obstacles in the form of indirect taxes which companies must pay on
life assurance premiums collected. These taxes amount to 4.8%o in France, 27o in
Luxembourg,1.2/o in Belgium,  and between L and 27o in Italy- acgording-to the
kind of coitract. They do not exist in Germany or the Netherlands.  In the
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this tax in France.
,ii) Fiscal advantages in connection with income tax and other direct taxes, in
'particular  concessions connected with the life-assurance  premiums paid by the
insured. The conditions on which these advantages are given are iomplex  and
vary from one country to another. The most important  fiscal advantages, which
allow deduction of life-assurance premiums from taxable income, are determined
iby the taxation rates applicable  to marginal income. The "savings premium"  may,
:in most of the membef countries, amount,  according to the insured person's  income,
to between 20%o and 50Vo of life-assurance premiums.
.Btiefly, these advantages  are much the same in four member countries: Germany,
.[taly, Belgium and Luxembourg. In these countries, provided the contract is for
ra certain minimum petiod, concessions  are granted for all the usual forms of life
assurance. In the Netherlands they are given only for life annuities and on
r:ondition that the insurance is payable only at retirement age (generally 65). In
.Ftance  concessions were abolished in 1958, but the Conrnission de l'Economie
rGdnirale  et du Financemeftt  proposed, when the Fifth Plan was being prepared,
that new concessions should be introduced.
iiii) Control of life assurance  companies by the authorities. Here there are two
opposing  principles. In all the Member  States, with the exception of the Nether-
Jlands, the principle is that the State is duty bound to see that the reserves of all
liife-assurance  companies are made up in more or less the same way and consist
mainly of fixed-intetest investments,  such as government stock, real estate and
lirst mortgages. In the Netherlands, life assurance  companies  are practically free
to invest their reserves as they like. The supervisorv institutions mav normallv
jntervene only if the company is managed  in such a wiy that there is u ritk of th.
r;avers' money being lost.
iv) Separation of branches. In three member counffies 
- 
Germany,  France and
the Netherlands 
- 
life assurance  may. be provided only by companies  specializing
in this type of insurance, while in the other countries the same company  may
handle other types of insurance business as well as life assurance.
lieparation of branches may mean extra costs for the insured (because of the
<luplication of administrative, legal and taxation departments, advertising  and
external services, computer  equipment, and so on). Companies which can undertake
several  branches of insurance at the same time vdll therefore normallv have a
competitive  advantage. On the other hand, the main argument  in favour of t.puru-
t.ion of branches is that holders of an assurance  policy must be protected  against
the possibility of losses arising in other branches, such as fire, where the risks of
catastrophe are f.at greater than in life assurance.
v). Administtative obstacles. In France, Italy and the Netherlands there is a ban
on the direct conclusion of life assurance contracts with foreign companies. In
l3elgium this ban is limited to contracts  made with a foreign company which
possesses  a branch or a subsidiary in Belgium.
2,82CONCIU.'IONS
35. 1) In order to facilitate the extension of the activities of life assurance
companies to the underwriting  of direct contracts with non-residents, the Group
suggests that:
i)  Advertising  and canvassing  by life assurance companies residing in other member
countries should be permitted;
ii) Administrative obstacles still preventing  the writing of direct contracts beyond
frontiets should be removed.
2) The Group is aware that if these recommendations  were put into practice they
would cause certain problems of competition  between life assurance  companies in
various member countries.  Consequently it recommends  that:
i) Indirect taxes which companies have to pay on li{e assurance premiums should
be abolished in those Member  States where they are still levied;
ii) Life assurance  contracts concluded with companies in other member countries
should enjoy the same fiscal advantages as contracts vrith domestic companies. At
present this is not always so and consequently  foreign companies find themselves
practically barred from certain markets.
iii) The problem of the separation of btanches requires solution: the advantages
of the twb types of organization  could be combined  by allowing  the joint ptovision
of various forms of insutance in principle but granting pefsons taking out life
assurance-policies  the status of preferential  creditors.
iv) The current principles undedying supervision of investments should be har-
monized: the long-term aim should be to permit a f.air degree of freedom as to
the form of investment, coupled with very strict requirements  as to the information
that must be given to the public. In all the member countries, furthermore, life
assurance companies should be free to ofler policies based on difieting investment
formulas (for example,  contracts  based mainly on investments in equities). In this
way the companies would be in a better position than at present to satisfy- the
requirements -of 
savers and could interest a vrider public in insutance as a form
of savins.
283CHAPTER 13
THE EXCHANGE RISK _ AN OBSTACLE TO TRANSACTIONS
L. Although it will gradually lessen as a European  capital market develops, the
exchange risk will not disappear completely until formal monetary union has been
aclhieved. The fact that the Group discusses exchange-risk problems in this report
should not therefore be interpreted as the expression of a doubt as to whether
monetary union within the EEC will be achieved.
i) Head I deals with the exchange-risk problems which the various classes of lender
and borrower have to face.
ii) I{ead II presents certain proposals designed to limit the risks deriving  from
the fluctuation  of exchange  rates around official parities.
iii) Head III discusses techniques  which can be used to spread the exchange tisk
between debtors and cteditors: currency options, use of a "third" currency,
adoption of a unit of account, etc.
I.  Problems arising from the assumption of an exchange risk
A. BORROWERS'PROBLEMS
2.  For ffansactions  concluded with non-residents,  most borrowers encounter
practically  no legislative or statutory impediments to the contracting  of debts in
fo:reign cunency. The main obstacle is a practical one: it adses from comparison
of the cost of credit in the borrower's  own country with the estimated cost of an
external loan, after taking into account the risks of loss (or prospects of gain) due
to changes of parity or exchange-rate fluctuations.
Tlre fact that in recent years the foreign-exchange indebtedness of borrowers
rer;ident in the Community  has increased seems to confirm that exaggerated  fears
with regard to the exchange  risk have gradually been allayed.  Once a firm begins
to extend its operational  sphere to several markets and therefore has a foreign-
exchange income from exports or from participations  in foreign firms, it is more
willing to assume an exchange  risk; this situation is tending to become genetal as
ec(lnomic integration  advances.
B. LENDERS'PROBLEMS
3.  lMithin the EEC, individuals and investment  companies are to all intents and
purposes completely free to take an exchange  risk. They also show less reluctance
thran most to run this risk in their investment oolicies.
28,1The situation is difierent for savings  banks and insurance companies,  which are
hampered, as has been shown in the preceding chapter, by major resffictions on
theii investment  abroad. As a general rule, these institutions  invest in a foreign
currency only when they need to cover exchange risks incurred  because they have
accepted deposits or written insurance policies  expressed in the cu-rrency in question.
In the Netherlands, horvever, it appears that the investments of these institutions
expressed in foreign cufrencies  exceed their foreign-exchange commitments. In
France, foreign stocks and shares quoted on a French stock exchange may serve
to covet the franc commitments of life-assurance companies.
It is also noteworthy that, in Belgium, France and Italy, life assurance  companies
have shown less reluctance to invest in the foreign-currency  stocks issued by
domestic borrowers,  which suggests that the status of the borrower or the close
links between him and the institutional investors  may sometimes push the exchange-
risk problem into the background.
The problem has a difierent dimension for the banks. Their medium-term transac-
tions in foreign currencies  are limited  because_ they feel obliged to seek a covering
operation  thai they can normally find only for short-tetm transactions. \X/ith a
few exceptions,  the banks undertake to finance medium-_  and long-term transactions
in a speclfic curfency only if they have the necessary funds in the same cuffency
at their disposal.
4.  The particular  problems connected with the operations of institutions -spe-
cialing inlredit for industry,  housing and local authorities'capital expenditure have
abeady been mentioned inChaptert 7 and 8. As these institutions work to narrow
intereit rate margins, they are irnable to take exchange  risks, except perhaps 
-within
the limits of crJits-granted from their own tesources. ln most of the Member
States, the specializeJcredit institutions  are thus required to match_their.foreign-
currency chihs with their foreign-currency  commitments in respect of bonds issued
for refinancing  purposes.
There have been exceptions to this rule, however, notably in ltaly, where -the
Cassa per il Mezzogioino,  fot example has been able to obtain credit abroad in
foreign exchange 
"nd 
later distribute the funds obtained among domestic borrowers
in lire, thus assuming the exchange risk itself.
coNcrusroNs
5.  1) In general, the exchange-risk  obstacles seem likely to decline rapidly in
importance, at least in relations between the member  countries of the EEC. \fith
the progressive  dismantling  of the various impediments to intra-Community  trade,
in particular customs  barriers, economic integtation is tending to standardize the
priie smucture within the Community.  The decisions connected with the common
agricultural  policy signify a decisive step in this direction. Because  common
agricultural prices have been fixed and are expressed in units of account,  any
modification  of exchange-rate relationships  between the membet counfties would
have such a heavy impact on the Community's  farming sector that it now seems
285a 'very unlikely eventuality. Indeed, the likelihood  seems ail the more remote  as
the chain reaction - 
on consumer prices and, subsequently,  wages - 
would make
it much more problematic  than in the past whether the results usually sought by
devaluation  or revaluation of a currency would in fact be achieved. These are, then,
thr: beginnings of "real monetary  integration", reflected  at formal level in the 1964
decision that the Member States will consult beforehand if any one of them is
co:ntemplating adjusting the parity of its currency. This commitment  could well be
the first step towards the establishment of absolute solidarity between the six
currencies.
2) In certain cases, firms or financial institutions may be reluctant  to run exchange
risks because the gains they may make from di{Ierences in interest rates between
the domestic market and foreign markets are sptead over several years in the
profit-and-loss  accounts, whereas any corresponding  capital losses would have to be
written ofi in a single yeat. One way of overcoming this reluctance  would be to
allow firms to set aside reserves  against exchange  losses, deductible, rvithin specified
limits, from taxable income.
3) '$Zith regard to investments in bonds denominated in foreign cumencies  or
including  special currency clauses, the Group considers that the exchange-risk
obstacle  could be reduced by the promotion of open-end investment funds spe-
cializing in this type of investment. These funds have the advantage of being
better placed than individuals to assess the risk attendant on an investment in a
given cunency or containing a specific currency clausel they can spread risks over
serreral currencies; finally, by issuing certificates  expressed  in a single currency, they
sarze holders the trouble of having to convert the various foreign currencies into
thr:ir own themselves.
4) The restrictions on institutional investors with regard to investments containing
an exchange-risk  element are often defended by the argument that savings must
be protected. However,  in certain member  countries, particularly the Nethedands,
institutional investots have been authorized to make investment of this kind within
specified limits, and no harm has resulted. The Group considers that, in view of
de'velopments since these investment rules were fixed, the regulations now applied
in the other member counffies are based on unduly restrictive  criteria. These seem
even harder to justify when it is remembered that, in certain countries, these
inrrestors are regarded as sufficiently  careful in their administration of the assets
protecting their customers to be allowed to make certain kinds of investment
(for example, in shares) involving risks at least as substantial as exchange  risks.
The Group is therefore of the opinion that institutional  investors should normally
be allowed to make, within certain limits, investments involving exchange risks.
As a first step, they might be authorized to purchase any security 
- 
including
those denominated in foreign currencies - 
quoted on domestic stock exchanges.
5) In particular,  the Group endorses  the principles on which the Dutch regulations
concerning  the foreign investments of savings banks are based: within the limits
of their capital and resetves, these banks should enjoy complete freedom to invest.
The Group also recalls its recommendation  in Chapter 8 on the operations of the
central institutions of saving banks: given their importance and the role they play
286on the capital market, the restrictions on their investments  in other member
countries should be removed 
- 
including those on transactions  which may entail
exchange risks.
6) 'With regard to the specialized  credit institutions, the stict requirements  imposed
by most of the Member States for matching the bonds in circulation with the
credits financed by them generally  suffice to ensure the protection  of creditors; it is
therefore safe to recommend giving these institutions greater latitude for uedit
operations within the scope of their own capital.
7) Moreover, it might be thought expedient for these financial institutions  to be
given support from the authorities in tespect of the exchange  risk, as already
happens in ltaly. These support  measures would, however, have to be consistent
with the principles set out in Chapters 5 and 6 to govern action by the authorities
on the capital markets and would in particular have to avoid conferring an exclusive
privilege on certain public or semipublic institutions.
8) Hitherto the European Investment Bank and the ECSC High Authority have,
as a matter of principle, balanced their assets and liabilities denominated in the
various currencies.  While recognizing that this attitude - 
based on a desire for
financial  orthodoxy during their early years 
- 
is a sound one, the Group considers
that the diminished  importance o{ the exchange risk in operations in Community
currencies and the progress made in the process of economic integration would
now allow the EIB and the High Authority to incur exchange  risks in those
currencies if the need to do so became apparent.
II. The reduction of tisks connected with fluctuations in exchange
rates around parity
A. THE PROBLEM OF THE "FREE MARKETS"
6.  The exchange risk is generally  taken to mean the risk of a change in the
parities of the various currencies. But, in addition to this risk, investors or
borrowets may sufler losses through exchange-rate fluctuations  around the official
parities.
For capital transactions  on the "free market",  these fluctuations  may, in Belgium-
Luxembourg and the Nethetlands, exceed  the 3%o which is the theoretical maximum
spread for current operations between any two Community currencies.
The margins between "free" exchange rates and oficial exchange rates have in
recent years been relatively narrow. This is largely due to the repeated intervention
of the monetary  authorities on the "free" markets. The main reason for their
intervening  is that too wide a gap between the "free" rates and the oficial rates
could prove an incentive to unauthorized  operations  and to speculation on the
oficial market. Under the first directive for the implementation  of Article 67 of
the Treaty, intervention  becomes  compulsory  when thi free rates show "appreciable
and lasting"  divergences from the oficial rates.
287.[t is therefore questionable  whether the maintenance of "ftee" exchange rates is,
iin present circumstances, still worth while. The Gtoup feels that unification of
the foreign-exchange markets is now feasible and would bring with it major benefits.
.[n the first place, it would mean greater security for borrowers and lendets at
lpresent operating on the "free markets".  Another no less important advantage
.would lie in the discontinuance of a number of administrative controls over financial
transactions, originally adopted solely to determine which of several foreign-
r:xchange markets a transaction would pass through.
)3. THE PROBLEM OF EXCHANGE.RATE  FLUCTUATIONS BETTVEEN EEC
(]URRENCIES
',7. In the longer term, there is one measure which would go even further  and
.which in the Group's view would have particulady  important advantages. This
is the measure proposed in 1964 by Professor Pfleiderer,  Chairman of the
l-andeszentralbank  of Baden-\Ttirttemberg, under which all possibility  of fluctuation
between the exchange rates of the various currencies  of member countries would
be completely  eliminated.  (1) In addition to disposing, of all exchange  risks in
intra-Community  financial operations, the measute would also have the advantage
of easing payments transactions within the Community and reducing their cost.
ifhe measure presupposes extensive co-ordination  of Membet States' intemention
arrangements on the currency markets, and at the same time it would necessitate
luller co-operation in monetary policy. It would thus represent a maior step
towards the establishment  of a monetarv union within the EEC.
IIL Techniques fot spreading exchange tisks between borrowers
and lenders
8.  The "cutrency clause", i.e. the terms governing the distribution of exchange
risks between debtor and creditor, is of great importance in connection with the
issuing of international  loans or the granting of international credit. Other things
trcing equal, an international loan will not enjoy the same success if the debtor
chooses his ovrn currency (and consequently  burdens his creditors urith the whole
of the exchange risk) as if he adopts a currency  frequently  used by the main
investors or if he ofiers a currency option.
llhe choice of the curtency clause is thus of major importance not only for debtor
and creditor but also for the development  of a European capital market. Cumency
c,lauses devised to meet the wishes of lendets on a number of separate markets
not only serve to promote  capital-market integration at the issue stage, but also
help to strengthen the links bet'nveen the secondary markets on which loan issues
a.re subseouentlv  dealt in.
(t) Pfeiderer  O., WZihrungsordnung und europdische Integration,  Kieler Vortrdge, N.F., Heft
32 (Kiel, 1964), p. 19.
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most often applied to international  borrowing and lending. It has consid'ered:
i) The various forms of currency option,
ii) Use of the currency of the market of issue,
iii) Use of a "unit of account",
iv) Use of a cumency other than that of the market of issue.
A. tOl4NS WITH,4 CURRENCY  OPTION
9  Recently, there have been relativel;r few examples of a "true" currency optioit,
i,e. one covering a whole range of currencies,  the parities adopted being those in
force on the date of issue. (t) The commonest technique so far is thai of loans
denominated  in sterling,  the capital and interest service on which can at any time
be requested by the creditor in DM or sterling, at a fixed parity. (2)
For creditors the currency option is normally the most advantageous  of the various
types of clause, particularly if it covers several leading currencies. If the creditor's
currency is included, the currency option involves no risk at all for him but only
the possibility of gain.
For the debtor, on the other hand, the currency option entails a particularly large
risk, and no prospect of gain at all if his own currency is included in the option.
In practice, however, this disadvantage  may be ofiset if, by accepting  this clause,
he is able to obtain a more favourable interest rate and easier access to the markets
where the currencies specified in the option are used.
The risk incurued by the debtor diminishes in proportion as the likelihood of
unilateral changes in the padties of the curencies specified in the option becomes
lnore remote. The sffonger this tendency  grows in the Community,  therefore,  the
less of a burden a currency option covering the six cunencies 'will become to the
debtor. As this clause also protects creditors in all the EEC capital markets from
all risks, it could prove. advantageous for the integration of the European capital
matkets if it were used in financial operations of interest to the Communitv as
a whole.
(1) These include; Peffofina, 5 lzVo to 7 y'zVo,  L957 (925 million), payable in dollars, Belgian
f_ra_ncs, guilders oJ Swiss francs; Reputlic of Austria, 5r/zVo, 1958 (925 million), payable  in
dollars,  sterling, DM or Austrian schillings.
(') Thqge include: City of Turin, 6lzVo, 1964 (€5 million); Enso-Gurzeir, 61/27o, 1965
(€4 million); Lamco, 5 3/c7o, 1965 (€4 million); Mobil Oil Holdings, 5 3/cVo,  L965 (fl10 million);
US Rubber,  67o, 1965 ([5 million).
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cURRENCv)
L0. From the angle of the integration of the turopean capital markets,  use o{
l6e creditor's  curr;ncy has two ,ip..ttr in the first.place it protects the *editor
from anv exchange risk (this hat ihe great merit of-removing  the main obstacle
i;,;i;";tfitionil  invesiors) and in the second place - 
unlike the currencv
optio'n - 
it confines the debtor's risk to a single currency'
For these two reasons the currency clause most frequently  ,4optg4 il  the past
rtr*in"J th. *rr.n.y of the market in which the issue was made. The loans were
lit* ;t.riiiion.l'; fot.ign loans, i.e. operations in respect of which the maiority
of the porchasers were iesident in the country of issue'
T'lre Group feels that a vatiant of- the "parallel  loans" studied in Chapter ? fll
f. of u4u. - 
the technique used, for examp-le,.in tSp+.y-31t international loan
i*,r,r.d bv the lstituto pri tn Ricostruzione-Industriale (IRI), under which the
;;.h;it  ;;;H ;h;"t" ut th. time of issue between  securities denominated  in
i;il*r-ft  t"*riti* ienominated in DM, the same terms attaching to. each' One
"opr..iabl. 
advantage of this arrangement  is that it leaves it to the subscribers  to
ali.-rrrrir. tr"* ihe" sections of thI loan are to be allocated  among the various
currencies, and this improves the quality of the placing'
h oarticular form of this technique - 
relatively easy to opefate - 
should be
maie available: it should be open to investors tesident in one Community  country,
;hil;l;-r"bt.rib.  to loarri issued in another Member State, to have their
securitiis denominated in their own currencies'
C. THE UNIT OF ACCOUNT
1.L. The unit of account is a valuable  technique for issuers wishing to- appeal
simultaneously  to a large number of markets,-  since subscribers are attracted by the
,o".i.t tiuUiliiv of this"device. The value oi the unit of account most frequently
;;Jl;  i.i","a't" gold. This value remains constant  unless there is a change in the
;;iJ ;r;ir" of all "the reference  currencies - 
i.e. the seventeen currencies of the
;r*',f;;t;,ti;;  ;ftt.  fot*.t European Pavments Union-(EPU) - 
to which
Iti. "rii 
of account is linked and at leait two thirds of the reference currencies  are
lit"".?;"".Jln th. same direction. 'Where these two conditions  are fulfilled, the
rrnit of account is revalued or devalued  by the same percentage  as that reference
;;.;;y;  ;;ng  th. two-thirds that move in the same direction, which changes
l,east in relation to its previous parity'
I{owever,  the stability of the unit of - account does not mean that the creditor
..."p., tlre exchange iisk altogether; for he sufiers an exchange loss if his own
;;;;;y  il re.raluei against thE unit_of account. On the other hand, the unit of
,..6"""i pr"*.ts him alainst unilateral  devaluation of the debtor's currency, or of a
itriJ ."i..ncy; should-his own cuffency be devalued,  he would practically always
p;ain from the adjustment.
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favour should his own currency be revalued  against the unit of account. Conversely,
he sufiers a loss should his cunency be devalued in relation to the unit.
The unit of account is thus a compromise between the interests of debtors and
those of creditors, though it benefits creditors if devaluations are more frequent
than revaluations.  The increased stability for creditors is generally ofiset by interest
rates favouring the debtors.
For as long as the parity of his own currency is not changed, the creditor whose
local currency is among the reference  cumencies runs no risk and may therefore
regard a claim in units of account  as a claim in his local currency. This is a better
arrangement for institutional  investors than an investment in a foreign currency or
an investment vrith a currency option not including the investor's  local currency.
12. The choice of "reference cutrencies" is of great importance for the definition
and use of the unit of account.  The unit of account hitherto used for international
loans is based on the seventeen currencies of the former EPU, and hence includes
the cunencies of certain countries whose capital markets are relatively  narrow.
\X/ith a view to the integration  of the capital markets of the EEC, there may be a
case for using a unit of account based on the six Common Market currencies.
The progressive integration of the EEC will appreciably reduce the risks of unilateral
revaluation or devaluation of a Community currency. For a Community creditor,
the "EPU unit of account" has the disadvantage, compared with an "EEC unit of
account", that he would sufler an exchange loss if all the Member  States were to
revalue their currencies to the same extent and a single one of the eleven other
EPU currencies  was not revalued or was revalued to a lesser extent. Conversely,
an EEC debtor would sufier an exchange loss if all the EEC counties devalued
to the same extent and just one of the other EPU currencies was not devalued  or
was devalued to a lesser extent.
For these reasons,  and because the adoption of an EEC unit of account is a logical
move in the Common Market's process of economic  integration, the Group finds
that the use of an "EEC unit of account" could ofier certain advantages  for
financial transactions  based on a future integrated market. tWhatever  unit-of-
account formula is adopted for implementation  of the common agricultural policy
will very probably become the basis for this "EEC unit of account".
D. USE OF A CURRENCY  OTHER THAN THAT OF THE MARKET OF
/SSUE
13. \7hen international loans are issued in a currency other than that of the market
of issue, subscribers risk a loss if the currency used is devalued in relation to their
own. The issuer, for his part, takes the risk of revaluation unless the currency
concerned  is his own. This situation is relatively  disadvantageous  for creditors,
and as a rule they agree to use a third currency or the issuer's currency only if
it is a hard currency and one frequently used in international financial operations.
In fact, so far only three currencies have been used in international  loans 
- 
mainly
the dollar, and to a lesser extent the DM and the Swiss franc.
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lrom the fear that its adoption may be interpreted  as indicating  a lack of confidence
in the local currency; this argument  would seem, however, to be valid only where
the last-named is already in dificulties.
,{.nother objection arises from the possible relucance of certain categories of
purchaser to subsctibe to loans on the market of issue in these conditions. However,
this factor is usually more than ofiset by the appeal of the issue currency chosen
to residents of the country whose currency it is, or even to other subscribers where
it is a case of a hard c.trt.n.y extensively  used in international  financial operations.
llhis is why it is so regrettable  that measures like the American interest equalization
tax and the German Kuponsteuer, devised to meet quite difierent requirements,
lrcth have the end-efiect of segregating the domestic and foreign markets in the
same currency,  thereby reducing the numbers of investors likely to engage in
errbitrage. This separation of a currency's internal and external market has been
highlighted in recent yeats by the loan issues placed abroad in dollars by American
companies and in DM by German companies.
r\gainst these arguments it way, however, be contended that the use of loans
denominated in a third currency helps to get savers used to issues in currencies
other than their own and may thus make a useful contribution to the integration
of the European  capital markits.
CONCTUS/ON
1i4. The currency clauses  considered in this chapter may give rise to diIlerences
of opinion. It has been said that these clauses tend to make savers to some extent
rnistustful of investment in their own currency.  Another criticism often made
questions the degree of teal protection  which currency clauses can give subscribers
in times of monetary upheaval.
llhe Group took the view that its study of the various types of clause for the
purposes of this report should concentrate on their possibl- contribution to the
clevelopment o[ a European capital market. From this angle it become clear that
the various experiments tried out to date have helped towards diversification of
i:nvestments  by enabling  issue terms to be flexibly adapted to the investing public's
pteferences. They have at the same time helped to increase  the international?uidity
c,f capital. In future, however, the disappearance  of the exchange  risk should makl
it unnecessary  to resort to such devices.
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TAX OBSTACLES
1. This chapter is intended to give a general view of the fiscal adiustments  most
likely to promote the development and smooth functioning within the Community
of a capital market of ruly European dimensions.  A brief survey of the principles
which have guided the Group is followed by an account of the tax obstacles
existing at present and suggestions as to how the main ones could be eliminated.
I. Objectives
2.  The main object of adapting  the tax systems is to attain a degree of fiscal
neutrality that will allow capital movements to take place within the Community
in condiiions  similar to thosi on a domestic market. To achieve this general  aim,
three broad requirements  must be met. The first tvro relate to the smooth
working of the various sectors of the market, and the third concerns the balance
between these sectors.
3.  First, the tax system should have no influence on choice of the place for the
investment  or transaction. This requirement is a direct corollary of the size of
market envisaged, no longer limited to the national  scale.
4.  Secondly, the tax system should not influence the saver's choice between
making his investment  direct or using the services of an intermediary  acting as a
collector of savings. This requirement is at present only very imperfectly satisfied
in several Member States, even for domestic financial operations. Such a situation
may be no more than a minor obstacle to the smooth working of a market, provided
the holders of capital available for investment on it are sufficiently well informed
of the opportuniiies and mechanisms of the market. However, the Group feels
that there must be access to specialized intermediaries if the capital markets are to
atttact broader classes of saver, especially for foreign investments:  hence the
importance of this neutrality  requirement.
5.  Finally, when the capital markets are integrated, the fiscal system of each
country must give equivalent incentives for the relative development  of the various
types of inveitmenf and methods of financing. Meanwhile, everything possible
shbuld be done to taper down the disparities existing in this respect between the
tax systems of the Member States.
As rvas explained in the previous chapters,  the Group does not advocate identical
fiscal treatment of the various types of investment. It accepts that difierences  of
taxation may be used to encourage a specific  type of investment, with a view to
securing the right balance of investment within the economy as a whole (e.g.,
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to combat excessive  liquidity of savings, or one favouring risk investments, if the
supply of risk capital appears inadequate).
I{owever, the Group_ finds it desirable that the Member States, as a general rule,
should ultimately  a-pply the same incentives  to promote the same iyp.t oI investmeni
and methods of financing. This is not an immediate requirement. The initial
situations in the various States are very difierent, and the existence of difletent
tax incentives in the national systems does not, in the present circumstances, appear
t,o be incompatible with the eficient working of a Euiopean capital marker. 
^ ^
(;. Where such di{ferences in fiscal incentives arc of a permanent character, they
afiect the functioning of the market no more seriously than do the differenies  of
scale, from coun-try to country, in the investment preferences shown by savers and
ttusinessmen.  The market_is.more likely to be disturbed  by changes in incentives
rvithin a Member State, which may upset the pattern of capital supply and demand
by suddenly introducing  new forces on the market.
Ilowever, it seems that the Member States will put an end to unilateral  adjustment
c'f these incentives only when they are collectively  agreed to do so - 
which, in
practice,- presupposes_ their adopting a uniform attitude on the matter. Until then,
they will always be free, as they aie now, to invoke  economic,  structural or sociai
considerations  to justify changes.
II. Present obstacles
7  The reasons why the_ requirements set out above cannot be met at the present
time fall into three broad categories:
i)  Double taxation;
i:[) Preferential  treatment of investments made in the country of tax domicile or.
conversely, imposition of taxes peculiar to some member  countries only;
i:ii) Difierent treatment, from country to country, of investment income paid to non-
residents or persons preserving  fiscal anonymity by not filing tax returns.
l'hese obstacles are described in general  terms below, in order to give an overall
view. of the tax problems besetting  capital markets. \7ays of sol"ving the main
p,roblems  are suggested in the following parts of this chapier.
,\. DOUBLE TAXATION
,4) INTERNATIONAL  DOUBLE  TAXATION
8. .Ap-a!t ftom _the incidence of the difierent rates of income and corporation  tax
in the Member States, the difierence between the gross yield (before iax) and the
net yield (after tax) of a given type of investment may be iarger or smaller  according
294to the countfy of investment  (source- of income), when this is not the country of
;;"-a;;;ii.'of  the l"n"n.i".v and tax is charged- in both countries on the
beneficiary's income. $flhere investments are made 
"*ith 
utt eye to yie1d, the double
;;;;;-;fi..;-;;;ar  to establish a preference for investment in the counffv in
which the investor is domiciled for tax purposes'
Double taxation occurs with both direct and indirect taxes' The rates of indirect
L*-ur. senerallv lo.o  ih"n those of direct tax, but as in many cases ,they 
are
ilf;rbf  ;; ,ip1t^l and not to income, their efiect on yield may be far from
negligible.
International double taxation would be avoided between States- which agreed, fot
,h.;;;;;.quivalent types of tax, on a uniform rule providing  for taxation in only
one of the trvo countrieq the alternatives being: (t)
a) countrv of domicile (head ofice) of the beneficiary, or country of source, for
taxes on income and Profits;
6) Country of domicile (or head ofice) ot country of location (of capital  assets),
for taxes on wealth;
c) country of destination (consumption) or countfy of origin (production),  for
indirect taxes.
If the Member states agreed to adopt uniform tax principles, there would be
,r.rilinn-*".h to cholse B;i;.;  these alternatives so lar as the smooth function-
ii?'"i'"rfrT."niiif  -"ir.., ir-;;;;;.i. the choice would have to be made in the
iig'rrr" ri.,rt;i  ;;d;;;;,  ;*h  as considerations of fiscal technique or budgetarv
Iactors.
The adoption of uniform principles  for taxing- income in one countfy only would
[.  "" iaid way of avoiding double taxation of investment in a country't".1 1l-"'-':l
ito-inr.rr.r;s iesidence. Iiou'.u.t, the Group considers ;-  apai.n, solely trom the
point of view of the capital market obi..tiu"t'--ih,ithit sol"ution is not the only
5;;:" I, *"v't.-r"m#;;6iy  t-o n.itttutir"  the efiects of double taxation in the
hands of the investo"rlri. ;;;;l  .it*g.a in the other country being refundable or
JJfy-At"-able  against tax due in ihe counry of domicile'
B) DOUBLE TAXATION OF INVESTMENTS  MADE THROUGH  A FINANCIAL
INTERMEDIARY
9.  The yield of an investment  may difier according to rvhether it is made direct
"i rflr."girl nnr".i"fini.rm.dirry (quite apart from the cost of,the intermediary's
r.r"i..rf  if th. tu".r .hmged on inu"tt-itttt made through direct channels  are
""-tt.ti.i 
Uv oth.tt *ft..Jthe transaction is handle{ bi' an inlslmsdiary'  and the
ilil;-;;;;;.  ".ith.r 
refundable nor allowable in the hands of the investor.
0) A..*d-c-"  the classificatiol-qdoplgd  by a-Fiscal and Financial  committee attached to the
EEC Commi-tsion.  Rappott du CCF, L962, p' 76'
295In most Community  States thete afe arrangements under which investments of the
second type can entirely (or very largely) escape any additional tax within the
country; but, as. these arrangeme_nts as often aJ not ipring from purely national
considerations,  they do not usually avoid the disadvantage of international double
ta:xation  when the investment  is in a country other thin that of the investor,s
residence and, even more so, when the investor's  tax residence is not in the same
country  as his intermediary's.
C) INTERNATIONAL  CONVENTIONS  FOR AVOIDANCE  OF DOUBLE TAXATION
7A'. Even between Community  countries double taxation can often occur, either
th:rough the absence of agreements (e.g. between Italy and Luxembourg,  L,r*.*-
bourg and the Netherlinds),  or because the existing conventions  do ;ot  cover
in'restment  incomes (Belgium and the Netherlands), or-becarrse  some of them, being
very old, are no longer appropriate to present-day  t^x systems.
M,oreover,  current bilateral  agreements_ are based on principles which vary and
so:metimes  even conflict; and the methods  employed ln  them to avoid double
ta:<ation are consequently  very-difierent. Furthermore,  some of the implementing
priocedures  are_ so complicated  that they are apt to discourage investors fr-om placin!
their money abroad.
T-he ideal way of eliminating  the remaining cases of double taxation between
Member  States would undoubtedly  be by conclusion of a multilateral  convention
among them. This_ course is in fact now under consideration, with the oECD
model used as the basis.
However, as the work in progress in this_field -may take some time to produce
res'ults, it might be.wise in the interim to look for an at least temporary  rot"iion ol the double taxation problem within the bilateral framework, i.e. by udding to
a.nd improving  the cument agreements,  the object being to iron out excessive
djvergences in cu_rrent principles and techniques. Heads"III, IV and v of this
chapter are mainly concerned with the praitical urrrng"-.ntt *hich -ijit 
- 
u.
made uncler multllateral or bilateral conventions.
Untilateral measures can also remove the hardships of double taxation for the
residents of a given l!qr., - Indeed, without any foimal agreement,  some countries
alr,eady permit tax withheld abroad to be allowed, at leastln purt, io, tax purposes
at home.
B. TAX PRIVILEGES  OR CHARGES  APPLIED SOLELY TO INVESTMENTS
IN CERT,4/N COUNTR/ES
4LI44 PRIVILEGES CONFINED TO INVESTMENTS  MADE IN THE COUNTRY OF
REiJIDENCE
11. There is no incentive to make an investment in one counffy rather than
another so long-as the privile_ge applies equally to whoever makes itj whatever hi,
courntry of tax domicile may be: in this case, ihe advantage accrues to the ,rr". of
n6the capital. Nor does the advantage  afiect the choice of country of investmenr
if it is granted by a State to persons who have their tax domicile there without
stipulations  regarding the country of investment. On the other hand, fiscal
advantages granted on condition that the investment  is made in the country of
residence arc, by definition, in direct conflict with the desired neutrality of fiscal
svstems.
B) HIGHER TAXATION OF INVESTMENTS  OR METHODS OF FINANCING IN
CERTAIN  COUNTRIES
Where a tax exists only in one country, or where a rate of. tax is higher in one
country than in the others, the result may be to render certain types of financing
more expensive in the country in question than in other countries or increase the
cost of cettain types of financial nansaction. This is often the case with indirect
taxes on the raising and movement of capital. As regards direct taxes, it is especially
the case with some schedular  taxes. Certain difierences  in systems of corporation
tax might have the same efiect, but this question lies outside the province of the
present  study.
C. COUNTRY-TO-COUNTRY  DIFFERENCE.' IN THE TAX TREATMENT
OF INYESTMENT  INCOME ACCRUING TO NON-RESIDENTS OR PERSONS
NOT MAKING,4 7,4X RETURN
12. When dividend or interest is paid in the counuy of source to a non-resident
not protected by a convention,  the tax authorities of the beneficiary's country of
dornicile are normally not at present informed. As many countries apply 
- 
the
principle of limited fiscal obligations to non-residents by imposing a fixed-rate
withholding tax, the non-resident  beneficiary  can often avoid graduated  taxation by
collecting his income in the source country and not declating it in his country
of domicile, with the result that he is taxed only in the source counry at the
standard rate applied by that country to non-residents  not protected by an interna-
tional convention.
Some countries even allow residents  to avoid graduated  personal taxation on some
types of investment  income by collecting a withholding tax which exempts this
income from all other taxation. Others, whilst not legally accepting  the principle
of a withholding  tax giving full discharge, use a deduction which may in practice
have the same efiect, since the tax authorities are not informed of the identity
of the beneficiary. Lastly, some countries levy no withholding tax on interest
payments  and do not require the authorities  to be informed of the identity of the
beneficiary.
These opportunities  for avoiding the graduation factor in personal taxes on some
types of investment  income arc of obvious  interest to persons taxed at a higher
marginal rate in their country of domicile than the withholding tax rate. They may
297also be attractive to persons taxed at a lower marginal rate. v/here the income
accuing abroad, if diclared, would not wholly escape double taxation, in the
absence of a satisfactory convention.
llhe cost of capital to the borrower, and theteby the relative development-of  the
vafious fornis 
-of 
finance, may be affected, in' some market situations, by the
clifierent  fiscal ffeatment applied by the various countfies to investment income
accruing to non-residents nJprotecied  by a convention s1 - 
'q7ls1s this is allowed
-- to i.rrons remaining fiscaily anonymous. Fuller harmonization of taxation and
controi systems whithin the Community is needed to avoid these consequences, which
can only'impede  the development  and-smooth  functioling-of the European  market.
ithe Group considers harmonization especially urgent for fixed-interest investments;
{ior, where an investor chooses to invist in equities, the immediate yield does not
determine  his choice as directly as it does in the case of fixed-interest investments.
,13. Tables B and E of the Annex show the marginal  ra;te of personal income tax
at and beyond which it is to the investor's advantage to avoid the -graduation factor
in personal income tax by paying the withholding tax discharging  him from futher
rrr* liubility, or by colleiting-thi investment income in_ a country which does not
reouire his identiiv to be disclosed and communicated to the tax authorities in
his country of residence.  The figures given take into account the incidence of
iLnternational double taxation conventions, the arrangements made by certain
r:ountries to allow taxes paid abroad even in the absence of a convention, and
"'tax credits" granted by 
-some 
other countries. These tables show under what
,:onditions uuoidutt.. of 
-progressive 
personal  tax may be profitable;  they do not
:indicate whether there is an incentive  to make an investment in one country rather
than in another.
IIL Adiustment  of direct taxation of investments  by individuals
14. The development of a genuine international  market for investments  made
direct by individuals is chiefly tampered by two of the types of obstacle mentioned:
a) Double taxation of incomes;
b) Grunt of tax advantages  only to investments made in the counffy of residence.
The Group has paid particular attention to investments in shares and bonds, since
these are 
^the main types of transaction performed by individu,als in tespect of
rvhich tax considerations  may decide the choice of the country of investment'
In addition, it has confined its study to problems raised by income taxes. At this
stage it did not seem feasible to study in detail capital gains, wealth and inheritance
taxis. These taxes may pfesent ptoblems similar to those atising from income
taxes, and capable of solution on the same general principles.
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/)  DOUBLE TAXATION OF INCOME
1.5. .Payment of a dividend to an individual  resident in a country difierent from
that in which the company concerned is incorporated may attract tax at two levels
when the dividend is paid in the company's  iountry, viz. withholding  tax in that
country, and personal income tax in the shareholder's country of iax domicile. lil/hen the dividend is collected by the shareholder in his country of domicile, a
withholding t^x may 5. selleled by the paying agency. This withholding tax is'an
advance payment of personal income tai ind, in principle, allowable ii  full, any
exces.s being. repaid. Technically,  there are seuerai porribl. ways of avoiding the
double taxation  cases described  above.
16. The Member States-could  agree to tax the income in one country only: either
in the country in which the company has its registered  ofice, by the-imposition of
an irrecoverable withholding tax (and waiver of income tax liability in the country
of domicile),  or in the country of domicile  only.
The first of these alternative  solutions would seem acceptable only as an option to
the shareholder; a difierent procedure would also be necessary,- for the 
-sake 
of
shareholders whose top rate of income tax is lower than that of ihe withholding tax
charged  abroad, in order to avoid their being penalized and ceasing to inveit in
foreign countries.
Q1 the other hand, from the special angle of this study, the Group sees no
objec-tion  to taxation_ solely in the shareholder's own country. Technically, this
could be- arranged either by not charging the foreign shareholder  withholding  tax,
or by refunding it. If the withholding tax were not charged, the shareholder would
be spared the necessity of having to collect his income in two parts; but it could
open the door to tax evasion unless the revenue departments  ofthe various States
agreed,to notify the shareholder's  identity to the tax authorities  in his counry of
domicile. In the system as at present applied between  certain countries, the refund
of withholding tax is made on submission by the shareholder  of proof that he has
declared the income in question to the tax authorities  in his own country.
17. Rather than agree on taxation in one country only, States wishing to avoid
double taxation might prefer to share the tax receipts by charging a wlthholding
tax in the source country and systematically allowing it for tax in the country
o{ domicile, with provision for a refund if the beneficiary's tax liability is lesi
than the amount withheld or if he is not liable to tax.
This is a refined version of arrangements already widely used to avoid double
taxation, in which the aim is to tax investment income in the country of domicile
while safeguarding  the financial interests of the source State, or, in 
-other 
words,
to share the yield from taxation of such income between the two States. The
result of this sharing depends on the lz;te of withholding  tax applied and the rate
to which the beneficiary  of the income is ultimately liable in hii-State of domicile.
In order to balance the sharing process, the current conventions embodying this
solution often provide that the rate of withholding tax applied in relations b"ivl..n
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rvloo c"annot'(or do not wish to) invoke the benefit of a convention. (This 
-reduced
rate may be arrived at either by reimbursement_ of part of the withholding tax
ch,arged'at the ordinary  fate, or by charging a reduced rate from the outset.)
ltl.  The way in which the States choose to-share  1ax rfceipts among themselves
hars scarcely any efiect on the functioning of the capital markets. On the other
haLnd, it is'necessary  for any tax withheld, and not refundable, in the company's
.o,,rnity to be allowable in'full in the shareholder's countfy, and even repaid if
it exceeds the income tax due in the latter.
At present, this condition is not fully met. Certain countfies do not permit tax
ivithheld abroad to be set against the internal tax liability; others do so only to
a partial extent. Many countiies treat tax withheld abroad as allowable for internal
tax purposes onlv at the rate of national tax due on the income slice into r.vhich
the ioriign diviiend falls, thus penalizing the foreign investments, of persons
paying a rate of tax lower than that of the foreign withholding tax. Other countties
,llow t"* vrithheld abroad within a limit not determined by the rate of national
income tax the shareholder  pays, but by the rate of withholding  tax which they
temselves apply to non-resident  shareholders in their own national companies  (see
T,able A of Annex).
L:). Apart from possible administative complications, the Group vroulj{ see no
objectioh to the Member States agreeing  to maintain a withholdjngtaxin the source
couotfy, for application to forelgn shareholders, provided_ this tax was wholly
ailowabie for th. pufposes of the shareholder's tax liability in his_ country _of
domicile and any e*ieri was refundable.  This solution'would embo{v the principle,
not as yet recognized, of possible reimbursement of the withholding-  tax by the
State oi domicile and might thus lead to compensatory payments  being_ madl
between States where they declined to refund taxes they had not in fact levied.
T,o the shareholder,  the withholding  tax would then always be simply an advance
payment of tax, and hence would hardly influence his choice -of- country of
iou.rt-.nt whatever the rate of the tax. It would be preferable if the rate were
ttre same in all countries, and identical with that of the withholding  taxes levied
on shareholders resident in the company's own counry; by facilitating compafisons
oli yield, this would help to make ihe'neutrality of tax systems more eflective  as
re,gards selection of the place of investment.
B,) TAX PRIVILEGES GRANTED ON INVESTMENTS  MADE IN THE COUNTRY OF
R]ESIDENCE ONLY
20. For some time past a very specidl problem has been set by the employment,
in. certain countries, bf fiscal fechniqueJ which may hamper international capital
m.ovements.
On dividends of companies registered in her territory Belgium  grants residents a
"tax credit" which is-in efiect a reimbursement of part of the tax paid on profits
b'y the companies.
In France there is a"tax credit" which appears to be the same for the dividends
of domestic and foreign companies, but which in fact represents  a pattial refund
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domestic  companies; for those of foreign companies, the tax credit is no more than
the refund of a special withholding tax imposed in France or the company's country
(where there is a convention bet'ween France and the latter). A French shareholder
returning a dividend of (FF) 100 may set (FF) 50 against his tax liability, or
obtain full or partial refund of this sum if he has no further liability. If  the
company is French, the dividend of (FF) 100 suffers no withholding  tax at source,
and the (FF) 50 allowed for tax is therefore the refund of a tax paid by the company
before distribution  of dividends.  On a foreign company dividend of (FF) 100, a
withholding  tax of.33,37o is applied and it is only this tax which can be claimed.
Accordingly,  the shareholder's  real income is in this case only (FF) 100, whereas it
is (FF) 150 for a French company distributing the same dividend.  Thus, the system
has radically difierent efiects according to whether  the dividend  is paid by a French
or by a foreign company.
21. In so far as the majority of its shareholdets are entitled to claim the tax
credit, the introduction of such a system gives a company a number of possibilities
of using the reduction of "economic double taxation" (the combined  impact of
corporation tax and personal  income tax) to facilitate the supply of outside finance
in the form of risk capital. These possibilities range from maintenance of the
shareholder's  income, including his fiscal claim, (by cutting the dividend by the
extent of the tax credit and increasing  self-financing  to a corresponding degree) (1)
to maintenance of the dividend (entailing an inctease in the shareholder's net
income).
22. The inroduction of the tax credit may have several difierent eflects on share-
holders. It tends to lead to a capital gain via the market's capitalization of the
increased yield prospects it holds out for shareholders  resident in the company's
counffy. It also tends to make the shares of domestic  companies a more profitable
investment for residents than fot non-residents,  and also more profitable for
residents to invest in than the shares of foreign companies.  These efiects bting
the tax credit system, in its present form, in direct conflict vrith the first of the
principles  advocated, i.e. that taxation should not influence the choice of place of
investment.
23. Apart from the doubts as to how efiective a tax incentive as complex as this
can be in influencing  shareholders,  the main teason why the tax credit system in
its present form is open to criticism is because it discriminates between income
from "national" shares and income from foreign shares, and between residents  and
non-residents.
The segmentation efiect on the markets could be avoided through the granting of the
same tax credit on the dividends of foreign companies. A solution better suited
to the requirements for smooth operation of the market would be to give non-
residents a refund of corporation tax equivalent to the tax credit. The second
solution would, moreover, link up with a system pursuing the same aims as the
1t) This is not iust a theoretical assumption. There are many examples of this course having
been chosen since the French law came into force.
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the system, now applied in Germany, whereby tax is charged at a reduced rate on
the distributed portion of company profits.
241. If the principle of reduction of tax on the distributed portion of company
profits rvere generally adopted, it would be desirable that the Membet States should
also adopt a uniform reduced rate. As regards  incentives  to the relative development
of the various types of investment  and methods of financing, uniformity of. tax
systems within tlie difierent countries is in point of fact the best guarantee of
smooth working of the capital market.
B INYESTMENT  /N BONDS BY INDIVIDUAI-S
2-i. Diflerences  in the fiscal treatment of income tend to partition bond markets
much more than share markets. In an investment in shares, consideration of the
prospects of capital gain may take precedence over the dividend yields; in a bond
investment, yield is always a primary consideration.
The technical  reasons for the partitioning of the bond market by tax systems
resemble those described for the equities markets.
2ti. Among persons declaring their bond income for tax, a difierence in yield may
arise according  to whether they reside in the country of issue or not, if a with-
hr:lding tax is levied at source in the counuy of issue and is neither refunded nor
wholly allowed fot tax in the counry of domicile of the bondholder.
Certain countries give an international  flavour to all loans issued in their territory
b;r not withholding any tax at source. Other States, without formally adopting this
principle, nevertheless  refrain from levying withholding tax on certain loans of
prrblic authorities or establishments undet their jurisdiction.  However, these
difierences  in treatment according to category of loan seem to be in process of
dj.sappearing,  except in Italy, where there is a special system. On interest ftom
It.alian bonds a tax is levied which has no equivalent abroad, the so-called tax
on income from movable wealth (iruposta sui redditi di ricchezza mobile\, category A,
al: arate of about 327o. This is a schedulat tax (theoretically botne by the creditor,
but withheld and paid by the debtor) and cannot in any circumstance be set against
the creditor's  total income tax liability. The efiect is to make the debenture loan
inL Italy a type of financing which is relatively more expensive for ptivate enterprises.
In respect of income from bonds just as much as from shares, the smooth wotking
of a European  capital market depends on holders in other member countries being
able to obtain reimbursement of tax withheld at source or to have it allowed for
taLx due in their country of domicile. The possible procedutes for shares have been
dr:tailed. It is not necessary to go further into them here, as the main problem for
the bond market is a difierent one.
27. Considerable  difierences still petsist from country to country - 
sysn flern
lcran to loan - 
in the fiscal treatment of interest paid to non-residents  not protected
b'y a convention or to persons not making a tax teturn. These difierences in tax
3Ct2arrangements  tend to engender  difierences in the cost of financing by debenture
loan. 
- In so far as the markets are integrated, the net yield which must be ofiered
to lenders tends to be the same in every country. Hence, if interest on certain loans
is subject to a withholding  tax, the borrower may have to bear it himself - 
by
ofiering a higher gross interest - 
to the extent that the lender regards the tax
withheld  as an irrecoverable charge rather than as prepayment of. a tax he would
have paid anyw^y (i.e. to the extent that the lender cannot charge the rvithholding
tax to his income tax liability, or does not declare the income in his country of
domicile). The cost of financing by issue of a loan the interest on which attracts
withholding tax can therefore never be lower than the cost if there were no with-
holding tai bnt may be higher by the amount of the withholding  tax when there
is only a limited supply of capital from lenders who declare the intere_st  they
receive and can charge the withholding tax to their tax liability or have it
reimbursed.
28. In so far as difierences in the fiscal treatment of debenture loans give rise
to difierent costs of this type of finance in the several countties, they also tend to
cause difierences  in the relitive cost of the various methods of financing. As was
explained at the beginning of the chapter, difierences  of this kind are all the more
of an obstacle to the smooth working of a European  capital market because  their
extent may constantly change.
29. A more uniform treatment of debenture-loan  creditors is needed in the
Community countries. The abolition of withholding tax,_or  application of the same
rate of withholding tax in all the countries, are possible ways of reaching this
objective.
If a unifotm rate were applied, it would have to be telatively low, for it_ is clear
that the bond market is a more developed  one in the countries where bond income
is not subject to the tax, either de iure ot de facto.
Moreover,  whereas on their dividend distributions companies cannot avoid paying
withholding tax levied by the county in which the companies _are incorporated
(except by moving their iegistered ofice) comPanies  _wishing to-float a debenture
io"n muy- avoid tLe withholding tax by issuing the loan abroad, in a country in
which no such tax is levied.
30. The tax system applied to bonds raises yet another series of problems. For,
like other s.crrritiet.  bonds in some cases rank for fiscal advantages granted to
residents only.
For instance, in Belgium the State grants what amounts lo a "tax credit" by
giving the creditor an income tax allowance in respect of withholding  tax at the
nor-"I rate on certain public loans which are partly exempt from it by virtue of
a privilege accorded at a time when a tax system, since change{, .-"t in force.
The practical incidence of these tax credits is small to the extent that bondholders
prefer to remain anonymous.
Germany, which originally did not levy withholding  tax on interest from certain
categories of loan, even when the interest was paid to,creditors not maldng  an
income tax return, later introduced  a withholding  tax of 25Vo applicable  only to
303non-resident  bondholders. This is in efiect tantamount  to discrimination between
non-residents  and residents  among creditors not declating their income from these
bonds to the tax authorities. The introduction of this withholding tax led to heavy
r;ales by foreign bondholders wishing to preserve their anonymity or unable to get
r:he withholding tax refunded ot allowed, in the absence of a tax convention
between  their country and Germany or of internal legislation permitting tax levied
abroad to be set against the tax liability at home.
,71. lil7ith regard to transitional  problems, modification  of the tax system applied
to a loan may change its yield for certain categories of holder and afiect the market
price of the bonds. Hence, the Group considers that it would be bettet not to
introduce in a single operation  a common fiscal rule for all the difierently taxed
bonds now in circulation, but to phase the ttansitions  by applying a common de
onlv to new issues. unless the ne$r svstem is more favourable, in which case
exiiting loans could'be accorded the same treatment.  Fot it would seem essential
to the smooth functioning of the market that nothing should happen to shake the
confidence of investo$ that tax arrangements  applying at the time of issue will
remain at least as favourable for them until maturity.
.tV. Adiustment of direct taxation of investments of financial institutions
.12. From the point of view of the development and smooth functioning of a
liuropean capital market, the tax system applied to the investment income of
linancial institutions raises two kinds of problem.
liirst, the tax systems must not be allowed to infuence the choice of the countries
in which these legal entities place their investments.
Iiecondly, individuals  who do not wish to make their investments direct must be
zrble to entrust this task to financial institutions  without fiscal disadvantage.
r\. /NVESTMENTS By /NSTITUTIONAL /NVESTORS
33. \7here financial institutions  invest in the capacity of institutional investors
rather than as mere intermediaries, an adequate way of preventing tax arrangements
from inducing them to invest in one country rather than another is to ensure
that taxes withheld in the source country and not reimbursed by it can be wholly
allowed fot tax purposes in the countries in which the financial institutions are
taxed (with teimbursement of any excess) and that no particular  advantages  are
attached to investing in this counffy only.
llhe problem of allowing or refunding tax withheld abroad is fundamentally  the
siame fot institutional investors  (insurance companies and pension funds) as for
individuals and calls for broadly similar solutions. Again, as regatds financial
:04institutions granting ctedit direct to foteign countries, the solutions applied up till
now in several Membet States are much the same as those desctibed in section 26
in connection with investment in securities. The system applicable to interest on
direct credits may in fact entail double taxation when the debtot is domiciled  in
France, Belgium and Italy, as these countries impose withholding  tax on interest
on these credits in the same way as on bond interest. The Netherlands, on the
other hand, levies no withholding tax on interest, and in Germany and Luxembourg,
there is no withholding  tax on interest other than from bonds.
34. However,  a particular feature of the taxation of corporate incomes in certain
member countries  raises a further dificulty. Vithholding  tax charged in the country
of residence on income received  by an individual  can, as a very general rule, not
only be allowed against tax due, but can also be refunded whete the tax paid
exceeds the liability. In some countries, the same rule is applied to corporate
income, but in others provision is only made for allowing the tax, not for its
reimbursement.  Hence, in certain conditions,  the tax paid might be imecoverable.
It is practically impossible to assess what influence this irtecoverable tax may exeft
at prlsent on the ihoice of investment by institutional  investors, for it cannot be
isolated  from other difierences  of tax system equally likely to afiect the investment
pattern, as for instance the various possibilities for ofisetting tax withheld  at
source abtoad.
B. INYESTI{ENTS BY INYEJTMENT  COMPANIES
35. For the purposes of the development of an eficient Eu,ropean.capital  market
another requirement arises in respect of investments  made by financial  intermediaries
who may pass the income on direct to individuals  ot to other institutions. Certain
afrangemenrs are necessary to ensure "fiscal transparenry",  i.e, arrangements under
which investment income passed on in this way reaches the beneficiaries  as though
they had made the investment  direct, in such a way as to avoid penalizing, from
the tax point of view, persons who prefer to have their savings administered by
expeft intermediaries. Any such afrangement  must preclude the _imposition of
additional tax on the investment income in the hands of the intermediary and must
also permit the ultimate beneficiary to set against other income tax liability any
retention at soufce which has not already been refunded or allo'ured to the
intermediary.
Administration of savings by intermediaries  may take a large number of forms.
At the extreme end of the range, there are institutions which can hardly be
considered pure intermediaries  because their object is to acquire participations
giving them a virtual controlling interest in the concerns. ft would appear desirable
to deal with them too, because  the problem of "fiscal transparency"  arises there
as well. However, it is not part of the Group's task to examine here the question
of relations  between parent companies and subsidiaries, despite the similarity of the
taxation problems they present; in this case it is a question of taxation of working
capital 
- 
not investment  capital, the only kind consideted for the purposes of
this report.
305)t6. In Community counmies,  investment  income passed on thro_ugh joint-stock
companies of the oidinary type is usually taxed twice because it sufiers corporaJion
tax in addition to the tax withheld at iource. The only exception to this rule is
clividend  income  teceived by Belgian  companies. There, cofporation tax is charged
on only l5Vo (107o  as from t967) of. the net dividend,  reduced to 5%o in the case
of industrial  companies.  The incidence of corporation tax at the level of the
intermediary is thirefore in this case small. No bther direct taxes are imposed on
clividends oi B.lgian origin. \X/hen the dividend is redistributed the company is
exempted from ile withholding tax, and the shareholder  can charge the, amount
rvithheld on the initial dismibnlion to his tax liability. The system applicable to
clividends of foreign companies redisributed by a Belgian company is similar,
though less favourible, foi it is generally not possible either to_have foreign with'
trolding tax allowed or to claim iis refund. However, the non-allowance  of JopiSn
rvithhJlding tax tends to be offset, for Belgian individuals_ who are shareholders
c,f the inveitment company and who declarelhe dividends they receive from it, by
the operation of the '?rar credit", which also applies to redistribution of foreign
dividends by the Belgian company.  Furthermore,  except where other afrangements
have been made und-er internitional conventions, the-normal rate of withholding
tu* on dividends of foreign origin on their enry into Belgium  has been reduced
to l07o for income receive-d or c-ollected from 1 January t965 by Belgian joint stock
companies and other corporate bodies treated on the same footing'
l.n respect of investment in equities, the efiect of these rules is that Belgian
investrirent companies can ofier iheir shareholders an income similar to that which
they would obtain by making the same investments direct. In the case of bonds,
on the other hand, only direct investment is atffactive, since "fiscal ffansparency"
has not been achieved.
-17. In Luxembourg,  there is a special arrangement  for financial  companies- with
the status of holding companies. A holding company is defined as any Luxembourg
company whose sole obfect is to acquire participations, in any _form, in other
I.uxembourg  or foreign enterprises, and to administer and exploit such paticipations,
without peiforming -any in8ustrial activity of its own or having a commercial
establishment  open to the public.
l{olding companies  are exempt ftom the direct taxes normally levied on other
companies and are subject only to certain special taxes involving  a-relltively low
charge. They are also exempt from withholding tax on,the dividends they distrib-
rrte. Howevlr, the dividends they receive from Luxembourg  companies  are liable
to withholding  tax which cannot be refunded or allowed against othef tax. In
addition, inveitment  income of foreign origin received by the holding  companies
does not qualify for concessions undei double taxation conventions, since the latter
never apply to holding companies.
lfhe holding companies'  undistributed profits escape virtually all tax. This is the
system's  greatest attraction, as it makes the establishment of a subsidiary  with
the statuJ of a Luxembourg  holding company often a more profitable method of
managing  certain types of asset than direct management,  for companies  wishing
t;o reinvest profits on these assets. For individuals, shares in Luxembourg  holding
companies  produce practically the same net income as direct investments  made
under cover of fiscal anonvmitv.
aio6)8. The Netherlands_has  estabrished a speciar tax system for the closed_end investment  companv (Beregging-smoottittippij),  whose ,i;';;rpo.. is to acquire, hold, administei  and d5noiE 
-"? ;q;i;;;;. 'fr'ii.'rl"r., ;i#"".*"-pany are quoted on the Amsterdam or Rotterdam ,lto.k .*.hrne.rl ilii.;d;'i.i.iu.a by it are not included in the taxllle__nrofir pr*ii"a*ti;'";;i;#".ffini.,  subject to a tax similar to Dutch .olporutiion !? (u proviso *hia ;;;fides, in particular, Luxembourg holding companies).  clor.d-..,d-inGrd;;;'.oilplni.,  whose shares are not quoted eniov the iame.e*emption, provideJ;1i|f jiririu",. to their share-
HIX:i"J.f:st 
6o% or the ai"ii"'iJ'-,i.i;;;;'",.i.iri*'l,"lth.  .ou,,.-";';-h;
The dividends disffibuted jv  these investment  companies attact rvithholding tax at the ordinarv_rate.of  25y;. .H"tt;!;  trr. ."r.?-r.iir,'.'il,rtion  of dividends received from Dutch. companies ,tri" Jf.t not constitut. 
" ,r"* charge, for the company can claim the rax initially withheld.
Redistribution of dividends received  from abroad involves double taxation,  except where the dividends origin_ate i"  .""iri.,  which have a convention with the Netherlands providing foi th-e *ithh;rdi;;  tax to be refunded, or alowed for mx purposes, to the Dutch shareholder.
The result of these rules is that Dutch investment companies  give their Dutch shareholders an income comparable  ,. il,"t *rri.'rr;.;;#il'ob,ui.,  by investing direct in the same shares and d..lurin! i^h!'ln.orn. received thereon. Dutch invest- ment companies can ofier "fiscal t."ntirt"rr.y', under th. ,;.;;rditions  for their foreign shareholders resident in a country -hi.h h"r -*r.ili.J''rir, 
the Netherlands a convention providing- for the reimbursement,or  allowar.. 
"i 
-n",.ri 
;irhi;ili;; tax. on the other hand these companies .u" ofi., ;;.h;"r;  i."rr}il'v?.;ffi8
lil::1fi:il'i"rli"*:. 
system 
^ppti.d t" ir,.- l,""irg"t.."'?.rid.J ;;ril; f;
39. The tax arrangements  for French investment  companies  are more generous than those for Dutcl. companies inasmuch as the exemption from corporation  tax applies also to bond income. The- e"empiiorr.  -uy, h#;;;,  bJ^r,ru;..t to certain conditions of redistribution, as is the cas'e wi;h i(.. "p.i."i'ir*r,-.n,  companies SICAV (Soci1tds d'inpestisienzent d capiai uariabte\'. 
---- -^-'-r
The dividends of French investment  companies are,exempt from withholding  tax; {urthermore, French sharehorderi ;;  r;i;grinst theinl" jiuuilirv the tax with_ held on dividends paid to th" i"u.ri-."t .o1np1nl urd, *h.r. ,ppropriate, secure a tax *edit on the iume terms as though tt.v r,IJ ,ir"a^.?..,J; iiu"rr-.nr, direct. This svstem has the disadvantage-f.ii"r.ig.  ,hrr.r,ord"i, ,;;,h.y  cannot, under existing conventions, claim tax i.ri.f o. r.f'u"d;;-;;r;;; .ii.ir.,,.rs  at source trom investment income received by the company.
40. In Italv. there is onry one investment,  company, of the crosed_end variety. The dividenii it receive, ,r" no r""g.i-ll"ur.. l;l;;  ;;;.#i  rrom movabre wealth (imposra sui redditi d; riccbeiii )".qigi. it;r';r;,.#rtuil,  subject to corporation tax, however, escaping it only- if th. di;i.i.=#"r...ir.a has sufiered withholding tax at the 30vo mtl,r?"i"J"r"r"il discharge of tax obligations, insread
307of the normal 5g/o. The investment companv .gnjoys a reduction of. 257o of
corporation tax. Thir';;iriil;;.;i;A'to'ull  hnun.. companies if not less
thin 60To of their **,:^i;-i;;;r,.d"in  participations in joint-stock  companies (the
reduction is 40Vo if d;"S;;;'h;iJt tf'"L" in'the finance companv)'.Capital  gains
o' the sale of ,..rrriii"i"l;;'*ntt, distributed or undisgibuted' attract the
proportional tax on ;ti,n;'ir#" *J""ri.- *..iitt. profits dis*ibuted bv this
i:;ir*';; iJi"iJ;#";'."'"1i..r,--i' ,1" U.'.nt1"'v'' hands, to the additional
progressive ,u* ,, ,n"'"upp-pii"t" tlt... r,rtthli*ore,'the normal system of u'ith'
holding tax at sourc. ir";il;;pli.utl.  to the income distributed by the invest-
ment company.
The double taxation which results in practice from this system is certainly the basic
reason why investm.tl ..*p,ties hive not developed in Italy'
4l-. The securities portfolio of the investment companies. liable to tax in accordance
v,ith the systems dJ;ii;Jrilt"  il it fu* if,. .o^*panies' own proDerw' In the
open-end investment 
-ffidt;.il"g 
{; Ger*1tt.-b'qt*q, the Ntiheriands and
Luxembourg, th. ,.*riti'Jr" do 
-"oii.fong.;;#'legal"entiiy 
T"iiCi?c^ ,'."T:rb*
are the collective p.;;it  of the unith6lders, who are bound to the managrng
c,ompany by a contract of a speclal type'
As the investment income is at no time the propertv of the managers' it cannot
t,e taxed as profit i" ;h;i;6*at. 
-f"t 
tlre same t.uton, the dis6ibution of invest-
nnent income ao., no,'ir,tr.i'*irfittJaing  ,u* ". 
the level-o{ the fund' National
and foreign withhoriini';; ;-h;+;i "; i;.;.  received by the fund are, for
rrolders of certificatet"r3rii."i i"';li-i;tyttiy-i" whi.h the.fund is incorporated'
refundable o, ullo*"f1""f";';;;;;ilgit 16. investments had been made direct
try the certificate-hoffit;;'ffiid.i-;1;,..ent  of the fund's investments is
produced.
On the same condition, individuals -participating in a Belgian open-end  investment
{und and resident i" il:,bil;;""  .f'"i. ifi. ilt& ...dit"'"ttgytl  on the dividends
of Betgian .o-p"ni.rli,'*;';il;il;;;il;  'h;;;-;i-such 
dividends in the fund's
income.
,Iaxwithheldatsourceonthedividej}dsofGermarrcompaniesisrefundedto
r3erman open-end #;;;";^i;nat.  fnit it 
"-priuit.ge,not 
found in anv other
pEC country, and ,ffi;;';^ji.  ttt.t.l"nas particularly  profitable for persons
:making a tax return.
.Thus,theopen.endinvestmentfundmayptovideasolutionwhich,fromthetax
point of view, is ";^i.*";;-p-ai"pr.- 
,[ *lttr.g.their  investments  direct fot
b.rro.,s resident ir ift" .""rirlij;;hi.h.'ift. f"ni has been set up, whether its
investments are in that country or abroad
For persons not resident in the country in which the fund has been set up, the
,"I"ffiil;fi;;,  ;;;;-tri.  in respect'of  investments in the fund's own countrv'
is fiscally the equivail# ;"i"difi  Jt... -tt"" these-persons do not declare the
income  received trornlt in their .ointry of Jomicile. If tends to be a fiscally less
profitable solution *li"'i6.ii..tun. ittit income, since the existing conventions
308do not enable tax withheld on income disuibuted by foreign investment funds to
be set against the ultimate  beneficiary's tax liability: only the tax authorities of
the countries in which the funds have been set up allow'these withholding  taxes
to be taken into account, on the basis of investment statements submitied bv
the funds.
42. This brief survey of the possibilities afiotded by investment through financial
intermediaries  thus shows that "fiscal transparency"  is by no means achieved  in
all cases on the international  plane.
For savers declaring their investment income, it is only in France, Germany,
Belgium and Luxembourg that this equality of fiscal treatment exists alike for share
and bond investments and for internal and external  investment - 
but it applies
only to residents. In the Netherlands,  "transparency" exists only for investment
in equities, but agteements  for avoidance of double taxation enable some non-
residents to benefit as well.
43. If investments through intermediaries  are to play their proper part in the
development of the European capital market, it is essential that the obstacles to
"fiscal transpafency", in those countries where the pfesent affangements  apply to
certain investment  categories only, should be removed for the other categories  as
well. It is also necessary for the income of investment companies *  open-end and
closed-end - 
to be accorded  the same fiscal treatment wherever the beneficiarv
resides in the Community.
44. At the moment, it is hardly possible to suggest the technical  methods of
achieving  these aims.
The solution of the problems will depend on the principles adopted by the Member
States regarding the taxation of income from capital invested abroad, and in
particular on their choice between taxation in one country only and sharing of tax
receipts between source country and domicile country. Moreover, no completely
satisfactory arrangement  can be made for investments in non-member  countries as
long as the Member States' conventions  with them are based on diflering principles.
These difficulties ate not likely to be adequately settled without a multilateral  double
taxation  convention which explicitly caters for the special case of investment
companies.
V. Adjustment of indirect taxes on the raising and ransfer of capital
45. As regards indirect taxes, the Group paid particular attention to the trvo
categories which at present have the most immediate efiect on the working of
capital  markets:
i) Indirect taxes on capital raised or borrowed;  this category comprises,  in particular,
tax on acquisition of corporate rights and stamp duty on loan capital taken up bydomestic borrowers and on the introduction of foteign securities  to stock-exchange
d,ealing;
ii) Indirect taxes on the movement of securities; this category includes taxes on
stock-exchange transactions and other comparable taxes.
46. Duty on the acquisition of corporate rights is usually levied when a company
(or other legal person treated on the same footing) is formed or its life extended,
and when any changes are made in its capital or corporate structure. This duty
gr:nerally takes the form of a registration tax, except in Germany  where it is a special
tax (Gesellscbaftsteuer),  and is always paid by the company rcceiving  the capital.
Stamp duty is levied when securities  are issued in the country of issue, or when
foreign securities  are brought into circulation  in a country. The two occasions  {ot
the charge may ovetlap in the case of securities  circulating  abroad.
In collaboration with the appropriate departments  in the Member States, the
Ciommission  has worked out a draft directive, - 
now befote the Council - concerning  the tv/o types of indirect tax on the raising of capital. The object of
this directive is elimination of the causes of double taxation and, where any of
these taxes is maintained, adoption of a uniform rate in all the six countries, with
a view to avoiding dillerences  among them in the cost of various methods of
financing.
The simplest solution for all tlese problems would have been abolition of both
srtamp duty and duty on the acquisition  of corporate rights. The Commission's
departments  suggested this, but it was found that it would be dificult to obtain the
assent of all the Member States. The draft directive befote the Council provides
for the abolition  o{ stamp duty and the prohibition of any tax which might replace
it, and uniform adoption of a tax on the acquisition  of corporate rights reduced
t<> l7o, and reduced still fumher, to 0.57o, in the case of mergers, with conditions
o[ collection harmonized so as to preclude double taxation. (The system amounts,
in principle, to taxation solely in the country in which the company is incorporated.)
T'he Group considers  that, short of the abolition of these two types o{ tax, the
a:rrangement proposed in the draft directive will come closest to achieving  the
desired  objectives.
47. The taxes on stock-exchange  transactions  concern purchases and sales for cash
and for {orward settlement  and contango operations. No taxes of this type are
levied in Luxembourg. The pattern of rates in the other Member States differs
quite considerably  from country to country. Futthermore,  Germany and the
Nlethedands tax not only transactions in their own countries but also, under certain
c,cnditions,  transactions  carried out abroad for account of theit residents; this may
result in double taxation.
T'he rates o{. tax on stock-exchange transactions are relatively low, but not negli-
gible. The international difierences can therefore  lead to one country being preferred
for a transaction to another. Moreover, these taxes, by discouraging  arbitrage
between  securities of similar type, are a Iactot making it less easy to discern what
a're the true current costs of the vadous methods of obtaining  capital on the
market. This has prompted  the Group to suggest the abolition of taxes on stock-
310exchange  transactions rather than the adoption in all six countries of unifotm
rates and conditions of collection designed to avoid double taxation.  However,
failing agreement on abolition, the adoption of uniform  rates would be preferable
to maintenance of the status quo, for it would ensure the neutrality of the tax with
regard to choice of the place for transactions.
48.  Stamp duties on bills of exchange,  where these are drawn to finance in-
ternational transactions, may also give rise to double taxation. This might be
eliminated by measures similat to those suggested above.
Conclusions
49. If an integrated capital market is to be developed and operated smoothly
inside the Community, the tax systems must not prevent the creation in that market
of conditions similar to those of a domestic market. Tax neuuality means that
taxes afiect neither the choice of the place of investment  or transaction nor the
saver's choice between  making the investment  direct or using the services of a
financial  intermediary. It  also means there should be no tax-induced difietences
among member countries in the relative development  of the various types of
investment and methods of financing.
If these requirements are to be fulfilled some improvements in the tax systems
of member countries would seem called for.
1) The double taxation still arising on income from security investments in a
country other than that of the beneficiary's domicile should be eliminated. If the
requirements of a European  capital market are alone considered,_ this could be
accomplished either by taxing the income in one country only, or by dividing  the
r.n.nli. between the two by imposing  a withholding  tax in the soutce State and
systematically allowing it for tax purposes in the beneficiary's State of domicile.
Similatly, double taxation by way of indirect  taxes on the raising and movement
of capital must be eliminated. Ttre necessary measures  are now being discu_ssed  and
a dtift directive,  drawn up by the Commission in association with official depart-
ments of the Member States, has been submitted to the Council.
2) The tax disadvantages still attaching to investment  effected in other member
countries through the intermediary of financial institutions should be g-ot out of
the way. Arrangements made wili depend on what principles the Member States
adopt for taxinglincome  from capital invested in securities  abroad. Because of the
complex legal relations between the various parties to such investments, _it is
probable tliat "fiscal ffanspafency" can only te,satisfactorily-achieved  under a
multilateral double taxatiori convention which explicitly  caters for the special case
of investment companies.
3) There should no longer be any fiscal advantages reserved exclusively for invest-
ment in particular countries. This requires amendment  of the "tax ctedit" systems
under which part of corporation  tax is at present refunded to residents only and
311clnly on the dividends of domestic  companies. The artangement  best suited to the
smooth working of a European capital market would be to extend the concession
try granting a refund to non-resident investors.
4f) At present there are many disparities between member counffies in their fiscal
reatm;nt of dividend  and inieresi paid to non-residents  of to persons not making
a, tax return. Here taxation and supenision systems should be harmonized. This
is especially  important for the bond market, since considerati-ons_of yield are.of
prime importance in determining the choice of an investment in fixed-yiel4 securities'
ith. hu.ronization might take-the form of total abolition of withlolding tax on
tnnd interest or application of a uniform rate of tax throughout the Community.
312ANNEX TO CHAPTER  14
Taxation of distributed
profits of ioint stock companies and of
intetest on bonds accruing to individuals
I. Taxation of company profits disttibuted
to shateholders who are individuals (')
GERMANY
,4) DIRECT TAXES  BORNE BY COMPANIES
(1) A profits tax, the yield on which goes to the Bund (Federal governrnent)and
itr. Land.t, at aiate oi t57o on distriblted profits (5lV,o on undistributed  p.rofits).
The tax on distdbuted  profits is not treated as a deductible expense, but as
unJistributed profit. Theieal  tax charge on distributed profit is therefore 8.447o'
(2) A communal tax, the rate of which varies from Land to Land and may
attain 57o, but levied on a broader  basis than profit in-the tfue sense.- (No account
i. iul.n tr... of communal  taxes on the net vrorth of the company and on payrolls,
rvhich are considered  indirect  charges.)
(3) A tax on wealth (vermi)gensteaer), at a maximum  rate of l7o, of a tax base
calculated by rather complex procedures.
The combined incidence  of (2) and (3) corresponds, on ayetage, to about I57o ol
the gross profit.
B) TAX BORNE BY SHAREHOLDERS,  CHARGED AT THE TIME OF A DIVIDEND
DISTRIBUTION
( 1) Dividends of German comPanies
i) Paid to a German shareholder: tax withheld at source at a r^te of. 257o of the
gross dividend.
ii) Paid to a foreign shareholder:  same rule. The rate is teduced,- by agreement,
;; l;% ior French", Dutch, Luxembourg,  Swiss and British shareholders'
(2) Dividends of foreign companies: no vrithholding tax in Germanv.
(r) I. Comoanies and shareholders domiciled in Germany,  Belgium, France, Italy, the Nether-
iands, Luxembourg,  Switzerland,  the UK and the USA'
IL Siamp duties ind tax€s on jtock-exchange  transactions are not takcn into"accootl.  ,,o-__--- iii."fri#"-,h"-rtrr.t.tJ.. i, ".otpot"t. 
Jntity the tax arrangements  are often very difierent,
especially in the case of companies  owning large participations.
313C) ALLONTANCE OF TAX WITHHELD AT SOURCE
(,1) Dividends of German companies: _the German shareholder may charge rax
v'ithheld at source to personal tax liability.
(ll) Dividends of foreign companies: the German shareholder  may charge tax
withheld at source abroad to personal income tax due in Germany, up ro an amount
nrct exceeding the German  tax_due 9n the portion of his income 
-repiesented 
by the
foreign income in question. (The allowanci procedure  may difier tiightly u"*iding
to the foreign country concerned.)
BELGIU M
/)  DIRECT TAX BORNE BY COMPANIES
A 307o tax on profits. 35%o on any paft of the profit exceedins  Bfrs. 5 million.
The additional 57o is refunded in the event of s.t-bsequent distriEution.
A,L-I4X BORNE BY SHAREHOLDERS,  CHARGED AT THE TIME OF A DIVIDEND
DISTRIBUTION
(1.) Dividends of Belgian companies
i) Paid to a Belgian  shareholder: tax is withheld ar source at a rate of. 209/o of the
gross dividend (as hom 1967).
ii,l Paid.to a foreign shareholder: the same withholding  tax is levied, as a tax on
non-residents.
(2) Dvidends o{ foreign companies:  withholding tax is charged at 20Vo of the net
dividend at the frontier.
C) ALLOITANCE  OF TAX 'TITHHELD AT SOURCE, AND TAX CREDIT
(1) Dividends of Belgian companie_s:_  the Belgian shareholder  may charge tax
withheld at source to personal tax liability. Hi also has a right to a tax"credit
equal to.half. the profits tax paid by the companies (on the propJrtion of their gross
profits distributed as dividend)
(2) Dividends of foreign- companr,es: the Belgian shareholder may claim for rax
withheld at source in Belgium to his liability.-For dividends which have attracteJ
wihhholding tax abroad, he has a right to tax allowance Ior l5To of the nei
dividend at the frontier, representing  the flat rate of allowance for taxes paid abroad.
F RAN CE
.4) DIRECT TAX BORNE BY COMPANIES
A tax on profits at the rate of 50%o.
B) TAX BORNE BY SHAREHOLDERS,  CHARGED AT THE TIME OF A DIVIDEND
DISTRIBUTION
(1 ) Dividends  of French companies
i) Paid to a French shareholder: no withholding  tax.
3ltlii) Paid to a foreign shareholder: tax withheld at source at t}re rate of 257o ot
the gross dividendl This is reduced, by agreement, to l87o {or Belgian shate-
holdJrs. 157o for German and American sliareholdets, and to nil for Dutch and
Swiss shareholdets.
(2) Dividends of foreign companies:  when these dividends are paid. il- !11".",
iax is withheld by the"banks ifiecting the paym-ent at a basic r-ate of 33.37o of
the net dividend at the frontier. This rate il ieduced when tax has been charged
ubroud on the dividend so that the sum of taxes levied in the two countries equals
ll.lEo of the gtoss dividend; when the foreign tax (e.g. UK tax) exceeds  33.3%io,
no tax is withheld in France.
C) ALLO\O'ANCE  OF TAX'OTITHHELD AT SOURCE, AND TAX CREDIT
(1) Dividends of French companies: the French shareholdet has a right.to.,a  tax
.r.dit .q,rul to half the profits tax paid by the companies (on the distributed
proportion of their gross profits).
(2) Dividends of foreign companies: t!-'e French shareholder  may charge 5,07o.of
ih. n.t dividend to tax liability, which corresponds  to the fate of French with-
holding tax.
IT ALY
A) DIRECT TAX BORNE BY COMPANiES
(1) A tax on income from movable wealtb accompanied  by various additional
ihrrg.r, bringing the total tax incidence  to about )57o of. gross profits.
(2) A tax on companies at a rate of.0.757o of the taxable capital and I5%o of the
orooortion  of income exceeding 67o of that capital.  Since 1961, a surcharge  of l0%o
i,rr'be.r, added. The average-incidence  of this tax on gross ptofit is about l5/o.
B) TAX BORNE BY SHAREHOLDERS,  CHARGED AT THE TIME OF A DIVIDEND
DISTRIBUTION
(1) Dividends of Italian companies
i) Paid to an Italian shareholder:  tax vdthheld at source at a rate of 5%o. This
ir Lir.a to 307o for shareholders  whose identity is not tevealed, and the with-
holding tax then counts as irrecoverable.  In the tables, only the 57o rute has been
taken into account.
ii) Paid to a foreign shareholder: tax withheld at source at a tate of 307o. This is
reduced by agreement to l5%o for US shareholders'
(2) Dividends  of foreign companies: withholding tax of 5%o on the net dividend
at.the frontier 007o for shaieholders  whose identity is not revealed).
313C) ALLO\TANCE OF TAX NflITHHELD AT SOURCE
(1) Dividends  of Italian companie.s: the Italian shareholder may charge the 5%o
rvithheld  at source to his tax liabilitv.
(2) Dividends of foreign companies:  the Italian shareholder is entitled to allowance
for the Italian withholding  tax of 57o; and for taxes paid on dividends in the
{JSA and UK, up to an amount not exceeding 87o of the gross dividend.
1'HE NETHERT.4NDS
,21) DIRECT TAXES BORNE BY COMPANIES
It tax on company profits at a graduated rate, representing  a charge of. about 47vo
of gross profits for large companies.
II) TAX BORNE BY SHAREHOLDERS,  CHARGED AT THE TIME OF A DIVIDEND
DISTRIBUTION
(1) Dividends  of Dutch companies
i) Paid to a Dutch shareholder: 257o withheld ar source.
ii.) Paid to a -fo-reign  shareholder: same general rule. The rate of the withholding
trax is reduced, by agreemenr, to t5%6 for German  shareholders , l\Vo for Swisi
shareholders and nil for French, Italian, British and American  shareholders.
(,2) Dividends of foreign companies: no withholding  tax,
C) ALLO\TANCE OF TAX WITHHELD AT SOURCE,  AND TAX CREDIT
(.1) Dividends  of Dutch companies:  the Dutch shareholder can charge tax with-
held at source to personal tax liability.
Ir[.B.: For t966,it is planned to grant tlre Dutch shareholder  a tax credit of. L07o
of the gross dividend in addition to the allowance of tax withheld ar source (257o).
(.2) Dividends of foreign _companies:  no allowance in the Netherlands for foreign
taxes_on dividends  (instead, the Netherlands  is endeavouring  to conclude agreemenlt
for the reduction or abolition of withholding taxes leviEd abroad on 
-dividends
payable to Dutch shareholders).
LUXEMBOURG
/4) DIRECT TAXES BORNE BY COMPANIES
(lL) A communal  tax on operating  profit and on capital, at a rate of 47o on profits
and^2%o on capital, together producing an avemge incidence of about llVo on
plfoIts.
316(2) A graduated  State tax on company  pr-ofits, amounting  to,40%o for.large
io*prnl"r. This rate is applied to ihe prbfit after deduction of communal  tax.
(3) A State tax on wealth at a tate of 57m, amounting  to an avefage charge of
about 57o on ptofits.
B) TAX BORNE BY SHAREHOLDERS,  CHARGED AT THE TIME OF A DIVIDEND
DISTRIBUTION
( 1) Dividends  of Luxembourg  companies
i) Paid to a Luxembourg shareholder: tax withheld at source at a rate of. l57o oL
the gross dividend.
ii) Paid to a foreign shareholdet:  same rule.
(2) Dividends of foreign companies: no Luxembourg  withholding  tax.
C) ALLOWANCE  OF TAX \(ITHHELD AT SOURCE
(1) Dividends of Luxembourg companies: the Luxembourg shareholder  may charge
the l5%o tax withheld at source to personal tax liability.
(2) Dividends of foteign companies: the Luxembourg  shareholder  has- the-^right,
ty special ur.u.rg"*.nf to alliwance for tax withheld at source in the US and
d.r-uny (at thJ reduced rate of l57o); and for French withholding.tax  up to a
limit of.'157o of the gross dividend  (rate of withholding tax in Luxembourg).
SlX/ IT ZERL,4ND
.4) DIRECT TAXES BORNE BY COMPANIES
(1) A federal tax on profits at a progressive rate, averaging 8%o.
(2) Various cantonal  and municipal taxes, with an incidence on profits ranging
from 15%6 to neatly 40Vo.
B) TAX BORNE BY SHAREHOLDERS,  CHARGED AT THE TIME OF A DIVIDEND
DISTRIBUTION
( 1) Dividends of Swiss comPanies
i) Paid to a Srviss shareholder: an "anticipatory federal tax" of 27%o and a "stamp
duty on coupons" of 37o, making )07o in all.
N.B.: it is'planned to combine these two taxes in a single anticipatory federal
tax of 307o.
3r7ii) Paid to a foreign shareholder:  same general rule. By agreement,  the rate of
rvithholding  tax is reduced to L57o for German  and American shareholderc, 57o for
Iirench shareholders,  and 37o for Dutch shareholders, and varies hom 37o to 277o
(according  to the income declared) for British shareholders.
(2) Dividends  of foreign companies: in general, no withholding tax is levied in
liwitzerland. However,  a "supplementary US withholding tax" of 1,57o is levied on
income from American shares.
C) ALLOIJTANCE OF TAX \OITHHELD  AT SOURCE
(1) Dividends of Swiss companies: the Swiss shareholder  may set the anticipatory
{ederal tax against his cantonal  taxes.
(2) Dividends of foteign companies: the Swiss shareholder is entitled to allowance
for the "supplementary US withholding  tax" and, under certain conditions, for tax
rvithheld at source in Germanv.
T/NITED KINGDOM
/) DIRECT TAXES BORNE  BY COMPANIES
ll direct tax on gross profit, at a rate of 407o (corporation tax).
I;) TAX BORNE BY SHAREHOLDERS,  CHARGED AT THE TIME OF A DIVIDEND
DISTRIBUTiON
( 1) Dividends of British companies
i) Paid to a British shareholder:  personal income rax on the gross dividend is
ldthheld at source at the standard rate of 8s. 3d. (4L.257o).
ii) Paid to a foreign shareholder:  same rule. By agreement, a withholding  tax of
only 3s. (157o) is charged on dividends payable to US shareholders.
(.2) Dividends of foreign companies:  no tax withheld at source in the United
Blingdom.
C) ALLO\rANCE OF TAX \TITHHELD AT SOURCE
(.t) Dividends of British companies: the British shareholder  may charge tax with-
held at source to personal tax liability.
(j2) Dividends of foreign companies:  the British shareholder is entitled to allowance
for tax withheld at source abroad to an amount not exceeding the British tax due
on the portion of his income  represented by the foreign income.
318UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
.4) DIRECT  TAX BORNE BY COMPANIES
A graduated tax in two steps on company profits (the first being called "normal
tax" and the second "surtax"), the total impact of which on big companies  is
about 487o of gross profit.
B) TAX BORNE BY SIIAREHOLDERS,  CHARGED AT THE TIME OF A DIVIDEND
DISTRIBUTION
( 1) Dividends  of US companies
i)  Paid to a US shareholder: no withholding  tax.
ii) Paid to a foreign shareholder: in principle, tax is withheld at source at a rate
of 307o of the gross dividend. This is reduced, by agreement, to 1,57o for German,
Belgian, French, Swiss, Dutch, Luxembourg,  Italian and British shareholders'
(2) Dividends of foreign companies: no withholding tax.
C) ALLO\TANCE  OF TAX \TITHHELD  AT SOURCE
( 1) Dividends of US companies:  no withholding  tax.
(2) Dividends of foreign companies: the US shareholder  may, undet certain  con-
ditions, charge tax on dividends paid abroad to personal tax liability, up to an
amount not exceeding the US tax due on the portion of his income  represented by
the foreign income.
II. Taxation of bond intetest accruing to individuals  (1)
GERMANY
.4) TAX BORNE BY CREDITORS ON PAYMENT OF INTEREST
( 1) Interest on German bonds
i)  Paid to a German creditor: no withholding  tax.
(1) I. Bonds issued and interest received in Germany,  Belgium,  France, Italy, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg,  Switzerland,  the UK and the USA.
II. Stamp duties and taxes on stock-exchange  transactions are not taken into account.
III. Many bond issues (mainly in connection with government loans) are accompanied  by privi-
leges sometimes  extended to all holders,  sometimes  only to foteigners  or nationals of the coun-
try concerned (or even certain categories  only among these). This resuicts the practical signi-
ficance of some of the rules summarized below.
319iji) Paid to a foreign creditor: 257o wiiltheld at source.
Iiy agreement, this tax is not charged to French, Dutch, Luxembourg, Swiss,
Iiritish and US creditors.
(.2) .Interest  on foreign bonds: no withholding  tax.
B) ALLO\TANCE OF TAX WITHHELD AT SOURCE
(1) Interest on German bonds: no withholding  tax.
(i2) Interest on foreign bonds: the German creditor may cJrarge tax withheld at
srf,urce abroad to tax liability, up to an amount not exceeding the German tax due
on the portion of his income represented by the foreign income.
BIELGIUM
A) TAX BORNE BY CREDITORS ON PAYMENT OF INTEREST
(-L) Interest on Belgian  bonds
i)  Paid to a Belgian  creditor:
irrterest (as from t967).
ii) Paid to a foreign creditor:
residents.
tax is withheld at source at a rate of 20%6 of gross
the same withholding tax is levied , as a tax on non-
(l!) Interest on foreign bonds: withholding  tax is charged at a rate of 207o on
nr3t interest  receipt at frontier.
B,) ALLO\TANCE OF TAX \ilITHHELD AT SOURCE
(1.) Interest on Belgian bonds: the Belgian creditor may charge tax withheld at
source to personal tax liability. (t)
(21) Interest on foreign bonds: the Belgian creditor may charge tax withheld in
Belgium to personal  tax liability. In the case of interest which has sufiered with-
holding tax abroad, he is entitled to allowance  of. I57o of the net interest at frontier,
representing  a fl^t rzrte of allowance  for taxes paid abroad.
(llt For cettain Belgian Government stocks which are exempt at the time of issue from all
wJithholding tax, the actual rate of the withholding  tax is reduced to 5Vo. The rate of 207o
may nevertheless  be claimed for.
32JFR/4.NCE
A) TAX BORNE BY CREDITORS  ON PAYMENT OF INTEREST
(1) Interest on French  bonds
i) Paid to a French creditor: they have a choice between two systems:
I.  L27o ot l07o withholding tax (according  to whether the bonds concerned were
issued before L January 1,965 ot subsequently). Interest is subject to personal
income tax; this arrangement  is the only one allovred in respect of indexed bonds;
2. 257o withholding tax, in full discharge of income tax liability.
ii) Paid to a foreign creditor: 25%o withholding tax. However, withholding  tax
is maintained at the rate of 1,27o or l07o f.ot creditors of countries which have
double taxation conventions with France. By agteement, no tax is vrithheld  on
interest payable to German, Dutch and Swiss creditors.
(2) Interest on foreign bonds: 333%o withholding  tax on net interest at frontier.
This rate is reduced when tax is withheld  abroad so that the total taxes levied in
the two countries equal 33.37o of the gross interest; when the rate of the tax
abroad exceeds  33.3Vo. no tax is withheld in France.
B) ALLO\(ANCE OF TAX \flITHHELD AT SOURCE
(1) Interest on French bonds: the French creditor may charge the tax of L2Vo or
l07o withheld at source (real or "fictitious" withholding tax) to personal  tax
liability. Vhen the flat fate of 257o is charged, the question of allowance for tax
obviouily does not arise, as it represents full discharge of income tax liability.
(2) Interest on foreign bonds: the recipient  may charge 50%o of. net interest
to personal tax liability. By this system, the additional withholding_  tax_levied in
France is always allowable, but foreign withholding tax may only be allowed in
full if its rate does not exceed 33.3%io.
IT ALY
A) TAX BORNE BY CREDITORS ON PAYMENT OF INTEREST
(1) Interest on Italian bonds: the tax on movable wealth.  category A(about  32%o)
is, generally speaking,  paid by the debtor; the creditor does not even know the
amo=unt. ai it is a schedular tax, it cannot be allovred against the cteditor's  personal
taxes either in Italy or in the countties  which have double taxation conventions
with Italy. In addition, it should be noted that the tax on movable wealth,_cat-
egory A,-is only levied at the full rate on interest from debentures issued by
companies in the private sector (not including  semipublic enterprises).
(2) Interest on foreign bonds: no vdthholding tax in Italy.
JZLB) ALLO\flANCE  OF TAX \TITHHELD AT SOURCE
(1) Interest on Italian bonds: see above.
(2) Interest on foreign bonds: there is no Italian withholdiqg^t3x.  B-y SgreeTent,
ihi ftrfia" creditor c.-an charge tax paid on interest in the USA and the UK, to
ti"tinly f"t i;;ti"* tr*, up to an amount  not exceeding 8%o of the gross interest. (1)
T HE NETHERL/NDS
il  TAX BORNE BY CREDITORS ON PAYMENT OF INTEREST
No tax is withheld at source on payment of interest on bonds'
B) ALLO\TANCE OF TAX \qITHHELD  AT SOURCE
\X/ithholding tax charged abroad on bond interest is not taken into account. (2)
LUXEMBOURG
D TAX BORNE BY CREDITORS ON PAYMENT OF INTEREST
(1) Interest on Luxembourg bonds
i) Paid to a Luxembourg cteditor: 5Vo withholding tax.
ii) Paid to a foreign creditor:  same rule. pY agreement, the rate of the with-
holding tax is reduced to nil for Getman creditots.
(2) Interest on foreign bonds: no Luxembourg withholding  tax.
B) ALLO\flANCE OF TAX \TITHHELD AT SOURCE
(1) Interest on Luxembourg bonds: the Luxemboutg  creditor is entitled to a tax
credit equal to the tax withheld at source.
(2) Interest on foreign bonds: the Luxembourg  creditor has the right to..charge
i'ren.h withholding  t-ax on intetest on Ftench bonds to personal tax liability, up
to 5%o of the income.
(r) An Italian creditor with an income in the Netherlands. which is large. enough to. tender
irl* ti"lt. to personal  income tax in that country is exempted from personal. income tax in ltaly
""-ttr[ 
i"..rie, which, however, is taken into consideiation in detetmining the rate of tax
applicable to his income in Italy.
(if A Outctr creditor with an italian income so large that he ha-s to- -pay personal income  tax
;  l; ir i;;tt  i.  e*.mpted ftom paying income. tax on it in the Netherlands.  This Italian
i*o*r  is, hoivever, takin into accorrnt in determining  the rate of tax applicable to his income
in the Netherlands.
322SlY IT ZERLAND
,4) TAX BORNE BY CREDITORS ON PAYMENT OF INTEREST
( 1) Interest on Swiss bonds
i) Paid to a Swiss creditor: an "anticipatory tax" is withheld at source at the rate
of 277o plus a stamp duty of. 37o.
ii) Paid to a foreign creditor: same general rule, the rate of withholdins  tax beins
reduced, by agreement, to l0%o for Dutch creditors, 5%o {or French anj Americafi
creditors,  and 37o,f.or.Ge.rmqr creditors,  and varying ftom 3To to 27Vo (according
to the income declared)  for British creditors.
(2) Inte.rest on foreign bonds: no tax withheld in switzerland,  in principle. How-
9y^er., a *supplementary us withholding  tax" of 25Vo is charged on interest from
US bonds.
B) ALLOWANCE  OF TAX \TITHHELD  AT SOURCE
(1) Interest on Swiss bonds: the Swiss creditor  may charge the anticipatory  federal
tax withheld at source to his cantonal taxes.
(?,1 Interest.on foreign bonds: the swiss creditor may charge the "supplementary
US withholding tax" to tax liability.
UNITED KINGDOM
A) TAX BORNE BY CREDITORS  ON PAYMENT OF INTEREST
(1) Interest on British bonds
i) Paid to a British creditor:  personal income tax is withheld at source at the
standard  rate when the interest is paid (8s.3d. l4I.25Vol in t965/66).
ii) Paid to a.foreign creditor: -same general rule. By agreement, no withholding
tax is charged to German, Dutch, Swiss and American cGditors.
(2) Interest on foreign bonds: no tax withheld at source in the United Kinedom.
B) ALLOWANCE OF TAX \VITHHELD AT SOURCE
(1) Interest on British bonds: the British creditor may charge tax withheld at
source to income tax liability.
(2) Interest on foreign bonds: the British creditor is allowed tax withheld at source
abroad up to an amount not exceeding  the UK tax due for that portion of his
income represented by the foreign income concerned.U'NITED ST ATES
A) TAX BORNE BY CREDITORS ON PAYMENT OF INTEREST
(.1. ) Interest on US bonds
i) Paid to a US creditor: no withholding  tax.
ii) Paid to a foreign creditor:  normally  tax is withheld at source at a r^te of. 307o .
T'his rate is reduced to L57o for Belgian and French creditors, 57o for Swiss
creditors, and nil for German, Dutch, Luxembourg and British creditors.
(iZ) Interest on foreign bonds: no tax withheld at source in the USA.
B) ALLOWANCE OF TAX WITHI]ELD  AT SOURCE
(.[) Interest on American bonds: (no withholding  tax).
(i2) Interest on foreign bonds: the American creditor  may, under certain condi-
ti.ons, charge income withheld at source  abroad to tax liability, up to an amount not
e.xceeding the American tax due for that portion of his income accounted for by
the foreign income concetned.
IIL  Tables showing,  by countries of origin and destination,
the efiect of taxation on the distributed  profits
of joint stock companies and on interes ftom bonds
A,. SCOPE OF THE TABLES
T'he purpose of the tables is to show the extent of the distortions which tax
s.rstems may cause in the working of the international  capital market.
T'hey are theoretical to the extent that they have been constructed  from,a relatively
c,ompact digest of the national tax laws and international  conventions.  Cenain
provisions  of the tax laws or conventions considered in drawing up the tables
may not in fact be applied, no implementing regulations  having been adopted.
Again, in practice the national  tax authorities  may give some provisions  a slightly
difierent interpretation from that assumed  here.
8,, EXPLANATION OF THE TABLES
T'able A: Income  procured for th'e sbareholder (indiuidual)  by distribution ol a
diuidend  of 100
Ilxcept in the case of a dividend collected in a "tax haven", the income here is a
grosJ income, on which pemonal income tax is still due (progressive tax in the
c,ountries dealt with here).
3'24This income is calculated:
a) By deducting, where applicable,  from the dividend distributed, the taxes borne
by the shareholder  and withheld at source
i)  In the country of the company,
ii) In the country of the shareholder,
which gives the net dividend actually received in cash by the shareholdet;
b) Then by adding back, where applicable, to this net dividend:
i) The portion of taxes withheld at soutce which can be set against personal
income tax,
ii) The tax credit granted by certain states, enabling resident shareholders to recover
part of the profits tax paid by companies.
The effect of international  double taxation conventions  has been taken into account.
!7here applicable, it is assumed that the shareholder  was in the most favourable
position to claim allowances for taxes withheld at source abroad. Many States
iake into consideration taxes withheld abtoad only up to an amount not exceeding
the national tax due on the portion of income accounted for by the foreign income
concerned. Full allowance for tax paid therefore presupposes a total income
which is suficient for the rate of national income tax to exceed that of foreign
withholding tax. The tables have been based on this assumption.
Dividends received in a "tax haven" may be considered net.
The commonest  haven is that to be found in certain countries which levy neither
withholding taxes at source nor personal income tax on the foreign income of
persons (as often as not, holders of an "external bank account") who ate not
normally resident in those countries, and sometimes provided they do not spend the
income in question there. Dividends collected in a "tax haven" have been
subjected in the country of domicile of the company to withholding tax at the
highest rate, and the tax concerned is irtecoverable, since no convention for
avoidance of double taxation can operate unless new taxes are introduced  in the
country in which the dividend is received. In many cases, the rate of tax withheld
at source is lo'urer than the marginal rate of personal income tax which the share-
holder would have had to pay upon declaring this income in his own country.
Table B: Margi.nal rates of personal income tax beyond uhich the "tax bauen"
secares a higber imrnediate yield for tbe shareholder
This table shows the marginal tate of income tax beyond which it would, in terms
of immediate yield, pay the shareholdet to collect his dividends in a "tax haven"
countfy.
This rate is calculated from the data of Table A, by relating the net income
received in the tax haven to the gross income which the shareholder  would have
received in his own countrv.Table C: Inc,ome procured for tbe shareholder  (indiuidual) by a gross profit ol L00,
u,hollj distributed
This table shows the maximum  remuneration  which can be ofiered to the share-
holdem of the various coun*ies by a company making a profit of 100 before
payment of taxes to which it is direcdy liable (gross remuneraiion as a general rule,
net for shareholders collecting  their dividends in the tax haven).
This remuneration has been calculated  by first deducting from the gross profit the
taxes dir,ectly payable by the company, which gives the gross dividend.  To this last,
it is sufficient  to apply the coefficients listed in Table A.
Table D: lncome procured lor tbe ueditor (indiaidual) by gross interest from
bonds ol 100
and
Table E: Marginal rate of personal incone tax beyond wbicb the "tax hauefl"
u,ould secure a higher immediate  yield for the bondbolder
These tables are on the same pattern as Tables A and B.
They describe the general arrangement.  There are numerous exceptions to this:
firany government  loans and loans issued by local authorities  and semipublic
enterprises  cany with them tax pdvileges extended sometimes to all bondholders
alike, .sometimes only to- foreigners or to nationals of the country concerned  (and
sometimes even to certain categories only of these).
The. privilege most often granted to foreign creditors is abolition of withholding
ta,x in the debtor's country. Since tax withheld at source in the creditor's  countri
is always an adv_ance payment  chargeable to personal tax, the gross income obtainei
fcrr the foreign bondholder in this case is 160%o of. the grosJdividend.
Frcr sorne loans of certain countries, even interest collected in a tax haven is
exempted from withholding  tax at source in the debtor's country. The creditor
(individual) then has an advantage  in having the interest on these loans paid out
inL a tax haven, if the same pdvileges of exemption from withholding tai and of
anonymity are not given him in his own counffy.
C. COMPARABILITY  OF DATA
U]NITED KINGDOM
In the-united Kingdom, exchange conmols limit the supply of foreign currency
available for investment in foreign shares and in foreign-bonds witFimore than
fi,re years.to run t_o _maturity. fhe currency for these-transactions is negotiated
at a premium which has at times exceeded 25Vo.
This means a lower rate of return for the British holder. No account has been
taken of this in the tables.
326UNITED STATES
In the USA, a tax ol 1,5%o (interest equalization tax) is levied on_the introduction
of foreign ,hut.r. The result is that tlie price of these shares in the United States
may be l57o above the price abroad ,ryh.! the American  market is a net buyer,
b.ri may be the same if ii is a net seller. This can mean a loss for the American
shareholder.
Interest  equalization  tax is also levied on the introduction of-foreign  bonds of more
than 3 yeairs'term.  The rate varies according to the term, from 2.75%o for bonds
-ut".ing at between 3 and 3 lf 2 yeats to I5%o for bonds matuting  at 28lf 2 years
or more.
The incidence of the interest equalization  tax has not been taken into account
in the tables.
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\STATISTICAL IANNEX
"rt LLrsT oF TABLES  (r)
1. Gross domestic capital formation and its financing
2. Savings as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) and of gross domestic
capital formation (GCF)
3. Gross public-sector saving as a proportion of public-sector investment
4. Self-financing of enterPrises:  gross rat€s
5. Size of the capital markets combined
6. Supply of funds by sections of the capital market
7. Net domestic issues of medium-  and long-term securities
8. Medium-  and long-term loans to business and private customers
9. Net domestic  issues of medium- and long-term fixed-interest securities for the
financing of the public sector in the EEC countries
10. Borrowing by enterprises
11. Financial structure of enterprises
12. Net {inancial investment of non-financial sectors
13. Movements of long-term private capital by country
14. Movements of long-term private capital by tyP.
15. Public issues of foreign bonds
16. Public issues of foreign bonds, classified by market of issue and residence of
issuer
17. Gross fixed capital formation in the housing  sector
(r) The statistics supplied  by the member countries  ar.e..not homogeneous and in some cases the
U*-;r;;i,h;;-in"d'&"rt.  or non-exrsrenr; srnce rn addition it has-not been_ possible  to climinate
;ifib.;;.; 6;i*""" ir.  definitioru  adoptcd in the various countries, the figures  that have been
brousht together are far from fully comparable.
ih;";;t.;-;r.i  f.r -itr. 
Commuiity  c6untries are given under each 
^table- 
For the United
fi"-j"- 
""a 
itre U"ited States, the Gioup  was authorizld  to use certain- figures obtained by.the
OEet Co--itt.. for Invisible Transacti6ns  for a study on capital  markets now in preparation'
These figures  are provisional and subject to amendment'118. Analysis of net purchases of fixed-interesr securities
!19. Apparent and real yields of fixed-interest  securities
ilO. Net domestic  issues of medium- and long-term fixed-interest  securities
1lL. Tap issues of medium-and long-term fixed-interest securities
12. Issues of variable-yield  securities
1!3. Market value of variable-yield  securities
114. Assets of investment companies (open-end and closed-end)
l!5. Gross issues of convertible  bonds
il6. Number of foreign  variable-yield  securities quoted on nine international exchanges
!17. Investments of life assurance companies
218. Investments  of savings banks and their central institutions
i19. Bank lending and security investments
3i0. Lending and security investmenrs  of specialized institutions
Abbreyiations anil signs  useil:
:  Zero, or less than half the final digit shown
Not available
ro.  :  Million
u..a. :  Unit of account
GNP :  Gross national  product
CICF :  Gross domestic capital formation
EEC :  European Economic Community
SOEC :  Statistical Office of the European  Communities
ECSC :  European  Coal and Steel Community
OECD :  Organization  for Economic Co-operation and Development
CXT :  OECD Committee for Invisible Transactions
EIB  :  European Investment  Bank
IIIRD :  International  Bank for Reconstruction  and Development
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s rTABLE 3
Gross public-sector  sauing as a proportion of public-sector  inuestment
l. Before eapital transfers
247.32
176.6r
116.80
144.80
e)
199.18
113.87
93.12
118.51
245.02
167.83
t43.25
144.89
17.74
186.61
118.10
99.61
101.80
201.62
120.23
143.62
111.46
41.10
137.59
72.73
101.77
6 /.d5
8s.70
20.23
122.11
84.62
88.49
71.97
166.46  165.78
135.69 162.91 155.50
127.20  129.36 33.05
136.09
Il. After eapital transJers  (2)
78.s3
74.57 50.46
123.79 87.77
107.87  105.24
90.29
66.99
85.21
0)
76.04
Sorra:  SOEC, National Acomts  1955-1965.
(1) Minus 6gure.
(r) Except  for Belgim,  where epital trmfers  are not dolt with separately.
343Country
Germany
e)
(')
e)
France
/1\
f)
(,)
t'1\
Italy
e)
/r\
N,:therlands
r1)
(')
Bdgium
/1\
U-K
r1\
r/2\
(')
UISA
rfl)
rs\
TABLE 4
Self-fnancing of enterprises ; gross. rates
(estimates from various sources)
78
74
78
93
64
7t
70
79
75
110
728
88
81
76
93
72
82
98
IJ
IJ
73
66
68
63
80
72
67
66
72
56
63.8
67
63
5t
68
76
72
80
IJ
80
40 37 40 51 64 46
46
60 66
73
69 68 67
l13
71
107
140
99
120
llo
IJJ
104
99
124
75
106
l12
B3
98
122
76
122
77
115 106
99
117
N. B.  For Notes and Sources  sre next page.
344Notes and Sources for Table 4
i) Germany
(r) Monthly Report  of the Bundesbank; enterprises excluding  housing. The net balance of capital
iiansfers is'inclirded  in internal financing.
e) OECD, CIT All enterprises  excluding housing;  Bundesbank'
e) cEcD, clT Sample of 2000 joint stock companies;  Statistisches Bundesamt.
(t) 26 conrpanies  (195942); Eurosyndicat.
ii) fuance
(r) private enterprises,  excluding farms and housing;  comptes  de la Nation.
e) OECD, CIT All non-financial enterprises; Comptes de la Nation'
(a) OECD, CIT 103 companies;  sample calculated by the_Crddit Lyonnais. Strongly weighted
in favour of iron and steel and heavy industry, consequently over-estlmatmg  average  decllne ln
self-financing.
(a) 30 companies  (195942); Eurosyndicat.
iii) Italy
(r) Samole of 233 industrial  companies  whose gross fixed investment n  1964 accounted  for about
itii;?i;i-gr*r-n*.a  n".rt*t'nt in industr!, excluding building  and construcrion  and ENEL;
Banca d'Italia.
(s) 18 companies  (1959-62); Eurosyndicat.
iv) Netherlanils
(r) All enterprises - Le Poole Report, Table IX; central  Statistical Bureau.
('!) 9 big companies  (195942); Eurosyndicat.
v) Belgiun
e) OECD, CIT All private enrerprises;  Unoflicial  estimate  provided by the Ministry of Finance.
vi) IJnited  Kingdom
(1) Saving  and investment  of private companies;  Financial Statistics'
e) OECD, CIT All non-financial enterprises; Central Statistical Office'
e) OECD, CIT Sample of about 2 000 companies; Board of Trade'
vii) United  States
(1) Saving  and investment of American companies;  Federal Reserve  Bulletin.
f) oECD, CIT A1l non-financial enterprises excePt farms; Flow of Funds survey of current
Business, Nov. 65.
y5Country
Germany
FreLnce
Italty ('?)
Ne,therlands
Be.lgium
UII
US;A
Germany
France
Italy ('9)
Netherlands
Belgium
u8:
USA
346
TABLE 5
Size of the capital markets combined (t)
ts6t I 
tnu,
L Funds supplied by the eapital market (converted into g million)
10 610  10 597  9 512  71 470  13 210  11 080
6 161  6956  7 785  8 811  8793  7 701
1537  1547
1,+00  1844
.  6 667  4 8ss  576r
1707  1953  2204  1 805
1440  2720 (3)  1691
5 788  7 367  10 556  7 902
s6 000  63 100  70 000  54 100 34440 47 2W
Il. As a percentage of gross  ilomestic  capital formation
53.5  48.9  40.6  47.1  4.4  47.1
48.8  52.2  50.8  52.7  44.4  49.4
50.8  46.0
65.1  74.5
.  60.7 45.5
43.5  51.5 59.6
38.4  54.0 s5.9  60.4  62.9
49.9  54.1  44.4
56.2  77.4
53.2
49.3
68.2
52.3
54.9
Sozras:_Funds  supplied by dre capital mtrket: OECD, CIT. Grm dometic capital fomation: SOEC General
Statiistiel  Bulletin.
(') 'Jlo.avoid  double comting,  funds collected on the securities  market  by cedit institutions  for len.ting purposes  have
beerr deducted.
(r) Iror. Italy no.data  onceming  funds supplied by the maket  are available:  fgures for funds collected by the market
bave thtrefore ben red.
(3) OECD  esrimate.TABLE 6
Supply of .funds by sections of the capital market (L) (2)
l "*- 
1 u,",,..  1
['il?,:I4lt'!?ii?rlodlX,l*r1,,;XX1;ol,,6.tto lrrrrlttnuL64)l(1e60-64)
Securities  market
i) Issues of  fixed-interest
securities
ii) Issues of shares
iii) Issues of short-term ne-
gotiable securities
Public sector
Banking system
Other financial intermediaries
Miscellaneous
36.0
13.0
16.0
7.0
23.2
19.6
3.6
25.4
14.4
39.8 13.4 - 
0.3
o.b  t.6
7.3  9.5
r.+ 
{- 
o.s
1.0 t4.o 10.1
39.3 27.3 28.0
2.1 - 0.5  18.6 10.0
20.0 27.3  37.9  29.9
3s.0 s6.6 e)  $3
- 
1.9
32.4
11
29.8
11.5
55.0
6.3 5.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sorne: OECD, -CIT. The figues for Frmc were broken down in order to distinguish  the funds supplied by the
bantrilng  slstem from those supplied by the " Caise dc D6p6ts et Consignatiom ", which ae strown  mder ,, Other
Enmcial intemediilis ".
C) Iiguf.l not available  for Luembowg.
(r) To "-fin?Lb_onowgrsl'_rq the public tnd private sators,  ucluding,,financial  intermediris ". (r) For the Netherlands this includa  direct lom md mortgage  loans, ivhich together account for 55.60/o of the total.
347TABLE  7
Net domestic issues of medium' and long-term securities
(Annual  average 1960-65)
I  Fixed-interest
.bqurty  secunfles 
I 
securities -;t;;i  '"1^; $millionJ total 
l$millionl 
total
All securities
Country
In
$ million
As /6 of
GCF
Germany
France
Italy
Nietherlands
Belgium
Luxembourg
tJSA
653.0
803.4
814.6
67.6
148.6
65.6
2552.8
724.2
1 016.0
| 992.2
n8.5
20.9  2 473.6
37.5  1744.3
79.1  3126.6 12.7
29.0
19.5
21.4
92.1
68.5
71.0
80.5
547.0  78.6
26.6 7 041.2
39.8  1 092.9 (') 60.2
96.9 3.7  32368.6
2547.7 15.5
2 806.8  31.6
346.1
695.6 25.2
77.2  44.3(')
9 594.0 r9.7
1877.7 12.0
33 384.6 32.8 (r)
9.0
EEC 73.4
I.IK
Sosr6?s: Gross dometic  epital formation, SOEC Gqeral qtatistical Bulletin. Sce the-souc givm for the followin-g
Effii'tti-f"Uizj;G.C;Fesuiry-iecir;tio.  (n) Table 21 : net domestic  isues of medim-  and lona-term  6xed-
iriiecesi  'iirurida.  (m) For thc Unit'eC fingaom-ind  the Unitcd Stats' OECD, CIT'
IIo&r: B:rccpt wherc  othenyire indlcatEd,  irsues.of  fixed-intercst rccrtities  includc  normd lolrg't€rm.fixcd-intcr€ct
;fii6,;-.;td;g"  d€benr*"., t"p ;s*  bf medium-temr fixed-interst secuities  with a life d +oq+an^9f_I^17
iti[;#;t  aia-nagium, mi <if two years in the other cowtric, such r  the deposit  note isred by the cedrt
istitutios ud Trmuy bills'
0) 1960-1964.
ilt MortSaSc rccuritis and Trmury bills cxcluded.
38TABLE 8
Medium- and long-term  loans to business and priuate cwstomers
(in I'000 millionl
Country 1962 1963 1964 ts6s I t;AX:
Medium-  and long-term loans to
business and priuate eustomers (1)
Germany
France
Italy
Netherlands
Belgium
EEC
oJ which:
Loans  granted against  deposits anil
owtl fesoufces
Germany
France
Italy
Netherlands
Belgium
EEC
I-oans grant e.d. against fun  d s b or r o w-
ed on secufttrcs  market
Germany
France
Italy
Netherlands
Belgium
12.74 13.37 15.15
6.21
2.79
2.29
1.0s
0.40 (,)
5.02
2.43
1.74
0.98
n a) (2\
6.2r
2.84
2.77
1.06
0.49 (')
4.75
2.40
1.53
0.94
0.40 e)
6.82
3.63
2.72
1?3
0.65 (r)
5.1 I
3.04
1.58
L -Z+
0.63 e)
7.12
3.41.
2.25
l-f+
0.s8 f)
6.59
Z.J L
l-zJ
0.53
14.04
5./U  ).lJ
2.80  2.67
1.26  1.38
1.38  7.14
0.43 e)  0.4s
9.89
1.19
0.36
t.l)
0.07
0.08
1.46
0.44
14, t.z*
0.12
0.09
1.71
0.59
1.14
0.09
0.02
I  la
0.61
0.99
0.16
0.15
1.45
0.50
I.IJ
0.11
0.09
t0.02 11.60 11.57  10.77
EEC 2.85 3.35 3.55 3.33 3.27
Sorrce: European Invstment Bank, Annual Report 1966,
(r) Bv finmcial irotitutions.  Dirrct loms between  individuals and advmces by shueholdss  to their compmis are
ir6t ihouaea. In Germmy, Fruce, Italy and the Netherlmds, lom Eruted bi  the public rector  are included  in the
fgua.
('J Including inv6tment cedits md fixed-term  advmces  granted  by the Belgim  banks, assed arbirarily  at 50 /o
of the item " advmces " in their balmce-sltets.
349TABLE 9
Net domestic issues of medium- and long-term fixed-interest securities
for the financin[ of the public trci, in tie EEC countries
(Average 1960-65)
Germany 
1 
r,",,." I u", I Xf  I u"**-
In
3n.17 (1)  486.12
558.12  27.68
(e.16) (27.68)
(548.e6) e)  e)
273.86  318.34
millions of ilollars
)  69.53  213.00
I  216.88 (4)
)  10s.93 e)  10s.66
1. Central government
2. Local authorities
oJ which:
Direct issues
of local authorities
3. Public enterprises
of local authorities
3. Public enterprises
Issues by specialized  credit
irutitutions for the financins
(')
498.75
(3.33)
(102.33)
41.33 (')
Total public  sector | 767.15 832.14 175.46  359.99
As a percentage of total net domestic  issues
715.63
1,.
2.
Central government
Local authorities
of which:
Direct  issues
Issues by specialized  credit
institutions for the financin,
27.e L,  " )  lr.l 7.7  I
38.9
19.3
13.3
22.6
18.2  24.9
25.0
38.0
(0.4)
ItJ  )\
n.1
(r.7) (0.6)
(18.7)
7.6
Total public sector 47.0 63.0 36.0
350
47.8 65.8
N, 8.  lor Notes  and Soues  see next page.Notes and Sources for Table 9
Sourtes:  Gernany: Monthly Reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank.  France: Annual Report ol
the Conseil Nati'onal du Crddit.'ltalv:  Anrutal  Reports of the Banca d'Italia. Netherlands:  Annuaf
Reports of the Nederlandsche Bank.  Belpiunr : Iirformation and documentation  bulletin of the
Bairque Nationale de Belgique and Annual Reports of the crddit communal de Belgique.
Noles
(1) Including the Linder.
(r) The funds collected in the form of " communal bonds " are mainly used for the financing
bi the communes, but also for the financing of other investments of the public sector'_ or,even,
in Germany, for construction backed by-public  guara,ntees. In Germany  some of the bonds
included in the figure are issued by private mortgage banks.
(s) Only the gross figure is available  for communal  bonds issued by the Crddit Foncier de France'
1960-65 average : $37 810 000.
(a) Government  loans and CCOP loans on Treasury  account, except railway  loans on Treasury
account, which are included under public enterprises.
(5) In Italy there are no " communal bonds " closely  comparable with the securities  iss-ued by
ilie Crddii Foncier in France or the mortgaee banki in Gtrmany. But the " ordinary " bonds
of the CCOP and the bonds issued by the ipEcial  branches for the financing of the public works
of the " Cassa di Risparmio  delle Provincie  Lombarde " and of the " Istituto  Fondiario  delle Ve-
nezie" rrte roughly tomparable  with communal bonds; it has not been possible to isolate the
sums involved in these  issues.
(s) Including the issues of the Netherlands Communes Bank, no net figure for issues by the
provinces  and comrnunes being available.
(?) It has not been possible to isolate net issues of semi-public enterprises.
351Tocil financing:
1960
7961.
1962t
7962i
19&,
Avaage  7960-64
Short-term loans from cedit institutions:
196{}
7961
1962,
1963'
1964.
Averagc  1960-64
Mcdirm- md long-tm  loans ftom crcdit
inetitutions :
1960'
1967
7962
7963
796/,
Average  1960-64
Loans  from insumce institutions  :
1960
1967
7962
1963
19il
Averagc  1960-64
Isue of fxed-interest .securities  :
t960
t96l
1962
1%3
1964
Average  1960-64
Isue of shares:
1960
7967
1962
1963
796/.
Average  1960-64
Dircrt loans from Cotral Rovement  :
19ffi
1967
7962
7963
7964
Average  1960-64
Borrowing  from abroad  :
1960
7967
7962
7963
1964
Average  1960-64
!o11als-: J. ?. Delacour:  "Remrques  sur cstains slEcts  du financement  des invstissements  industrieb dans les pays dc la CEE-. Tabk bascd on soEc Statistical.sulletin:-pr.  rryra, S.ippoii su- le comnis  o" r" nlEdiii r"r-d;;t;d;tfi7h6oru  of tue Dourcbe  Bmdcbank;  for $e Netherlmds,  Nacionale {ekening€n;  ror Itati, n'erioru "itii-6iil 
art"ru. lqr e6l,rmn  1; sowces brouefit up to date for Germmy, Italy md Betgii&  md rectified fo-r tdese couriiries'in;.d.A"T;;;irf  ;*.a'-i"-tiETioiritiiiaru"to.
GERMANY
DM.
'000
m.
35.6
35.0
36.0
41,7 (t'
35.3
5.6
7.7
2,9
3.6
s.l e)
1.9
77.3
15.6
17.9
18.5
1e.8 C)
16.6
1.7
2.6
2.6
2.7
2.8 e)
c1
2.7
7.2
7.7
L1 tr\
20.2
19.9
8.3
10.0
72.2
13.9
&.9
43.8 qlr
51.4
47.s
47.O
6.1
7.3
7.4
t.J
6.7
7.1
5.t
6.9
2.6
3.3
s.l e)
4.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
32.7
29.O
77.9
15.1
79,4
21.2
25.6
32.8
47.7
49.7
31.9
34.7
o.)
6.7
73
6.4
5.t
6.3
1.2
3.8
10.0
9.2
o.f,
6.3
76.7
73.9
9.6
6.0
8.0
10.4
---2.4
5.U
74.6
77.9
12.9
10.4
19.7
8.8
5-5
5.U
15.6
70.7
2e.7 o
7.1
8.4
9.7
8.6
8.5 o
8.7 e)
2.6
3.4
4.5
tt
3.7
).t
4.2
2.7
6.2
4.7 (')
1.5
t.6
1.9
1.8
1.7 ('t
25,6
27.8
31,1
u.3
16.8
23.8
21.9
21.8
26,3 (t)
22.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
6.4
7.7
9.5
11.0
4.3
7.8
9.0
8.8
8.4 e)
7.7
1.1
7.6
1.6
7.4
1.5 C)
1,4
0.2
0.9
2.2
2.O
1.7 e)
7.4
2.8
3.3
2.1
7.3
11tr\
2.3
-4.4
7.2
3.9
3.4 (')
2.3
J.J
,1
7.2
7.7
4.1 e)
2.4
2.3
2.5
2.8
2.5
2.5 (',)
o.t
2,5
6.3
5.6
4.1
4.0
10.1
9.3
6.3
3.6
9.J
6.8
9.O
77.2
77.7
18.9
14.4
74.4
73.7
6.0
3.0
9.8
6.8
o.2
0.9
2.2
2.0
t.t
7.4
2.8
3.3
,o
7.3
2.2
2.4
2.5
4.0
6.0
6.8
6.0 e)
5.1
TABLE
Borrowino
(i) Including  residential constructio;
FRANCE
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
25.O
27.7
30.5
32.t
28.8
100.0
n.7
30.2
37.2
25.1
28.6
n.eo
7.O
8.2
9.5
8.0
8.2 e)
5.2 (',)
:
2.6
3.4
4.5
4.2
3.7 o
3.8
2.3
0.7
3.8
2.7 (',)
1.5
1.6
7.9
1,8
1.7 (')
100.0
34.7
36.8
37.4
29.O
u.5
2t.o
tl.4
77.2
11.0
9.1
10.1
72.9
15.2
17.7
15.2
15.3
18.8
10.3
2.8
13.8
11.4
20,2
22.3
25.4
n.6
3.0
4.3
6.0
7.3
2.3
2.5
2.8
2.5
2.5 (','
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
14.8
19.3
%.6
?i.4
9.0
9.0
9.0
7.3
8.6 e)
to.2
12.2
14.5
12.2
72.3
22.3
15.1
8.7
18.1
7.4
5.8
6.1
a,
J. T
7,4
't)
t.)
6.5
7.2(\
35210
by enterprises
(ii) exchidlng residential  construction
ITALY NETHERLANDS BELGIUM
Lit.
'000
m.
2402
2812
3952
3 874
2 337
3 063
7 047
7 258
7 823
7 996
773
7 259
548
733
7 077
952
933
849
93
53
71
99
163
96
210
253
266
369
507
323
496
515
398
5f,tr
5JO
%
100.o
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
42.6
44.7
52.3
7.4
41.1
22.8
26.1
27.2
,lo.o
27.7
10.1
9.0
6.7
9.7
27.8
10.5
20.6
18.3
78.2
10.4
23.8
3.9
7.9
1.8
7.0
J.t
Lit.
'000
m.
2 146
2251
J  IJJ
3 729
2 665 (2)
915
1 091
7 673
1 804
l 356 C)
499
558
812
714
646 (4)
405 e)
251
220
365
263 (')
480
402
484
255
Yo
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
42.6
48.5
t t.f,
57.7
50.1
,aq
25.0
22.4
100.0  e)
24.O  (')
9.8
7.2
11.3
10.0 e)
224
17.8
I
2.54
3.08
4.ll
3 38 e) I 100.0
0.61
0.72
u.5 /
0.78
1.62
2.82
2.97
(2.37 (.) (1)
0.11 (3)
0.18
0.77
0.45
0.08
0.22 (')
0.13
0.05
o.27
15.4 i
8.2 
i
,u.oa,l
'000
20.7
0.67C) I 20.5e)
6e.8 e)
1oo.o I
100.0 l
100.0 
1
100.0
100.0
24.O
23.4 23.4
r3.e 
L 20.7 
I
zo.s erl
n,a
63.8
69.5
68.6
77.2
5.1
r-o
u:u
7.7
t.f,
10.9
2.7
6.4 f)
:
:
%
n,a
Bfrs.
'000
m. l*
J t.z
5I.a
44.5
49.4
57.6
42.8
6.6
9.0
17.3
1b-f,
11.8
11.0
14.8
76.3
77.2
18.0
17.7
100.0
100.0
100,0
100.0
100.0
100.0
21.1
2+.O
25.4
22.9
47.4
43.5
38.6
36.4
43.4
47.3
11.8
10.6
8.1
7.6
8.9
--4.6
3.9
9.4
4.8
o.J
20.3
16.0
18.5
13.2
27.3
77.8
20.7
25.4
':'u
2s.5 e)
6.6
9.0
77.3
16.5
10.e e)
100.0 e)
31.9
35.4
37..0
34.8 e)
tElr\
31.9
29.5
26.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
7.4
8.6
9.2
JJ. I
33.9
30.2
0.5
7.2
5.9
8.4 f) C) 33.3 e)
4.O
3.6
3.6
3.9
3.8
-4.2
2.2
4.8
2.5
2.7
6.3
6.0
8.2
6.5
11.0
7.6
0.1
o.3
1.8
2.9
1.3 C)
6.6
8.2
6.2
7.7 (") 29.4  (2)
:
:
Provisional.
Average  1960-63.
Average 196O-62.
Withi;  these figura it hs not been posible  to distinguish  between  medium-  and long-tcm  loam from credit institutioDs  and
issue of fixed-interst seffities.  Comnissariat go6ral  du Plan d'Equipment et de Productivit6:  Ve Plan 7966-7970.  Rapport  ge Comnissariat go6ral  du Plan d'Equipment et de Productivit6:  Ve Plan 7966-7970
Lie e6n6ral et du Finmcement.  Annexes. Tome  II. n6ral de la Comission  de I'Economie g6n6rd  et du Finmcement,  Annexes, Tome  II.
353TABLE  11
Financial  structure of enterprises
1963
Ratio of
owners'
equiry to
fixed
assets
Ratio of
long-term
capital
to fixed
assets
Ratio of
net
working
capital
to stocks
Ratio of
realizable
and liquid
assets  to
short-term
debts
Ratio bf
medium-
and
long-term
debt to
cash flow
Ratio of
medium-
and
long-term
debt to
owners'
equiry
Giermany
F:rance
Italy
LrK e)
LISA
0.e0 e)
0.94
0.67 e)
1.26
1.18
1.27
1.31
1.07
1.49
1.46
0.72
0.68
0.25
1.04
1.24
0.82
0.78
0.64
1.05
1.31
2.44
2.64
0.41
0.39
4.31(')  0.59
0.18
o.'24 1.50
&ures: lee Table,l0: Germny: Wirtschaft uud Statistik,  statistic on a large nmber of mterprisa.  Frarue:  SEDES
beJmce-sheet d^tz (279 coTnmi* in 10 qrdultria,  including iron md stel)l Itly ; Mediobmca  (131 major  non-fnancial
cc,mpanie  from various indusnis). UI(: Crddit Lyoruis (mple  of 76 major non-fnmcid'compaiies), USr{ : US
T::ruuy Dq)rtrnent  statistics  (more dnn 32000 non-finaicial  compmis),  -
(1) Includi"g  pension rmrus in Germany  (8.2o/"\  md svermce  Davmmts  in Italv (6 o/J,
(r) The_ long+em  debt/cilh flow ratio foi Italy'has bm  worked but from a ditrireii sample, of 44 companies.
(,) 7962.
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t\. Foreign issues in local
cufrency
Germany  (1)
France
Italy ('?)
Netherlands
Belgium
Luxembourg
Total EEC
United Kingdom  (3)
Switzerland
Total Europe
United States (!)
f). Euro-bonil  dssues (5)
of which:
Units of account
Currency option
DM
Swiss Francs
Dollar subject to IET
Total (A t  B)
Public issues of foreign bonds 1961-65
199.71 651.36 568.53
24.90  5.00  40.00
24.00  24.00  24.00
159.39 52.49
6.00
588.00 609.41 3 011.11
35.00  104.90
30.38  25.32  55.70
24.00  96.00
15.20  29.00  256.08
72.00  12.00
0.60  6.60
208.29  87.49
5.60
242.82 t49.77
80.58  90.92 531.28
723.62 36.82  296.13
93.30  86.67  704.n
64.00
130.09
131.71
451.11 248.86
148.60 402.50
325.80 297.50 214.41 1 531.68
242.83 290.50 395.00 7 479.43
5.N
5.00
2s.00 132.22  650.75 957.52
64.40
415.00
478.12
1 770.49
73.00
98.40
615.05
73.72
970.32
5.00
20.00
53.00  10.00
14.00
200.05
13.72
65.50 426.70
604.7r 676.36 700.85 7 238.75 1566.93 4781.60
lioutce: EEC Directoratsceneral  for Economic and Financial  Affairs;  Directorate  for Studis.
(,') Since 1 April 1964, when the stablishnent of a withholding  td  (Kuponsteutr) on inome from Germm  bonds
i.i:ld by non-isidents  was amounced,  lom in DM isued in Gemmy  by non-rsidents  have been considered  Euo-
t'ond isues s  a very high pacentage  of them hc been subsaibed  by non-rsidents.
(') For 1965, this dci noiindiude  thtltalim trmche of the ENEL  paaltel lom, this being treated as a domstic loan.
('l lncludine  loam  floated bv Comonwealth  comtris.
ii  f"Ouaitg doll* issues ptaed (a) outside  the USA, fb, inside the USA, but subject to the Intaest Equalization
ilu,  and /cI dollr issus *hich may not be sold in the USA: the 8,100 million lom of the Development  Corpora-
tion for Isrd, which  began in 1964, and Cmadian loam are also excluded.
('t) This compiiss isue placed mainly on makets  other than that of the comtry in whose  curency they ile ds
n.ominated, in puticula  the following  :
t\  Dollar isua subject to Interest Equaliation Tx  (lET)
n) DM isua floated  after 1 April 1964 (se Note  1)
ni) Isues with 8/DM md €/DM currency options
ru) Isus in mirs of account
vi  Swiss franc issues floated abroad.
(Gross  totals in I nillion)
360;cl
ECI ol
E EI
931 !61 fr  8l
I o.ol
9:rl
.ial
ul
v6l
i  .9  I
cdl
.YOl
Hl
Jol
hl Hxl
I E  rnl
I  El
o6l A  :I
I
.9;l
iol
<  dl r-l I  bl
I
9=l
:61 oNl
>*l ol
ndl
9"9  1
dtl
-ol
Fel
iol
2)l
ool 991
&l '61
I
c:ol
v--l
r  Fl
Hql ol
d?l
Fal
6..  Il
u  >  :  dl
e8  8;l ha  Esl
Es oi.ql
.:>5  12E-l
=58  6_91
",n.5  E{El
iiu  ;isl I.e.g *a"l
.qgs d3,gH I
siF€sr€l
o A
\o
i- d./
@
t^
J'- l6
lF- l'
T- lq
| ..1
t6
I
O  do.tr-OO(oc\tQ q  aSq-1 \qnq N  coo+i+(.)O\c.l h  $FRS:388
ei +  | | | l+++
Nnd.i*OlN
\cl=.:q=-:-1 \
hO.@O\\Ol"+ ro\OO@Ln  @ s3d  O
EEeqeq +U.)\o\oc\\o 9-o.K*
+++++++
/ii <
6
F.
cO  O\ t-- (O cq  a c.l  +ali*  o i  RsSR N n  F-f-c.l+
.i-j
E  8$b3
a-  r- 6..i o. t- cn  \o@\oc\
e  N-l-
E  EEEq n  +H.+O\ r-  s**R
rn r\
6n
ns ot e'l
;-xY6  6
$F*g si 885 e  +t.;
N6 x gs $8"
".8 * o.s
x  :_i:  x
o  00o  6
NN
co  *  c.)
E  E  E88qE g  S  E$HRH
o@ (ov
c\|
k o
-
P
*
!rn
:J  \O {l
\o id
hl  \-
v,\  O
l\  .:
a9
€
ba
SJ
q)
FS
(.) 6  t''-+\OO 6  @oof)
c.;  r; o+r; +  F- \O  O.l
NN E€
I.o lr t'.. lg
lco
cO
r; ro
OF-
FF o\ ca
d
a
a
13-
Ao .eB
#9
a
d
;
aO
c..l
el
(.) 8 R8R8€
ri r; <.i od c.i G
@rnFhi
cjrni(oeolej \OO\iOeF\..-
o++r-..odd+ \ONO\O\Oim ii(\  i  t)
O
rq
rr.1
\o
$6- ov
@ F
c.)
ai
ct
ot
@ q
cO rn
9  R  fiR$€$
H g  $I;RRR
olo\o\(.)o\c\N \O O eil t  C\ I-- F-
cjo+:edt.; tf,F-aqi@ii
A
r
tr
s  3  88303 3  N  Kh$Rb
+  d  (\Hni
oorono  F-
Gl Ci Ca 6 c.l  u1
8  3  SSBS
s  s  ri R$N
a q.!E
I  =+ +9tr
d,::  q
6E_g
!l!
.RXT H-E
HK
E
!,.
efiF -82 E't o?q -o;..o 98ts
Y= aEx
=xv 5-c
>i.i
<.o
\O C{  Cil  O oqoq a  vl
++  \o  co c\|ro  *
c\l
EE.C  E r:  .9-E  i V  EFA r !.H E€i:  F F  E ei:  '='E Ei  E
.EsgE#iH t nE;ssEEs
d
rt
36rh
Y a
h
-
z
6
$
a
*o  o\  s  (o  \o  *  @ gOr@\OtnF\6tt-
oF-(ooF\\oF-
du.)i@\O@eOOHF-u.)f)@
^i  od c.i r;  r;  <j  c.i  6i  t-  -i  r-  r;  o.  + ln  o\  @  N  o  (\l  @  N  ol  ca  H  ol  i  o.l iio\of\Fr
ll1  .+  tq  c.)
d]\oqoqga
F839N  R
ol
o
(o
@
(\l
u1
d
N
F
o\ n
N +
+
(O .+
al
t)
ol
otnoroo orool\oo
ciddci<j F\  ts  !i'  (\l  rn rq6l@o\o\
\o\o(o
(.)
GI
ot
+ ol
a (a
6l
.:
s
q
.€eqaol-q s- 6I  O\  rO  @  f.. \3 0l  t\  co  o.l
rr
a
b{dl  I  q  a  9  a ENESSRs
Fq  A  A  -1 a  d'l
Sd.f@\OC{O
\(\  Ol  Ol  d  (\l  Ol
o+ocoo rn(.)6l+O
6i+r;dd; O\  (\l  F.  F.  O\ O*OF.cO \Orn+
Eoo\o6o.l *roOOiOOFr EF-+oi<to'o SO(c)roro\o(.) oivhh 6*  g.1 r+  qe)
!
Oa
-s
*s
t\
t_rl .s
:JE ;(s lr  ,o
*
B
\
tr
L
8i..,\oo\oo\rn e.i6i+$6r_.er.; (q  N  OI  O.l  i  (\l  C-.1  CI
H
O(f)cooo\rn6l@
r-  c.i  ri  F..  t-.  r-  dt  r; F-6lO1  6l€6ldO.l \o
o\
O
EI
EEEDAA 6lF-@\O@O\ +r..)Gli006l o\+@rarn
*t.)ol
o60C\oo u1  (e)+6lO@
OlrooO\OF- rnC\lF.d+Ol +d(\lrn\O
*(oo.l
6I@OO\O6l \O\OOF-OO\
F--toritooi *(.)iF63 f'.@O*t1
(nc\lot
-es g- €E€
sEgsflI
h  Erg" Ep  bEE
$EgEfl3
E'e
YP <:
>r
e
O
352TABLE 18
Analysis of net yturchases of fixed-interest securities (1)
Germany
Enterprises,  households  and
open-end investment funds
Non-residents
Local authorities
Social insurance institutions
Insurance  companies  and pen-
sion funds
Banks and specialized  credit
institutions
Total
France
Enterprises, households
Non-residents  ('!)
Central government  and local
authorities
Social insurance institutions
Banks and specialized  credit
institutions
Caisse  des ddp6ts  et consigna-
tions, savings banks
Investment companies
Regional development cornPa-
1lles
Insurance  companies
Total
Italy
Enterprises,,  households  and
non-resldents
Insurance  companies
Social insurance institutions
Cassa Depositi e Prestiti  and
post offrce savings banks
Banks and specialized  credit
institutions
gm' 
I
*...-  I "t
1960 t961 1962
Per cent
1963 1964 t965 Aver-
age
908.09 30.3
178.15  29.7
70.95  7.9
327.76 20.2
237.51 15.6
802.00 --3.7
26.5 29.8
3.4  7.6
5.2  1.6
9.6  15.5
7.3  9.4
48.0 36.1
32.5 45.0
16.8 --{.9
3.7  1.9
10.1 10.7
7.3  8.8
29.6 34.5
43.7 36.0
0.8  7.r
0.3  2.9
16.4 13.0
70.4  9.2
28.4 31.8
2518.46 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1069.10 55.5 56.5 56.7 72.8 71.4 72.8 66.4
6.7r
98.89
1.95
68.60
365.43
0.5
9.6  8.2
0.4
4.8  9.3
28.6 25.4
0.4  0.5
5.1  l.+
0.2  0.2
1.7  5.0
0.5  0.4
1.9  6.0
0.1
6.5  4.3
0.6
9.2
0.1
--3.4
9.7  17.5 18.3 22.8
9.5
1 610.68 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
38.0
728.93
40.67
129.34
238.72
942.69
63.5 26.8 31.3
3.8  3.7  t.9
3.3  7.7  5.8
1.8 10.3 30.6
27.6 52.1 30.4
19.8 39.5 35.0
0.7  7.1  1.9
15.8 0.2  6.2
19.5 0.1  1.1
44.2 59.1 55.8
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total 2 080.35
363TABLE 18 (cont.)
Per cent
\letheilands  (3)
Enterprises,  households,  banks
Specialized credit institutions,
open-end investment  funds,
non-residents  (a)
S,ccial insurance  institutions
Pension  funds
L:ife assurance
Postal giro services
Postal savings banks
General savings banks
Building societies
Agricultural savings banks
Toral
Belgium  (5)'
Errterprises,  households,  open-
end investment  funds, non-
residents
Lr:cal authorities
Social insurance institutions
Fonds des rentes
SaLvings banks and mortgage
comparues
Insurance  companies  and pen-
slon luncls
Banks. ald specialized credit
lnstltutlons
Total
275.81 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
148.9t  33.0 43.1 63.1
8.7  10.2
20.5  6.4
1,.1 -J.2
3.6  7.4
2.9  9.4
17.7 17.1
0.5
1.9 -5.4
36.4 113.8
J.J  1.5
19.7 --:3.4
2.7 -12.5
3.3  2.4
3.3  0.1
14.5 -4.2
16.8  4.7
54.0
6.3
14.4
0.1
2.9
7'7
LJ.O
0.1
4.9
17.23 5.8
39.67 21.1
u.Jb  6.5
7.89  2.9
10.29 4.0
37.58 16.9
0.33  0.2
13.5s 10.0
181.20 44.0
7.20  6.5
0.80  0.7
s.60  8.6
33.20 12.2
85.20 27.3
81.20 0.7
50.7 35.2
0.9  1.8
--0.9 --2.2
I.J  J.J
s.3  12.3
13.2 1L9
29.5 37.7
14.8  86.7
1.8 ---0.6
-t.z 
o-r
3.6 -8.9
24.4 -11.1
40.8  25.0
2.8 15.8
100.0
45.9
1.8
0.3
1.4
8.4
21.6
20.6
394.40 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sowes,: Gerruny:  Montlrly Report of the Deutsche Bundebmk, April  1966. FruM?Comotf  de la Nation.  Italv: Armual repo_r*-bf thr Bnica &rtatia.  Netherraia":  Mainasia*ti-& u'"lifffr""iiji*.;;ffiil;6ol,;e'"ffiiiJ
lepgrtg 9f tlre Nedqlandsche  F/mk. Belgium: Brdletin d'irfomation er de domentation "f 
i-trJ sinquJNationJe
de Belgique,  Mry 1966.
(!) Unl6s  shown othwise, puchas  of domestic or foreign ordinary bonds, mortgage  bonds md convertible  deben- r*r€s offered for public.su6s-aiption.or placed lri"n.tyifia;di";,  fi-c;;;t;F1;;ini"rumuoug,  p*.u*"s of medim-tm  seorities  at fixed inteffit).
fl  F"^,:-$  leue  available is tbat for total puchue of seguitieg in Fmce by non-rsidents. In the ..Comptes
o€ la Natron -'_this figue was taken to reprsent puchma of bonds. (r) ody sffiiries  offered for public subsiption.  -
Q th:  itf-  " householctl,  egte_rpriq9r,-  bmics, specialired  cedit institutiotr,  open-end  investmtrt  fmds and non- rNdtrts " bd been elcdated  by deducting the total puchms of institution-al invstors from total domestic and fg.r{en-isus offered for pubtic iubmiptiorion  the doniestic  rr-t"i  torii ijg,iil  p"6iitill,ati'
(r) Public-*ctor issua only.
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Net domestic  issues of medium-  and
$ million
Germany
Federal Government  and Linder
Local authorities (2)
Finrrncial  institutions  (3)
Putrlic enterprises ({)
Prirrate enterprises
Total
Fratee
Cerrtral government
Local authorities  (6)
Financial institutions  (6)
Put'lic enterprises (?)
Prirrate enterprises
Total
Ital,v
Cerrtral government  and local autho-
nues
Instirutions issuing for account  of the
T'reasury  (8)
Other financial  institutions  (o)
Put'lic enterprises (ro)
Prirzate enterorises
Total
Netberlanils
Cerrtral goverrment
Local authorities (r1)
Mortgage banks
Specialized  credit institutioru (tr)  )
Private  and semi-public  instirutions I
Norr-profit-makin! institutioru I
139.96
232.02
617.93
145.31
-89.62
1 045.60
-226.86
- 
14.18
287.62
190.40
328.13
565.11
195.68
63.M
720.N
41.44
307.84
1 328.00
159,60
178.68
n.26
41.58
410.12
298.00
84.00
- 
8.00
156.00
- 
14.00
10.00
290.93
464.n
| 029.35
190.75
25.12
2 000.35
166.09
30.38
415.22
220.78
354.47
t58.72
463.20
1204.32
402.27
147.90
2376.41
s06.38
16.20
526.63
253.19
279.52
1581.92
-fi4.n
273.60
1213.44
96.00
329.60
| 738.24
83.98
223.23
270.W
128.00
38.00
170.00
20.00
64.00
690.00
13.10
4t2.45
639.75
| 466.62
4r0.75
85.80
3 015.37
t 124.16
30.38
63r.96
350.41
267.37
2404.28
- 
320.00
206.40
1292.N
440.00
150.40
1963
I 768.80
135.25
110.50
39.78
- 
4.97
280.56
102.00
62.N
32.N
104.00
34.00
62.ffi
$3.n,
751.50
1735.02
334.50
83.52
3 337.76
698.80
34.43
9W.46
368.64
768.12
204.02
158.00
104.00
86.00
44.00
- 
10.00
60.00
r 186.94
- 
12.80
228.80
893:28
184.00
?20.80
1 514.08
10.74
48.62
19.34
14.92
93.62
120.00
78.00
42.ffi
196.00
28.00
16.00
480.00
45.99
55.80
36.46
2179.45
112.00
254.40
r 175.20
758.40
52.80
2352.80
4.30
79.28
82.32
38.12
Belgium
CenLtral  government
Local authorities (rs)
Indr:pendent  funds f)
Financial institutions  (r5)
Public enterprises (1s)'
Pril'ate enteiprises'
Lux:embourg
EEC
I Otal
Total
Total
Total
526.N
6.10
396.00 442.ffi
4.10
N. Il.  For Notes  and Sources  see p. 368.
36(i
3 880.93 s273.W 6 622.90 7 863.31 I520.1320
long-term fxed-interest  securities (1)
Per cent
486.12
27.68
6s3.23 
I
318.34 
l
2s8.e3 
I
1744.30 
i
I e.68 
I
304.64  I
| 074.5e 
I
401.31 
|
201.97 
i
lrrrJ, 
)
I
6e.s3 
|
105.93 |
43.72 
I se.37 
I
,?855 
|
I
2r3.00
105.66 |
34.00 
|
140.47 
|
qc.ii 
I
s4zo1 
I
I
s62 
I
?olL:n 
l
539.69
798.08
1 478.15
159.60
90.80
3 066.32
648.10
68.88
1148.47
526.63
155.96
2 s48.10
257.60
801.60
| 153.62
888.00
150.40
3 251.22
182.60
45().78
330.00
178.00
14.00
172.80
- 
14.00
67.32
329.17
558.12
L 255.23
273.86
57.25
2 473.63
13.4
22.2
59.1
13.9
- 
8.6
100.0
- 
40.1
- 
2.6
50.9
33.7
58.1
100.0
1,4.7
4.7
54.2
3.1
23.3
14.5
23.2
51.5
9.5
l-J
100.0
14.o
2.5
35.0
18.6
29.9
6.7
19.5
50.7
16.9
6.2
1962 1963
13.7
21.2
48.6
13.6
2.9
100.0
44.7
I.J
26.3
14.6
11.7
- 
18.1
100.0
48.2
39.4
14.2
- 
1.8
100.0
100.0
1965
100.0
25.4
2.7
45.1.
20.7
6.7
100.0
100.0
13.1
35.4
11.8
39.7
100.0
M.l
23.8
1.9
23.7
- 
1.9
9.0
100.0
Annual
average
100.0
27.9
1.7
37.4
18.2
14.8
100.0
+ 0.6
15.3
53.9
tn1
10.1
100.0
100.0
38.9
19.3
6.2
25.7
1A
8.5
IJ.J
22.6
50.7
11.1
2.3
17.6
26.0
48.2
5.2
3.0
13.9
22.5
52.0
10.0
2.6
100.0
- 
10.0
15.7
69.8
5.5
19.0
100.0
21.O
25.0
16.3
37.7
100.0
39.1
18.6
5.5
24.6
2.9
9.3
100.0
100.0
32.1
l.o
47.7
16.9
7.7
100.0
JJ. I
23.5
19.5
10.0
- 
2.3
lJ-o
32.0
1.0
JJ.J
16.0
17.7
15.1
59.0
12.2
14.6
25.0
38.0
15.7
21.3
4.8
10.8
49.9
32.2
2.3
2.7
38.8
40.3
18.8
11.6
73.0
24.9
8.6
100.0
38.9
43.6
a^
10.1
60.33
t62.71
54.74
r t-)
51.9
20.6
16.0
25.8
15.6
8.1
26.3
8.6
15.6
14.00 
I
10 0s?54 
I
25.0
16.2
8.7
40.8
5.8
3.5
367Notes and Sowces for Table 20
Sources: Germany: Monthly reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Franee: Rapports  annuels du
Conseil Nationaf  du Cr6dit. Italv i  Annu l reports and Bulletin of the Banca d'italia. Netherlands:
Annual reports of the Nederlairdsche Banl<.- Belgium: Bulletin d'information et de documenta-
tion of the Banque Nationale  de Belgique.  Rapports annuels de la Commission  Bancaire. Bulletin
Statistique of the Institut National  de la Statistiqte. Luxembourg: SOIC.
(1) OnJy public issues by residents of member  countries on their home market, including  bonds
isiued ciniap, mortgage'bonds,  medium-term securities (medium-term notes and certificat-es  (bons
de caisse) and Treasury bonds) with a currency of one year and over in Germany  and Belgium,
18 rnonths in ltaly, and two years in the other countries.
(') Includes direct issues by local authorities and issues of communal bonds, part of which is
used to finance  building.
(3) lvledium-term notes and certificates and mortgage bonds.
(r) Irederal Post Oflice and Federal Railways.
(5) l{ot including the communal bonds of the Crddit Foncier de France, no net ligure for
which is available. Gross issues averaged $ 37.81 m. a year in the period from 1960 to 1965.
(5) Orddit National,  Cr6dit Foncier and Caisse Nationale de Crddit  Agricole.
(?) ['oste et Tilicommunications,  Socidt6  Nationale des Chemins  de Fer Frangais, Electricitd et
Gaz de France, Charbonnages de France, Caisse Nationale  des Autoroutes.
(8) Issues of the Consorzio  di Credito per le Opere  Pubbliche  (CCOP) to finance railways, the
Grem Plan (for agricultural developmenQ, ANAS (Azienda  Autonorna delle Strade Statali, or
highway  service), etc.
(0) I'ublic boards, " people's banks ", ordinary credit banks and first-category pawnbrokers.
(r0) IRI (Istituto per la Ricostruzione  Industriale),  ENEL (Ente per I'Energia Elettrica) and ENI
(Ent,: Nazionale  ldrocarburi).
(u) Provinces, communes and the Bank voor Nederlandsche  Gemeenten.
(1') llhe only available breakdown is for gross issues. The 1960-65 annual average  is (in $ million)  :
Specialized  credit institutions  8.14
Privrte and semi-public  enterprises  55.37
Non-profit-making  institutions  7.28
Miscellaneous  3.86
'Iotal 74.65
(12) Provinces, communes and Crddit communal de Belgique.
(ra) Itoad fund.
(15) Siociitd Nationale de Crddit i  I'Industrie,  Caisse Nationale de Crddit Professionnel, Institut
National de Crddit Agricole,  Office Central de Crddit Hypothdcaire,  miscellaneous  building so-
cietir:s,  private mortgage companies, banks and savings banks.
(18) Siocidtd  Nationale  des Chemins de Fer Belges, Socidtd Nationale  des Chemins  de Fer Vicinaux,
Sociriti Nationale de Distribution des Eaux, SABENA, RTT and various inter-communal  companies.
368TABLE 21
Tap issues of medium- and long-term fxed-interest  securities
Cermany
Mortgage bonds
(Pfandbriefe)
Communal bonds
Medium-term  notes
and certilicates
Total
France
Three- or five-year
Treasury bonds.
Five-year certifi cates of
the Caisse Nationale
de Crddit Agricole
Total
Italy
Mortgage bonds (Car-
telle fondiarie)
Medium-term  deposit
certificates issued  by
banks and public
credit institutions
Total
Netherlanils
Mortgage bonds
(Pandbrieven)
Five-year Treasury
bonds
Total
Belgium
Mortgage bonds
Medium-term  certifi-
cates of the Crddit
Comrnunal
Other medium-term
deposit certificates
Total
$m. Percentage of total net domestic issues
889.83 50.7
548.96  21..5
164.30 12.9
41.3
23.3
3.5
38.3
18.6
4.5
30.8  33.1 33.4
21.5  22.0 25.1,
2.8  11.6  6.5
36.0
22.2
6.6
1 603.09
485.45
254.87
85.1 68.1 61.4 55.1  66.7 65.0 64.8
20.2  11.3 r2.4
26.8 43.0 26.9 24.6  27.8
15.7 19.4  14.7
29.9
10.4
740.32
386.64 16.4  24.3
67.71 4.6  4.7
25.9  27.6  16.3 12.7  19.4
20.2 38.1 55.4 39.5  42.6 44.0  42.5
3.4 3.7 1.6 2.9 3.7
454.35 21.0  29.0 29.6  30.5  17.9
76.3  r4.2  40.3
32.3 - 
11.4 -24.4
76.4  22.8
11.8  15.7
rf-l
43.71
- 
0.06
7.4  20.7
0.6 - 
67.0
43.65 8.0 -  46.3 48.6 2.8 26.9
3.3
15.7
3.6
r9.9 11.0  16.2
72.7 13.4  22.7
15.9
3.8 4.9 4.6 20.10  3.1
89.00 19.0
t20.71 21.3
19.6 17.2
26.2 33.3
2.0
13.2
25.2
36.2 27.7  42.1
Sorce: Sec Table  20
229.81 43.7 50.4 55.4 40.4
369TABLE 22
Issues of uariable-yield  securities  (1)
(in I  nillhn)
| 
^rr"."*. I 
1e604s
l
7  653.0
I  803.4
I  814.6
67.6
148.6
65.6
2552.8
Soures:.  Germny: Monthly  reports of the Deutsche Bmdabmk. France: Rapport mnuel du Corcil National  du
Crtdit. Italy: Amud reports of the Bme d'ltalia. Netherlands:  Annual relDrts of the Nedslandscbe  Bar*, Belgium:.
Bulletin d'infomtion  et d$mentation  of tbe Banque Nationale  de Belgique.  Lmtnbourg: Genelal  Statistical Buuedn
of tbe Statistical Oftce of the Europcan  Communities,
(r) Sums actually paid up, Isues of convertible debentures are shown  in a separate table and are not iucluded in
tbtxe 6gures,
370T,{BLE 23
Market ualue of uariable-yield securities (t)
(in 8 '000 nillion)
Country
Germany
France
Italy
Netherlands
Belgium
UK C)
USA
EEC e)
24.6
17.5
6.5
7.9
24.2
21.8
10.5
8.4
23.0
20.9
20.8
10.0
9.0
4.7
22.2
20.0
7.4
9.9
4.9
19.5
18.7
9.3
9.4
4.2
21.7
20.3
8.4
8.8
4.5
18.6
7.2
8.0
4.2
56.5 64.9 61.0 65.4 54.4  61.1 63.7
218.4  172.2
537.s  410.6
142.8
307.0
140.0
387.8
154.0
34s.8
168.0
411.3
2r0.0
474.3
Sou.tes-:-Germny:  Wirtrchaft md Statistik. Frarce: Rapports muels du Conseil National du Cr6dit. ltatyr Ban-
aria. Nethetlqn^ : Maandstatisdek vm het Financieweren.  Belgiuw:  Commision de la Bouse de Bruelles,  Unr'red
Kingdom-:  Statistics  relatirg  to Secuities  quoted on the London  Stocls Exchmge (for the year ending  31 Mrch 1966).
United  Stotes : Survev of Cunmt Buins.
(r) The maket tlu.  n**.,  have  been mtablished, with due regard  to the nmber of securities  listed,  on the bmis
of the 6rst pria quoted (cah  dealings) at the lst  stck xchmge  resion of the y*.  For the EEC countries  they
mbrace only the secuities  of the comtry conmed,  but for the united Kingdom  md the United  States the 6guei
take in all semitie listed on the stock exchanges. The figues covc secuities  listed  on the following stck exchmges  :
in Gemany,  all stock  exchangs scept Berlin, in Frmce, the Pdis stock  exchange, in Italy, all stock exchmges, in
the Netherlmds, the Amterdm stock  *change, in Belgim,  the Brcls  stock exchange, md in the United  Stats
the New York StGk  Exchmge.
e) Not including Luemboug, no fgures  being available.
(r) For the United Kingdom,  the only figurc available {e  those on the aggr€gate  market value of all fxed-interst
md vaiable-yield seffities.  In Mrch 1966 the milket value of the vuiable-yield  secuities was abo* 72 o/o of the total.
371TABLE 24
Assets of inuestment companies (open-end  and closed-end)
Sowes : Germny  : Monthlv reDorts of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Frunte : Amvire de l'msociation  des socidt€s frm-
caises d'investis6mmt for i960, 1961,  7962, For 1963 md 1964 infomation  supplied direcdy by this rsociation.  Ne-
ihqhnds: Mmdstatistiek  van het Fimncieweren.  Net assets have been calcrrlated from  the balance sheets by subtracting
fron total asts tbe  items (debentwe  lom, sundry creditors,  dividends  to bq paid) md alrc capital
rot paid up. Bel2ium: Fiappons muels de la Comision Bmaire, Lwembourg: 7960-1962: Etude fioancidres,  Kre-
dietbank,  December  1964.  The fgures for 1963 md 1964; Banque Intmtionale,  Luembourg.
(t) lbe Sgura refer to the 10 main Dutch fmd&
(') the fgwe for 1960 to 1962 concern 6 funds, those for 1963 nd  7964 refer to 11 funds.
(in E million)
372TABLE 25
Gross issues of conuertible  bonds (1)
Germany  ('2)
France
Italy
Netherlands
Belgium (r)
30.38
19.47
o.t2
26.33
26.80
80.00
6.30
106.88
22.28
136.00
21.55
28.26
(in I  millionl
67.50
81.02
24.00
42.54
16.3r
18.22
L4.W
1.44
4.05
Total (3) 49.97 33.75 53.13 90.35 314.97  231.37
Soures : Germny : Ds Bcirsenbild 1966, Deutsche  Bnk, Frane:  Rapport  mnuel du Comeil National du Cr6dit, 1965.
Irall : Annual report of the Bmca d'Italia, 1964. Netherlands: Annual  reports  of the Nederlandrche  Bank. Belgium:
Figures supplied dirady by the Comision  Bmcaire.
(r) The total of net isues ennot be calculated since in most of the member  countrie there  are no statistiG relating
to bonds onverted into shares or to the value of bonds not so converted  that have ban redeemed.
O Excluding isus placed privately.
(t) Excluding Luembourg, no figurc being available.
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31',4TABLE 27
Inuestments of hf, assLffance companies
Investments
I.  Breakilown of assets at the
end oJ 1964
A. Total assets, gmillion
B. As o/o of total  :
Shares
Fixed-interest  securities
Mortgage loans
Loans on policies
Other claims  and loans
Balances with banks and
elsewhere
Participations
Real estate
Ger-
many
France
6394  2792
4.5  14.9
21.8 e)  64.0
24.8  3.3
1.7  0.9
35.0  7.8
Italy Nether-
lands
Bel-
gium UK USA
1292 22212 r49 470 I 351  3 518
3.0
27.0  6.0
3.0  27.3
2.9  0.8
14.0  53.2
4.0
6.3
42.8
22.5  5.3
43.1  25.5
17.3  36.9
4.8
20.0
6.7
4.5
10.4  3.0
6.0
48.2
28.3
3.2
r.7
3.7 (',)
0.7
I r.f 8.5  8.9 9.1
Total
II. Auerage  annual increase  in
assets of EEC life assurdnce
companies in relation to cer-
tain economic aggregates  (3)
A. Total in g per head of
populauon
B. As /o of gross domestic
capital  formation
100.0 100.0
IZ.J
2.9
100.0 100.0  100.0
4.7
t.4
2.5  2r.6  10.7
100.0 100.0
3.7 7.4 T,2
Sorrces: European  Insuance  Committee;  SOEC General  Statistical  Bulletin, Germany:  Monthlv Reoorts of the Deutsche
Bundesbank.  Frante: Statistiques  et Etudes FinmciCres:  Rapport  du Ministdre  de liEconomie et ds Finances  sur I'acti-
vite des societ€s d'asuances et de capitalisation. frary : Report of the Bmca d'Italia.  Netheiqnds  : Maandstatistiek  van
het fnmciewezen,  Belgium: Bulletin  d'information  et de documentation  of the Banque  Nationale de Belgique.
(r) Including claims on Equalization  Fund.
(') Foreign  securities,
Q _Av-eragj for 1960-1965  for Gemmy,  7960-7964  for France, 7960-1964  for Italy, 7960-1963  for Netherlands,  1960-
1964 for Belgim.TABLE
Germanv  |  ,r**  I l-] 7e5e I  reu I  1e5e |  1e64 
I
Netherlands  (')
Invstments
t959 1959 |  1964
Liqrid assets (r)
Tre,rsury bills
Bills
Secuities
Short- md medim-tem
Ioam (r)
Loans to local authorities
Mortgage  loms
Other long-term loms
Oths  assets
Total sets
Liquid  assets (t)
Tremuy bills
Bills
Seoritie
Short- md medium-term
lom (r)
Loans to local authorities
Mortgage  loaro
Odrer long-term  loans
Other asts
23 780.33 5 552,1J
20n.64
388.02 e)
1 418.48
7 368.76
936.50
2809.26
639.79
1 949.ss e)
11.8
8.1
24.3
76.9
3 570.72
0.15
u0.97
3 135.15
2756.67
2077.10
6 845.90
1 461.10
2752.57
1 18.19
901.15
840.31
50.43
3123.U
e.15 C)
4U.04
25.32
2.7
16.2
15.1
0.9
o.2
8.7
tr-f,
152.79
7 975.23
1 683.11
427.87
6 434.33
18.88 f)
518.41
139.70
7.3
77.O
74.9
3.7
57.0
0.3
4.6
1.2
1 090.35
2.4
482.64
916.12
@2.85
407.34
268.43
71.37
s08.60
4 335.10
25.2
0.1
11.1
22.2
73.9
9.4
6.2
0.2
77.7
7 269.86
214.U
874.N
z Jz),)o
1 508.17
920.33
738.31
31.27
7 063.79
a 946.53
74.2
)r'.
9.8
26.O
76.9
10.3
8.3
o.2
11.9
22.34
41.79
615.16
7.84
396.45
7?0.74
787.79
29.63
48.92
50.39
917.13
20.22
586.,10
295.19
545.19
77.02
2534.46
$ mil
As o/o of
7.9
2.O
36.2
0.8
23.2
77.6
27.5
2.8
71.9
on
29.5
6.5
11.8
100.0 
|
l.o
2.9
43.3
u.5
27.9
8.5
13.2
2.7
Total  assets 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sowe : World  Thrift: special isue for the cmgres  of Mrch/April  1%6 aranged by the International  Savings Banks Institute
1r1 Local, post oftce,  State or centrd savings  banks.
C) Cash in hmd, postd  cheque accout md bank balancm (including compulrcry minimm reserves)'
(r) To entemrises  and individuals.
i"i Itauainri  chcqus  and bills for collction,  intetest  coupons and dividend wdrmts due-
i.i  tnOuainE  trurimitted aedits:  1959, $685.43 million; 1964, $138.32  million.
100.0 100.0 100.0
37628
and their central institutions (*)
Belgium Luxembourg
1959 7964 1959 L9g 7959 t964
Iion
O.JJ
86.00
754.73
137.45
35.e1 o
695.52
26.54
24.OO
37.74
I J.Za
843.39
69.95
31.29 (1)
I 043.40
296.61(3)
747.66
8.44
JJ.If,
44.43
10.83
24.87
6t.74
3.70
13.83
68.49
89-78
2.86
33.34
1 056.10
39.01
44.17
3 273.37
2 263.67
903.81
4 633.63
2178.76
4 924.97
3 964.84
7 348.97
2 540.80
5 052.74
7 627.63
8 948.51
4 790.65
10 177.94
9 037.46
2852.58
10.4
4.6
J.J
18.3
9.8
20.8
18.5
f,.d
6.5
46.2Q
2740.36 (to)
734.16
35.84
J 550.50
70.28
3 791.76 (rc)
829.7
72 433.8  (tt)
367.2 gt'1
24783.7
553.8
11 280.e e)
739.9 (e)
&328.5
885.9
7 765.94 2 679.69 297.48 2482+.53
4171.00
48856.72
1464.96
66.08
5 393.08
70.3
38 961.1 54 237.8
dssets
o.4
4.9
7.8
7.9
39.4
1.5
7.4
1,.4
a)
2.8
32.2
2.7
1.2
39.8
77.3
5.4
4.5
77.7
23.7
5.8
33.0
2.O
11.4
73.4
1< )
4.7
23.5
30.8
1.0
73.2
J.O
18.7
8.8
19.8
16.0
5.4
10.3
0.9
63.6
7.4
74.4
l.J
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(6) Onty the Alsace-Lonaine  savings banks.
(6) The trgures  refer to savings  banks included in the register of credit institutiom and to six communal savings banks. Not included  re
savings  institutions closely  connected with commercial banks.
(?) Including  provincial  md commmal  bonds  not included mder " Secuities ".
(6) Of which industrial loans, 9220 million.
(0) 20 November  1959 and 20 November  1964.
(r0) Of which  deposited with the National Debt Comissioners  : 1959,  N2418.64  million; 1964,  $2 808.68 million.
(rr) Of which shares : 1959, 3813.5 million ot 2.7 o/o of the assets;  7964, 81 258.6 million or 2.3 o/" of the assets.
(1') All other  loans md dedits not secured by mortgage.
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oTABLE 30
Lending and security inuestments (t) of specialized  institutions (2) (r)
Lending and security
investments
Oermdny
I  Credit to :
P'ublic authorities  ({)
-- Short-term
-- Medium-term
-- Long-term
Ilusiness  (5)
-- Short-term
-- Medium-term
*- Long-term
Other financial irutitutions
-- Short-term
-- Medium-term
-- Long-term
Il[ Securities
\rariable-vield
Fixed-int6rest
Per cent
1960 1961 1962 7963 796/,
$
million
Aver-
^ge amount
1960-64
74
Average
percent-
^ge t96G.64
2.3
6.2
45.6
33
3
47t
7
133
1 079
51
73
391
1.5
0.2
22.0
- 
r3.7
9.0
52.5
1.2
0.9
24.6
2.4 -2.8 r.3  0.4 20.1  tt.3
t.6
25.4
3.5
1.5
0.1
20.9
3.7
- 
0.9
23.8
1.5
0.4
17.6
2.6 3.8
1.9
5.8
4s.5
4.1
3.9  r.t
4.6  s.3
54.s  44.6
1.7  1.7
0.7 - 
0.2
2t.9  t7.0
4.3  2.3
7.2  0.6
10.6  17.4
0.2
5.9
47.8
1.t
0.2
t.6
Itrance
I  Credit to :
Public authorities (r)
-- Medium- and long-term
Industry and commerce
-- Short-term
-- Medium-term
-- Long-term
Iluilding and construction
-- Medium-term
-- Long-term
.Agriculture
-- Medium-term
-- Long-term
IL Securities
!'ariable-yield  ) Fixed-int6rest  I
Total 2255 100.0
0.9
55.3
- 
0.3
32.2
1.4
100.0
1.6  1.7
-7.5  -9.2  - 
1.0
7s.4  17.0  20.5
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1.8 4.4 2.6 28
0.7 0.8
100.0
6.6
36.2
0.6
4.0
33.0
3.8
33.0
0.6
26
-Jt 206
52
400
50
393
2.5
3.2
- 
4.3
20.4
3.r
31.7
3.0
o.7
17.4
2.5
2.3
-3.3 18.3
7.3  4.6
26.7  35.s
5.4  4.5
36.9  34.9
4.9
46.2
33.2
0.7
380
Total 1 072 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0TABLE j0 (cont.)
Lending and security
investments
Inly
I Credit to :
Public authorities (a)
-  Short-term
-  Medium-term
-  Long-term
Industry
-  Short-term
-  Medium-term
-  Long-term
Building and construction
-  Medium- and long-term
Agriculture
-  Short-term
-  Medium- and long-term
II Securities
Variable-yield
Fixed-interest
Total
Belgium
I Credit to:
Public authorities  (a)
-  Short-term
-  Medium-term
-  Long-term
Industry and commerce
-  Short-term
-  Medium-term
-  Long-term
Agriculture
-  Short-term
-  Long-term
Housing
-  Short-term
-  Long-term
II  Securities
Variable-yield
Fixed-interest
Securities  not classified
$
million
Aver-
age
amount
r960-64
Per cent
1960 196t 1962 1963 t964
2.2  0.4
-  1.1  1.6
18.2  23.5
- 2.2  0.6
6.0  4.0
38.6  30.9
28.2  28.9
Average
Percent-
^ge 1960-64
2.3  5.1
J. t  J.+
6
22
339
8
58
445
417
70
50
2.0  2.7
1.4  2.3
36.2  23.0
2.9 - 
0.7
3.5  2.9
19.7  27.9
23.4  29.6
- 2.5 - 
0.9
4.0  0.9
25.0  19.8
- 0.1  3.8
2.8  4.7
29.9  33.5
28.7  32.7
4.9
3.5
0.5
1.2
0.9  1.0
2.0  2.8 18
9.0
z-+
0.4
0.4
2.0
3.5
4.4
3.4
u.5
1.8
7Ml 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
71,
t73
0.7  8.0
2.8 - 
0.4
37.7  37.1
v.t 0.8  s.0 44.7 3s.9
0.5 -0.2 1.9  3.7
8.4 -2.3 1.6  2.6
34.8  42.6
J.f,  3. t
4.4  2.3
41.5  38.9
3.0  3.5
0.9  0.9
6.2  6.3
0.8  0.1
I
I
5
120
1
72
9
7
1
6 ,
1n
- 
0.7
32.0
7.7
6.3
3.7
0.4
1.2 -  1.3  0.3
3.6  0.6  1.8
48.9  44.4  41.2
4.5
2.7
- 
0.5
1.5  0.3
7.9 - 4.7 - 3.4  2.2
0.8  0.1  3.6  1.3
0.4
4.2
3.0
0.4
0.1
4.8
1.9
0.6
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total 291 100.0 100.0
381Notes and Sources for Table j0
Soures:  Germany: Monthly Reports of the Deutsche Bundsbank.  Frane: F.apport du Conseil  National  du Cr6dit.
Inrly: Report and Bulletin of the Banca d'Italia. Belgium:  Bulletin d'infomation et de docmentation  of the Banque
Nadonde  de Belgique and balance sheets of the institutions in qustion.
(rlf Excluding all other asrets.
(2'j Eor Germany the following  are covered  : public  and private  mortgage  banks,  instalment credit irutitutiom, and ottrs
iiaialized  credit institutions.  For Frarce: Cr6dit National, Crddit Foncier  de France,  Caisses de Cr6dit Agricole,  Caise
dr: Consolidation  et de Mobilisation des Cr6dits l  Moyen Terme, Caisc de Cr6dit Coop6ratf Banque Frmgaise du
Commerce Exterieur, md the financial  establishments,  For Italy : Institutions  spaializine  in credit to industry, public
works,  agricultue, md building md construction.  For Belgium:  Soci6t6 Nationale  de Cr6dit e I'Indstrie,  Cr&it Com-
m.mal,  Caisse Nationde  de Crddit  Professionel, Offic Central de Cr6dit  Hypoth6caire,  Institut National  de Cr6dit
Agricole, Sci6t6 Nationale de la Petite Propri6t6  Terrieme.
(3) It has not been posible to draw up corresponding  statistiG for the Netherlands  and Luembowg.
(r) Credit to public authoritis  mainly comists of lom to central govemment  and to local authorities  in all the coun-
tries covered.  Also included  are : aedit to the railways  and post olnce in Germmy  and Italy, md in the latttr comtry
credit extended  in connection with miscellaneous  invctment  sctrems cmied out for accomt of the central govement.
(,jt For Germany it has not been possible  to distinguish between credit  for trade md industry, agriculture and housing.
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8r8r * /5/I/1967 l5
f1.9.0  $4.00  FB 200  FF 20  DM L6  Lit. 2500  Fl. 14.50